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**THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:
CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY APPLICATION.**

VOLUME TWO

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⑪ 11 Apr 76

⑫ 642p.

Research and writing completed June 1972.

⑬ DH

1976

⑭ PRH-525-7-2

DDC
REFORMED
SEP 28 1976
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FOREWORD

This collection of essays has been compiled by AIR using information in the open literature, unclassified government documents, and original contributions. In scope it covers the entire spectrum of military psychological operations (PSYOP). Appropriate consideration is given to related civilian activities as well as to relevant aspects of communication theory. Emphasis is placed on the entire operational field encompassed by such terms as "international communications," "political warfare," "cultural affairs," "psychological operations" (PSYOP), and "psychological warfare."

The editors have sought to illustrate the effective and noneffective uses of PSYOP and to describe the problems encountered and the solutions adopted by military and civilian personnel involved in PSYOP/Information activities during recent decades. Contrasting points of view were deliberately included in the casebook to provide a balanced as well as a general view of the state of the art. Some of the contributions may be considered as controversial, depending on the reader's point of view. Where copyrighted material has been quoted, permission has been obtained for its use.

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PREFACE

AIR, operating under a contract with the Department of the Army, has developed this two-volume anthology in the form of a PSYOP casebook. It has been prepared in response to a request from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This publication has been produced as a part of the overall research program undertaken by the Department of the Army to improve the capability of the United States Army to conduct PSYOP/information programs under a variety of circumstances in many different environments. The major focus of attention has been placed on psychological operations of military relevance, with special emphasis on the types of activities that may confront U.S. personnel in the two decades ahead.

In content, the editors have sought to cover the whole range of U.S. public international communications whether they be described as international information, cultural affairs, or psychological operations, and whether or not they be conducted by members of a military service or personnel of a civilian agency. The editors also have touched upon the ways in which PSYOP is employed elsewhere, with the hope that such material will serve to broaden the American understanding of how others around the world attempt to communicate effectively across cultural barriers and international borders.

COMMUNICATION THEORY AND PSYOP

The science of communication theory is relatively new; more than half of all the research, most of the important books and articles in the field, and most of the great figures in the study of communications have become well known only in the last twenty years. Moreover, increasingly for the last decade and a half it is in the context of communication theory that psychological operations—PSYOP—has been studied. Therefore, these volumes will include several timely essays on communication theory.

ORGANIZATION

The Art and Science of Psychological Operations is an anthology bringing together both original and previously published material. In effect, the essays comprise an analysis of the state of the PSYOP art. Some of them also provide conclusions and recommendations for the future. The individual essays, which are organized into chapters, deal with the nature and scope of PSYOP and communications; national policy and PSYOP; organizational and personnel matters; policy objectives and operational goals in Volume One; and PSYOP intelligence requirements, sources, and methods; social science research (including communication theory) and PSYOP; media, methods, and techniques; evaluation of effectiveness; and foreign ideology and propaganda in Volume Two.

SOURCES

The types of selections that have been incorporated in this casebook include professional and scholarly publications, original contributions, foreign and domestic PSYOP-related material, excerpts from official memoranda and directives, lecture notes, letters, and newspaper items. An attempt has been made to ensure a reasonable geographic coverage by providing examples from all areas of the world. For example, Algeria, Burma, Cameroon, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portuguese Guinea, Taiwan, and Rumania are among the more than 30 countries treated in the text.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

General

The casebook is designed to serve primarily as background information for training in the field of psychological operations and as an introduction to the more important elements and principles of PSYOP. It is intended to serve not only as a point of departure for the uninitiated but also as a useful reference. The use of overly sophisticated material requiring a substantial social science background has been avoided. On the other hand, articles dealing in overly simplistic terms with principles painfully obvious to the reader have been excluded.

The editors have, however, intentionally included several somewhat advanced papers in the section on research in Chapter VII and on PSYOP effectiveness in Chapter IX. In Chapter VII, the selections give an indication of how sophisticated social science research can contribute to PSYOP. Similarly, the content of Chapter IX would have been incomplete and anachronistic without reference to the methodological thinking current in the 1960s and the early 1970s. It is believed that all the articles lend themselves to an understanding of the subject without an extensive background in communications research.

Secondly, most of the case studies have been purposefully selected to complement and supplement a standard reference in the field titled, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, written in 1956 by William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz. Changing perspectives of the nature and scope of PSYOP since that time, as well as changes in the politico-military environment in which PSYOP is carried out, have played an important part in the updating process. In this respect, the editors have given due weight to relevant events occurring since the publication of the PSYWAR casebook and have tried also to portray the new conceptions, methodologies, and techniques that have been developed to improve the effectiveness of PSYOP.

Thus, this compilation of case studies represents PSYOP generally in the 1960s, the situations experienced and the lessons learned in that decade. It is noted that although most of the incidents described took place between 1960 and 1972, some of them happened earlier but are best analyzed in the literature of the 1960s.

Philosophically, the editors of this casebook have tried to indicate the new concerns in PSYOP, the changing conceptions of the field as a whole, and the trends in the use of new methodologies and techniques to improve its effectiveness. It is with reference to the change in conceptualization of PSYOP over the last fifteen years and to the trend of thinking in the early seventies that PSYOP is viewed in this book as communication. When the question is asked, "What is PSYOP?", the answers of different generations and different experts vary. Yet, as noted earlier, increasingly over the last decade and a half, psychological operations is studied in the context of communication. Although "persuasive" and "purposive" communications are the focus of this study, many scholars in the communications field argue that all communication is "purposive" and hence "persuasive." There is no need, in the context of present purposes, for this anthology to align itself with one or the other of these schools of thought.

Editorial Method

The desire to cover the "open" literature as thoroughly as possible and to make this an essential source for both military and civilian personnel interested in PSYOP and communications has made it necessary to be as concise as possible. It has therefore been necessary to excerpt many selections on the basis of relevance and concision. Except in the very few cases where the essays were "adapted," the excerpting is indicated by the use of ellipsis points in both copyrighted and noncopyrighted material. Only in the "original" and editors' essays were editorial changes, other than purely stylistic ones, made. Where necessary, the footnotes in each essay were renumbered, but not otherwise altered in form. The notes pertinent to a particular essay appear at the conclusion of that essay. Bibliographic citations for most sources used by the essay authors are found at the end of each chapter.

In as far as possible, the editors sought the consent of authors and organizations, even when their material was not copyrighted. The copyright holder, at least, was provided with a copy of the material in its proposed form. A particular note is made of the willingness with which publishers, editors, and authors responded to requests for permission to reprint material. In some cases, they even offered to update, substitute, or revise their articles, and when time permitted, the editors were able to take advantage of this. Some authors even suggested that they were flattered to be included. The undersigned, however, look at this the other way around: this book needed their contributions.

Inevitably in a work such as this—in which authors represent many nationalities, professions, and perspectives—the reader will find some material in spoken or translated English. For example, in those contributions illustrative of the day-to-day output of military units engaged in actual operations, a kind of clipped but useful military style is employed. Such a style was retained because it has a feel of immediacy and serves as an example of real PSYOP in action.

As in any anthology, one is advised to consider the article's original date of publication in his reading. A further result of the use of the case study approach is the fact that articles do not have an inherent order and flow. Although each selection has been placed in a chapter on the basis of its contributions to the topic covered in that chapter, an overly rigid linking of the several selections would be an arbitrary enterprise, misleading in some cases, since many contributions are illustrative rather than conclusive. The editors, therefore, have used the introductory comments at the head of each article to place the contribution in its situational context in many cases. However, this means, in some instances, that emphasis has been placed on aspects the contributing author did not necessarily consider to be preeminent, given his sometimes different purpose. Furthermore, because of the disclaimers carried in the mastheads of many of the original source publications, no implications should be drawn concerning the original source publishers' views on any articles published by them, without consulting the original source.

The chapters of this anthology, as well as the articles themselves, stand alone in large measure, even though references and cross-references reflect the interdependence of the various aspects of the PSYOP process as a whole. It is to be noted that because of the use of the casebook approach, style varies markedly from one article to another, providing a diversion from a single manner of expression.

Finally, a concerted effort has been made in the selection process for this compilation to stress the importance that the "PSYOP-related" fields have for effective psychological operations. Moreover, admittedly, controversial analyses, conclusions, and recommendations are found in several of the articles. These have been included not only for the purposes of the casebook already discussed, but to stimulate thinking. Essays featuring contrasting points of view are presented to provide a general idea of the range of thought of the individuals working in the field.

At any rate, this study looks at psychological operations analytically and conceptually as well as descriptively. Above all, every action and all inaction communicate. The goal in PSYOP must be to ensure that, through the combination of action and words, the desired message is the one that is transmitted. This is as true for nations as it is for individuals and groups.

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DA Pam 525-7-1

PAMPHLET

No. 525-7-1

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1 April 1976

**THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:
CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY APPLICATION**

CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD.....	i
PREFACE.....	iii
AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS.....	vii

VOLUME ONE

CHAPTER	I. INTRODUCTION	1
	Psychological Operations in the 1970s: A Program in Search of a Doctrine, by Robert F. Delaney	1
CHAPTER	II. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF PSYOP	17
	Origin of PSYOP Terminology, by William E. Daugherty	18
	What Is Communication? by Yasumasa Tanaka	20
	PSYOP and Communication Theory, by Phillip P. Katz	22
	PSYOP: What Is It? by Raymond J. Barrett	40
	Is International Persuasion Sociologically Feasible? by Daniel Lerner	47
	PSYOP and Related Activities, by Francis M. Watson, Jr.	53
	Communication and Institution Building in Developing Countries, by John H. Johns	62
	Role of Psychological Operations Within the Military Mis- sion, by Alexander R. Askenasy	67
	Bibliography, Chapter II	75
CHAPTER	III. NATIONAL POLICY AND PSYOP	79
	National Policy and PSYOP: Framework for Policy	79
	PSYOP in Perspective, by William E. Daugherty	80
	The National PSYOP Community, by The Editors	85
	USIA's Mission and Responsibilities, by Irving R. Wechsler	102
	Selling Uncle Sam in the Seventies, by Kenneth R. Sparks ..	111
	Policy Planning	120
	Presidential Policy Parameters, by William E. Daugherty ..	121
	When Are Political Objectives Clearly Defined? by Michael A. Morris	122
	Making Policy Is Not the Propagandist's Business—Or Is It? by Reuben S. Nathan	125

	Priorities in the PSYOP Effort, by JUSPAO Planning Office	133
	A Former PSYOP Group Commander in Vietnam Looks Back, by Taro Katagiri	137
	The Military in Institution Building in Developing Countries, by John H. Johns	144
	Some Thoughts on Psychological Operations, by William F. Johnston	149
	Public Opinion, the Press, and PSYOP	154
	The Role of Public Opinion, by Lloyd A. Free	155
	Effective Press Relations, by Barry Zorthian	167
	Bibliography, Chapter III	174
CHAPTER IV.	ORGANIZATION	177
	Organization for International Communication	177
	The ExCom in Public Diplomacy, by G. Scott Sugden	178
	Levels of Command Conducting PSYOP Planning, by C. K. Hausman	181
	The Changing Role of British International Propaganda, by Sir Harold Beeley	186
	The Organization of Official Communications about the Nigeria-Biafra War, by Morris Davis	191
	Agencies Responsible for Peking's Foreign Propaganda, Information, and Cultural Programs, by 7th PSYOP Group	194
	Radio Free Europe, by James R. Price	197
	Radio Liberty, by Joseph G. Whelan	213
	Organization of In-country Communication	219
	The 4th PSYOP Group: Organization, Operations, and Observations, by Taro Katagiri	220
	PSYOP in Vietnam: A Many Splintered Thing, by The Editors	225
	Teamwork in Santo Domingo, by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.	229
	JUSPAO Organization and Function, by John W. Henderson	232
	Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Cameroon: Psychological Dimensions, by Victor T. Le Vine	234
	The Undenounced Intervention, by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.	241
	The CPOC, by Taro Katagiri	246
	Headquarters-Field Coordination	247
	Revolutionary War and Psychological Action, by George A. Kelly	248
	Cuba: Strategic Dilemma, by Reuben S. Nathan	259
	Divided Counsels, by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.	262
	Bibliography, Chapter IV	266
CHAPTER V.	PERSONNEL	269
	PSYOP Personnel	269
	Professional Capabilities of PSYOP Personnel, by C. K. Hausman	271
	PSYOP and Unit Officer Prerequisites, by Dino G. Pappas ..	272
	Response of U.S. Personnel to Local customs in Stability Operations, by K. Stanley Yamashita	282
	Building Rapport with the Vietnamese, by Marilyn W. Hoskins	287
	Sources of the Ability to Estimate Foreign Attitudes, by Alexander R. Askenasy	299

PSYOP-Related Personnel	305
Military Advisor	306
A Military Advisor in the Philippines, by George M. Guthrie	306
Relationship Between American Advisors and Vietnamese Officers, by An ARVN Captain	307
MAAG Advisor	312
Language and the Adviser, by Charles C. Thebaud	312
Security Assistance Advisor	314
International Assistance in Psychological Perspective, by Kenneth and Mary Gergen	314
Information Officer	326
Information Officer or Propagandist? by Gordon A. Moon	326
Radio Programming Officer	333
Staffing at Radio Liberty, by Joseph G. Whelan	333
Special Forces	337
Special Forces Psychological Operations in Southeast Asia, by William P. Yarborough	337
Interpreters	340
Interpreters on Operations with Infantry, by A. H. D. McAulay	340
Political Officer	343
Guerrilla Methods and the Mind: The Political Officer, by Howard R. Simpson	343
Ideological Work in the Soviet Army and Navy, by Ministry of Defense, U.S.S.R.	346
Propagandist and Agitator	353
Some Advice to the Agitator, by Ministry of Defense, U.S.S.R.	353
Indigenous Scout	357
Kit Carsons Strike Back, by Dave Furse	357
Bibliography, Chapter V	358
CHAPTER VI. POLICY OBJECTIVES AND OPERATIONAL GOALS	361
Strategic PSYOP	362
General Premises for VOA, by Lloyd A. Free	364
What the U.S. Information Program Cannot Do, by George V. Allen	368
Defeating Communism in Malaya, by C. C. Too	370
Afterword: Psychological Warfare Complements Military Operations, by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.	379
Accentuating the Positive, by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.	380
Foreign Policy and Communications During the Hungarian Uprising, by The Editors	382
Effective Diplomacy: An Exit from Armageddon, by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.	386
Defector Operations, by John Ozaki	391
Neglected Deterrent: Psychological Operations in "Liberation Wars," by William J. Johnston	397
Tactical PSYOP	400
Tactical PSYOP and Strategic Objectives, by The Editors	401
Lessons from VC/NVA Propaganda, by Martin F. Herz	403
The Korean Safe-Conducts, by Carl Berger	407

Telling It Like It Really Is, by William T. Macy	408
Operation Strike, by Elliot Harris	412
Effective Combat PSYOP in Delta, by Colburn B. Lovett	413
Defection Or Surrender, by Martin F. Herz	416
Politico-Military Affairs	419
The Good Guys and the Bad Guys, by Harold R. Aaron	420
Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, by Thomas Perry Thornton	425
Target—The Civilian, by Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannon	440
Grace Under Pressure: The U.S. Soldier in the Dominican Republic, by Charles C. Moskos, Jr.	454
Civil Assistance in Laos, by William P. Yarborough	458
Expanding Political Participation—The Long Haul from Villagism to Nationalism, by John C. Donnell	460
Political Warfare in Vietnam, by Monte R. Bullard	461
Communication and Nation Building, by John H. Johns	465
Bibliography, Chapter VI	471

VOLUME TWO

CHAPTER VII. INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH	477
PSYOP Intelligence	478
A Survey of PSYOP Intelligence, by Phillip P. Katz (Introduction)	478
PSYOP Intelligence Requirements	494
PSYOP Essential Elements of Information, by 7th PSYOP Group	495
The NVA Soldier in South Vietnam as a PSYOP Target, by JUSPAO Planning Office	498
Translation Problems, by Richard H. Orth	506
Tet in Viet-Nam, by Chuong Dac Long	508
PSYOP Intelligence Sources	510
Prisoners of War	512
PW and Captured Document Doctrine, by John A. Hemphill	512
Defectors	513
A North Korean Defector, by 7th PSYOP Group	518
Civilian Population (See Imogene E. Okes "Effective Communications of Americans With 'Inai' in PSYOP Intelligence Method section.)	
Broadcasts	534
Radio Broadcast Monitoring, by 7th PSYOP Group	534
Captured Documents	536
Viet Cong Documents on the War (I)	536
Propaganda	545
Romania—A Chinese Toehold, by 7th PSYOP Group	545
Voice of the People of Burma, by 7th PSYOP Group	547
Intelligence Reports	549
Views Held by North Koreans About Foreign Countries and Peoples, by 7th PSYOP Group	549
Unpublished Studies	553
Attitudes, Communications and Communist Propaganda: Factors in Insurgency in Southeast Asia	553

PSYOP Intelligence Methods	571
Methods for the Exploitation of Major PSYOP Informa- tion Sources, by Phillip P. Katz	572
Intuition	585
Asiatic Guerrilla Motivation, by John M. Little	585
Direct Observation	587
Unconventional Warfare—The Psychological Role of Special Forces, by William P. Yarborough	587
Interviewing	590
Effective Communication by Americans with Thai, by Imogene E. Okes	590
Sampling	594
The Sampling Process for Psyoperators, by Richard H. Orth	594
Content Analysis	606
Factors Influencing North Vietnamese Morale, by 7th PSYOP Group	606
Social Science Research and PSYOP	609
Persuasion, by Irving L. Janis (Introduction)	609
Anthologies, Syntheses, and Explorations: An Attitude Change Sampler, by Gerald R. Miller	624
A Model of Communication Effectiveness, by A. Edward Foote	636
The Measurement of Speaker Credibility, by R. Barry Fulton	642
Bibliography, Chapter VII	649
CHAPTER VIII. MEDIA, METHODS, AND TECHNIQUES	655
Audience Selection	658
Groups and Attitude Change, by Richard H. Orth	658
Prestigious Persons and Key Communicators, by Richard H. Orth	662
The Problem of the Unintended Audience, by Paul M. A. Linebarger	666
The Decision to Defect, by Lawrence E. Grinter	668
Message Composition	670
Selection of Themes, by Carl Berger	670
One Pair of Shoes, by Reuben S. Nathan	673
The Soviet "Peace and Progress" Broadcasts, by 7th PSYOP Group	676
Brief Observation on the Importance of Up to Date Lan- guage in "Black" or "Grey" Propaganda Leaflets, by Martin F. Herz	678
Films from the Vietcong, by Peter Gessner	680
The Viet Cong Slogan Slip, by JUSPAO Planning Staff	682
Leaflets at a Glance, by The Editors	684
Golden Bridges, by Reuben S. Nathan	684
Sihanouk's Appeal to the Monks of Cambodia, by 7th PSYOP Group	687
The Famous "MIG" Leaflet, by Carl Berger	689
Pretesting the Product, by Wilbur Schramm	690
Exploitation of Channels of Communication	693
Communication and the Use of Mass Media, by John Dennis Lanigan	694
Visual Communications in the Nigerian Civil War, by Morris Davis	698

Media of Communication and Propaganda, by B. S. Murty	699
Nongovernmental Communications in the Nigerian Civil War, by Morris Davis	702
News Broadcasting on Soviet Radio and Television, by F. Gayle Durham	711
Strategic Leaflets, by Carl Berger	713
The NLF Leaflet, by Douglas Pike	716
USIA's "Little" Magazine, by Nathan Glick	718
U.S.-Soviet Magazine Propaganda: <i>America Illustrated</i> and <i>USSR</i> , by Anita Mallinckrodt Dasbach	720
TATZEPAC: Medium of Conflict in China's "Cultural Revolution," by Barry M. Broman	722
Earlyword, by The Editors	725
Postal Subversion, by Michael Choukas	726
Mainland Pounded by Balloons in Psychological Warfare	727
Quemoy: Pop Goes the Propaganda, by Lee Lescaze	728
Psychological Operations and Air Power: Its Hits and Misses, by Robert L. Gleason	730
China's Use of Culture for Propaganda, by John S. Barr	735
Plays and Propaganda: Theatre as a Communication Medium in Southeast Asia, by James R. Brandon	739
Organization and Operation of U.S.-Supported Culture-Drama Teams, by the JUSPAO Planning Office	744
North Vietnamese and NFLSV Songs as Propaganda, by 7th PSYOP Group	749
Symbolic Acts as PSYOP, by Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde	754
The Older Vietnamese as a Communicant, by the JUSPAO Planning Office	755
An Unknown Warrior, by Edward J. Clarkson	758
Unorthodox Techniques	759
Tactics of Deception in Psychological Operations by Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde	760
Special Operations Against the Vietminh, by Edward Geary Lansdale	762
Our Poison Pen War Against the Nazis, by Brian Moynahan	763
Rumors and How to Counter Them, by Wilbur Schramm	765
"Practical Jokes" by Edward Geary Lansdale	767
Intra-Group Communications and Induced Change, by Arthur H. Niehoff	770
Bibliography, Chapter VIII	773
CHAPTER IX. PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS	777
Introduction	778
A Brief Review Study of the Problems of Criteria in Psychological Warfare, by David D. Robinson	778
The Pueblo Film, by 7th PSYOP Group	784
Source Analysis	789
Source Factors in Persuasion, by Richard H. Orth	790
The Likability and Self-interest of the Source in Attitude Change, by Vernon A. Stone and Harrogadde S. Eswara	796
The Hungarian Self-Image and the Hungarian Image of Americans and Russians, by Radio Free Europe	806
Ways and Means of U.S. Ideological Expansion, by A. Valyuzhenich	823

Influencing Political Change by Broadcasting to the Soviet Union, by Robert L. Tuck	830
Content Analysis	835
Coding and Analysis of Documentary Materials from Communist China, by Paul Wong	836
Polite Propaganda: "USSR" and "America Illustrated" by Richard A. Garver	843
Puppet Regime Clings to Psychological Warfare, by 7th PSYOP Group	854
U.S. Vulnerabilities as Portrayed in the East German Television Film, "Pilots in Pajamas," by Harley J. Preston, James L. Monroe, and Aldo L. Raffa	855
Audience Analysis	862
Audience Analysis and Public Opinion Research—Radio Free Europe, by Lorand B. Szalay	862
Audience Analysis at Radio Liberty, by Lorand B. Szalay	878
Identification with North or South Vietnam in Eastern Europe, by Radio Free Europe	883
Reference Groups, Congruity Theory and Cross-Cultural Persuasion, by F. S. Lorimer and S. Watson Dunn	886
Media Analysis	897
Effectiveness of PSYOP Messages: A Foundation Study, by Ernest F. and Edith M. Baird	898
East European Attitudes to the Vietnam Conflict, by Radio Free Europe	913
Using Motion Pictures to Aid Inter-Cultural Communication, by Neil P. Hurley, S.J.	919
The Future of International Broadcasting, by Francis S. Ronalds, Jr.	928
Propaganda Through the Printed Media in the Developing Countries, by Y. V. Lakshmana Rao	939
Evaluating Films for Development, by Tulsi Ehatia Seral	943
Effects Analysis	946
Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level, by P. P. Morris	946
Measuring the Effectiveness of An Overseas Information Campaign: A Case History, by Leo Bogart	957
Radio Liberty's Audience Impact and Effectiveness, by Joseph G. Whelan	972
Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts, by Don D. Smith	985
The Chieu Hoi Program Poses Threat of Special Dimensions, by Hammond Rolph	996
On Analyzing PSYOP Campaigns Before Using Them, by Richard H. Orth	1063
Conclusion	1011
Effectiveness of International Propaganda, by L. John Martin	1011
Bibliography, Chapter IX	1021
CHAPTER X. FOREIGN IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA	1027
Role of the Government System	1027
Propaganda and the Monopoly of Mass Communications, by Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski	1028
The Changing Soviet Union, by Ithiel de Sola Pool	1043
Propaganda and Democracy, by Jacques Ellul	1050

Ideology	1058
Communist Ideology and Revolution, by John H. Norton.....	1059
Propaganda and Ideology, by Jacques Ellul	1065
Psychological Total War, by Bernard Yoh	1072
Propaganda	1075
Western Europe	1075
The Projection of Britain Abroad, by Max Beloff	1075
International Film and Television Propaganda: Cam- paigns of Assistance, by Bernard Rubin	1084
Eastern Europe	1090
Development of the Soviet Propaganda Line, by Fred- erick C. Barghoorn	1090
Propaganda for the PLA: Soviet Attempts to Subvert the Red Chinese Army, by Richard H. Giza	1100
East Asia	1105
Political Warfare—Qualified Application, by Monte R. Bullard	1105
China in Africa, by G. T. Yu	1110
Southeast Asia	1115
Better Understanding of the Role of Newsreels and Documentaries in the New Situation, by Phan Trong Quang	1115
Psychological Operations in Laos, by 7th PSYOP Group	1119
Pacific	1120
Information and Cultural Affairs, by New Zealand De- partment of External Affairs	1120
Africa	1122
South African Propaganda: Methods and Media, by Vernon McKay	1122
Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict: Psycho- logical Operations in Portuguese Guinea (1959 until 1965), by I. William Zartman	1130
Insurgent Appeals and Methods	1141
Insurgent Appeals	1142
OLAS: General Declaration, by Latin American Soli- darity Organization	1142
The Algerian Problem, by Algerian Delegation in Cairo	1146
We Are At War, by African National Congress	1149
Insurgent Methods	1152
Communication of Ideas, by Douglas Pike	1152
Bibliography, Chapter X	1163
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	1167
AUTHOR INDEX	INDEX-1
SUBJECT INDEX	INDEX-3

THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY APPLICATION

CHAPTER VII

INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence and research support PSYOP in a number of crucial ways—from initial planning of a specific PSYOP program to the development of new methodologies for analysis and delivery. This chapter deals with both intelligence and research, the collection of information and its transformation, through research or analysis, into operationally relevant fact.

Intelligence, particularly, is so closely related to the process of effective persuasive communication that separating it from that process for purposes of study is exceedingly difficult. Utilization of intelligence output in some form is bound up in PSYOP planning from its earliest stages and continues to support PSYOP and to be affected by the PSYOP strategy until the process starts over again. Moreover, PSYOP intelligence cannot be neatly separated from other intelligence. Because it must meet both tactical and strategic requirements, specification of even the "essential elements of information" (EEI) overlaps information categories that intelligence is asked to address for other purposes, including politico-military planning and combat operations.

Growth of intelligence capability, particularly in analysis but to some extent collection as well, depends on a number of factors covered elsewhere in this casebook. (See, for example, chapters V and IX.) It also depends upon improvements in techniques resulting from social science research. Once again, in fact, all PSYOP, as all communications, looks to research for conceptual and methodological, as well as technological, innovation.

That intelligence and research are an integral part of PSYOP and central to the entire process, is attested to by the fact that most of the chapters in this casebook involve one or the other, and usually both. Their interrelationship is shown by the importance of the communications concept to the delineation of EEI. Meanwhile, social science research has constantly tried to refine communications models. Refinement supports analysis (Chapter IX), which is central to the processing of intelligence.

The last two decades have seen rapidly increasing social science research on communications. Transferring the results of this research to PSYOP, however, often requires a major effort. Yet, the commitment in the 1960s to utilizing this approach in PSYOP seems to be paying off: PSYOP appears to be on the threshold of important new benefits from the use of computer technology and the findings of communications research.

PSYOP INTELLIGENCE, INTRODUCTION

"A SURVEY OF PSYOP INTELLIGENCE" *

BY PHILLIP P. KATZ

From a PSYOP viewpoint, intelligence is the basis for understanding human actions. PSYOP is dependent on intelligence for the effective management of its programs, for obtaining current information about PSYOP targets, testing or obtaining feedback on message content and format, and measuring the effect of PSYOP messages and programs.

The purpose of this essay is to sharpen the focus of PSYOP essential elements of information (EEI) as related to intelligence requirements. It will emphasize the technical skills and knowledge that are needed to provide the PSYOP community with the answers to the EEI for planning, conducting, and evaluating PSYOP.

To this end, the essay will first discuss the general nature of PSYOP intelligence; second, outline the major focus of the EEI for PSYOP; and third, discuss the three major uses of PSYOP intelligence: target analysis, the testing of communication content, and the measuring of the effect of PSYOP programs.

NATURE OF PSYOP INTELLIGENCE

Since a wide variety of technical data and information is needed to manage, plan, and conduct communication programs effectively, PSYOP is dependent on intelligence for the effective management of its programs. Intelligence, from a PSYOP viewpoint, is the basis for understanding human actions. It involves a thorough understanding of all aspects of the audience of PSYOP targets; the ability to gauge the progress of current programs; and, finally, the capability to determine the overall effect of persuasive communications. Each will be discussed briefly.

First, anyone engaged in communication programs must know certain things about his audience; for example, who they are and how many are reading or viewing his messages. The PSYOP managers, planners, and communication or media programmers should understand the audience as if they were communicating face to face. Certainly, they must have a real understanding of current attitudes on a variety of appropriate subjects, and these attitudes should be considered as ranging, for example, from very hostile, somewhat hostile, neutral to somewhat friendly. On the basis of such knowledge, PSYOP communication programs can then help to:

- a. restructure hostile attitudes of selected individuals or groups;
- b. reinforce attitudes of friendly individuals or groups; or
- c. maintain the continued neutralization of those whose attitudes are unstructured and who are deemed "safe" if they remain neutral.

*Original essay by Phillip P. Katz.

It is obvious, however, that without a real understanding and knowledge of current attitudes on a variety of appropriate subjects there is no scientific way of determining whether progress is being made toward restructuring attitudes.

Second, when a PSYOP campaign is in progress it is very important to obtain constant feedback in order to know how it is going and what tactical changes, if any, are required. This requirement is substantial when the full range of communication media and channels is to be used. A careful and honest analysis is necessary in order to determine what messages and channels of communication worked well and why, what the mistakes were, and what can be done to avoid future errors and failures.

Finally, PSYOP intelligence is needed to measure the overall effect of communication on the attitudes and actions of selected targets.

Importance of Systematic Research

By building on carefully observed and evaluated experience, costly delays and failures can be avoided. In other words, in developing and implementing PSYOP programs, the first requirement is for a systematic approach. Systematic research is the most efficient way yet found to obtain dependable information about people and their environment.

The PSYOP communicator should be suspicious of the single letter or comment about the quality of a particular item of communication. The difference between the unsystematic gathering of information and research is that research, when properly designed and conducted, usually produces results that can be relied upon, whereas we have little idea how reliable less systematic information is. As Wilbur Schramm states:

*The quality of information from and about the audience is of the essence. If it is to be useful, it must be based on facts rather than hunches; it must be adequate to allow for differences among parts of the audience, and for changes with time. This is why it is important that, so far as possible, [the] clear light of research be turned on the informational needs of the audiences.*¹ (Emphasis added.)

MAJOR FOCUS OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION FOR PSYOP

Figure 1 depicts a concept model of the PSYOP intelligence process as it is related to program implementation. This dynamic process is based on the EEI.

The focus of EEI for PSYOP programs must be related to the total population base, because, as Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap put it, "That's the basis of our strategy that the Americans fail completely to understand."² Consequently, the EEI for PSYOP are the critical items of information about PSYOP targets (friendly, neutral, hostile) needed by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist decisionmakers, planners, and media development personnel in implementation of communication (PSYOP) programs. They must include:

1. The definition of key audiences (both friendly and enemy) within the society
 2. The beliefs, attitudes, opinions, and motivations of key audiences as individuals and groups
 3. The analysis of current vulnerabilities of specific audiences within the society
 4. The determination of message content and the most effective (best) communication channels to reach the target
 5. The impact or effect of PSYOP communication
- Each of these considerations will be discussed below.

Definition of Key Audiences (Friendly and Enemy) Within the Society

The need for definitive target selection has been firmly established. Again, it is emphasized that a country struggling for identification and vitally involved in nationbuilding usually does not have a single audience. In fact, in the United States, despite mass media and a highly developed educational system, there are many special groups based on geography, ethnic origin, religion, race, economic status, and social position. Certainly the attitudes of each group will vary on many political, social, and economic subjects. Therefore, it is important to consider the many diverse segments of the population and to aim communication programs to the specific groups and subgroups that one wishes to influence. Accordingly, specificity of target selection becomes an important first step in the development of PSYOP programs, with the intelligence community playing an important role in the selection of remunerative PSYOP targets.

Significant historical evidence shows that definitively and specifically worded communications are usually more effective. Although strategic programs are not concerned with a single hamlet or a small military unit, they should be concerned with significant religious groups, occupational subgroups, and specific military organizations as worthwhile targets. For example, major PSYOP target groups in an insurgency environment could be:

- Host country civilians (friendly—neutral—hostile)
- Insurgency-sponsoring-country civilians (friendly—neutral—hostile)
- Incumbent military or paramilitary forces
- Insurgent military forces

One of several further subdivisions of the host country friendly civilian target group could be by rural classification and occupational group, in this way:

- Land owner
- Farm owner-operator
- Farm tenant-farm worker
- Laborer (unskilled)
- Laborer (skilled)
- Fisherman
- Merchant, Storekeeper




Figure 1. A Schema of PSYOP Intelligence.

Housewife

Priest, minister, monk

This, of course, does not imply that each category requires distinct and definitive media programming. However, based on the importance of the group or subgroup in the particular operational environment, a PSYOP program manager could decide to develop a special pamphlet, magazine article, radio program, or cultural drama team performance directed to any one of the hundreds of possible target categories.

Guidelines for the selection of PSYOP targets are based on several practical considerations: first, the importance of the target to the PSYOP mission. For example, a small rural minority group located in a remote and nonsensitive part of the country would be of little importance to PSYOP programs. On the other hand, a small but highly organized religious order, with its members strategically located throughout the country, could be of great use to PSYOP programs as key or influential communicators. In a similar way, a small minority group that occupies a strategic border area could be an important PSYOP target. Certainly, the PSYOP program manager and planner must understand their significance, as key communicators or important targets, and should direct appropriate communication to affect or restructure their attitudes.

The second guideline for target selection is based on the probability of attitude change. It was stated above that attitudes within a given group could vary from fanatically hostile to extremely friendly. Because it is generally recognized that PSYOP programs (especially mass media) will have little influence on fanatics, intelligence is needed to insure that the major PSYOP effort is directed to typical segments of the population. The atypical person or fanatic could be considered as a secondary or tertiary PSYOP target. For example, Henry V. Dicks, who was a leading PSYOP analyst during World War II, established the following five categories of response to Nazism among German males of military age:

1. Fanatical "hardcore" Nazis (10 percent)
2. Modified Nazis "with reservations" (25 percent)
3. Unpolitical Germans (40 percent)
4. Passive anti-Nazis (15 percent), and
5. Active anti-Nazis (10 percent) ³

From the above analysis, it appears that a majority of the German soldiers were politically neutral. No doubt this information was valuable to the PSYWAR planners and media programmers in that it provided the basis for the tone of political messages.

Beliefs, Opinions, Motivations, and Attitudes of Key Audiences as Individuals and Groups

If attitudes are to be restructured, reinforced, or neutralized, the first essential is to establish a baseline from which to provide an accurate assessment of current attitudes toward significant political, military, economic, and social subjects. The requirement is for more than hunches

or gossip. Hard scientific evidence about the reality of social situations is needed.

PSYOP is concerned with people's attitudes toward a variety of subjects: political ideologies; the enemy as a military force, as administrators, or as compatriots; and the friendly government, its bureaucracy, military forces, and aid. Also, it is important to understand the attitudes of particular age groups, social strata, and occupational groups. This information is needed for the development of a realistic communication strategy for specific PSYOP targets. As stated, important, significant, and typical audience samples should be used in assessing attitudes. There is considerable danger in assuming that the attitudes of one or two high-ranking defectors or several friendly civilians are typical.

Analysis of Current Vulnerabilities of Specific Audiences Within the Society

An analysis of current dissensions, fears, anxieties, complaints, and "gripes" within a selected target audience is vital in order to determine PSYOP vulnerabilities. Accurate and current evidence is needed about real or imagined complaints dealing with political, social, economic, or military subjects. Obviously, it is important that the complaints be typical ones.

Examples of fears and anxieties on the part of military PSYOP targets could be:

1. Close surveillance by comrades
2. Fear of punishment or reprisal against an individual's family
3. Fear of mistreatment, killings, or torturing of prisoners by the incumbent military forces
4. Fear of air and artillery bombardment
5. Anxiety over aerial surveillance

When assessed realistically and taken advantage of intelligently, many of the fears and anxieties mentioned above can be exploited as target vulnerabilities for PSYOP programs. The problem then becomes one of identifying them so that they can be exploited.

PSYOP vulnerabilities can be of long duration or of relatively recent origin. For example, a group can develop deep animosity, based on religious or racial prejudice toward another group. If the communicator adequately understands the nature of the animosity, it can be used for PSYOP exploitation. In this respect, the Viet Cong in their propaganda still equate the presence of U.S. forces in Vietnam with the colonial French forces, knowing, of course, that the majority of the people have a strong animosity toward both the French and colonialism.

PSYOP vulnerabilities are dynamic, and thus able to be reinforced or changed. By way of illustration, on August 8, 1968, the U.S. Ninth Infantry Division, reacting to a VC ambush, fired on the friendly hamlet of Yen Thuong, killing several innocent civilians. This incident made the people in the area extremely susceptible to anti-U.S. PSYOP. For example, rumors spread by the VC agents stressed that:

The Americans fired without provocation.
 The Americans can't tell the difference between enemy and friendly, and open fire on all people in black pajamas. In this respect they are no better than the French.
 The hamlet was caught in a crossfire in a fight between the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and U.S. forces.
 The American helicopters "callously" opened fire on the hamlet.

Typical thoughts and attitudes of the villagers were:

The Americans are just like the VC—kill innocent people.
 The GVN should order the Americans to stop undisciplined firing because too many people get killed. They (the Americans) are just like the French.
 We used to think that the Americans came to help us (didn't they build schools and dispensaries?) but now the Americans show how they really feel toward the people.

The next morning (August 9) an ARVN political warfare team explained to the people of Yen Thuong and others in the general area that the Americans reacted to a VC ambush. They emphasized that, had the people informed or reported the VC activity, the tragedy surely would have been avoided. This message was also carried by the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) to district towns and markets. This, plus the active concern of the government of Vietnam, the prompt medical attention given to the wounded, and the distribution of commodities and prompt indemnity payments by the Ninth Division tended to "cool" the situation and thus reduce this PSYOP vulnerability.

Determination of Message Content and the Most Effective Communication Channels

Writing about PSYOP during World War II, Daniel Lerner makes the significant point that the development of PSYOP themes (message content) is the one most crucial element in the PSYOP process. He also notes that this is the point at which the considerations of policy, intelligence, and the target are brought to bear upon the use of available media and channels of communication. Once there is a clear understanding of attitudes and PSYOP vulnerabilities for definitive targets, and with the knowledge of policy guidelines, there is nothing difficult or magical about the selection of thematic content for PSYOP messages. Of course, without an understanding of current attitudes, motivation, and actual vulnerabilities of specific issues, thematic content could be very mysterious.

It is apparent that content for PSYOP messages must meet a triple test: first, it must be consonant with PSYOP policy guidance; next, it should support one or more significant objectives as stated in the PSYOP plan; and, finally, it should be based on as accurate an assessment of vulnerabilities as can be determined by scientific analysis and evaluation of target information.

It is obvious that PSYOP messages should be programed over communication channels that are readily available to the audience. It is a wasted effort to prepare extensive and varied radio programs for groups

in areas not possessing radio receivers, or to develop large quantities of printed matter for an illiterate audience. Deciding on the most effective communication channel or channels to reach a PSYOP target is an important and critical step in the planning of PSYOP programs. There is no doubt that, in many environments, PSYOP is more than a loudspeaker and leaflet operation, and all available communication channels should be considered as PSYOP options.

The first requirement, therefore, is for a scientific analysis of current communication patterns for the target(s). Some of the questions are: (a) What channels are open? (b) What media are credible? (c) What media are most appropriate to the thematic content? (d) What channels are capable of reacting to appropriate time and space requirements? It should be made clear that a considerable amount of current data is required to adequately understand the various communication channels and the pattern of communication for PSYOP targets.

Measuring the Effect of PSYOP Communications

In evaluating the effect of communication programs, consideration should be given to whether the concern is for the short term, long term, or institutional (very long term) effect. As stated previously, if PSYOP programs are to be accurately measured, information is required from many PSYOP sources. Also, measurement requires the use of a variety of techniques, depending, of course, on the location, importance, and size of the PSYOP audience. Specific data-gathering techniques for determining the impact or the effect of PSYOP communication will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

Measurement can be quantitative, qualitative, or textual. Quantitative measurement can be based on the number of prisoners, defectors, or refugees who came in during the reporting period; or on the number of hours of radio or loudspeaker broadcasts; or on the number of leaflets disseminated. The second and third measurements are production indicators only and do not measure the true effect of PSYOP communications in restructuring attitudes. Even the first set of criteria are not necessarily valid indicators of PSYOP effectiveness because it is necessary to demonstrate a relationship between the PSYOP media output and actions, and the inflow of persons. Qualitative measurement can be based on specific cases of measured attitude change. Most of these data are obtained from verbal accounts gleaned from in-depth interviews or survey measurements of the restructuring of attitudes. In addition, textual or content analysis can be used to obtain PSYOP effectiveness clues from enemy documents, newspapers, periodicals, and broadcast monitoring reports, among others.

There is no doubt that the focus of PSYOP EEI for an insurgency environment is more complex than obtaining information about the "enemy and his environment." PSYOP targets represent a broad spectrum of the population, and the exploitation of the varied targets for PSYOP programs requires considerable technical knowledge. The follow-

ing paragraphs will discuss the utilization of PSYOP intelligence in the implementation of programs and the essentially technical method used to exploit major PSYOP information sources. The following discussion of the scientific techniques used to gather data from PSYOP information sources will expose the technical nature of PSYOP intelligence requirements.

UTILIZATION OF PSYOP INTELLIGENCE

Target Analysis (The Importance of Audience Research) ⁴

An important first step, in both commercial communication research and psychological operations, is to understand clearly the nature of the audience(s) and the communication patterns related to those audiences. This is accomplished through audience research or target analysis.

The spectrum of information to be derived from audience research is very wide. Five components will be discussed. First, as indicated previously, an important aspect of audience research is concerned with the communication pattern: How does information get to people? Who depends on radio or newspapers or other individuals for a given kind of communication? Who listens to the radio, and when? Who can pick up leaflets, and when? Who goes to the movies? Who reads magazines, and what kind? Specifically, audience research is necessary in order to find out what channels or combinations of channels to use for a given communication purpose.

Audience research is also used to find out what skills an audience has in reading or listening, and how the audience is likely to interpret a given text, illustration, picture, or slogan. This kind of data is essential so that the communicators will have the needed information to encode or prepare messages that are meaningful to the various PSYOP targets.

Another important point is that audience research is vitally concerned with the credibility of information, sources, and channels. In short, what kind of messages are likely to be believed, accepted, and lead to the desired action.

In addition, PSYOP media programmers require a clear understanding of how messages are understood or perceived, what part individuals and groups play, and how perception gives rise to the restructuring of attitudes and eventually a change in behavior.⁵

Moreover, audience research is necessary in order to find out something about the social organization of the audience, that is, to answer such questions as: Who are the opinion leaders (key communicators)? How are decisions on a variety of significant subjects likely to be made? What is the role of the primary group and the social organization in the communication process? This information is needed, specifically, to develop a rational communication strategy and to better understand what use to make of interpersonal communication, mass communication, and mixed strategies in the development of the campaign.

It is very important in attempting persuasive communication to really understand the attitudes of people as individuals and as members of social groups.⁶ To a degree, Washington research can provide significant data, but, because target analysis is dynamic and should be based on the reality of "today's attitudes," the answer to the above questions can be obtained only after current field research.

The vital importance of audience research is clearly stated in a document prepared by the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV). It states that:

Adequate audience analysis is the key to effective psychological operations and the basis for audience analysis is a *sound responsive intelligence gathering effort* [emphasis added]. Audience analysis provides the psyoperator and commander with the vulnerabilities of specific target audiences; susceptibilities to a variety of PSYOP appeals, available communication channels. With this information, the psy operator can develop PSYOP objectives. [Author's note: PSYOP objectives are provided by the command; the "psy operator" develops appropriate themes for media implementation.]⁷

It is apparent that target analysis is necessary in order to identify meaningful population groups and subgroups as specific PSYOP targets. Furthermore, target analysis provides important clues to the attitudes of the selected audiences prior to exposure to PSYOP messages. In addition, it is important because it provides the data needed to anticipate what resistance might be met to communication content and to determine what message content and communication strategy might be most meaningful and effective. In sum, target analysis (through the use of surveys and other data-gathering techniques) tends to bring the selected targets closer to the PSYOP source, for example, the radio scriptwriter, the man at the microphone, the artist or illustrator, the newspaper copywriter or leaflet writer, and, of course, to the PSYOP cadres. Thus, it is evident that audience research is a broad and basic requirement of PSYOP programs.

Testing of Communication Content

The need for testing communication content before the message is disseminated is clear: After the message leaves the channel, it is lost to the PSYOP media programmer (the source); therefore, in the communication process, the source wants to know whether he is in tune with his audience, that is, if his messages are properly understood by the receiver.

In testing messages it is important to check the respondent for psychological as well as sociological representativeness (age, sex, occupation, education, and so forth). These two items should not be confused. Prisoners of war, for example, while they may be much like their uncaptured comrades from a sociological point of view, are very different from them, psychologically speaking. They are relatively safe in a prisoner-of-war compound and no longer have the physical fears associated with the combat area; also, they are no longer under the strict influence of their political officers and the military primary group (squad and platoon).

Consequently, the fact that a persuasive message, directed to a hostile target, scores high on an initial test with prisoners of war or defectors, does not necessarily mean that it will "bring them in." As stated, the social environment in the prisoner-of-war camp is different from that of the target area. In addition, those selected for testing are usually neutral or friendly to the source; they are not in a hostile communication environment; and their primary group will usually be sympathetic toward the source. Hence, while they may be fair subjects for testing some kinds of communication (that is, general information messages), they are not suitable for testing certain persuasive messages. This is also true of political refugees.

Alfred de Grazia, who made a thorough study (1953) of target analysis and propaganda media, states that:

Although frequently useful as sources of intelligence concerning events and conditions in areas inaccessible to psychological warfare, the POWs may not share the attitudes and temper of their former compatriots. The very fact that they chose to flee, and are now situated in such different surroundings affects their perspective and reduces their value as pretest subjects.⁸

De Grazia also stressed that in testing there are no definitive rules. Each instance is unique, and before an estimate can be made of the reliability of a proposed test, careful consideration must be given to the nature of the communication, the type of subjects available, and the overall psychological atmosphere in which the test is to be conducted.

The following paragraphs will discuss some techniques that are used to test or obtain feedback in PSYOP communications. In addition to testing, the techniques are used for other purposes such as attitude measurement. Four techniques will be discussed: (a) the general sample survey, (b) the panel as a survey tool, (c) the in-depth interview, and (d) informal media testing as part of an interrogation or interview.

The General Sample Survey

The sample survey is perhaps the one best systematic method for determining effects of media content. Its application in military PSYOP is, of course, limited to those targets that are accessible to the surveyors. Certainly, in an insurgency environment, this technique can be used more frequently than in conventional military situations.

The sample survey is usually conducted during and after the PSYOP campaign. By asking significant questions of a relatively small sample of persons, scientifically selected to insure a certain representativeness, the survey can obtain highly accurate information on the percentage of the audience actually reached by various communication channels, and how the audience is responding to the communication. The purposes of the survey technique in PSYOP testing are to determine if the messages are understood, to obtain clues about the credibility of content, to determine if the message evokes the desired response, and finally, to find out whether it has provoked any undesirable effects.

In considering the use of surveys in an insurgent environment, it is pertinent to note certain observations made by one of America's leading attitude research organizations. In its introduction to a 1967 attitude survey conducted by the Center for Vietnamese Studies, this firm commented that one major problem would be respondent suspicion of interviewer motives. As a result, it was thought respondents might alter their answers.⁹ Such data can either be taken as a direct indication of the sample population's attitudes and beliefs or

the data can be interpreted comparatively. That is, the majority of the respondents need not express a particular attitude for it to be regarded as an important finding. Whether a given datum is meaningful or not depends in part on the degree of support derived from other parts of the same study. To utilize this more modest definition of the study is to say that the findings *can yield considerable insight into the feelings of the people but will provide projectable information on the whole population within fairly broad tolerance limits.*¹⁰ (Emphasis added.)

Finally, the study concluded that the interviews did constitute an acceptable reflection of reality.¹¹

There is no doubt that there are many problems in polling overseas. In some countries, it is not feasible to go into the countryside; in others, especially those with autocratic governments, the population is afraid to answer questions, telling interviewers, when they do talk, what they think their government would like to hear them say. The best clues of the extent of bias are to be found in the survey findings themselves. Thus, for example, there have been surveys taken in semipolice states which revealed monotonously regular approval of all government actions at close to the 95 percent level, clearly suggesting the absence of freedom of expression.

The United States Information Agency is primarily responsible for conducting attitude surveys overseas. The world opinion surveys conducted by USIA are especially significant to PSYOP communication. They are available and used by other agencies of the government, including the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the Department of Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The surveys cover questions from basic values to specific reactions to programs, media, or activities. Interviewing is usually done by indigenous personnel, sometimes by locally run public opinion organizations, and administered by contract professionals under the guidance of USIA staff personnel. Thomas Sorenson notes that a "confidential" policy statement spells out the use of surveys by USIA as follows:

We use the public opinion poll abroad, in concert with other methods, to measure (1) understanding of and support for important U.S. policies and actions, (2) the standing in the public mind of the U.S. compared to . . . other nations with respect to relative military power, scientific progress, economic growth, and the like, (3) attitudes or questions and personalities . . . of significance to this country in the conduct of its foreign affairs, (4) the aspirations, fears and prejudices of the USIA target audiences, and (5) the importance and credibility of the various communications media in different countries for different audiences.¹² (Emphasis added.)

The scientifically planned survey is an important tool in providing data and material for the answers to PSYOP EEI and in testing the contents of PSYOP communications. It is important, however, that the surveys be programed for the widest variety of urban rural targets.

It is apparent that use of sampling procedures and implementation of attitude or opinion polls requires demographic data and professional skills. It is beyond the scope of this essay to consider the tools of field research and the specific techniques of the sample survey.

The Panel as a Survey Tool

The panel is a group of people chosen to represent in a scientific way some larger population segment. The difference between the panel as a testing or measuring instrument and the survey is that the panel involves interviewing the same population segment not just once but repeatedly at regular intervals.

This technique allows for the gathering of a great amount of relevant data, and provides for a better comparison of long-run and short-run effects on attitudes and behavior. The validity of the results is highly dependent on the scientific selection of the panel to insure that it represents a demographic cross section of the target or targets.¹³ For example, the requirement might be for a series of panels that scientifically represents the major social groups and subgroups. These could include separate panels for communication directed to urban civilians, rural civilians, enemy military and paramilitary forces, refugees, and the like.

The survey method of data collection requires free access to the audience, with the members being checked for psychological representativeness. That is, are they the best and most recent sample available to represent the psychological environment of the target audience? It also requires skilled handling of what is called the "interviewer effect," that is, biases introduced into the responses of the panel members as a result of their repeated interviewing and consequent heightened awareness of the issues.

The In-depth Interview

An important technique used to obtain PSYOP intelligence, the in-depth interview is primarily used for post-testing and measuring attitude change and effect. Essentially, the in-depth interview is an outgrowth of the psychoanalytic interview, but is somewhat more directive, and of course not therapeutic in its aim.

During World War II, Dr. Henry V. Dicks (LTC, Royal British Medical Corps) was the first military psychiatrist to use in-depth interviews to support PSYOP programs. As in the psychoanalytic interview, the objective is to put the respondent at ease and get him to express himself as freely as possible on the subject at hand. If the interview is to progress satisfactorily, the psychological atmosphere must be permissive, and the respondent must be made to feel that nothing he says will be "used against him" or embarrass him in any way.

The purpose of the in-depth interview is to give insights into the deeper meanings that some objects and events hold for the respondent and to clarify the psychological process and mechanisms by which these meanings are formed, perpetuated, and changed. In order to gain insights of this kind from the in-depth interview, the interviewer must possess considerable psychological sophistication as well as a good grounding in the principles of modern dynamic psychology. Clumsy and aimless in-depth interviewing produces nothing, and its indiscriminate application by amateurs can result in more confusion than insight.

Informal Media Testing

The testing techniques discussed, to this point, are very sophisticated and require technical knowledge in both the planning and implementation of their use. Surveys and in-depth interviews should be methodically planned and tested prior to implementation. This takes time—something often lacking to a PSYOP programmer. Often an immediate test or evaluation of a leaflet or other item of communication is required. Therefore, if operational pressures do not permit the use of the formal techniques discussed above, the PSYOP programmer might elect to test the communication informally on:

- Members of his local national staff, or
- An accidental urban or rural sample, or
- An accidental sample of prisoners or returnees, or on all three

At times, informal testing or evaluation is accomplished after a leaflet is printed and distributed.

One respondent, a 22-year-old former Viet Cong and teacher of "politics, culture, and indoctrination," made the following significant comments concerning PSYOP leaflets:

I propose that you use suitable terms in preparation of leaflets. It is natural that both sides try to abuse each other but we must speak ill of our opponent in an elegant manner. The picture must adhere to the truth because the readers will compare them with reality. If they find out that the leaflets are excessive, they will lose confidence. Most of the men from North Vietnam have a good culture and their general education level is equivalent to Junior High School, therefore, they can make a clear cut observation and analysis. Thus special attention must be paid to the text as well as to the pictures in the leaflet and efforts made to adhere to the truth as far as possible.¹⁴

This kind of feedback, obtained during an interrogation or interview, is useful to PSYOP media programmers. As noted before, however, it must be considered together with other data.¹⁵

Measuring the Effects of Communication

Variables

Measuring the effects of PSYOP communication is, of course, primarily of interest to commanders, planners, and communicators. The effect of communication is directly related to its purpose. It is difficult to learn the effect of persuasive communications, especially about targets in hostile areas, because, apart from the question of audience accessibility, media

effects are so diffuse and so variable in character that they defy simple analysis or uniform description. A complete inventory of the prerequisites needed to measure effects of PSYOP programs is yet to be formulated. In this regard, de Grazia presents some idea of the complexity:

... responses to communications may be specific or general in nature, they may be of short or long duration, they may be of high or low intensity. In some instances a communication may produce a significant change in attitude with no accompanying change in observable behavior. In other instances, behavior appears to change markedly without any appreciable change in attitudes. Some intended effects may be produced in some people by carefully planned messages. In other audiences, the same messages may produce precisely opposite effects, or no effects at all. In short, the question that is of most interest to the psychological warfare operator, namely, that as to the target's intellectual and emotional responses to his messages, is still largely unanswered by students of the human sciences.¹⁶ (Emphasis added.)

Although assessment is difficult, the data-gathering techniques and procedures discussed in the previous paragraphs are relevant in discovering whether communication media stimulated behavior or had a measurable effect on restructuring attitudes. As stated previously, it is important to consider attitudes as gradients or points along a continuous scale.

In analyzing the effect of PSYOP communication and strategy, there are many considerations. A partial list of the variables includes:

- a. The type and location of the target
- b. The number and variety of channels open to the target
- c. The degree of program saturation over the various channels. (It is apparent that a PSYOP campaign that is given unlimited media support and money is likely to have greater impact than a limited effort.)
- d. The degree to which the messages conform to group standards.

The techniques discussed in regard to target analysis and communication testing are applicable in measuring the effect of PSYOP programs. Where possible, a combination of data-gathering techniques should be employed. Some social psychologists profess that it is rarely possible to predict action behavior from "paper and pencil" (survey) responses. However, Samuel Flowerman maintains that:

since all measurements, even in the physical sciences, are indirect measurements, we commit no violence to scientific method by urging additional criteria for estimating effectiveness of pro-temperance propaganda. . . . (Perhaps effectiveness in social psychology is like infinity in mathematics; we may approach it but never attain it. Yet this does not stop us from making progress.) . . . We can accept as evidence the satisfaction of a reasonable number and kinds of criteria of effectiveness. Such reasoning would also enable us to make better comparisons between two different sets of propaganda symbols.¹⁷

Criteria of Effectiveness

Six indicators of the effectiveness of PSYOP will be discussed.

1. *Immediate Recall.* Other things being equal, the content of messages that are immediately recalled is more effective than that of messages that are not recalled (forgotten).

However, it appears that unfavorable messages as well as highly favorable messages are liable to be remembered.

2. *Delayed Recall.* Other things being equal, PSYOP messages that are remembered for a long time after exposure are more effective; usually the longer it is recalled the more effective the message.

3. *Repetition.* Other things being equal, messages that are repeated to others are more effective than those that are not so repeated. This can be developed further to take into account the circumstances of repetition, the number and kind of persons repeating the message, chains of repetition, and accuracy of repetition.

4. *"Paper and Pencil" Behavior (Attitude Surveys).* A significant measurement of the effectiveness of PSYOP messages and programs can be obtained from the responses to well-constructed questionnaires (surveys) and the development of appropriate scales for measuring key indicators of attitudes. For example, questions pertaining to the key attitude indicators would be included in a programmed survey for a particular social group or geographical area, and the data would be collected prior to the initiation of the PSYOP program. After the data are collected, PSYOP target and effect analysis personnel would retrieve the data on the attitude indicators and it would be indexed according to an appropriate scale. This would represent an attitude rating prior to the initiation of the PSYOP program. Subsequent surveys conducted at appropriate intervals during the campaign would provide information about the progress or lack of progress concerning attitude change.

5. *Physical Response to a Message.* It was emphasized that the primary purpose of PSYOP is to influence the behavior of the audience; therefore, positive audience action is the final indicant of the effectiveness of PSYOP communication. When specific action, such as writing letters, voting, or defecting, is called for, and takes place, then the effectiveness of a given item of communication (or campaign) becomes apparent, although, of course, it must be demonstrated that the action was motivated by the message and not by some other factor in the situation. Sometimes, PSYOP messages serve as stimulants for future action.

6. *Content Analysis.* Indicators of PSYOP effectiveness can often be obtained from a content analysis of the monitoring of radio communication, newspapers and other publications, captured documents, enemy propaganda, and in-depth interviews and other intelligence reports.

CONCLUSION

In sum, PSYOP intelligence is vitally important to the development and the implementation of meaningful PSYOP programs. It is used to obtain current information about PSYOP targets, to test or obtain feedback with regard to message content and format, and to measure the effect of PSYOP messages and programs.

NOTES

¹ Wilbur Schramm, *Mass Media and National Development* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 177.

² Oriana Fallaci, "The Americans Will Lose" Says General Giap, *Washington Post*, Section V, April 6, 1969.

³ Daniel Lerner, *Sykewar Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to V-E Day* (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1949), pp. 135-136.

⁴ The terms "target analysis" and "audience research" are used in this report synonymously.

⁵ See Phillip P. Katz, "PSYOP and Communication Theory," (Chapter II of this casebook).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Guide for Psychological Operations," April 27, 1968, p. IV-9.

⁸ Alfred de Grazia, *Target Analysis and Media in Propaganda to Audiences Abroad* (ORO-T-222) (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 1953), p. 57.

⁹ Opinion Research Corporation, "The People of South Vietnam: How They Feel About the War," a CBS News Public Opinion Survey (Princeton, N.J.: Opinion Research Corporation, 1967) p. 1.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Thomas C. Sorensen, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 77.

¹³ The panel design is the most vital component of the process. For an evaluation of the panel-impact design, see Donald Campbell and Keith N. Clayton, "Avoiding Regression Effects in Panel Studies of Communication Impact," *Studies in Public Communication*, 1961, no. 3, pp. 99-117.

¹⁴ Office Memorandum. United States Government. From Colonel Johnston to Mr. Giebuhr, Subject: Evaluation Report, Leaflets. Evaluation of Leaflet SP-1069 September 1, 1966.

¹⁵ There have been a number of studies dealing with techniques for pretesting leaflets. See H. C. Bush, *Pretesting PSYOPS Leaflets in Vietnam* (Honolulu, Hawaii, 1963).

¹⁶ de Grazia, *Target Analysis*, p. 55.

¹⁷ Samuel H. Flowerman, "Mass Propaganda in the War Against Bigotry," *Journal of Social Psychology*, XLII (1947), pp. 436-437. (Emphasis added.)

PSYOP Intelligence Requirements

Initial treatment in the intelligence portion of this chapter is given to intelligence requirements for psychological operations, specifically, the role of intelligence, planning requirements, language and interpretation, and, finally, timeliness.

The role of intelligence in PSYOP is similar to the overall role of intelligence in military operations. Although conceptually narrower—clearly, PSYOP intelligence concerns only that information relevant to PSYOP and excludes all other military intelligence—the intelligence potentially useful for effective psychological operations covers an extremely wide range of subject matter, probably broader than that useful for any other military task. This is evidenced by the EEI for PSYOP intelligence.

The role of doctrine and policy in PSYOP intelligence is to place limits on methods or sources, or to provide guidance with respect to the utilization of certain methods or sources. Doctrinal constraints are important, but our involvement in Vietnam clearly indicates that more emphasis needs to be placed upon the refinement and modification of doctrine and policy based upon experience in the field. (See Chapter III.)

The solution of the language usage problem can be the difference between successful and unsuccessful PSYOP campaigns. It is essential to use the idiom correctly. (See Chapter V of Martin F. Herz, "Lessons From VC/NVA Propaganda," Chapter V.) It is also necessary to insure that the dialect is properly selected for the target group. The context of the language as used must also be proper in the minds of the target audience. The role of research in assuring these factors is to validate the use of the language, idiom, and dialect. Native language facility on the part of PSYOP personnel is highly desirable, but hardly ever exists; therefore the use of interpreters is common. There are many problems associated with utilization of such an intermediary, among which are accuracy, target audience perception of the intermediary, and social position of the intermediary.

Timeliness is a major factor in both the production and the content of intelligence. While old data are not necessarily invalid data, constant vigilance must be exercised to insure that changes have not in fact invalidated intelligence material. For many categories of PSYOP intelligence—categories relating to the culture and economy of the audience, for example—change will not be rapid.

PSYOP depends upon adequate intelligence. Without it, adequate targeting, choice of the optional channel of communications, and message selection can never be systematically attained.

PSYOP ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION*

BY THE 7TH PSYOP GROUP

This enumeration of the PSYOP EEI analyzes the information required for effective PSYOP planning and comments on current military information collection activities relevant to psychological operations.

SUMMARY

Psychological operations research and analysis entails three major functions: Analysis of the target area; propaganda analysis; and evaluation of PSYOP media output through pre-testing and post-testing, and determination of reactions of inhabitants of the target area. Psychological operations research and analysis has particular information requirements which are different from those of combat and tactical intelligence. Briefly, psychological operations intelligence research and analysis needs to know about what it is like to live in the target area, about all aspects of life there so that psychological operations media output (leaflets, radio broadcasts, loudspeaker broadcasts, and so forth) can be developed which are suitable for the target area. This particular approach requires a large amount of detailed information about the life patterns and living conditions of people in various occupations and social levels in the target area.

*From "PSYOP Intelligence Notes," No. 62, by the Target Analysis Section, 7th PSYOP Group, 3 December 1968.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

At present information collection by military components is mostly centered around the obtaining and reporting of information about strictly military subjects. Only a small part of this kind of information has been found satisfactory for use in support of psychological operations. This brief guide tells the kinds of information which are useful in support of psychological operations. The following is a suggested list of PSYOP essential elements of information:

Social Organization. Composition of the society by ethnic group, age, sex, occupation, role, status, and so forth. Distribution of people by occupation and territorial location (that is urban, towns, villages). The family in the society. Method of reckoning kinship in the society (names of relationships used). Social stratification—levels, ranks, classes, and prerogatives, duties and privileges of each social level. Tensions between social groups. Methods of social control. Attitudes of each class. Suitable psychological operations messages, themes, and techniques. Best delivery techniques for psychological operations messages for each group. Accessibility of each group to PSYOP media output.

Daily Routine. Specify in detail all activities performed by a person on normal work days and on special days, giving approximate timetable, including the hours for rising and retiring, beginning and ending work, preparing and taking meals, time spent in recreation, meetings, shopping, cooking, washing, cleaning and conversation. Include seasonal variations, for example, the farmer's year may be broken down into the periods of preparation of fields, planting, growing season, harvesting, and the off season. Different routines for people in various occupations such as farmers, factory workers, miners, school children, army personnel, government workers, and administrative personnel at various levels; men, women, and children may have different patterns.

Habitual Customs. Habits in the individual's household with regard to food, sleep, bodily functions and cleanliness, and all forms of normal or customary behavior. Gestures. Postures. Bodily positions.

Etiquette. Standards of behavior and actual or normal behavior in relations between individuals, including with other members of the farm household and village, fellow factory workers, officials in higher positions and the like. Include salutations, forms of address, special gestures, rules of hospitality, and politeness toward others in accordance with rank, age, sex, and relationship. Special forms of behavior and treatment of higher officials, old people, children, fellow workers.

Training and Education. Treatment and training of children. Children's activities. Nurseries, kindergartens, primary, and secondary schools—mode of attendance, activities, subjects, text books, and other pertinent matters. Acquisition of traditional cultural patterns. Training in bodily habits, postures, language. Manifestations of fear, anxiety, and affection in children, and how handled by adults.

Life Cycle of Individuals. Conception, contraception, pregnancy, abortion, birth, infanticide, suckling, and naming. Childhood. Puberty. Adolescence. Sexual practices—including normal patterns and development, deviations from normal development, frigidity, impotence, bestiality, prostitution. Courtship. Age at marriage. Betrothal. Types of marriages and ceremonies. Divorce. Adulthood. Old age. Death. Suicide. Burial technique and disposal of the dead, including normal deaths, dead from epidemics, soldiers in war, enemy soldiers, infants, and other related matters. Ceremonies held at various stages of life cycle, including birth, transition from puberty to adulthood, marriage, attainment of old age (for example, 60th birthday in Korea), death, burial, and post-burial.

Political Organization. Systems and types of government at national, regional, provincial, township, and village levels. Political leadership and organizations at all levels. Prerogatives of leaders, special treatment. Obligations of leaders. Councils. Quasi-political associations, units, and organizations. Crime, law, and justice.

Economic Organization. Property. Types of property (real estate, household and occupational equipment, personal effects, ritual objects, foodstuffs, livestock). Rights to utilization of property. Inheritance. Land tenure. Production (industry, trade, agriculture, herding, fishing, hunting, and collecting). Seasonal variations of production. Participants in production. Complaints and stresses of people engaged in production. Organization of work. Distribution of products of the various forms of production. Stores and shops at all levels. Availability and scarcity of food and consumer goods. Stocks and prices of goods. Farmers markets. Monetary system. Remuneration for labor. Consumption of items produced, for instance, final uses. Rationing systems. Attitudes of people to all of above.

Ideological and Religious Beliefs and Practices. Beliefs about men and about the supernatural. Ceremonies, rituals, meetings, and detailed description of proceedings. Sacred or venerated objects. Culture heroes. Myths. Religious organizations and societies. Secret societies. Beliefs associated with warfare.

Knowledge. Methods of recording and communications (writing systems, languages, dialects, tape recorders, shorthand systems, motion pictures, photography). Methods of counting and reckoning. Measures of weights, distance, surface, capacity, time, and value. Seasons, weather, and climate. History and myths. Culture heroes. Stories, songs, and sayings.

Communications. TV and radio communications (numbers and types of broadcasting facilities). numbers, types, and distribution of receivers. Wire-diffusion systems. Publishing of books, magazines, of newspapers and their distribution. Literacy. Availability of foreign language published materials. Motion picture industry (languages, types of films, and distribution). Languages and types of recorded materials. Public information organizations in area and content of media. Censorship. Attitude,

reaction, and credibility of people to indigenous public information. Distribution of non-indigenous propaganda materials (leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker broadcasts). Attitude, reaction, and credibility among local people. Numbers of people who listen to or see non-indigenous propaganda. Word-of-mouth communication and gossip systems. Meetings, speech making, and other modes of information dissemination. Postal system. Telephone system. Telegraph and teletype systems.

Personal Care and Decoration. Cleanliness. Perfumes. Sanitation. Personal appearance (hair-dressing, nails, teeth, cosmetics, tattoos, clothing, personal ornaments, recognition marks, and visible symbols of rank, emblems and badges, membership in organizations, status).

Housing. Patterns of housing in cities, towns, and villages. Description of interiors and exteriors of houses. Lists of and placement of all objects found in each room and in and around houses. Functions of each room of a house or apartment and facilities near the dwelling. Ownership of houses. Who lives in houses—family relationship. Assignment of houses. Arrangement of houses in villages. Other structures in villages. Urban dwellings—houses, apartments, and rooms. Relation of dwelling to place of employment. Shortage of houses. Attitude of people to housing.

Food. Foods and their preparation. Seasonal variations. Availability of food and drink. Preservation and storage of food. Cooking techniques. Nature and times of all meals. Condiments. Special customs. Rationing of food. Forbidden food. Food preferences. Water and other liquids consumed—source, availability, and preparation. Stimulants and narcotics. Attitudes of the people relating to all of the above.

Travel and Transportation. Modes of travel and transportation. Vehicles. Routes and roads. Restrictions and documentation related to travel and transportation. Resettlement of population. Migration.

The Arts. Drawing, painting, sculpture, music, musical instruments, dancing, singing, literature, poetry, drama, games, and amusements. Descriptions of the preceding. When and where do they take place? Sponsorship of such activities.

Health and Sanitation. Medical Practices. Modern and traditional medical techniques. Personal hygiene. Training of practitioners. Medical organization and system. Availability of medical service and supplies at all levels. Attitude and reaction of people to medical services.

THE NVA SOLDIER IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS A PSYOP TARGET*

BY THE JUSPAO PLANNING OFFICE

The presence of soldiers in a country other than that of their origin, even when this country of deployment has had a long history of close cultural contact with their country of origin, offers a variety of themes to PSYOP unavailable for use against indigenous forces.

*Excerpts from PSYOPS POLICY, No 59, 20 February 1968 JUSPAO Planning Office, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam.

PROBLEM

To focus PSYOP more effectively on the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldier in South Vietnam; devise surrender or defection appeals for dissemination to NVA units in South Vietnam (SVN); and provide field personnel with information on the most recent vulnerabilities and deterrents to surrender or defection in the psychological makeup of the NVA soldier.

DISCUSSION

The North Vietnamese soldier in South Vietnam presents a particularly difficult target for GVN/US PSYOP aimed at inducing surrender or defection. He has a relatively high state of indoctrination, reinforced by a range of psychological controls wielded by the cadre which include self-criticism sessions, the three-man cell, and the endless repetition of communist themes. A contributory reason for the resistance of the NVA soldier to Chieu Hoi inducements is that unlike the Viet Cong, defection for most does not hold the promise of an early family reunion.

Moreover, unlike the VC guerrilla who may be a teenager conscripted from his hamlet environment by VC "recruiters" and sent into battle without much party schooling and political indoctrination, the NVA soldier is the product of a closed, totalitarian society, subjected to communist indoctrination from his earliest school days. This makes him more resistant as a PSYOP target. Unlike the VC he finds himself fighting in a region unfamiliar and semi-antagonistic to him, usually in relatively uninhabited areas and with little chance for contact with the civilian population.

There are three options that should be pointed out to him in US/GVN PSYOP messages:

The first is to rally, take advantage of the Chieu Hoi program and in short order become a free citizen of the RVN. (Until further notice, only defection appeals as outlined in PSYOP Policy #57 of 8 Feb 68 are to be observed.)

Second is to surrender as a prisoner of war and await repatriation at the end of the war in the safety and relative comfort of a prisoner of war camp.

As a third alternative, until the opportunity of either rallying or surrendering may present itself, NVA soldiers should be counseled to devote all their efforts to individual survival rather than getting killed or maimed for an unjust cause. Malingering, the avoidance of risks, passive resistance to the exhortations of the cadre should be stressed as a way to survive the war. Even a partial success in this PSYOP effort will contribute to shortening the war by reducing the combat effectiveness of NVA units.

While a decision to rally will be personally more advantageous to the individual, it may involve too direct a renunciation of country, family and all past training to form the substance of a viable PSYOP appeal in every

instance. Whichever of the alternatives are offered to NVA soldiers in our PSYOP messages, the vulnerabilities which they exploit remain the same.

The NVA as a PSYOP Target

. . . . The most recent study shows that the age of infiltrators has dropped significantly. Prior to 1966, the most frequent age at infiltration was 22 years, with a lesser age peak for cadre at 25. By mid-1967 the age distribution had changed to a very sharp concentration at 19 with a much lesser age peak (again cadre) at 26 years. Further age drops are indicated. For instance, prisoners captured in July 1967 stated that 60 NVA replacements received by the battalion in June had all been 16 or 17 years old. Moreover, the composition of the NVA force has undergone a change from a majority of volunteers to over 70 percent draftees or former servicemen recalled to duty.

There is also some indication that soldiers with relatives in the South were included for the first time among the infiltrators, by mid-1967, although no estimate of their number is available. Previously, the NVA avoided sending to the South men whose immediate families regrouped to the South in 1954.

These factors would appear to reduce to some degree the responsiveness of the latest NVA infiltrators to cadre propaganda and provide greater opportunity for exploitation of vulnerabilities by US/GVN PSYOP techniques.

Vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities themselves have not changed significantly over the past two years but they may have been intensified somewhat due to the change in the makeup of the force.

Separation from families, the hardships of infiltrations, fear of allied arms, and perhaps most significantly, the contrast between what they have been told by the cadre and what they experience themselves, are major exploitable weaknesses. For example:

NVA soldiers, told that most of South Viet Nam is already "liberated," come South and find that they must hide in the jungle and are stalked continuously by the heavy weapons of their adversaries.

They have been told by the cadre that the side which controls the people will win the war and that the VC have already won the support of more than two-thirds of the people and control four-fifths of the land. But instead of being welcomed by the people, NVA soldiers find that they must live in hiding, cut off from the people, who are sullen and seek to avoid contact with them. The recent NVA-VC Tet offensive, which failed in its aim to induce a general uprising, reinforces this vulnerability.

They have been force-fed in training and throughout the constant indoctrination sessions with tales of NVA/VC victories and GVN/U.S. defeats. According to the cadre, Americans have low morale and fighting

skill, cannot stand the climate, think only of going home. ARVN troops are reported to be poor fighters who are despised by the people. In the face of these optimistic forecasts, NVA soldiers find that they are subjected to incessant pounding and that the VC units to which they are attached or with which they operate are forever withdrawing from areas or hiding in the jungle.

They are told that the Americans, like the French before them, have enslaved the people, who are living in misery, exploited by the colonialists and the landlord class. These are the lackeys of the Americans and compose the puppet government in Saigon. Instead, on the rare occasions that NVA troops come in contact with the civilian population, they find them relatively well off, in possession of more material goods than are available in the North, and not interested in being 'liberated.' Though US/GVN media messages are in part discounted because of the training and indoctrination of NVA soldiers, our PSYOP products with which they come into occasional contact (leaflets, radio broadcasts, posters) may also give them pause for thought if they project convincingly an image of SVN well-being and confidence.

The party's concern for the soldiers is a standard indoctrination topic, the gist being that the party and the country are proud of the fighter who will be given a hero's welcome when he returns after the Americans are driven out, or if wounded along the way, he will be well taken care of, or if killed in battle, he will die a hero's death and will be buried with honor and live forever in the grateful memory of his countrymen. But NVA soldiers fear that they will get little care if wounded, might even be left behind on the battlefield, and if killed, might be hastily buried in unmarked graves, which their families will never find. They have this fear because they know that this is what happened to some of their comrades, contrary to what they had been taught to expect.

There is almost no mail connection with their families in the North. While several years ago letters could be sent to immediate families without limitation, latest interrogations state that only one letter on a single sheet can be sent North every six months, and mail from the families is similarly sparse, censored, and uncommunicative. This deprivation is intensely felt by the soldiers, most of whom despair of ever seeing their families again.

Deterrents

The endless repetition of the same communist themes by the cadre, by official publications and training documents, and in the cadre-managed self-criticism sessions sets up near automatic responses along the lines desired by the party, irrespective of objective reality. Because of this pattern, there is a tendency to reject Allied arguments out of hand. It is hard to break through to the NVA soldier with PSYOP messages because of this mental conditioning.

... The capability of the party cadre to instill a spirit of self-sacrifice in

the minds of the troops is another of the strengths of its propaganda. To endure hardships, to be wounded or die for the just cause and live forever in the memory of the people as a hero of the revolution is a potent theme in talking to the young. By the time the trail and the hardships in the South have ground them down, they go on automatically. Each successive disillusionment alienates them further from the cause, but these doubts cannot be expressed to anyone, and with all the suffering and blood spilled for the cause, it is difficult for an NVA member to rationalize himself into defection.

A powerful cohesive element is the three man cell system present throughout the NVA, by which political and disciplinary control is maintained. Though detested as a device to prove the cadre right most of the time, it serves the function of letting off steam, improving survival chances in combat, and responding to emotional needs as a kind of family substitute. But just as in the family group in a totalitarian state, innermost thoughts are kept to oneself.

Conclusion

While vulnerabilities among the NVA in South Vietnam appear to be on the increase, units continue to show a remarkable degree of cohesion, largely due to the psychological controls and continuous group therapy (cell system, self-criticism sessions) to which they are exposed. However, according to the available evidence, NVA units and individual infiltrators are now younger and less conditioned than ever before. The effects of war weariness, disenchantment, and the nagging deprivations on these less seasoned troops should serve to make them a more promising PSYOP target than in the past.

GUIDANCE

In devising a PSYOP program aimed at NVA units and individual NVA infiltrators, both the elements of cohesion and the psychological vulnerabilities of the target audience will have to be taken into account. Whittling away at the indoctrinated response might be less productive in the short run than exploiting obvious vulnerabilities, but in the long run a weakening of the soldiers' psychological defenses, laboriously built by the cadre, may cause their entire world view to crumble. At any rate our approach should be in tandem. We deal here with the cohesive elements first, as they are harder to tackle.

Attacking Elements of Cohesion

The endless repetitions of communist themes of colonial oppression, liberation and revolutionary duty must be countered by patient, reasoned, and repetitive efforts to explain American policies and intentions in Vietnam simply and convincingly. That we seek no colonial status, no bases or special privileges, that we have solemnly stated we will withdraw when the Vietnamese people themselves have had a chance

to decide their own future without foreign pressure or interference, that the people of South Viet Nam need no liberation, that they are already free, with institutions chosen by majority rule, these are the points that need to be made continuously and persuasively.

The myth of cadre and party infallibility must be attacked over and over again by contrasting word with deed or fact. We must ask insistently whether the NVA soldier knows the real purpose of the three-man cell and the constant self-criticism sessions, namely to make him into a tool of his leaders and trick him into casting aside those doubts and hopes that do not correspond with the aims of the party. We must reassure him that his doubts and hopes are right that they are shared secretly by a majority of his comrades and openly by most of the world, and that the goals of the party are wrong, disruptive of harmony, destructive of family life, cruel, unjust, and therefore doomed to failure.

We must counter the mental conditioning against surrender or defection as a dishonorable act and the concomitant fear of mistreatment at GVN/U.S. hands, which have been drilled into NVA troops by their cadre. To do this effectively, we must provide potential ralliers both with a framework of sound rationalizations and detailed instructions on giving up the fight. We must persuade the NVA soldier that to surrender or rally will be neither dishonorable nor personally detrimental to him, on the contrary, that ending the bloodshed and suffering both individually and collectively, can only benefit the Vietnamese people.

Attacking Vulnerabilities

... The vulnerabilities to be exploited are covered in some detail by the individual themes given below. In general they include separation from families, lack of mail, the daily hardships and risks which are particularly harsh on the unseasoned young troops now being brought into battle, poor or nonexistent medical care, and the wide contrasts between what they are taught to believe by the cadre and what they experience or see for themselves.

Now that there are indications that soldiers with relatives in the South are beginning to appear among the infiltrators, our range of PSYOP appeals should include some messages assuring reunion with these family members. A concerted effort should be made to identify NVA Hoi Chanh with relatives in the South and to obtain family reunion photos for use with these leaflets.

Different approaches should be used for PSYOP messages along the infiltration route and those to NVA units within the RVN. Trail leaflets might suggest ways to avoid service such as symptoms of grave sickness, straggling and desertion while still in North Vietnam.

THEMES

Attacking Vulnerabilities

Sympathize with the NVA soldier on the hardships he must undergo in

the South, give him credit for his courage and steadfastness, but prove to him that he has been misled, that the cause for which he is fighting is not just and not deserving the sacrifice of his young manhood. Couple with Chieu Hoi message.

* * * * *

Illustrate that NVA forces in the RVN face a formidable Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) defense force, highly motivated because they are not attacking anyone else's territory but defending their own, equipped with the most modern weapons, aided by the most powerful nation in the world in an unbeatable combination. To avoid the death or mutilation which will become inevitable the longer he remains with the NVA or VC, offer the NVA soldier the advantages of the Chieu Hoi program.

* * * * *

Convey as often and as persuasively as possible the story of defeats suffered by NVA units in South Vietnam. Give credible details of these defeats and ask the recipient of the leaflet to reflect on his own whether or not the cadre are lying to him. Again, couple with surrender or Chieu Hoi appeals.

In case NVA soldiers do not have the opportunity to surrender or rally in the heat of battle, suggest that they permit themselves to be captured and provide full information on the treatment of prisoners of war by the GVN, including scrupulous observance of the Geneva Convention, ample food and medical care, educational and sports programs, mail privileges, Red Cross inspections and gifts, and eventual repatriation.

Remind NVA soldiers that they are wasting the best years of their lives away from families and friends in North Vietnam. Recall that the first NVA infiltrators were told in 1963 that South Vietnam would be "liberated" in that year. Pose the question of whether their sacrifice is justified and offer the Chieu Hoi program as an alternative.

* * * * *

Sympathize with the NVA soldiers' lack of working mail communication with their close families back home. Pose the question of whether the cadres do not want to keep them isolated from the world in order to shut out all unfavorable news and control them even more completely. Talk knowledgeably about their worry concerning the safety of relatives in the north, reiterate that only military targets are bombed by U.S. planes to make NVN stop its invasion of the South, but that the U.S. is cognizant that civilians living or working near military objectives may inadvertently suffer. State that their decision to rally or to get captured is an honorable way to shorten this bloody internecine war.

* * * * *

.... During future Tet seasons, utilize photos of ex-NVA soldiers enjoying life with a family in the South, grouped around a festive Tet table. Point up the complete disregard of the NVA/VC for Tet and its meaning as seen in the treacherous 1968 Tet offensive. The special family significance of Tet continues to have a hold on the emotions of NVA

members, and its celebration in the free South should be stressed. Offer the Chieu Hoi program as their way to a brighter future.

Attacking the Indoctrinated Response

The entire mental conditioning of NVA troops, pursued through political indoctrination sessions, the three-man cell system, and constant exhortation by the cadre, aims at achieving automatic responses reflecting the communist party view of world issues. This rote learning becomes a powerful cohesive element. It can be chipped at only by repeated discoveries that what has been studied and accepted as gospel truth does not accord with visible facts in the soldier's personal experience. We probably cannot hope to substitute printed arguments for personal experience, but can reinforce the secret doubts which may have been nagging typical target audience members.

We have to build confidence and reassure NVA soldiers that the secret doubts they have been harboring are correct and that they are secretly shared by their comrades. The three-man cell system is a cruel and dishonest game, we should tell them, to have them suppress legitimate doubts and make them putty in the hands of the cadre. Again, the Chieu Hoi program is a way to reassert that they are human beings instead of machines without a will of their own.

The themes of colonialism, U.S. aggression, SVN misery and exploitation, the hireling nature of the GVN, are the kinds that are drilled daily into NVA troops to trigger parrot responses and automatic rejection of contrary evidence. Our messages must whittle away at each of these themes.

We need to remind the NVA soldier continuously that although he is being told he is in South Vietnam to "liberate" his southern compatriots, the people do not need or want the kind of liberation he is ordered to bring them. He should be aware that he is rejected by the people whom he is sent to "liberate."

PSYOP messages should stress that the United States is not in South Vietnam for a colonialist purpose, but only to help the elected government to defend itself against aggression and the imposition of a communist system rejected by the majority. The United States is in Vietnam at the invitation of the GVN. It will leave when the GVN no longer requires U.S. assistance to defend itself and requests the departure of U.S. troops. United States leaders have stated America's intention to withdraw as soon as practicable after a settlement is reached with Hanoi.

The GVN and the United States have tried every possible way to get Hanoi to the conference table, but Ho Chi Minh and his government have not responded.

RVN prosperity and the development of representative institutions which give every man an opportunity to work, learn, and earn according to his free will and his personal ability instead of forever being told what to do, should be emphasized over and over again with photo illustrations where appropriate.

Repetitive use of messages showing plenty of consumer goods in the hands of the RVN people, such as private vehicles and appliances, plentiful food, entertainment and educational opportunities instead of the deprivation and drastic controls that are the rule in North Vietnam, should raise the question of which system performs better for the people.

Examples of the SVN National Assembly taking independent steps, reprimanding the government, or causing changes in government plans can be used to drive home odious comparisons with the totalitarian institutions of North Vietnam. Again, we should ask and answer: which regime serves the people better?

TRANSLATION PROBLEMS*

BY RICHARD H. ORTH

Although bilingual interactions will often escape precisely accurate translation, there are a number of steps the psyoperator can undertake to overcome or minimize this problem.

When the population studied speaks a foreign language, the problems of translation have to be faced. While it will not always be possible to obtain perfect translations, the PSYOP officer should strive to reach a reasonable approximation and to avoid known pitfalls. In some cases, the PSYOP officer may be fluent in the foreign language. In many instances he will have to rely on other U.S. Army or indigenous personnel who speak the local language or dialect. Some of the problems involved in translation and some solutions that have been developed by various researchers are considered below.

Problems of word meaning. In translations one seeks to get across the identical meaning from one language into another. There are several hurdles to the accomplishment of this end. A word may have two or more meanings. A word's meaning is affected and may be altered by the context. Words may carry the general meaning but differ in intensity—for example "very good," "excellent," "outstanding." A word or statement carries with it a certain feeling tone and implied values and assumptions of which an outsider may not be aware.

Possible solutions to problems of word meaning. To counteract the above problems, the following methods have been developed on the basis of field experience. Two or more persons translate an item independently of each other so that any discrepancies can be checked and resolved.¹ "Back translations" are made. This means that in addition to the original translation from English into a foreign language, a retranslation is made by another person or persons into English. The original text and the "back translated" text should be practically identical in meaning. Any differences should then be resolved.² Translators should be especially sensitive to the intensity of a word. If time is available the translated wording can be tried out on some foreign nationals and the interviewer may question them to see whether intended meanings come across. When

Original essay by Richard H. Orth

words and statements imply more than the direct literal translation, these implications must be spelled out.³

Problems of spoken versus written language. In every language, there are differences between the spoken and the written language. Such differences may reflect distinct functions; for example, the formal literary language may be used in legal and governmental relations, while the villagers discuss their problems among themselves in the vernacular or a dialect. Social class factors may be involved in the choice of words. Terms appropriate for legal matters may be quite unsuitable for a frank and unrestrained interview. In addition, certain items may be incomprehensible to local people. Although a word is listed in the dictionary, it may not be familiar to the rural dwellers. Such abstract concepts as "prestige," "problem," and "loyalty" may be meaningless to many rural people.⁴

Possible solutions to problems of spoken versus written language. To overcome the above difficulties, some solutions have been offered in social science literature. The use of persons familiar with the language or dialect is recommended. A try-out of the items is indicated with some persons who are as familiar as possible with the local language usage. In general, it would be well to keep in mind that rural people usually are not too familiar with the literary language. Therefore, it would be a good rule of thumb to use simple words and sentences in the translated text. Another practical solution is to use an illiterate translator immersed in the local culture who translates to a literate translator who in turn can write down the translation.⁵ When unfamiliar concepts, for example, "prestige" or "loyalty" are to be translated, one may find a simpler synonym or define the term in simpler words.⁶

Problems of social context. The meaning of a word is affected not only by its place within a sentence or statement but also by the social and situational context in which it is spoken.

Possible solutions to problems of social context. To overcome these problems, it is advisable where possible to use personnel who have bicultural experience and can perceive the effects of the situation and the cultural setting of the words.⁷

Problems due to interviewers. Interviewers may influence the responses to a questionnaire or interview not only by their use of language but also by their personal effect on the respondent. For example, when city students from the capital are used to interview rural people, they may evoke a negative or suspicious set among the latter.

Possible solutions to problems due to interviewers. It has been proposed to have a native interviewer, even if he is illiterate, pose the questions and have the outside researcher (for example, a student) write down the responses. Another possibility is to give a tape recorder to an illiterate local interviewer.

The quality of translations is limited by time, personnel, and budget. One cannot be certain of achieving ideal translations. One can, however, strive for a reasonable approximation of meaning by using the above suggestions within the given limitations.

When the respondents speak another language, the questions have to be translated. Translations should carry the precise meaning, yet often there is no one-to-one relationship of words in two languages. While the PSYOP officer may not find ideal conditions to solve these problems, a number of suggestions are offered to obtain reasonably accurate translations.

NOTES

¹ Herbert P. Phillips, "Problems of Translation of Meaning in Field Work," *Human Organization*, XVIII, no. 4 (Winter 1959-60), pp. 184-192.

² Eugene Jacobson, Hideya Kumata, and Jeanne E. Gullahern, "Cross-Cultural Contributions to Attitude Research," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIV (1960), pp. 205-223.

³ Phillips, "Problems of Translation."

⁴ Frederick W. Frey, "Surveying Peasant Attitudes in Turkey," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVII, (Fall 1963), pp. 335-355.

⁵ Susan Ervin, and Robert T. Bower, "Translation Problems in International Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVI (1952), pp. 595-604.

⁶ Frey, "Surveying Peasant Attitudes."

⁷ Ervin and Bower, "Translation Problems."

TET IN VIET NAM*

BY CHUONG DAC LONG

Time is an important determinant in the receptivity of audiences to media as well as to messages. Analyses such as this one facilitate message composition and media selection.

The custom of celebrating Tet goes back to remote antiquity. Like many other Vietnamese traditions it was imported from China. . . . One of the best preserved rites of Tet is the celebration of the feast of the Jinni of the Home, on the 23rd day of the 12th month. This feast gradually lost its original meaning, even in China, and when it was imported into Viet-Nam, it underwent a profound change in the minds of the people and became simply a sentimental story.

The same may be said of nearly all the customs concerning Tet: originally they were imbued with lofty and precise philosophical significance, although usually disguised under a poetic parable. The incomprehension of later ages brought about profound transformation and alteration, and the customs became largely folk beliefs. They should be examined in this light, rather than rejected outright as beliefs of no value, unworthy of consideration. Nothing is more moving to Vietnamese than the permanence of these rites, they are like messages addressed to us by our ancestors from the distances of time.

* Excerpts from JUSPAO Field Memorandum, Number 31, November 28, 1966. JUSPAO Planning Office, Saigon.

One of the most characteristic customs of Tet consists in buying a flowering peach-tree branch that is placed in a vase for the duration of Tet. . . . Many people imagine that these branches have no other purpose than to add a graceful decoration to Vietnamese homes, and today, in fact, they have no other significance. Originally, however, they had the same effect as the *cay-neu* (a tall decorated pole erected before the house during Tet) and were used like them, to protect oneself from the visit of demons.

. . . According to the Chinese astrological calendar, time is circumscribed in revolutions of 60 years, divided into cycles of 12 years, each cycle containing 12 months, and the like. Years and months thus have the same names: there is the year *thin* (Dragon), just as there is the month *thin*; the year *ty* (Serpent), the month *ty*, the day *ty*, the hour *ty*, and the like.

A cycle of twelve years is placed under the sign of twelve supernatural powers (*hanh-khien*), some of whom are well-disposed and others hard and cruel. On the last night of the year, this power passes to the new power. The passing of service that is known as *giao-thua*.

In town and countryside, the head of each family; each mayor (*ly-truong*), each mandarin governing a province, the Emperor in his capital and all the pagodas, would offer a token sacrifice at the same moment to thank the old power *hanh-khien* and to welcome the new. This ceremony of *giao-thua* is performed in homes at midnight, the moment when the hour of the Pig (*gio hoi*) changes to that of the Rat (*gio ty*). It is carried out with great solemnity. In the old days it used to be accompanied by noisy and interminable fireworks and the beating of drums. This has given rise to the expression "*Trong keu ran nhu trong giao-thua*" ("A rolling of drums comparable to those of the *giao-thua*").

It is the custom at *giao-thua* for everyone to stay awake till morning so as to be prepared to welcome in the New Year. It is often amusing to see parents, as soon as the drums of the pagoda announce the arrival of the New Year, rush to wake up all the sleepy children in the house, sitting them up by force if necessary and, in spite of their cries and grumblings, so they too will not tempt fate by failing to observe this custom.

It is strictly forbidden to sweep the house (*after giao-thua*) during the first day of the Tet. During the days that follow, sweeping is allowed but it is absolutely forbidden to gather up rubbish and throw it away.

. . . It is forbidden to touch a broom on this Tet day. Vietnamese children recite the following riddle: "*Trong nha co mot ba hay la liem*," which means: "What person in the house scrounges all she wants?" The answer, of course is "The broom," it picks things up wherever it passes. The origin of the prohibition on removing household refuse is found in another Chinese legend. . . .

. . . One of the customs concerning Tet has a curious resemblance to a practice taught by the Druids of ancient Gaul, who used to lead the people into the forest on the first day of the year seeking lucky branches of

mistletoe they would keep the following twelve months. The Chinese and Vietnamese are also expected to bring home from their first walk of the New Year a leafy branch, if possible covered with fruit and flowers (*canh-loc*). The heavier the branch, the greater will be the riches (*loc*) earned during the coming year. Today this belief has become a reason for people to go for walks in public gardens or the Vietnamese countryside.

... It is generally supposed that Tet in Viet-Nam begins on the first day of the first month of the lunar New Year. This is true in general, but there is an exception in certain provinces (Hadong, Son Tay and Thai Nguyen), where Tet is celebrated later, during the first month. This custom dates from the reign of the Emperor Tu-Duc and is thus 70 or 80 years old. We have heard of an explanation given by certain old men, survivors of this heroic period. Emperor Tu-Duc's reign was marked by numerous uprisings and especially by frequent raids by Chinese "black flag" pirates. These pirates knew that the Vietnamese, like the Chinese, were in the habit of holding sumptuous celebrations at Tet. This offered them a good occasion to loot, burn, rape and massacre the inhabitants of the coast. After several years of this treatment, the people got together and decided to adopt the practice of *Tet cung*, or "Delayed Tet." During the days when other Vietnamese were celebrating joyfully, these people would bury their valuables, leave their homes and hide in the woods and mountains. The arriving pirates, finding nothing of interest to them, would conclude that the region was so poor that its inhabitants could not even observe Tet. A few days later, the villagers would return and hold their feasts in peace, finding their pleasure even greater for the delay. They became so used to this "delayed Tet" that they continued the custom.

PSYOP Intelligence Sources

The sources of intelligence for psychological operations are several and varied. As Phillip Katz has indicated,¹ primary sources are (1) prisoners of war, (2) defectors and refugees, (3) the civilian population, and (4) broadcasts. Other sources, of different levels of importance, include (5) captured documents, (6) enemy propaganda, (7) intelligence reports, and (8) published and unpublished reports.

In this part of the chapter are articles dealing with or illustrating intelligence production from these sources. The methods used to derive useful information from the sources—to "exploit the sources"—are covered in the following subsection, "PSYOP Intelligence Methods."

The use of prisoners of war or defectors as intelligence resources hardly requires comment here. This practice is almost as old as the concept of warfare. Refined psychological techniques for extracting information from prisoners of war have been available for a number of years and are applied with varying degrees of success by all elements of the armed forces. Treatment of defectors does not generally pose the information extraction problems encountered when handling POWs. However the problem of overstatement or understatement by the defec-

tor, for the explicit purpose of telling his new-found friends what he thinks they might want to hear cannot be discounted.

Civilians—friendly, hostile, or neutral—are an important potential source of PSYOP intelligence—especially when, as in insurgency situations, the civilian population may be the only group in constant contact with the insurgents on other than military terms. Interviewing and sampling, two major approaches to intelligence collection from the civilian populace, are discussed in the section of this chapter dealing with “PSYOP Intelligence Methods.” Similarly, travellers from among the target audience can be an important source of information on audience attitudes (though the representativeness of their views may be suspect) as well as on socioeconomic and political intelligence.²

Radio broadcasts within target areas are also a primary source of information. Monitoring such broadcasts—a newer source than those time-honored ones, such as prisoners of war and refugees—provides not only timely intelligence, but supplements, as well, the surveying of local newspapers, periodicals, and books to provide a good idea of the information locally available which helps shape the opinions of the audience.

Documents are sometimes narrowly defined as captured enemy secrets. This definition is far too narrow for intelligence purposes. Documents also include enemy-issued, or enemy-sponsored public media pronouncements and communications to other governments. With respect to U.S. psychological operations, the amount of relevant information available from this source has often been overwhelmingly large, and therefore somewhat misused or unused. Advances in information storage and retrieval, as well as in content analysis, suggest that captured documents and public utterances of an enemy regime will be far more useful intelligence resources in future PSYOP campaign planning.

The use of original documentation as an intelligence assimilation method is historically one of the most successful techniques. It involves the careful analysis of written and verbal enemy messages. Capture of documents provides an analysis source that is usually too large in volume to process well. Major problems involve screening captured documents to select those which have the highest potential impact, reliability, and accuracy³ and correlating analyses which might be based upon different and conflicting documents.

Propaganda can often appear in the form of enemy documents. In other cases, however, propaganda may take the form of rumors or other communications. (See Chapter VIII.) Enemy propaganda is one of the most fertile fields for PSYOP intelligence.⁴

Additional data for the psychoperator are contained in intelligence reports produced by U.S. or friendly intelligence agencies. These are secondary resource materials (that is, they are derived from other sources, covert or overt).

Other published and unpublished studies, reports, and documents are the last major source of intelligence. These include reporting in news-

papers, periodicals, and other media; books; theses; government or private studies or internal documents; and research findings. Like intelligence reports, these sources are usually secondary in nature (though they may incorporate primary research materials), and, again like intelligence documents, this may or may not include analysis. Inclusion of analytical comment in source material can be dangerous, since the analyses may be (1) directed toward an objective dissimilar from the one for which the document is later utilized, (2) outdated, or (3) inadequate as a result of time constraints exercised on the production of the document for its original purposes.

Sources of PSYOP intelligence often present one or two opposite problems: inadequacy or superfluity. The psyoperator may find that not enough of his material is relevant, that it is outdated, or that there is simply not enough for his needs. On the other hand, there may be so much relevant intelligence data that his primary problem is in ordering and analyzing the data in the time allowed. In either case, the information that he decides to use must be analyzed. The methodologies open to the psyoperator for analysis of his intelligence data are discussed in the following section.

NOTES

¹ Philip P. Katz, "A Survey of PSYOP Intelligence," in the beginning of this chapter.

² See, for example, Radio Free Europe, "East European Attitudes to the Vietnam Conflict: A Study in Radio Effectiveness" and "Identification with North or South Vietnam in Eastern Europe," both in Chapter IX of this casebook.

³ See U.S. Army, FM 30-5, *Combat Intelligence*.

⁴ See "Know Thine Enemy: Estimate of the Enemy Situation," Chapter V of Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannon, *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1962).

Prisoners of War

PW AND CAPTURED DOCUMENT DOCTRINE*

BY JOHN A. HEMPHILL

Newly captured prisoners of war and documents are important sources of information. To maximize usefulness, particularly in stability operations, interrogation and document translation should begin as soon as possible after capture.

The problem of what to do with prisoners of war (PW's) has perplexed military commanders from the beginning of recorded history. . . . In modern times, steps have been taken to eliminate brutality and to standardize PW treatment. However, one part of the PW subject has not changed over the centuries—the PW continues to be a valuable source of information and an important link in the production of intelligence.

*Excerpts from "PW and Captured Document Doctrine," *Military Review*, XLIV, no. 11 (November 1963), pp. 65-71.

For the modern U.S. Army, operations such as in Vietnam are a new experience. In contrast to the two World Wars and the Korean Conflict, there are no frontlines, no adjacent friendly divisions, and no rear areas containing an echelon of higher headquarters. Instead, there is a fluid battlefield with an elusive enemy. The command and control pattern has changed with brigade command posts usually located at such a distance from division headquarters that the brigades conduct virtually independent operations.

The subordinate battalions of the brigade, often widely separated, conduct small-unit operations to find the insurgent forces. When a significant insurgent force has been located, the brigade, and its battalions build up firepower and conduct a coordinated operation. However, these operations are generally brigade controlled and not the multiple-division coordinated operations envisioned for higher intensity warfare.

Operating on a fluid battlefield, the brigade and battalion commanders require fresh information to keep pace with the fast tempo of operations. Newly captured PW's and documents are important sources of this information as they have been in past conflicts. But the commander must have the capability to obtain this information before its timeliness is lost. This capability should be provided for in U.S. Army doctrine.

ADEQUATE DOCTRINE?

Doctrine contains the fundamental principles guiding military actions. These principles provide the guidelines for organization and equipment that determine capability and operational procedure. U.S. Army doctrine for brigade and battalion PW and captured document operations was conceived for general and limited war. Is the doctrine adequate for stability operations?

The characteristics of internal defense have changed the military operational pattern. In general and limited war, the military forces create their own operational environment. Both sides have established frontlines and rear areas. Progress is marked by the capture of key terrain features which usually results in the tactical defeat or destruction of the defending enemy forces. The brigade and battalion commanders plan their operations based upon terrain-oriented objectives and intelligence of the defending enemy. If the enemy gives up the objective without a fight, this is a "plus" and generally accelerates the operation. But the characteristics of stability operations are different.

In stability operations, there are no well-defined frontlines and rear areas. All areas are an actual or potential battleground. The objectives are the insurgent's forces, underground infrastructure, logistic support system, and support by the population. From the brigade and battalion point of view, the predominant differences from general and limited war are the fluidity of the battlefield and the difficulty in fixing the location of the insurgent forces.

In over-all terms, the insurgent is generally the weaker military force. He cannot afford a major battle with stability forces until he gains a preponderance of strength. The insurgent must use mobility, clandestine locations, and advantageous terrain to offset the stability force's superiority. His is a war of continuous movement dictated by the capability of the terrain and population to shield his location. To prevent annihilation, the insurgent must retain the capability to strike and then withdraw before his initiative is lost or the stability forces can employ their superior firepower against him.

DIFFERENT PROBLEM

The stability force commanders have a different problem. They must find the insurgent and maintain contact until their superior firepower can be built up and employed. In a war with frontlines, enemy withdrawal is a battlefield victory. In stability operations, the withdrawal is the insurgent's way of changing the location of the conflict to another area where he will have the advantage.

In stability operations, the brigade and battalion commanders do not achieve success by taking a terrain objective or forcing an adversary to retreat. Success is gained only through the complete destruction of the insurgent force. To destroy the quarry, contact must be maintained with an effective pursuit. However, the insurgent has a variety of options to conduct his withdrawal. To counter, the stability force commander needs immediate, up-to-date information on the enemy's plans and strength. The brigade and battalion commanders cannot wait the time required for higher headquarters to develop intelligence for their next operational phase. The information is needed immediately if relentless pursuit is to be initiated without hesitation.

EVALUATE SOURCES

Captured insurgents, refugees, and defectors are firsthand, last-minute observers of the adversary's operations and plans. Also, documents and personal letters often are a valuable source of recent information. However, capture is not enough. The brigade and battalion commanders must have the available capability to screen, interrogate, translate, and evaluate their sources immediately after capture in order to obtain timely information. An hour's delay, especially when operating in difficult terrain or under the cover of darkness, is often enough time for the insurgent to slip away.

In Vietnam, it [was] not uncommon for a unit to spend over 90 percent of operational time searching for, and less than 10 percent fighting, the insurgents. Most contacts [were] broken by the insurgents under the cover of darkness. Prisoners and documents are of limited immediate value to the battalion commander who does not have the organic or attached capability to interrogate or translate thoroughly.

The U.S. Army's doctrine sets the guidelines for a commander's operational procedures and outlines his operational capability. This does not imply that the commander cannot use initiative and ingenuity, but doctrine places a limit on these attributes. To be effective doctrine must conform and change with the operational environment.

U.S. Army doctrine concerning PW's is based upon the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949 (GPW) which prescribes the humane treatment of captives.

* * * * *

When U.S. military combat units were introduced into Vietnam in 1965, the U.S. command in Saigon announced that its soldiers would follow the GPW in the treatment of captives. This establishes the precedent for U.S. Army PW doctrine for stability operations to be based upon the GPW's principles.¹

OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

The objectives and principles of current U.S. Army PW doctrine are concerned with assisting friendly operations within the limits implied by the laws of land warfare to include the GPW. These objectives and principles set the goals and parameters for PW operations and guide the development of doctrine. These objectives are:

- Acquisition of maximum intelligence information within restrictions imposed by the law of land warfare.
- Prevention of escape and liberation.
- Promotion, through example, of proper treatment of U.S. personnel captured by the enemy.
- Weakening the will of the enemy to resist capture.
- Maximum use of PW's and civilian internees as a source of labor.

The principles are:

- Humane treatment.
- Prompt evacuation from the combat zone.
- Provisions of opportunity for prisoner interrogation.
- Instruction of troops in the provisions of international agreements and regulations relating to PW's and civilian internees.
- Integration of the procedures for evacuation, control, and administration of PW's and civilian internees with other combat service support operations.

With the exception of objectives regarding use of PW's as labor, these objectives and principles apply to the brigade and subordinate units. For brigade and battalion stability operations, there are contradictions between the second and third principles. The principle of providing for PW interrogation is primarily aimed at division and above. However, it does have applications to PW evacuation and control at all levels. In general, the objectives and principles are satisfactory for internal defense situations, but not all current U.S. Army PW doctrine developed within these guidelines is adequate for brigade and subordinate unit-level stability operations.

Prisoners are usually captured by the battalion's frontline troops. The doctrinal guidance to the capturing forces is to disarm and then to perform the five "S's"—search, silence, segregate, safeguard, and secure. During the search phase, the PW's and documents are tagged with a card giving pertinent facts concerning the capture. The documents are forwarded to the battalion intelligence officer (S2) and the prisoners are evacuated to the battalion PW collection point.

This doctrinal guidance is sound and simple to follow. Emphasis is placed upon preventing escape and evacuation to a place of less danger for interrogation. However, because of the quick evacuation and lack of interrogation capability, the company commander does not obtain the needed timely information.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The company commander does not have an organic intelligence support capability, but the battalion has this capability in the intelligence officer and intelligence sergeant. The primary function of both is to advise the battalion and subordinate commanders on enemy intelligence and information, but neither is required to have the capability to interrogate PW's or to translate documents. This requires special qualifications—interrogator and interpreter—that are not organic to the combat battalion. The emphasis is to evacuate PW's and documents as quickly as possible to brigade and division for interrogation or translation. The principal tactical interrogation of PW's and evaluation of documents take place at division level.

The field army, or equivalent level headquarters, military intelligence (MI) battalion, provides each division with an MI detachment. This detachment has the mission of providing specialized intelligence and counterintelligence functions which require special skills in the utilization of foreign languages.

The detachment includes an interrogation prisoner of war (IPW) section with interrogation and document translation capability. Although division is the tactical focal point for PW operations, the normal procedure is to attach IPW teams to committed brigades. This provides the capability to conduct formal interrogations and to scan documents for tactical information. The IPW teams are a valuable asset to the brigade commander and his staff.

Depending upon the number of interpreters, the IPW team usually consists of approximately four to eight people. The number of personnel limits the team's ability to screen and determine accurately the true intelligence value of each PW and document. The thorough analysis must be left to higher echelon where time is lost in transit, processing, and dissemination of the gained intelligence. When this intelligence arrives at the brigade and battalion level, it has become history and is of little [tactical] value.

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS

U.S. Army doctrine envisions the temporary attachment of IPW personnel below the brigade level for specialized operations. But this is not encouraged. Also, the battalion commander may request brigade IPW teams to come forward to interrogate selected PW's before being evacuated from the battalion operational area. This has advantages in that the brigade interrogators should be familiar with the battalion's operation, and the PW's information should be up to date.

If IPW support cannot be obtained, the doctrinal guidance is for battalion and subordinate commanders to rely on assigned noninterrogator personnel who have a language capability and some interrogator experience. There is unlikely to be any personnel in a combat battalion with a significant interrogator or indigenous language capability. When required, battalion and lower units probably will be provided an interpreter. This appears to be a satisfactory solution, but much depends upon the capability of each individual interpreter. Logically, the better trained and more capable interpreters will be placed in higher priority assignments than with a combat battalion.

Interrogation is an art requiring special training in questioning and examining an individual. To be most effective, the interrogation of a PW should begin as soon as possible after capture. Being captured, even voluntarily, is a harrowing experience. At this time, the PW can be expected to talk more freely and to lack the ability to remember security lessons. To exploit this vulnerability, the interrogator should begin his examination with minimum delay.

PW interrogation and document translation immediately after capture would enhance the brigade and battalion capabilities to conduct a rapid pursuit and other operations with the least possible hesitation. To eliminate delay in obtaining this enemy information, the battalion and the brigade commander require an adequate IPW capability that will meet their stability operations requirements.

The U.S. Army's doctrinal principle of prompt evacuation from the combat zone states:

Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger. . . . Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone.²

Any point is a likely point of insurgent attack to include PW collecting points, higher headquarters, and PW compound locations. The GPW principles must be followed, but should be interpreted in accordance with the type conflict involved. GPW does not prohibit retaining a PW at brigade, battalion, or lower level for interrogation unless the PW would be subjected to danger from known or suspected combat. Unless there is continuous fighting, the point of conflict in a stability operation is difficult to predict. The brigade and battalions should not maintain PW compounds or hold documents for excessive periods. Both should be

evacuated to higher headquarters as soon as the command's tactical requirements are fulfilled.

In reevaluation of current doctrine, the emphasis must be placed upon the characteristics of internal defense conflicts and operational requirements of stability forces. The key to success in brigade and battalion stability operations is the capability to destroy the insurgents. This capability would be greatly enhanced with a PW and captured document doctrine conceived in context with the distinctive characteristics of internal defense stability operations.

NOTES

¹ The United States, the Republic of Vietnam, and North Vietnam have ratified the GPW. Both the United States and the Republic of Vietnam are following the agreement's provisions while North Vietnam and the Viet Cong have refused to apply the GPW. The Vietnamese Communists have taken the position that they are not a signatory to the convention. North Vietnam contends that U.S. pilots captured in their territory are criminals and subject to North Vietnamese laws.

² Field Manual 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 18 July 1966, p. 39.

Defectors

A NORTH KOREAN DEFECTOR*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

Defectors, agents, and prisoners of war can be a useful source of PSYOP intelligence. In this essay the defector provided information which could help (1) enhance communicator credibility, (2) lead to recommendations for operational changes to increase effectiveness, and (3) update available target group information.

The source was a male, who graduated from a North Korean agricultural college, was a former member of a North Korean economic planning unit, came to the Republic of Korea in July 1969.

PSYOP TARGET GROUPS IN NORTH KOREA

Based upon his knowledge of conditions and of categories of people in North Korea, he suggested the following as suitable target groups for PSYOP directed against North Korea:

1. Workers in factories, enterprises, mines.
2. Farmers
3. Students
4. Intellectuals
5. Government office workers
6. Full-time Party office workers
7. Military personnel

*From "PSYOP Intelligence Notes," Nos. 248, 254, 253, 252, 255, the 7th PSYOP Group, 5-13, April 1971.

8. Office workers at factories and enterprises
9. Fishermen
10. Agent trainees
11. Repatriates from Japan

Workers in Factories-Enterprises-Mines

According to the source, North Korea defines workers as people who engage in work in the industrial field and who receive wages based on this manual or physical effort. Also classified in this group are farm workers (*nongup rodongja*) who are employed at state-run farms and receive wages rather than work points, as do farmers on cooperative farms. In North Korea, "workers" are treated as a basic class and a nucleus of the state because they are responsible for production.

Workers and their families can be classified according to their backgrounds into these groups: (1) those who have worked in factories and mines during and since the Japanese occupation; (2) those who were former landlords and capitalists during the Japanese occupation and became workers after it; (3) those who were formerly middle and small businessmen; (4) those who had family members who had defected to the ROK since the liberation from the Japanese; (5) those who had supported UN Forces during the Korean War; (6) those who had been purged from high official North Korean posts on charges of anti-Party activities or factionalism; (7) repatriates from Japan; (8) those formerly engaged in low-level labor such as A-frame porters and peddlers.

North Korean authorities claim in indoctrination programs that workers are the basic class. When this is closely examined, it is seen that workers are composed of people with a wide variety of family backgrounds (*songbun*). The source said that while workers can be termed a key production group, they can by no means be designated as a political unit. Except for those who were workers during and since the Japanese occupation, workers in the other categories listed above are distrusted politically by North Korean authorities. All of these groups of workers have grievances against the North Korean Government because they know that they and their children will not make any progress where they work or in North Korean society. People who were workers under the Japanese occupation can get and hold positions at all levels and can certainly be, at least, work team chiefs who may not be engaged in direct manual or physical work. Members of the other groups can never become work team chiefs. Workers aspire to progress and become work team chiefs, management workers, or office workers, but only those workers in the first group, those who have worked in factories and mines during and since the Japanese occupation, have the possibility of achieving their aspirations. Workers in the other groups cannot progress to such positions even though educated and qualified for them. The reason is political distrust because of the family background of all the groups except those who were workers during and since the Japanese occupation. The source

estimated that no more than one out of every four workers had a favorable family background because of having been a worker during and since the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the chance to improve their position is denied to the majority of North Korean workers. Educated and qualified workers who might otherwise progress see less well-qualified workers with good family backgrounds rise to positions above them. This has been a continuing source of resentment.

Farmers

The source separated farmers in North Korea into four categories according to backgrounds: (1) farmers now farming and whose families have been farmers for generations; (2) farmers and their families and people who have been sent by the North Korean regime to work on farms because of unfavorable family backgrounds, especially people who had made false statements or entries during family background investigations; (3) former urban dwellers and their families who committed political errors, engaged in anti-Party activities and factionalism, and who have been purged and punished by being sent to work as farmers; (4) people and their families who engaged in business during or after the Japanese occupation.

According to source, North Korean farmers like those in the RCK, tend to be conservative and believe in the maintenance of traditional Korean cultural practices. They also have a strong desire for private ownership.

In the North Korean farming population women outnumber men. The reasons are: (1) during the Korean War many men were killed, leaving their widows on the farms; (2) for a while after the Korean War, men moved from the rural areas to cities to work in factories; (3) there was a tendency after the Korean War for men who had been discharged from the North Korean Army to go to jobs in factories; (4) there was a past pattern for students from rural areas on graduation to move to jobs in urban areas. At present, North Korea prevents the movement of people, especially males, from rural areas to the cities.

Farmers, particularly the young, would like, if they could, to go to cities as factory workers. Most girls in farming areas aspire to be urban dwellers so that they can escape living and working on farms. Some people would like to move to other farming areas where the land is more fertile so they can increase their incomes.

Older farmers would like to operate their own farms as they once did. They want to cultivate land and live on it as they did for generations—working hard on the land during the farming season, but relaxing, eating, drinking, and visiting during the farming off-season—in other words, to follow the traditional living pattern of Korean farmers.

Older farmers wish for return to the pattern of general farm life, but former patterns are now extinct on North Korean farms. Now farmers in North Korea must work during the winter, formerly they had been able

to relax and engage in a variety of other activities. They are not allowed any freedom to travel or to visit friends and relatives now. If a factory worker misses a day's work for sickness or other valid reason, he receives 60 percent of his day's wage; but if a farmer misses a day's work, even for a valid reason, he receives no work points at all.

People who were sent from urban areas to work on farms are particularly suspect politically. Farmers, in general, believe that they are subject to political indifference by the Government. The source said he heard that in 1965 Kim Il-song said, after he visited a rural area, that there seemed to be no key people in farming areas who could lead farmers politically. The reason he was reported to have said this was that the farmers in the area visited by Kim Il-song had generally poor political backgrounds. The children of farmers with good political backgrounds and who had the talent and training had left the farms for work in urban areas. These children were later reported to have been recalled to their home farming areas.

The source said that the North Korean Government now had a policy of retaining people in rural areas, especially those with good political backgrounds and training. Authorities cut back the number of technical school graduates allowed to go on to senior technical schools. Instead of going on to more advanced education, technical school graduates were sent to work in rural areas.

Students

The source divided students into two categories: (1) those receiving nine years of compulsory education, and (2) those receiving higher education, including senior technical school and college. The source's remarks pertain to the second group of students.

The common grievance of students is that job assignments after graduation are influenced more by family background (*songbun*) than by academic record. There are no competitive tests for jobs as in the ROK. Students graduate and are then assigned jobs. Political activity by students while at school is also a factor in future job assignments.

Students worry not about whether or not they will get a job, but rather about the type of job they will get. A person with a good family background will receive a good job; a student with a politically unfavorable family background, even though he has a good academic record, will receive a less attractive job, and perhaps in a remote area. Of course, to enter college a student must have a good family background, but even among good family backgrounds there are many gradations which influence a student's future in the North Korean social system.

The source remembered the case of an honor student at Kim Il-song University who had majored in languages and literature, but the student's father, the source believed, had been a refugee to the ROK during the Korean War. For this reason, the honor student was assigned as an ordinary worker in a construction materials factory in a rural area.

Source learned about this one day in Dec. 1967 when he went to visit his wife's parents and heard it from a former student who was there with the source's brother-in-law. The source asked him why he had a bandage on his hand, and the former honor student told his story. He had the bandage on his hand because of injuries caused by manual labor at his job. The onetime student was very dissatisfied with what had happened to him.

Students were also dissatisfied with the frequent and excessive compulsory social labor they had to do while attending school. In principle, college students had to engage in compulsory social labor for 30 days a year, divided into two 15-day periods, one during the rice-planting season and the other during the rice-harvesting season. In practice, however, students had to do more compulsory social labor at the rice-planting and rice-harvesting seasons than was specified. In addition, they had to spend a lot of time doing other forms of compulsory social labor throughout the year, both at school and elsewhere.

Students were dissatisfied with their overly organized and controlled life, which included compulsory attendance at many ideological indoctrination meetings, lectures, discussions, and rallies. Also, most college students had to live in dormitories at their school; there, life was strictly regulated.

College students were curious and interested in knowing what was happening in the world outside of North Korea, but under the North Korean system such information was not available.

Also, the source said that college students were romantic by nature, but the strict regulation of their lives and their education in required and ideological subjects prevented them from enjoying their youth, let alone experiencing the romantic aspects they hoped for.

Students during the compulsory nine years of education were still immature, accepting whatever was taught. They had not yet developed sufficiently and did not have enough experience to make significant complaints and adopt critical attitudes.

Intellectuals

The source separated intellectuals into two categories: old and young.

Old intellectuals

Old intellectuals (*nalgon intell*) were those who received higher education during the Japanese occupation of Korea. Therefore, because most of these intellectuals had bourgeois parents, they were not considered by North Korean authorities as a key or basic class. They were targeted to be removed from their positions. In North Korea now, however, they are utilized as subjects for the North Korean program for reform of old intellectuals. Also, old intellectuals were the targets of ideological indoctrination activities under the slogan of revolutionization of intellectuals, which, according to the source, encompasses only old intellectuals. Gen-

erally, there has been a lot of unrest among intellectuals in their normal lives, and as a group they have been frustrated by the system. Accordingly, old intellectuals can be characterized by a passive attitude toward their jobs and activities and by a desire only to maintain the *status quo*. They are easygoing and do not seek any change in the system. They are "yes men" in responding to their supervisors. Most chief technicians at enterprises are old intellectuals. For example, a chief technician might develop a new idea and implement it. If he is successful, there is no problem. But if the idea is unsuccessful, he is severely criticized and held responsible for the failure. Authorities will criticize his failure by telling him that since he came from the old bourgeois class he was influenced by egoism and personal ambition. North Korean ideology says these qualities are commonly found in old intellectuals. Officials will also criticize the chief technician for wasting a lot of state property and materials. Therefore, knowing this will happen, most intellectuals adopt a passive attitude, lack enthusiasm, and try to maintain the *status quo* in their work. They are afraid to take chances and to dare to make improvements that might go awry.

A characteristic of old intellectuals who are writers is that their literary output is conservative and contains no innovations. Rather, they write with strict adherence to North Korean ideology, emphasizing class consciousness and Kim Il-sung's teachings.

Source said that many old intellectuals, including artists, were purged after the Korean Labor Party's Congress in August 1956, when many politicians who were members of anti-Kim Il-sung factions were also purged. At that time, North Korean authorities revealed to the North Korean people at meetings what anti-Party elements had done. Among these explanations, the source recalled one in the literary field in which a novel written by a purged writer was used as an example. The novel was about a mother whose only son joined the Army and went to a front-line unit. She worried very much about her son and prayed for his safety. The novelist stressed the mother's affection for her son. This was the main theme of the novel, but North Korean authorities criticized the book because of this theme and said the novel lacked class consciousness. Why should a mother in a socialist society worry about her son? Instead, said the official critics, the mother should have encouraged her son to join the glorious people's army to fight for the fatherland and the people. They also criticized the novel for developing people's hatred and pessimism toward war. They said the novel had no social value.

Old intellectuals are discontented because they are ignored, disregarded, and mistreated by Party workers who are even less educated themselves. Many old intellectuals are not satisfied with jobs they hold and therefore display little enthusiasm for the work. Because of this, old intellectuals are criticized and blamed for conservatism and for being indifferent to political activity.

Old intellectuals tend to be afraid of being replaced by young intellectuals, something happening gradually throughout North Korea.

Old intellectuals want the class policy (*gyekop chongchek*) of the North Korean Government to be ended. In North Korea, class is continually emphasized in all aspects of life, in propaganda, meetings, and indoctrination sessions. Old intellectuals want this ended along with restrictions on their advancement because of class and family background. They propose that people be allowed to progress in the society because of talent, performance, and ability.

Young Intellectuals

Young intellectuals (*jolmjon inteli*), as described by the source, are men and women educated in North Korea and in other Communist countries after the liberation of North Korea from Japanese occupation in 1945.

Young intellectuals, as are old intellectuals, are criticized for having a passive attitude toward their jobs. In North Korea, it is thought that in terms of technical knowledge, talent, and ability young intellectuals are inferior to old intellectuals. When young intellectuals are criticized for some error, they are also criticized for being inferior to old intellectuals and for the misuse of the Party and Government gift of an excellent education and much other assistance in their studies. Now, they have failed to pay back the Party and Government. Officials tell them that they are still inferior to old intellectuals despite what the Party and Government have done for them.

When young intellectuals who studied in other Communist countries are criticized for some error, officials contend that they have been influenced by "revisionism." There is a tendency for other intellectuals to envy young intellectuals who have had the opportunity to study abroad. Source said it was a common belief that young intellectuals who studied abroad were really not superior to those who had studied in North Korea. But young intellectuals who had studied abroad "put on airs" and considered themselves superior to those who had studied only in North Korea.

Old and young intellectuals, because of knowledge and educational background, had a keen perception of the realities of life in North Korea. They could see social, political, and economic contradictions and problems there. Because of this characteristic, they were apt to make accidental remarks in their normal conversation which revealed their inner awareness of problems in the system and to voice their complaints about it. The North Korean officials criticized them for this.

Government Office Workers

This group includes people who work in North Korean Government offices from the Cabinet down to the *ri* level. It does not include office workers in factories and enterprises or full-time workers in Party organizations.

North Korea builds up and reinforces the image of Government office workers as being the best qualified North Koreans because they work for the Government and as such as leaders of the masses. Because Government office workers are treated in such a way by North Korean authorities, they tend to become self-satisfied, and their perception and insight into the world around them are dulled.

The source emphasized that here lies the big difference in characteristics between Government office workers and intellectuals. Intellectuals are continually subjected to criticism, but their perception of reality is sharp. Government office workers are praised, but their perception of reality is blurred.

Government office workers, although they are praised as leaders of the masses, are continually assigned hard tasks and heavy workloads, and their pay in return is low—not much more than that of ordinary factory workers. Government office workers have to work long hours on their jobs and do not receive extra work allowances. But factory workers have rotating shifts and do get extra work allowances for high production.

Because of long hours and heavy workloads, many Government office workers suffer from poor health.

What Government office workers want is an opportunity for advancement and higher salaries. However, the criteria for promotion is based more on an employee's political activities than on his job performance.

Full-Time Party Office Workers

This group comprises Party members in full-time jobs in Party organizations from the Central Committee down to the village level. Party office workers are considered key personnel and a nucleus in North Korean society. They are the most envied of all groups in North Korea. They enjoy more authority and influence than any other group in North Korean society and receive the best social treatment of all groups there. As a result, they are generally very enthusiastic about their work, apply themselves diligently, and have great personal dignity. Economically, however, they are not so well off as such occupational groups as factory workers, technicians, and engineers.

The source said that if Party office workers had grievances, they would be economic—that is, standard of living and salary.

Military Personnel

The source said that generally young officers and enlisted men company grades and below, were influenced by and accepted what they were told in North Korean propaganda and indoctrination. For this reason, he believed they had no fear of war. They believe the propaganda that North Korean military forces are second to none. The source attributed this attitude to the fact the young officers and enlisted men had not actually experienced the horrors of war or of the Korean War. Also, they have no knowledge of the outside world. The actual strength and performance capabilities of military forces of other nations are unknown.

Yet young officers and enlisted men, according to the source, had a number of grievances because of their lives as soldiers. Promotions in the North Korean Army are slow because there is no war. Also, since members of this group are young, they are bored with the monotonous routine of military life; they want change, excitement. They have little opportunity to go on leave or to experience any North Korean life outside their confining military environment. The source thought this group would welcome war, even if all it did was end the boredom of their lives.

Office Workers in Factories and Enterprises

This group includes people who work in offices at enterprises and factories, but not office workers in Government and Party organizations. Economically, office workers in this category are not so well off as factory workers and technicians in factories, except for office workers in cadre or executive positions.

Office workers, unlike members of a work team who receive bonuses for overproduction, do not receive bonuses, except in cases when the whole enterprise or factory receives a bonus. Office workers are held responsible for what goes on in the enterprise or factory, even production, because they are considered responsible leaders. But they do not receive pay commensurate with the responsibility.

These office workers generally want to become qualified as technicians so that they can be reassigned to better jobs and earn more money. They, of course, would also like to be promoted in their present jobs, but in promotion, political activity is more important than job performance.

Fishermen

The source thought that significant grievances among fishermen included long hours of hard, dangerous and uncomfortable work, long days at sea and away from home, and the prohibition against taking any fish caught to their homes when they returned to port. He believed that many fishermen would prefer—even desire—to obtain jobs on land.

Agent Trainees

Agent trainees are commonly afraid they will be killed on their missions in the ROK. This fear grows on them after they have been in training for awhile and become aware of technical and operational problems associated with successfully conducting missions in the ROK. The source said that once agent trainees realize the difficulty of their missions they became greatly concerned about their lives and lose confidence in their ability to accomplish their missions in the ROK. Source said that this is a common psychological attitude among agent trainees. Most of them put their faith in fate and luck and hope for a miracle in accomplishing their missions.

Another psychological problem for agent trainees is worry about and longing for their families, especially about what will happen to the

families if they fail while on their mission and are killed. These worries increase the longer they are in agent training.

Source said that, of course, while in training, agents are told that their job benefits the people and country and that they are revolutionaries. However, the source said, agent trainees still suffer from a growing worry about the future, about what will happen to them. This is aggravated when agent trainees, as part of their training, become more familiar with the situation they will face in the ROK. The source said some agent trainees pretend to be sick in an effort to obtain release from training and be sent home.

Repatriates from Japan

The source said that generally repatriates from Japan regretted that they had come to North Korea once they are aware of the generally low living standards and the many restrictions normally placed on people in North Korea. Some repatriates, of course, were happy in North Korea, these had mostly been peddlers, day-to-day workers, or jobless in Japan. It was this nappy group that was exploited in North Korean propaganda.

RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT LEAFLET OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH KOREA

The source reported that while in North Korea he had seen some leaflets from the ROK. Based upon his experience with them, he made a number of recommendations:

1. According to the source, in leaflet operations, as in radio broadcasting operations, three key points should always be considered: theme selection, credibility, and repetition and continuity in the dissemination of the message.

2. A leaflet should be simple and clear with regard to message. The text should not be long and small letters should not be used because then the leaflet cannot be read easily and quickly. If a leaflet is simple and clear, the person who picks up the leaflet should be able to catch the message and outline at a glance.

3. In North Korea, farmers and workers are enjoying some benefits—employment, education for their children, and welfare. Therefore they consider that their lot is now better than it would be under a capitalist society. They do not think that entering into a capitalist society would benefit them. The source recommended that leaflets convey messages to them to allay any fears they might have about living under a capitalist society and to show them that in actuality their circumstances would be improved.

4. When taking photographs for leaflets, care should be taken in selecting sites to be photographed that demonstrate real benefits to the people, rather than producing just a pretty picture.

5. In leaflets, where possible, use comparisons between the ROK and North Korea. To do this, review and analyze themes used in North

Korean propaganda output and other sources to determine North Korean vulnerabilities. Take those vulnerabilities with superior points found in the ROK. For example, North Korea emphasizes its education system in its propaganda; vulnerabilities should be found in North Korean education. Then leaflets can be prepared based upon these identified North Korean vulnerabilities, which emphasize the strong points on these specific topics in the ROK educational system.

North Korea continually emphasizes that life is better in North Korea than in the ROK; however, on closer scrutiny of both, it will be found that in the ROK things are generally superior to North Korea. For example, North Korea claims to stand for socialism and for the welfare of farmers and workers. In practice in North Korea, this is not true. The treatment of dead soldiers is an example of this fallacy. They are buried in unmarked graves on the battlefield; only high-ranking North Koreans are honored with tombs. In the ROK, however, those who die in the defense of their country, regardless of rank, are buried and honored by all at the national cemetery.

6. The source considered that for leaflets the following two themes were important: basic living conditions (food, clothing, and housing) of average people in the ROK; and social welfare, cultural, and material benefits of life in the ROK.

7. Regarding leaflet preparation the source recommended that the best quality of paper be used. This will reinforce the idea of a prosperous paper industry in the ROK. Also, paper should be used that is durable so that the leaflet can be read even though exposed to the elements. Printing and photo reproduction should be clear. Color leaflets are preferable to black and white leaflets to attract the attention and interest of the target audience. Size of the leaflets is not important. Source said that the size of the leaflets from the ROK he had seen in North Korea was appropriate. Source said that the type faces used should be clear and attractive; small type should be avoided. Use short texts and an abundance of photos. If the text is too long the reader may become bored and not read the entire message. He suggested the use of photos with clear captions so that the meaning or message of the text can be caught at a glance. Source said that this was very important in leaflet operations, that long booklets with a lot of text would not be effective, but pamphlets printed on good paper with many color photos would make positive impressions.

8. Source recommended that special leaflets be prepared for use against North Korean soldiers. The upper half of the leaflet could have a calendar, photos of pretty female Korean movie stars, or photos of nude females. The lower half of the leaflet could contain the PSYOP message. Then the leaflet could be cut in half and the photos or calendar retained by the soldier, and the message disposed of after being read. Such leaflets could be printed on one or both sides. If printed on both sides, on the reverse side of the part bearing the photo or calendar could be printed the music and text of Korean popular songs, with the bottom half bearing a

PSYOP message. Source said that the reason for this suggestion was that he believed that not enough calendars were issued to North Korean army soldiers. Most young soldiers, while in the army, did not have much chance to see or be with girls, but they did think about them a lot. Therefore they would especially welcome color photos of the faces of pretty Korean girls and nude color photos. By printing the leaflet so that half could be disposed of and half retained, the soldiers would be able to keep the calendar or photos without danger to themselves. Source said that although some soldiers would interpret the use of nude photos as a sign of degeneracy of morals in the ROK, most North Korean soldiers would welcome the leaflet and not turn it in to their leaders.

The source said that North Korean soldiers learned the words of Korean popular songs by hearing them over ROK DMZ loudspeaker broadcasts. The use of printed versions of those songs on leaflets for North Korean soldiers near the DMZ would reinforce this.

9. Regarding dissemination of leaflets, the source said that massive dissemination of leaflets in one place at one time should be avoided for the reason that if it were done, social security authorities could easily have them all gathered up and confiscated.

The source considered the best time for disseminating leaflets to be at night, preferably after midnight and before dawn, so that the leaflets could not be seen falling to the ground.

He also recommended that leaflets not be disseminated in remote mountainous areas of low population density for the obvious reason that there were too few people to see them. On the other hand, leaflets should not be dropped on densely populated areas, because the number of people would inhibit reading of the leaflets because of observation by others. Therefore, he suggested that they be disseminated to areas of moderate population density where the person who found the leaflet would have a reasonable chance of reading the leaflet unobserved.

10. Although the source had never seen or heard about the use of plastic bags floating on water as a delivery means for leaflets and other materials, he said that type of operation was, in his opinion, excellent and a well-suited PSYOP delivery method to reach the target audience. He recommended as gift items for inclusion in the floating plastic bags the following:

- Fujigi* A square cloth designed to carry articles. *Furushiki* in Japanese.
- Indon* case Container for carrying a type of medicine used for sweet-smelling breath. *Indon* is available in North Korea, but the containers are not good.
- Handkerchiefs
- Soap Containers
- Shoe horns
- Combs

Certificate or money case
Children's toys
Children's fairy tale books
Picture books for children

Source recommended that in sending such gift items, the best quality items should be used for greater effectiveness. He said that this would achieve two purposes: (1) show the excellence and high quality of ROK goods to the target audience, and (2) create in the target audience dissatisfaction with North Korean goods, especially when in actual use the ROK items lasted much longer and were better than North Korean-made equivalents. If the aim is to create an immediate impression of excellence of the item, then the brand names of ROK manufacturers or some other indication of ROK origin should be clearly seen. But if the aim is to emphasize the superiority of the item based upon actual long term use, then there should be nothing on the item to indicate origin in the ROK.

RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT RADIO BROADCASTING OPERATIONS DIRECTED AT NORTH KOREA

The source provided a number of recommendations which he said should be considered in PSYOP radio broadcasts directed against North Korea:

1. Radio broadcasts have the capability to send messages covering a wide range of topics and themes to the North Korean target audience. However, only one topic should be treated in each program unit.
2. News programs, in particular, are very important for informing North Koreans about what is happening in the rest of the world. But because North Koreans find it difficult to listen to foreign radio broadcasts, it is very important to repeat news programs over and over so that the news will have a better chance of being heard. Repetition of a news broadcast ten or twenty times is good—the more repetition the better the chance that it will be heard.
3. The source recommended that priority be given in news selection to those themes listed in "PSYOP Themes for North Korea," *PSYOP Intelligence Notes*, No. 251.
4. The source reported that of all target groups in North Korea, agent trainees have the best opportunity to listen to radio broadcasts from the ROK. He recommended the use of special programs directed to agent trainees to induce their defection after they have been sent to the ROK. He stressed that programs should be built around the lives of North Korean agents and others who defected to the ROK. North Korean agents, according to source, do not know what treatment they will receive if they turn themselves in to the ROK Government. Therefore he recommended that special programs be regularly produced about benefits to agents who turn themselves in when they are sent to the ROK.

5. The source said the best time for listening to foreign broadcasts in North Korea was from 8:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M., because people are more likely to be at home during this time. Before 8:00 P.M. people are often still at work, meetings, or engaged in other activities. People usually have returned home for the night by 8:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. The time does not matter, really, to those who like to listen secretly to broadcasts from the ROK; they will do so when they can. Also, agent trainees have good opportunities to listen to ROK broadcasts at night.

6. Regarding sentence structure used in broadcasts, the source recommended the use of short sentences, rather than long complex ones. Short sentences are easier to understand than long ones with complex construction.

7. To attract the interest of the North Korean audience, the source suggested that Korean popular songs, especially those popular from the end of World War II until the end of the Korean war be used. Recent Korean popular songs can be used if they are in Korean rather than Western musical style. He advised against the use of recent Korean popular songs with Western musical arrangements and instruments.

CREDIBILITY IN PSYOP DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH KOREA

The source provided a number of recommendations regarding credibility in psychological operations against North Korea.

1. Cite or quote the objective views and opinions of foreigners about the subject matter: for example, their views about the ROK. He considered that the views of people from neutral nations would be more effective.

2. In developing, preparing, and editing programs care must be taken to insure that the content is not superficial and abstract. Exact sources, detailed statistical figures, concrete and actual examples should be provided, and all should be focused on a specific, limited topic or subject.

3. Terminology should be used which is easily understandable to all North Koreans. Avoid words of foreign origin because they may not be in use now in North Korea, and therefore not understandable to North Koreans. Add explanations where words are given that are used in the ROK but not in North Korea.

4. Use live interviews with people on the street in radio broadcasts to North Korea. If possible, interview working-level people such as factory workers and farmers, rather than high-level officials.

5. Avoid use of abusive words and slander in PSYOP output. Instead, take a sympathetic and polite position in order to persuade the target audience.

6. Use dialogues between two voices over radio rather than one person reading a script. This, the source said, will help overcome the monotonous effect of one person reading.

7. Announcers should use a clear, natural speaking style rather than a strident, ardent style. The source said that announcers on North Korean

radio used the strident, ardent style of agitators; he did not consider this to be effective. Instead he preferred the natural, calm voices of the announcers he had heard on stations from the ROK. The source said that while he was in North Korea, he listened mostly to news programs on KBS 1, but on many occasions he considered the announcer's reading speed so fast that it was difficult to follow what was being said. He, therefore, recommended that announcers avoid excessive speed. Also, he noticed that KBS 1 used many words of foreign origin; this also made the programs difficult to follow.

8. For credibility, the source recommended that programs should take a neutral, objective viewpoint. They should take a position between the Western countries and the Communist nations. In the period before 1965, North Koreans considered Japanese news reporting credible because North Koreans believed that the news took a neutral, objective position. As a result, North Koreans listened to and believed Japanese-originated news broadcasts. Since 1965, according to source, because of Japan's closer relations with the United States and the use of the theme of the revival of Japanese militarism in North Korean propaganda, the credibility of Japanese news among North Koreans has fallen.

9. The source recommended coverage of rural affairs as a way of enhancing credibility. Generally, North Koreans believe that under capitalist societies, cities are emphasized while rural areas have withered from lack of attention.

NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION TECHNIQUES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The source had some knowledge of the dissemination of North Korean propaganda materials in the ROK, gained through conversation with others while he was in North Korea.

He reported that North Korean leaflets were disseminated in the ROK through the use of balloons drifted down from North Korea. He knew that not only leaflets but also booklets and pamphlets were disseminated in this way. He believed that a certain section of the Liaison Department of the Central Party was responsible for such balloon operations.

The source also believed that some North Korean agents were used to disseminate materials in the ROK. He said that North Korea utilized two types of agents for propaganda dissemination in the ROK: long term, in-place agents, and those dispatched on missions to the ROK. In some cases, North Korean propaganda materials were carried into the ROK secretly by carrier and placed in caches. The agent-in-place was told by radio where the cache of propaganda materials was. He then went to recover them. In other cases, agents dispatched on missions to the ROK carried the propaganda materials with them.

The source mentioned as an example that in April or May 1937, six fellow trainees and himself were sent to a safe house in North Korea and divided into two teams, one of four men and the other of three. The two

teams were placed in separate rooms in the safe house. The source was assigned to the three-man team. On each team there was one man who had attended the "695" a special political school for indoctrinating agent trainees. These two persons arrived at the safe house first, and then the source and the others arrived. A package of North Korean propaganda materials was given to each two-man team, about 200 or 300 booklets. The plan was for each team to carry its package of propaganda materials to a location on the West Coast area of North Korea. The planned training exercise, however, was not carried out because other missions were given to several members of the teams.

The source mentioned that he believed that another method used to disseminate North Korean propaganda materials in the ROK was carried out from Japan through *Chosen Soren* (Association of Korean Residents of Japan).

According to the source there were two purposes in disseminating North Korean propaganda materials in the ROK: (1) to convey the leaflet and booklet themes to the ROK target audiences, and (2) as a communication means between a North Korean agent in the ROK and his headquarters in North Korea.

If a North Korean agent brought propaganda material with him into the ROK, he might disseminate it himself, get another person to disseminate it or have an agent in-place do the disseminating. Usually, agents or others disseminated the leaflets during the hours of darkness, but not during the ROK curfew, 12 midnight to 4:00 A.M., for fear of being caught by ROK police for violating the curfew. First, a target was selected where the leaflet was to be disseminated in accordance with the theme of the leaflet. For example, if the message attacked the United States, then the leaflet target would be a U.S. compound. The agent then tried to get the leaflets into office areas, toilets, desk drawers, and the like. On some occasions, leaflets were disseminated widely, regardless of the PSYOP theme, if there was a good opportunity for distribution. When there was no wind blowing an agent might put groups of leaflets on the top of walls, and when the wind came up later it would blow the leaflets around.

If the agent was busy with other missions, he might try to get someone else, such as an agent-in-place, to disseminate the leaflets. If an agent believed he had recruited someone as a potential North Korean agent, he might give the prospect the task of disseminating some leaflets to test him out. When giving the prospect the task, he was assigned an exact time and place to disseminate the leaflets, and then the North Korean agent would check to see that he carried out his mission.

A North Korean agent who did not have radio communication means could use leaflets to communicate with his headquarters. For example, at the end of some North Korean leaflets, on the back side, the agent would write the name of a certain society or association and some numbers to indicate that the agent desired to return to North Korea on a certain

date, for example, 11 Battalion, 5th District. In this case, "5th" means the month of May and "11th" means the 11th day of that month. The agent places this information on a number of leaflets which he then disseminates. North Korean agents believe that when leaflets are disseminated they are reported in ROK newspapers, or an agent-in-place might find the leaflet and report it to North Korea. In either case, the aim was to get information about the agent's desire to return to the proper authorities in North Korea. Each agent, before dispatch to the ROK, was given a different message to use on leaflets for communicating his desire to return to North Korea. Thus when such a message was acquired by North Korea, it was known which agent was communicating the message.

Broadcasts

RADIO BROADCAST MONITORING*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

An example of how content analysis of a radio broadcast, by indicating the relative emphasis that the source wishes to place on propaganda themes, may provide valuable insights into political objectives and strategy.

KHMER REPUBLIC

Stations considered in this report are *Hanoi international*, *Liberation*, *Voice of the National United Front of Kampuchea (VNUFK)*, *Peking*, and *Moscow*. This report covers the period 11-17 December 1971. All broadcasts were in the Cambodian language.

Hanoi international and *Liberation* stressed continued support for peoples struggles. They stressed such topics as the downing of U.S. helicopters, comments by Sihanouk on the failing Lon Nol administration, combat victories of CNPLAF units, and a report in which a Vietnamese Student Association located in Hue condemned the use of Saigon troops in Cambodia. CNPLAF units claim total defeat of Lon Nol's CHENLA II operation.

VNUFK continued broadcasting about the combat victories of CNPLAF units. An 88-minute speech by Sihanouk (31st message, part II) was used to propagate support for people's struggles.

Peking placed primary emphasis on international prestige; however, the amount of time devoted to the attendant themes, support for people's struggles and negative treatment of an established government, were of significance. International affairs were the keynote this week with references to the People's Republic of China (PRC) ambassador's party in Hanoi, the Albanian visit to Peking, NUFK and RGNUG delegations to Pyongyang, and development of communications in the mountain regions of Chekiang Province. In support of people's struggles, *Peking* extolled the success of PLAF units for victories in Cambodia and Laos. Much time

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Radio and News Service Highlights: Trends and Analysis," Issue no. 51-71, 27 January 1972, pp. 51-16 to 51-18.

Theme	Hanoi		Liberation		VNJFK		Peking		Moscow	
	I	M	I	M	I	M	I	M	I	M
Propagation of ideology	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	11
Glorification of the revolution	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Present success of socialism	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	9	11	25
Guidance for future success of socialism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	11
International prestige	8	37	0	0	8	60	22	91	66	145
Support for people's struggles	36	84	33	137	18	249	14	78	27	51
Negative treatment of a government	13	34	6	13	7	66	13	73	27	82
TOTAL	57	155	41	156	33	375	53	251	137	326

Weekly Trend Analysis (11-17 December 1971). Broadcasting in the Cambodian language to the Khmer Republic.

was devoted to condemning the Indian and Soviet governments for involvement in the Indo-Pakistani war. It was claimed that Indian warplanes bombed Dacca and killed civilians. South Korean President Pak Chong-hui was denounced for declaring an emergency when China was admitted to the UN.

Moscow continued to expound on the Soviet Union's role in world affairs in its quest for international prestige. The USSR continues to condemn U.S. involvement in Indochina affairs and to attempt to align Peking in collusion with the United States in some items.

Comment

Hanoi international, *Liberation*, and *VNUFK* will continue to support people's struggles, with little or no change in future formats.

Peking will continue to stress international prestige; however, an increase in the negative treatment of the Soviet and U.S. governments has been noted. The split between Peking and the Soviet Union is still evidenced by such commentary as "The Soviet Social Imperialists are the Master of the Indian Expansionists."

Moscow continues to stress foreign relations and express Soviet gains in economic and industrial efforts. Under the new Five-Year Plan, the USSR promises to have one-third of the Moscow population in new housing. The soft landing on and exploration of Mars received extensive coverage. Negative treatment of the Peking and U.S. governments is becoming a recurrent theme. The USSR has persistently condemned U.S. involvement in Indochina, the hypocritical nature of the U.S. stance on the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and increased U.S. air activity in Indochina. The PRC was denounced for collusion with the US in an attempt to impede the Soviet disarmament conference.

Captured Documents

Viet Cong Documents on the War (1)*

This report illustrates that document analysis is an important tool for understanding the target's perceptions as well as for remaining abreast of foreign military and political strategies and activities.

Since the early part of 1967 increasingly large quantities of Communist documents have been captured during military operations by American, South Vietnamese and Allied forces. Especially rich caches of highly-classified documents and operational directives were found in headquarters areas during operations "Cedar Falls" and "Junction City" directed against long-established Viet Cong base areas. Among these were top-level internal communications of the Viet Cong movement, many of which have been officially released for use by the press and by scholars.

*Excerpts from "Viet Cong Documents on the War (1)," *Communist Affairs*, V, no. 5 (September-October 1967), pp. 18-24. Reprinted with the permission of *Communist Affairs*, copyright holder and the author, Hammond Rolph.

These documents range from general analysis of the world situation and the strategic role of the Vietnamese Communist revolution to the exposition of tactics for implementing the revolution in the villages and hamlets of South Vietnam. In this and the next issue, *Communist Affairs* will present excerpts from some of these lengthy documents, most of which have not been comprehensively quoted at any length in this country and are therefore still relatively unknown. The selections illustrate not only the policy problems and decisionmaking environment of the Viet Cong movement, but also convey something of the Vietnamese Communist's view of his world.

In general, the documents reveal or confirm the following: (1) the tight control of the levers of power in the Viet Cong movement by the *Lao Dong* Party of North Vietnam, and the insignificance of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam as anything other than a tactic in the struggle; (2) the complete faith of the Vietnamese Communists in the doctrine and strategy of "people's war" as a road to certain victory; (3) a rather realistic sense of weakness in the Viet Cong movement, coupled with a grossly exaggerated view of the defeats and problems of the other side; (4) great stress by the Communists on a military victory within a relatively short time, while simultaneously preparing for protracted war and anticipating the use of the political weapon of negotiations at a propitious time; (5) emphasis on the international revolutionary role of Vietnamese communism; and (6) the absolute primacy of ideological motivation and purity in all aspects of the direction of the Viet Cong movement.

Chronologically the documents range from the end of 1963 to the spring of 1967. Thus they cover a period from Hanoi's confident decision to escalate the war decisively in the South following the death of Ngo Dinh Diem to the present situation of great difficulty for the Viet Cong.

LAO DONG PARTY SETS TONE OF WAR IN SOUTH

One of the basic documents captured in the field is the resolution of the ninth plenum of the Vietnam Workers Party (*Lao Dong*) Central Committee in Hanoi, passed in December 1963. Entitled "World Situation and Our Party's International Duties," it presents a lengthy philosophical and doctrinal rationale for the Vietnam struggle, largely in terms of the demands of "proletarian internationalism" and the global requirements of the socialist camp. The resolution was prepared in the immediate aftermath of the downfall of Ngo Dinh Diem, which undoubtedly somewhat weakened the basis of the Viet Cong movement through the removal of its chief target, and it seems to represent a call by Hanoi for acceleration of the armed struggle in the South despite the changed political situation. Adopted during the period of Hanoi's marked leaning toward the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it reflects a strongly hostile tone toward "revisionists," while at the same time expressing Hanoi's desire for a mediated truce which would restore the unity of world communism in pressing toward its national and international goals.

In the present human society, there are the following basic contradictions: (1) contradictions between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp; (2) contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries; (3) contradictions between the oppressed people and the imperialists and colonialists; (4) contradictions between imperialists and imperialists, between one monopolist capitalist clique and another monopolist capitalist clique in imperialist countries.

The four above contradictions are basic contradictions in human society because they reflect the true nature of the era, they survive ... during the entire phase of evolution from capitalism to socialism throughout the world. The first group of basic contradictions belongs to the contradictions between two opposing international systems. The other basic contradictions belong to the internal contradictions of the international capitalist system.

CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM CARRIES OUT CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIRECTIVES

Following the earlier resolutions of the *Lao Dong* Central Committee, the situation in Vietnam underwent a great change. In response to increased North Vietnamese army participation in the Southern war, the United States began aerial bombardment of key North Vietnamese military targets in February 1965 and made a full-scale combat commitment of American troops in the South a few months later.

In the face of this massive American intervention, the Central Committee 12th plenum met in Hanoi in December 1965 to lay down new guidelines. These new policies were then translated into directives by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the Viet Cong's highest echelon of political and military direction (the NLF being a facade with no real power). COSVN, which is an integral part of the *Lao Dong's* interlocking machinery and which acts as a Central Committee for Southern operations, then called its fourth congress in March 1966 to translate the 12th plenum's guidelines into an all-encompassing "Resolution of the Central Office for South Vietnam." A copy of this top-secret document was seized on April 21, 1967, in Khanh Hoa Province by units of the 101st Airborne Division.

This resolution covers almost every aspect of Hanoi-COSVN plans and programs for the Viet Cong, from high-level matters such as peace negotiations to detailed village-level activities. Thus only a fraction of it can be quoted here. The document is quite open in discussing Hanoi's leadership of the war, and one of its central themes is the need to increase the Party's control of all Viet Cong activities. While pointing out the importance of the NLF as a useful united front tactic to be developed to the utmost, the resolution nowhere indicates that the Front has any real decision-making authority whatsoever.

First, the document reviews the military and political situation in 1965, both as to successes and failures, strengths as well as weaknesses.

1965 was also a year when we all marched forward to win victories. Our entire army, people, and Party strongly stepped up their activities in all fields and all the movements achieved great successes in the midst of an extremely arduous situation.

a. Our major success was in the military field.

All the three forces expanded and fought the enemy well. Our guerrillas succeeded in causing the attrition of and destruction to both the U.S. and puppet

regime armies with very brave and creative forms of combat in resisting mop-up efforts, attacking communications lines and the enemy's rear. But most outstanding of all were our regular forces which came upon the battlefield in a bigger operational force and with increasingly creative combat tactics. . . .

For that reason, in the effort to destroy the enemy, we overfulfilled the norm prescribed by the Central Office for South Vietnam at the beginning of the year. Concerning the build-up of the armed forces, we moved quickly, over-passing the regular force and regional force build-up requirements. . . .

b. Our second success was in the political field. . . . We broadened the National Front to unite all classes and social strata and ethnic minorities in the same effort of rising up against the Americans to save the country.

* * * *

In the disputed rural areas and at strategic hamlets, we continued to score successes.

* * * *

. . . in spite of the hard conditions, the morale of our partisans remained unshaken and united. . . .

. . . yet there were still deficiencies, difficulties, and weak points:

Our armed forces developed considerably but still did not meet the requirements of the situation.

Only half of our regular forces fought well. The regional forces mostly did not fight well and some of them hardly fought while others were so embarrassed that they could not fight. . . .

Political activities and Party tasks . . . were still poor among the regional forces in certain areas. Therefore, there were many incorrect displays of ideology, behavior, and activities. . . .

Although the liberated zone was expanded, it was not yet consolidated and no solid base was established there which could serve as a stable rear for the South.

* * * *

. . . The revolutionary base in the cities was still too weak.

* * * *

Political struggle activities were not brought up to the same rate as military activities and did not keep up with military achievements. . . . Not enough emphasis was given to the ideological leadership of the masses and to the task of breaking up the enemy's psywar and Chieu Hoi schemes [Editor's note: a program designed to encourage defection from Viet Cong ranks] and his peace trick swindles.

* * * *

. . . Mass organizations especially at the village levels were not well built.

Leadership and indoctrination of the masses were also weak. . . .

The unsatisfactory state of mass proselyting activities affected other activities, especially those pertaining to recruitment, conscription, finance, prevention of spies, protection of secrets, guerrilla warfare, etc.

Activities related to the building of the Party, especially those pertaining to organization, were still weak. . . .

Next came an evaluation of enemy intentions and the prescription of general strategy to counter them. Party leadership is emphasized in all aspects of struggle, particularly in the matter of peace negotiations.

In general, in 1966, the basic intention of the enemy will be to carry on the major plans laid down in 1965, but they will do it with new vigor, more wicked schemes and a higher determination. Therefore, the war will develop in a more fierce manner.

In the face of the new situation, the mission for the entire country as prescribed by the [12th] resolution of TW [Hanoi Party Central Committee] is as follows:

"All the Party, the army, and the people should exert the maximum effort and concentrate all forces to step up the armed and political struggles to defeat the American imperialist aggressors and their henchmen on the main battlefield which is in the South.

In the North, the war of destruction of the American imperialists must be defeated, the achievements in the development of a socialist regime must be preserved, human and material resources must be mobilized for the liberation war in the South, and preparations must be made to defeat the enemy in case the local war is expanded throughout the country.

...while continuing to acquire a thorough understanding of the long-term resistance slogan and in applying it, we must exert a maximum effort to concentrate the strength of both zones of our country in order to achieve a decisive victory on the Southern battlefield within a relatively short period of time.

...we are determined not to entertain any illusions concerning a negotiated settlement to the problem of Vietnam, and we must concentrate all our strength to destroy the enemy. Only when the American imperialists' aggressive will is crushed and the objectives of independence, peace, democracy, and neutrality of the South are guaranteed can we negotiate a settlement of the Vietnam problem.

...At a certain time, we can apply the strategy of fighting and negotiating at the same time, in order to support the armed struggle, and thus accelerate the disintegration of the puppet army and regime, and create more conditions favorable for our people to win a decisive victory.

...That objective can only be achieved if we coordinate very closely the armed struggle with the political struggle and psychological warfare.

The Southern branch of the [Lao Dong] Party has extensive and solid foundations. It is a valiant vanguard element, thoroughly trained in combat, closely connected with the masses and fully trusted by them. It is well experienced in the matter of political and armed struggle and it is also closely led by the Party Central Committee."

In order to carry out the general mission, major tasks are then assigned in detail. Included among these assignments are build-up and deployment of the armed forces, political leadership in the armed forces, expansion of the united front under the Party's guidance, diplomatic efforts abroad, consolidation and expansion of the Viet Cong base areas, defeating the enemy in the contested areas, clarification of agrarian policies, improvement of mass proselyting [sic] campaigns and development of the Party's strength.

We must strongly emphasize armed warfare, build up our armed forces, expand the people's guerrilla movement, destroy a major portion of the American and puppet forces. During 1968, ... we must try to inflict a loss of 30,000 or 40,000 American personnel, including the total destruction of about 10 battalions and some scores of companies. We must also destroy and disintegrate about 200,000 puppet troops, over a half of whom will be regulars, ...

All the armed forces, from the regular forces to the regional forces, shall be responsible for participating in, assisting and emphasizing guerrilla warfare.

... Regulars must retain the initiative in the attack to destroy the enemy. ... Regular warfare must be active, mobile, flexible, aggressive and must be victorious.

All our armed forces must be sharp instruments of both armed and political struggle.

Efforts must be made toward mobilizing the youths and the populace to insure the replacement of regular forces and to provide vanguard elements and civilian manpower in service of the battlefield.

Increase the Party's political and leadership activities in the armed forces.

... In the armed forces, maximum attention must be paid to building up the Party, especially the basic structures, ...

In the field of leadership, class lines and the mass viewpoint must be maintained; . . .

The front for national unity, anti-American resistance, and national salvation must be expanded, the political and military proselyting [sic] movements must be intensified.

* * * *

We . . . have the capability to motivate the patriotic sentiments of the people in various social strata and walks of life, to win over even those in the puppet regime and army who follow a progressive trend . . . in order to expand the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, . . .

. . . we must try to implement democracy, step by step, to secure the interests of the working classes, especially the farmers. The expansion of a national solidarity front must be founded on the close unity of the masses and a consolidation of the workers-farmers alliance.

* * * *

. . . the Americans and puppet regime exhort their "peace trick" slogan, intensify their psywar and espionage activities, intimidate and bribe the people by flattering them with plans of "rural development," "social revolution," "democratic regime," etc. . . . hoping to deceive and lull all our people, weaken their combat morale, make them suspicious of our victory, and moving ahead with their Chieu Hoi plans. This dangerous plot of the enemy has somewhat affected the combat morale of our people in certain areas. Therefore, breaking up the enemy's political schemes and indoctrinating the people are two things that must be done on a regular basis. . . .

We must intensify our propaganda and diplomatic activities.

In our anti-American resistance for national salvation, we depend mainly on ourselves but we also need the sympathy and support of our friends in the world. Furthermore, our revolution is part of the world revolution. It is related to the movements of national liberation on the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it is also related to the preservation of the socialist camp and world peace. For that reason, we must do our utmost to gain the support and assistance of the socialist camp, the people of the world, the American people. . . .

The diplomatic requirement at this stage is to concentrate all efforts . . . to gain the sympathy and support of the socialist countries, the people of the world, including the American people, and to isolate to the maximum degree the American imperialists and their henchmen.

* * * *

Consolidate and expand the liberated areas and establish bases to provide rear support of the revolution, destroy the enemy's pacification plan, continuously attack the enemy in cities and areas controlled by him, and restrict the enemy's rear.

* * * *

. . . in order to help our three strategic zones develop and support . . . the accomplishment of the mission prescribed by the Party for the Southern revolution, we must fully understand the following:

We must constantly seek to develop and expand our bases and liberated areas in both the jungle and delta and secure a solid base for the revolution. Along with that, we must continuously attack the urban areas and those enemy-controlled areas to disrupt and restrict the enemy's rear areas. Those are the two points of the party's great strategic mission. Accomplishment of one is not enough but would also be ineffective. [sic]

* * * *

. . . Defeating the enemy's pacification plan is an urgent requirement. If we cannot meet this requirement, we will be unable to build up our rear and disrupt and restrict the enemy's. Vice versa, if we cannot strengthen our rear areas, we will be unable to defeat the enemy's pacification plan. . . .

We must thoroughly understand the Party's general strategic principles concerning the leadership of the movements in the delta, the rural areas, the jungle and in the urban areas. . . .

. . . We must try to convert a major portion of the enemy-controlled areas into disputed areas (some into liberated areas controlled by us), to convert a major

portion of the presently disputed areas into liberated zones where our control would be firm, and at the same time, we must devote all our efforts toward securing, developing and expanding our liberated and base areas . . . so as to convert a major portion of the areas under his control into disputed areas or liberated areas controlled by us.

* * * *

Local and external forces must be coordinated and armed activities must be coordinated with local mass movements. Reactionary organizations must be destroyed. The tyrants and their public control organizations (including the police, security, pacification, and reactionary elements) must be attacked. . . .

In guiding all kinds of activity, we must always and steadily maintain the objective of the uprising in the rural areas. . . .

. . . we must cleverly maintain the legal status of the people, a positive legality, which would permit the constant carrying out of our political and armed struggle movements in pulling down the enemy's influence.

One of the decisive prerequisites is the development of sound political organizations to include strong Party chapters able to lead the masses in the fight against the enemy, and into which the masses themselves are organized.

* * * *

The requirements of the liberated rural areas consist in holding on to the land and people and making decided efforts to prevent the enemy from taking over additional land and herding the people to his areas. . . .

. . . Strive to ideologically motivate the people so that they will step up their resistance. . . .

We must realize that the main point in the defense of the liberated areas lies in the fact of maintaining our control over the population and, most of all, in nurturing the fighting spirit.

. . . People must be determined to struggle against the enemy, to cling at all costs to their paddies and villages, to step up production for national salvation, to tie their personal interests to those of the revolution and resistance. . . .

* * * *

Reality shows that recently in order to avoid airstrikes, the population have left their lands and fled to the enemy-controlled areas. They then become homeless and penniless and their lives are miserable. For this reason, if we can perform well the tasks of protecting the people's interests, lives and properties, and of production, suitably in the new situation, and the relations between the people and Party are close and firm, they then realize that the Party really cares for them and will cling at any cost to their native villages for combat and production.

* * * *

Great efforts must be made to achieve solidarity in the rural areas, to implement the Party's agrarian policy well and the Party's class lines which state that: "Based on the unity of poor, middle and rich peasants, we are trying to gradually topple the landlord class, to win over those landlords desirous of joining ranks, neutralize the fence-sitters and smash those wicked landlord agents of the American imperialists."

* * * *

The urban areas and cities have to meet the following requirements:

According to the situation in each locality, uninterrupted attacks in every form and size must be launched against the enemy in order to create constant disturbances even in the enemy's safest rear bases. Movements in the cities and urban areas must be encouraged to catch up with those in the rural areas.

. . . We must capitalize on the differences existing within the enemy's camp, isolate and divide the diehards, win over the neutralists' sympathy, persuade the fence-sitters to take sides . . . [and] . . . to continuously expand the movement and create conditions for the forthcoming general attack and uprising.

* * * *

We must create and develop the movements among various classes, the laborers, the needy urban people, the petit-bourgeoisie, the students, and then gradually associate them with other movements and organizations to form a coalition front for widespread action, proceeding toward the development of a united front

with a platform inferior to that of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam but endowed with the conditions to operate openly and to attract the above classes for a struggle against the Americans and their lackeys.

* * * * *

It is apparent from the expression of tasks in the cities that the Viet Cong have made little headway in the urban areas, despite the existence of substantial anti-government feeling in the larger population centers. Viet Cong leaders have also been dissatisfied with results in general proselyting [sic] among the civilian population. Their dilemma has become evident. On the one hand, they have worked hard, and not with great success, to move the peasant out of his world of narrow self-interest and to mobilize him for the larger goals of the revolution; on the other, it has become plain that in the context of the very personal suffering of rural families in the war, this effort has led to some alienation from the movement. The following excerpts illustrate these points:

Intensification of Civilian Proselyting [sic] Activities.

... in the recent past, our civilian proselyting [sic] activities have been too weak. We have not fulfilled the task of motivating, indoctrinating and assisting the people to settle those complex problems created for them by the war so as to enable them to carry out the resistance activities.

* * * * *

... Emphasis has been placed only on the mobilization task while the difficulties and problems of the masses remained incompletely understood.

The Party's cadres and personnel must remain close to the masses, particularly the workers and farmers, and must stand back to back with them, remain with them during moments of hardship and danger and not leave them in the lurch or stay aloof from them even under easy circumstances.

* * * * *

A large-scale mass motivation campaign must be opened ... Nationalism must be promoted, sufferings pointed out, national and class hatred provoked. ... Mass organizations must be strengthened and developed, ... so as to enable the Party to secure its control over the elements of the populace—farmers, youths, women in the rural areas, liberation unions and syndicates in cities. ...

* * * * *

The class factor must be viewed as the key factor. But due consideration must also be given to an individual's character, age, and walk of life. In the meantime, efforts must be made to attract and gain the middle classes.

* * * * *

We must be more enlightened on the position of the farming class, consolidate our control over the rural areas, strengthen the poor and middle farmers' unity and make them an active force of the Party in the rural areas. ...

We must penetrate into the religious masses and motivate them, promote their nationalist spirit, ... prevent them from being fooled by reactionary elements. ...

With regard to the ethnic minorities ... we must properly carry out the Party's ethnic policy, penetrate deeply into the masses ...

With regard to the Chinese residents, we must continue to penetrate their masses and motivate them to unite with our people ...

... The Labor Youth Group must have sound control over the youths, and must encourage them to join our ranks and in countering the enemy's conscription effort. We must motivate the women to participate in the political struggle ... and assume activities in the rear area so that young men can go to the front.

Strengthening the Party, both ideologically and organizationally, is made the order of the day. Attention is to be concentrated on improving

the Party chapters, the key "grass roots" organization of the *Lao Dong* (or the People's Revolutionary Party, as its Southern branch is publicly known) in both the rural areas and towns. Again a dilemma appears. While the directive stresses the flexibility and initiative necessary to continue operation by lower echelons under difficult circumstances, it tends to defeat this purpose by calling at the same time for tight controls from the top. Thus it provides some explanation for reports from observers in the field that there is a considerable lower-level paralysis among the Viet Cong cadres in the absence of direction from above.

Increase the Party Development Activities

... Development must be efficient from both the ideological and organization standpoints so as to insure the unity of thought and action in the Party. Ideological development must be considered as the primary requirement.

First the entire Party, population and army must be indoctrinated so that all realize the sublime historical mission of our people. ...

The effort of developing and promoting the class viewpoint among cadres and Party members in the days to come must satisfy the requirements of creating a spirit of perseverance, revolutionary optimism, readiness to overcome hardships and dangers and to accept sacrifices, determination to eradicate the enemy, to cling to one's area and to the populace, especially the workers and farmers, to share hardships with the people, to properly carry out every activity and not to be shaken by the enemy's peace trick arguments and his Chieu Hoi scheme. ... Within the Party as well as among the population, the outstanding ideological problems, such as deviationism, conservatism, rightism, must be settled. ...

* * * *

... we must see that the Party's political and ideological views are firmly upheld by using political and ideological indoctrination as a basic means to promote the position of the proletarian class in order to enhance revolutionary vigilance ...

... we must increase counterintelligence and counterespionage activities. ... The Party's leadership activities must be increased. ...

... it is necessary to improve our technique and to increase centralized leadership and, in particular, to strengthen the Party's absolute control over the armed forces. ...

... In the days to come, the task of developing and consolidating the Party's chapters (especially in villages and cities) must be considered as a central effort in the task to develop the Party from the organizational standpoint.

* * * *

First we must start with improving each individual member of a Party chapter. This is accomplished by raising his political and ideological levels, making him thoroughly understand the situation and his mission, enhancing his will to attack and destroy the enemy, his determination to cling to the land, to the people, and to fight until the end. ...

... Substantial assistance must be given to help each member of the Party to know what he is supposed to do daily, how to do it ... we must proceed toward developing working methods, raising the political and organizational standards of committee chapters and chapter secretaries. Only thusly can we make the chapters capable of functioning by themselves under difficult circumstance and execute the policies from above without remaining passive as before.

* * * *

Finally, a summary of the Viet Cong mission, in clarion tones:

... Our resistance for national salvation against the American imperialists, the most powerful and cruelest enemy of mankind, is occurring in the center of an area in which are concentrated the most serious contradictions in the world at the present time. Our resistance is part of the world revolution which is designed to liberate our people, and at the same time protect national independence, democracy and socialism throughout the world.

... the factors determining our ultimate victory are apparent. We have the correct domestic and foreign policies of a Marxist-Leninist party. We possess a

Central Committee which is clear-sighted and which is headed by Chairman Ho. We have the heroic army and people of the South, a people's war line which is matchless, a North which is solid and strong, and the increasing support of the socialist camp and people all over the world. . . . every individual leader and Party member must clearly perceive and be proud of his responsibility before history. . . .

Propaganda

ROMANIA— A CHINESE TOEHOLD?*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

As evidenced in this excerpt, careful analysis of propaganda and news in a society in which both are controlled by the government can yield results useful for political forecasting

At the present time, Romania seems to be successful in treading a relatively impartial line between the USSR and Communist China. Or, as stated by Emil Bodnares, Vice President of the State Council of Romania, "Romania aims at developing friendship, alliance, and cooperation with all socialist states on the basis of equality and mutual respect."

On 25 March, *Radio Peking* announced . . . that Cornel Burtica, head of the Romanian Trade Delegation and Minister of Foreign Trade, arrived at the Peking Airport. On 28 March, *Peking* reported that the Romanian trade official had met with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and Acting Minister of Foreign Trade Lin Haiyun. A second broadcast later the same day announced the signing of a trade agreement for 1970 by Burtica and Lin. On 1 April, the Romanian Trade Delegation left Peking by air, seen off by Romanian Ambassador to China, Aurel Duma, and Li Chiang, Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Trade.

A *Radio Peking* broadcast on 19 April carried an article from the Romanian paper *Scinteia* which warmly praised the friendly relations between Romania and Communist China. Referring to the trade agreement which had been signed some three weeks earlier, the article stated that goods to be exchanged between the two countries would continue to be increased and diversified. After mentioning the strides made by Communist China in the field of industry and agriculture, the article concluded by stating that Romania was convinced that "the friendship and cooperation between Romania and China will be further developed."

A 19 April *Radio Moscow* broadcast in Mandarin to China reported that Nikolae Ceausescu, Secretary-General of the Romania Communist Party and President of the State Council of the Romanian Republic, had said that "Romanian people join people of the Soviet Union and people of other countries in commemorating the great Communist theorist and revolutionary leader of the proletariat, Lenin." The Moscow broadcast went on to state, "The Romanian Party activist and statesman emphatically point out that the Romanian Republic values its friendship with Lenin's country and will henceforth develop cooperation between the two

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Highlights: Analysis and Trends," Issue No. 25-70, 19 June 1970, pp. 25-27—25-29.

countries in order to consolidate the world socialist system and promote universal peace."

On 9 June, *Radio Peking* ... reported the arrival of Emil Bodnares and the delegation of the Grand National Assembly of the Romanian Socialist Republic by special plane after concluding their visit to NK. On hand to greet them at the airport were Kang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng, Li Hsien-nien, and Kuo Mo-jo. A second broadcast later the same day reported that Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng, and Li Hsien-nien had held talks with Bodnares and Romanian Ambassador Aurel Duma. The speeches by Kang Sheng and Emil Bodnares at a dinner celebrating the arrival of the Romanian delegation that evening were carried the following day by *Radio Peking*.

The People's Daily carried a welcoming editorial on 9 June, which was broadcast over *Radio Peking* that day. The editorial praised Romania for maintaining its independence and sovereignty from "foreign aggression and interference." The editorial then concluded, "We believe that the coming friendly visit to our country ... is bound to strengthen the traditional friendship between the people of China and Romania still further and make a positive contribution to the militant unity among the revolutionary people of the world."

On 11 June, *Peking* domestic Chinese and NCNA English language service carried the texts of speeches made by Chou En-lai and Emil Bodnares at a banquet given by the Romanian Ambassador in honor of the visiting Romanian delegation. Chou reported that Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao had met with Bodnares and the other Romanian guests and that cordial and friendly talks had been held on those questions that "concerned them both" and that "positive results had been received thereby." Chou also took the opportunity to assail directly the US for its actions in Indochina. Without naming the Soviet Union, Chou alluded to US-USSR collusion in the division and maintenance of their respective spheres of influence and in their interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

For his part, Bodnares praised Communist China for its achievements in agriculture and industry, the launch of its first man-made satellite, and condemned the US for its actions in Indochina.

On 12 June, the departure of the Romanian delegation was reported on *Radio Peking's* English language service. The safe arrival of the delegation in Bucharest was carried by *Radio Peking* on 13 June.

Comment: Official claims by all concerned notwithstanding, there appears to be a definite bias in the activities of Romania in its relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. This may be due in part to the rather hard line expressed by the Soviet Union in the past, typified by a UPI article dated 8 August 1969 from Bucharest, reporting that the Soviet delegate to the Romanian Communist Party Congress, Konstantin F. Katushev, walked out when a message from Communist China was read congratulating Romania on success in its "defense of national independence." Katushev later returned to the meeting and reportedly

warned that the Soviet Communist Party would use "any effort" to counter excessive independence or disunity within socialist ranks.

Resentment of such an attitude, encouraged by Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia and the no doubt gentle arguments of the Chinese Communist representatives in Bucharest and Peking, may have contributed to the two-year delay in the renewal of a treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and Romania. The initial friendship treaty was signed in 1948 for a period of 20 years with a provision for renewal. At the present time, according to a *Japan Times* article dated 14 June, Leonid I. Brezhnev is planning to travel to Bucharest in early July to sign the treaty.

In the meanwhile, an extended and enlarged trade pact with Communist China has been in effect for almost three months, and the Chinese have contributed a reported 50,000,000 yuan (\$7,000,000) for flood relief in Romania. Communist China's concern for Romania, its repeated praise of Romania's "defense of its national independence," and the assurances that China would support Romania in maintaining its freedom of action, tend to indicate a closer relationship than has previously been the case.

Although it is a bit early to say, it is not impossible that Chinese-Romanian relations may develop to the point that the Soviet Union may fear the establishment of another "Albanian situation." Additionally, the stated position of Romania that it would fight if Soviet troops crossed its borders would lead one to suspect that Romania was counting on something more than world opinion to discourage such adventurous moves by the Soviet Union.

Finally, the presence of Yuang Ung-sheng, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, at the 9 June meeting between Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, Li Hsien-nien, and Emil Bodnares and other unspecified members of the Romanian delegation at least opens the possibility of some type of Communist Chinese military aid or assistance agreement being offered to, if not yet accepted by, the Romanians.

Continued observation of relations between Romania, the Soviet Union and Communist China may disclose another "Albania," albeit a more independent one, in the making.

VOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF BURMA*

By the 7th PSYOP GROUP

Analysis of Burmese antigovernment clandestine radio provided an indication of the objectives and tactics of the radio's sponsors.

The *Voice of the People of Burma* (VPB) (clandestine) continued to berate the Ne Win military government. For the week of 12-17 December 1971 the station held true to its policy of repeating its programs over a two day period. All was transmitted in Burmese. Reception was poor.

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Highlights, Trends and Analysis," Issue No. 51-71, December 1971, pp. 51-15-51-16.

The first item on 12 December 1971 dealt with the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) policy on the treatment and education of prisoners of war. VPB stated there were five basic principles followed in the treatment of captured Burmese soldiers. This lasted nine minutes. The Ne Win clique was criticized in San Yu's speech on defense expenditures and dependence on imperialists to build Burma's industries. Another program entitled "Military Clique Which Is Stepping Up Military Expenditures to Depend More on Imperialists and to Oppose the People" lasted for nine minutes. Another program, "Talk on Austerity Exposes Dogfight" lasted 7.5 minutes and stated that the military clique is corrupting itself from within at high levels by squandering the country's money. Lasting six minutes, the last program, "Who Suffers from a System of Providing Raw Materials and Procuring Finished Products?" dealt with the Government's poor system of distribution of finished products. Eleven minutes of victory news from Cambodia and Vietnam closed out the broadcasts. The program for 12 December 1971 was repeated on 14 December 1971.

On 16 December 1971, the broadcast opened with "Combat News" for 3.5 minutes. The first item, "Dogfight Within Ne Win's Military Clique," was a repeat of the topic of 12 December 1971. For 5.5 minutes, it treated the corruption of high level officials and predicted more political fights and power struggles. A seven-minute program, "Ne Win's Economic Plan Will End Up Like the Welfare State Plan" followed. Calling on the people facing housing problems to fight together, "Beware of the Dangers of Military Government, Rangoon Hut Dwellers" lasted 5.5 minutes. "The Growing Struggle of the Thai People against the US and Its Followers—The Thanom-Praphat Clique" continued the broadcast for four minutes. The usual Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung Thought program closed the broadcast period. The foregoing lasted 18 minutes and presented quotations from Lenin's teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat. This program was repeated on 17 December 1971.

Comment. During this period VPB was stressing governmental graft and corruption. The attack is aimed at high level officials who are said to squander the Government's money on luxurious office equipment while preaching austerity to the people. This line may create more distrust and unrest among Burmese because many are discouraged by Burma's lack of progress. Nothing is known of the VPB audience. If only Communists listen, they are probably convinced already that Burma's only solution is Communism. VPB programs then serve to reaffirm the conviction. Whether the corruption charge is true or false in Burma is not really important. People in Burma, patient though they be, know that progress is minimal. To blame some of this on corruption is a way of saying that Communism is needed and is not corrupt. VPB, as usual, reports the strides forward in other nation's people's wars. There is no reason, VPB implies, that such progress will not occur in Burma, too.

Intelligence Reports

VIEWS HELD BY NORTH KOREANS ABOUT FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES*

By the 7th PSYOP GROUP

This report gives an example of how intelligence reports can improve the audience information data on which PSYOP targeting is based.

1. UNITED STATES

Source said North Koreans believed that economically, militarily, scientifically, and in material wealth the United States was the most powerful nation in the world. The NK Government did not deny these facts about the US.

Older North Koreans had the opinion that Americans were humane and gentle, and in fact some other North Koreans believed this privately. They believed that the US engaged in international cooperation. But many North Koreans believed that the US had held a constant war aggression policy throughout its 200 year history. They also believe that the US, a mighty nation, was defeated by North Korea during the Korean War, and they are proud of this victory. Moreover, in connection with the Pueblo seizure and the shooting down of the EC 121, some unsophisticated North Koreans firmly believe that the US will never think lightly of the North Koreans. On the other hand, some intelligent North Koreans believe that the US has restrained itself and endured these events in a cautious, prudent way because the US wished to avoid further involvement in Asian wars, since it was already involved in Vietnam.

When many North Koreans think of the US, their first impression is imperialism. North Koreans do not know about the real functioning of the democratic system in the US. Many also believe, because of North Korean propaganda, that Americans outwardly are humane and cooperative toward underdeveloped and small nations, but in actuality are cunning and crafty. North Korean movies and plays portray Americans in this manner.

North Korean propaganda uses the theme that US forces are stationed in Korea (1) to exploit Korea and (2) because the Korean Peninsula is a strategic base for future US expansion on the Asian mainland in concert with the Japanese. Despite this propaganda, some North Koreans reason that US forces are stationed in the ROK to provide active and positive support to the ROK, to help the ROK develop into a more advanced nation, and to protect a friendly nation from the threat of Communism. On the other hand, source observed prior to his departure from NK in

*Excerpts from "Views Held by North Koreans About Foreign Countries and Peoples," PSYOP Intelligence Notes, No. 257, 17 May 1971.

July 1969 that some North Koreans complained about the passive attitude taken by the USSR and Communist China in supporting North Korea. The US has provided visible active support to its friend, the ROK, but Communist China and the USSR have provided only passive support to their friend, North Korea. Some intelligent North Koreans attribute their poor basic living conditions to the passive aid and support given North Korea by the USSR and Communist China.

2. USSR

Source provided some information about the attitudes of North Koreans about the USSR, but it should be noted that this is based upon his experience in NK before his departure for the ROK in July 1969, and therefore attitudes may have changed in some respects.

From the end of the Japanese occupation until the mid-1950s, North Koreans regarded the USSR as a very close and friendly socialist nation, in fact almost worshipping the USSR. However, their attitude toward the Russians changed to one of keeping the Russians at a distance. The reason for this, according to source, was that at first North Koreans greatly admired the Russians because they had come to North Korea as liberators, but this friendship was not based upon a long historical relation, instead upon the momentary assistance of the Russians in liberating Korea from the Japanese and in providing help during the Korean War. However, after the Korean War, when Khrushchev adopted revisionism and peaceful coexistence, North Korean leaders began to draw away from the Russians. The attitude of the North Korean leaders was spread among the people by the North Korean propaganda apparatus.

North Koreans believed that the USSR was the strongest and most powerful of all the socialist nations, but was not as economically powerful as the US. Some had believed that the USSR was the most powerful nation in the world, but they were surprised at Khrushchev's announcement proposing peaceful coexistence, and that Russian productivity would catch up with US. In so doing, Khrushchev admitted that the USSR was behind the US economically. This surprised many North Koreans.

However, in science, especially space science, most North Koreans still believe that the USSR is ahead of the US. The fact that the Russians put the first man in orbit around the earth, ahead of the US, had a terrific effect on this North Korean attitude.

Some North Koreans began to feel uneasy after their dependence on the USSR became less and less, and the USSR followed revisionism and adopted some capitalist concepts. Nowadays, under Kim Il-sung's concept of *chuche*, North Korea has kept its independence of the USSR, economically, politically, and ideologically.

During the 1950s and even the early 1960s it was the ambition of young students to be able to go to Moscow to study, but now only a limited number of students go. Generally, learning from the Russians has

become less and less attractive, especially since the time Khrushchev adopted peaceful coexistence, his trip to the US, and his humiliation in the Cuban crisis. Now, as far as source knew, there were almost no students from the USSR and the Eastern European satellite nations in North Korea. But there were some students from African nations and North Vietnam studying in North Korea.

North Koreans considered that the Russians were cowardly, selfish, and egotistical.

3. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Source provided some information about attitudes of North Koreans toward Communist China and the Communist Chinese, but this information is based upon his experience in North Korea up until he left there in July 1969. Since then based upon current relations between NK and Communist China, attitudes of North Koreans may have changed in some respects.

The first impression that North Koreans formed of the Communist Chinese was that they were "magnanimous" and "generous." Generally, North Koreans, both leaders and ordinary people, regard Mao Thought as the product of the dotage of an old man and the Cultural Revolution as an ultraleftist action. North Koreans, at the time of the Cultural Revolution, felt proud because they believed that only in North Korea was genuine Marxist-Leninist ideology being followed, the Russians having gone to the right, and the Communist Chinese to the ultraleft. North Koreans generally thought that the Cultural Revolution in Communist China brought shame upon the Communist Bloc, and that the Cultural Revolution, which they termed a riot, would stand in the way of the unification of Korea under North Korea. They considered that the cruel acts in the Cultural Revolution against the intelligentsia would stimulate negative reactions to Communism among the intelligentsia in the ROK.

According to source, a large number of people of Korean ethnic origin lived in the northeastern part of Communist China, but during the Cultural Revolution many cadres of Korean ethnic origin were purged. This also was a factor in worsening the attitude of North Koreans toward the Communist Chinese.

Source said that there had been many small incidents during the Cultural Revolution along the Communist Chinese-North Korean border. Once in August 1967, when source was at Hyesan on the Yalu River, he saw such an incident. There was a small island in the river, which, because of floods, was usually submerged. The North Koreans built an embankment from the river bank on their side of the island. As a result of the construction of the embankment, the Chinese Communist side of the river was flooded instead of the North Korean side. The Chinese Communists, to protect their side, built a stone and wood embankment out into the river. Then the North Korean side was flooded. As a result, the

North Koreans built out from the island an embankment of stone and wood jutting out into the river at an angle a little below the Chinese Communist embankment. This directed the flow of the flood back against the Chinese Communist side of the river. Then the Chinese Communists started building another embankment to correct the situation. At this point the North Koreans proposed negotiations with the Communist Chinese. A North Korean high level provincial official was selected to meet with a Communist Chinese representative who was from a low-level organization. The North Koreans, as a result, would not hold negotiations with the Chinese. Source did not know what happened further in the matter.

Source had heard that there were many small incidents provoked intentionally by the Communist Chinese against the North Koreans. Once three or four Communist Chinese soldiers waited in an ambush in a border area until North Korean trucks came by, then they threw stones at them.

On another occasion the Communist Chinese allowed some relatives of North Koreans to cross into North Korea where they actively promoted Mao Thought.

During the period 1963-1965, according to source, the Communist Chinese authorities put economic pressure on the North Koreans by stopping or postponing the regular or periodic shipment of oil, coke, and other materials for which North Korea depended upon Communist China. Such factors worsened relations and the attitude of the North Korean leaders and people toward the Communist Chinese. North Korea did not officially attack Communist China's move toward the ultraleft, but unofficially, anti-Communist Chinese remarks were spread among the North Korean people. Brotherly relations between the North Koreans and Communist Chinese, based upon help from the Communist Chinese during the Korean War, almost disappeared. The first impression the North Koreans had of the Communist Chinese as magnanimous and generous was replaced by feelings that they were foolish, stupid, and stubborn.

In the case of an emergency, such as an attack from the ROK, the North Koreans expected that they would receive manpower support from Communist China, with material, modern military equipment, coming from the USSR.

The Communist Chinese, source believed, thought badly of the North Koreans for their great idolization of Kim Il-sung. Source said that in March 1968, when he was in the Ryongyang Grand Theater where there was a drama being put on by the North Korean Army, he saw the Communist Chinese diplomats display a bad attitude in welcoming Kim Il-sung. There were a large number of foreign diplomats present, including the Communist Chinese. The area in the center of the front rows of the theater was occupied by the foreign diplomats. A large portrait of Kim Il-sung was hanging at the back of the stage, and at the beginning of the affair as was the custom in North Korea, a choral group sang "The

Song of Kim II-song." When Kim II-song came to deliver a speech or when "The Song of Kim II-song" was sung, it was the custom for everyone to applaud. At the time source was at the Pyongyang Grand Theater, when "The Song of Kim II-song" was sung, everyone in the theater stood up during the song and applauded when it was finished, except for the three Communist Chinese representatives.

Unpublished Studies

ATTITUDES, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA:
FACTORS IN INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

By the U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

This report illustrates how an unpublished study, bringing together a number of communication findings, can constitute a compact sourcebook of PSYOP-related intelligence for field personnel, even though the report was prepared for other purposes.

ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Small increases in literacy and education, improved communication facilities and urbanization in the Far East have been responsible for a slow expansion of the base of public opinion. Young army officers, professionals, students, religious leaders, businessmen and trade union leaders all seek a voice in their future. Alien and competing foreign influences often reinforce these national groups, which are beginning to understand the nature of their influence and attempt to exert it more freely. Successful expression of opinion and influence is still sporadic, however, and suffers from official efforts to censor and repress in many countries.

Some of these primarily urbanized groups have begun to serve also as links back to the predominantly rural, more traditionally oriented sectors of their communities. They thus help to change the outlook and orientation of the rural masses. Often they interpret and communicate government policy and opinion to the masses, and are becoming increasingly influential opinion molders, creating as well as interpreting mass opinion for the government. These new groups represent a new type of nationalism; pragmatic but with a touch of idealism; cosmopolitan, but without a loss of patriotism; modern, yet somewhat tolerant of tradition. They are more interested in action and results than in the dogma and ideology of their elders. For them, integrity and competence count more than the traditional values based on kinship, status or wealth, and their actions indicate their anxiety to improve matters.

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In general, where accommodation is made to the surge of opinion and change, transition can be orderly and peaceful; where opinion is suppres-

*Excerpts from "Attitudes, Communications and Communist Propaganda: Factors in Insurgency in Southeast Asia—1962, "R-76-62 (A), U.S. Information Agency, 1962, pp. 1-29.

sed or ignored, events are more likely to produce violence or upheaval. . . . In Japan [during 1961, for example], public opinion showed a more mature and responsible face. While the mechanisms for the expression of public opinion were relatively unchanged, evidence suggests that mass media, organized pressure groups, political parties and various front groups were forced to become more aware of and responsive to public opinion favoring moderation. This desire for moderation and public order was galvanized into forceful expression by the excesses of the 1960 anti-security treaty struggle.

The Japanese example provides a classic observation on the impact of opinion. When such crystallization of opinion takes place, all institutions must pay attention to closing the gap between popular sentiment and performance of the media, parties, etc. Only when opinion is in the process of formation, or when it is not held strongly, can the media or parties pursue an active course seeking to control and mold public opinion. Once opinion has crystallized, media and political leaders ignore it only at their peril.

BASIC FACTORS INFLUENCING OPINION

. . . Several environmental factors produce unique or special problems in all nations of the Far East and basically influence the general orientation of opinion. These include: The aftermath of colonialism during which most Southeast Asian nations are attempting to recover from the painful distortion of traditions resulting from automatic imitation of the West without adequate adaptation; demands of urban elites for rapid modernization of the economy; right wing resistance to reform; peasant pressures to secure social justice and agricultural reforms; attempts to form adequate administrations and the inability of some governments to exercise authority as in South Viet-Nam, Indonesia, Laos and Burma; internal warfare and subversion as in Laos, Thailand, South Viet-Nam; separatist movements and problems of national unity in Indonesia and Burma which weaken the central government and aid the Communists; ethnic and racial disputes as in Burma, Malaya, Singapore and Laos; outbursts of nationalist extremism as in Indonesia; regional antagonisms like that of the triangular struggle between Thailand, Cambodia and South Viet-Nam; tensions of the divided countries of Korea, Viet-Nam and Laos; contiguity of several Southeast Asian nations to Communist China and North Viet-Nam.

REGIONAL AND LOCAL ISSUES

Local and regional issues dominate the thinking of most Asians, whether they be political or "trained" elites, laborers or peasants. A brief listing of the prevailing regional and local concerns would include: (1) social change and dislocation caused by modernization, (2) economic orientation, (3) regionalism, (4) Communist threats, (5) separatist movements and problems of national unity and (6) tensions of divided countries and problems of guerrilla warfare.

It would be difficult to over-emphasize the problems and difficulties attendant on modernization and national development in the Far East. Demands for modernization are strong among urban elites, but weak from the primarily unreceptive rural sectors. Peasants prefer to secure social justice and agricultural reforms with few resultant changes in their traditional way of life. Yet, political leaders have over-extended themselves through efforts to modernize their country too rapidly. Some of them, however, like U Nu and Sihanouk, have realized that traditional mores also must be maintained and adapted to the times if stability is to be assured.

Meanwhile, the process of modernization has progressed enough to add new strains to the old as traditional and modern groups clash. Radical changes have produced expectant new social groups, plans without managers, factories without technicians and university graduates without jobs.

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COMMUNICATION PATTERN

With the exception of Japan and the urban centers of the Far East, the communication pattern is far from adequate for the nations' needs. A low level of information is characteristic for all sectors except the small urban elites. The press remains limited largely to urban distribution and radio receivers are too few and not widely dispersed. Most information is still transmitted through informal channels. Mass media serve to feed an increasing amount of information into informal channels.

... Consequently, the effective utilization of the village council is of considerable importance to leadership as a source of feedback and as a mold of peasant opinion on the government's authority and programs. District leaders and provincial governors share an important role as a feedback source to the leadership and as molders of opinion.

With the exception of Japan, and possibly Malaya and the Philippines, the general communication process providing for a dialogue between decision makers and the public is best characterized as a "semi-closed" one; the public generally cannot express itself by pressure or representative strikes or press campaigns or non-manipulated elections. Yet street demonstrations—albeit ones often organized by political parties for their own benefit, expressions of opinion in the press and intellectual quarterlies and party conferences and conventions, serve to keep the communication process partially open.

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ATTITUDES

National Development, Economic and Technical Aid

In most of the Far East, expectations of social reform and desires for economic modernization exist among Westernized, urbanized elites. The

peasant masses seek land reform, agricultural credit and simple but modern tools, yet cling to the traditional values and social customs.

While the new governments find it difficult to administer even the most basic national functions, they encounter still greater difficulties when they try to initiate change. Efforts to carry out planned economic development become especially burdensome when communication facilities are inadequate and few competent administrators and technicians exist. Since accomplishment lags far behind promise, national discontent is intensified.

Yet "modernization" is an important political issue and a rallying point for intellectual leaders and modern elements of the new states. These are also the most active political elements who can make the issue of modernization a source of unrest, discontent and turmoil in the area.

The new nationalists are seeking ideological and cultural identity, a workable political and economic system, and determined, strong leaders. Their inward search for a national character leads them to probe for a synthesis of traditional and modern ideas. Since national unity is one of the most serious problems confronting these countries, the role of the military as an agent of nationalism in South Korea, South Viet-Nam, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia, cannot be overlooked. Military organizations, which often stage coups for nationalist reasons, have the discipline, talent, *esprit de corps* and coercive means to reorganize and operate their country more effectively than the diffuse bureaucracies. Yet military rule often creates political tension and an atmosphere more favorable to the growth of communism than democracy.

[International Issues]

There is a massive disinterest, even by Asian elites, in most international issues which do not directly impinge on their interests. The burning struggle in the world for them is not the Berlin crisis or even the ideological struggle between communism and democracy, but rather the development of their own new nations. They say so, quite vigorously.

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TARGET GROUPS

The following sections will discuss the various groups involved in change. The groups are discussed, for convenience, under the usual three major categories. The categories should be considered flexible, however, for the early stage of modernization and change has not yet produced definitive patterns and roles.

General Populace. This numerically preponderant group is generally inarticulate but capable of becoming a strong force if stirred by their leaders. It includes peasants, ethnic minorities, army enlisted men, and unskilled laborers. The great size of these masses contrasts sharply with the small number of elite who control the society.

Middle Class. This is an expanding group, containing articulate political forces, and one where the distinction between "westernized" and

"traditional" is more strikingly apparent. It includes professionals, the religious hierarchy, educators, students, communicators, civil servants, junior army officers, labor leaders and a growing group of businessmen.

Elite This includes top government officials, senior army officers and the monarchy.

Voluntary Associations and Interest Groups. A fourth category might deal with combinations of these population elements into voluntary associations and interest groups.

General Populace

Peasants. They comprise the bulk of Southeast Asian society and are often least receptive to change because of their lack of education, fears of the supernatural, devotion to religious principles and tradition. Although they are not directly involved in the structure of power or the process of government, their support is necessary for those in power. Thus, indirectly, they influence the government. Although the peasants are largely unorganized, cooperatives are gaining popularity and politicians—especially the Communists—are attempting to organize them. Among the peasantry, the village headman either because of his age, education or respectability, is given high credence and serves as a source of news and advice for the peasants.

Labor. A major problem for this group is created by the frequently abrupt transition many workers make from a more or less primitive rural subsistence economy to a technologically more advanced urban economy. Governments in the area are attempting to help them adjust to the requirements of an industrialized life in order to prevent them from becoming dissatisfied and a prey to opposition leaders. Labor, particularly plantation, dock and mine workers, has been a prime target for Communist infiltration tactics.

Urban Proletariat. This urban, unskilled labor group, separate from the urban industrial labor force, includes, for example, street vendors and pedi-cab drivers, who have become socially mobile and are beginning to respond to and participate in political parties and small pressure groups. This group—breaking away from traditional social controls—has suffered personal maladjustment and disorganization; juvenile delinquency and unemployment frequently plague this group. As their desire for education and advancement increases along with their discontent, they will become increasingly important as a target for mass communicators, politicians and others competing for their support.

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Army Enlisted Men. The enlisted men come from the lower classes and have little chance for education, exert little influence and are more susceptible to blandishments from any side which can offer them a better life. They are important because they have roots in the local community and often carry information to it.

Ethnic Minorities. The number of indigenous tribal minority groups in Southeast Asia created by physical conditions and differences of race,

attitudes, beliefs, and language, is estimated in the hundreds. Sharply differentiated from one another, these tribal groups who generally live in a semi-savage state have in common a fierce pride in their own organizations and cultural patterns and an intense fear of being swallowed up by the alien culture of the majority. These do not include alien minorities such as the Chinese or Indians.

Although often small in number, the individual minority groups when combined account for a fairly large segment of the area population. They constitute elements in the society which are highly susceptible to dissident and subversive activities. If well organized and directed, these minority groups could exert considerable influence.

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Women. With increasing urbanization and improved education and organizational consciousness, women are assuming more active roles. Their influence is generally projected through women's organizations, but they are also important in some business circles and in education. Limited surveys to date show that women are a substantial and distinct target audience. It would be most difficult to reach both men and women of the non-elite group with a single program or magazine. Radio listening, which permits women to have contact with the outside world while performing their household duties, appears to be a major source of information for women who own sets.

Middle-Level Groups

Mass Communicators. Because of the relative lack of effective political opposition groups, civic and special interest associations or pressures from academic personnel or professional classes, newspaper editors and others in mass media work must carry the heavy burden of responsible instruction of public opinion.

Often, however, the government itself employs many of the nation's best publicists, and their consequent removal from journalistic action leaves the field open to less responsible, less educated journalists. In addition, the low status of journalists, in comparison with those into whose public conduct they would inquire, tends to hamper the press. Many reporters are critical of those they consider "politicians" but often their criticism is tempered by the relationship of the newspaper publisher or editor to a particular party or politician. The editorialists find it easier to write about Western foreign policies and problems than the current problems of their own societies; however, this does not mean that foreign news coverage is heavier than domestic coverage. There are exceptions, of course, and as the number of educated editors in Southeast Asia increases, they will be most influential in understanding and helping to advance modernization.

Religious Leaders. (Buddhist) Buddhist monks provide the largest number of public-opinion molders in Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and to a lesser extent, South Viet-Nam. The members of the *Sangha* (order of monks) belong to individual monasteries and sects but have a cohesive organization. The chief monk or abbot—head of the

local *wat* (pagoda)—possesses high prestige within the community, is a source of influence and information and is one of the few members of the village community (outside of the teachers) who reads newspapers and is a transmitter of new ideas.

Buddhist monks now receive training in state schools and indoctrination in secular thoughts and methods. Because of increasing social and political consciousness, the monks are attempting to keep abreast of modern learning and methods.

In addition to the role of the *Sangha*, powerful Buddhist societies of laymen, such as the *Sasana* council in Burma, play an important role as informal pressure groups. Although theoretically aloof from secular affairs, there is ample evidence in recent history to indicate that these groups respond dynamically to important issues such as the threat of local Communists to the Buddhist religion and the Communist threat to Buddhism in Tibet.

(*Islamic*) In the Muslim country of Indonesia, where religion is inextricably interwoven with politics, the role of the *ulema* (Muslim scholar and teacher) is not as influential as the monk in the Buddhist world. Ulemas are apparently more influential in the outer islands, where there are greater manifestations of devotion to religion, than in Java where political affiliations are as important as religious ones. The *ulemas* are frequently highly nationalistic and make their influence felt through the political party, the *Nahdatul Ulama*.

Divisions within Islam occur along two prominent lines. There is the social cleavage in Java between the communities of the *Santri* the devoutly Muslim persons often associated with town or village trade, and the communities of the intelligentsia or middle class of the cities and large towns who are nominally Muslim but accept most of the cultural content of Western civilization and are more receptive to change. A second type of cleavage has developed inside the Muslim *Santri* between modernism and religious reform as expressed by the urban small traders and the orthodox Masjumi Party. Such cleavages condition attitudes toward change and make different communications approaches necessary.

(*Catholic*) In the predominantly Catholic Philippines, the priests are very influential and the Church is a dominant force second only to political parties. In South Viet-Nam, although Catholics form only ten percent of the population, there is a large percentage of Catholics in high government positions.

Labor Leaders. They tend to be middle-class intellectuals strongly favoring economic development and change. They are becoming influential because of their affiliation with political parties and the support they can deliver by virtue of their control of mass organizations. Many have simply chosen the unions as an additional stepping-stone to power, prestige or just to provide a higher standard of living.

Junior Army Officers. Junior army officers, together with university

students, serve as major communication channels between Western influence and their own culture. Both junior and senior army officers have the added advantage of being well disciplined with both administrative capacity and responsibility. This demonstrated capacity is the more remarkable in a situation where decision-making by deliberation and compromise is neither customarily applied nor effective.

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Middle-echelon officers are trained primarily in their own countries and act as mediators between the top and lower levels. Often they are closer to the rural and urban middle classes and are influential in bringing about change.

In Burma, South Viet-Nam, Malaya, Laos, and the Philippines, middle-level army officers and the rank-and-file are coming into closer contact with the masses through civic action committees, or National Solidarity Councils (Burma) through which they attempt to curb insurgency, fight the Communists and at the same time promote citizenship and greater loyalty to the state. Through these activities, they gain greater status and authority and also become a more effective channel for information.

The development of a traditional, professional corps and the establishment of defense colleges and economic institutions—that is, National Defense College and Defense Services Institute of Burma—indicate an increasingly persuasive and possibly intellectual role for the Army. Certainly the Army can be expected to exert a far greater influence in civilian affairs than ever before.

Most decisive of all, will be the extent to which military leaders are able to broaden their own education so as to see their country in perspective and cope more effectively with the innumerable problems confronting their countries.

Small Businessmen. The economic and social "underdevelopment" of Southeast Asian countries is often reflected in the small size and structure of the middle class. The entrepreneurial classes tend to be more mercantile and financial, and these are not the fields in which economic progress is sought. Although there are numerous small retail traders, they are largely illiterate and have assimilated little modern culture. Government restrictions on foreign businessmen are gradually propelling indigenous groups to participate in the economic life of their countries. As they grow, so may their influence.

Overseas Chinese now control most of the trade in Southeast Asian countries, and although assimilation is taking place, they are likely to preserve a separate cultural identity for several more generations. Restrictive measures now being applied to Overseas Chinese in several countries are intended to offer new opportunities to indigenous businessmen, but these measures may cause more Overseas/Chinese to look toward Peking for support.

University Students. Students are among the foremost progenitors of change, the first to become disenchanted with the slowness of economic

and social progress and the first to revolt against tradition. The inadequate opportunities open to them after graduation may lead, and in some cases have already led, them to agitate for rapid change and to cooperate with groups advocating the overthrow of incumbent governments.

In Burma, Indonesia and Malaya, especially, student organizations have grown strong and are militantly anti-colonialist and nationalistic. Communist elements everywhere are ready to take advantage of and attempt to infiltrate these groups. For these reasons, ruling elites regard student groups as unruly, fear their power, question their political abilities and are currently making efforts either to silence them or appease them.

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Teachers and University Professors. Teachers throughout the rural areas of Southeast Asia traditionally hold a respected place in society and are important opinion leaders. In rural areas they are often the only newspaper readers and source of news and opinion. But in urban areas the traditional respect for teachers is being gradually transferred to political leaders. In Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya, teachers' unions are taking on the character of trade unions as they seek greater benefits for their members and try to promote better citizenship. Their cohesiveness and organization are not great, however, despite highly centralized educational systems.

University professors, many of whom are Western educated, ordinarily are not the leaders of the intelligentsia; government control of the universities often hampers the exercise of leadership and professors generally lack any power to alter the situation.

The major area of effectiveness of this group is as a channel of communication and influence for the intelligentsia and the students. But the wide gulf that exists between faculty and students—based on traditional deference to persons in authority—restricts their effectiveness and makes it only formal one-way communication. The influence of this group is thus based more on prestige than on power or action.

Elite-Level Groups

Intellectuals and Administrators. This important group's attitudes differ substantially from the general national attitudes with respect to goals and values, principally because of their Western training. They believe in the truth of science and in its application: the value of rational administration, written laws and orders, achievement and professionalism. Gradually they are beginning to place less emphasis upon religious and family affiliation, and believe more in progress, and, to a limited extent, planning on a long-term basis. They are somewhat delocalized, albeit less completely than they themselves think. The cleavage between them and the rest of the population is often apparent; their problem a universal one.

These intellectuals—though usually employed in the government

—are often distrusted by the politicians, who, although often intellectuals themselves, are more populist and even demagogic. Criticism by political leaders has appeared to weaken the position of the intellectuals, making them less prone to oppose the often unrealistic aspirations of their political superiors. For all these reasons, effective criticism by these groups within the government is insufficient and ineffective.

Those intellectuals remaining outside the government often express themselves through organizations which could contribute to improvement of the quality of public opinion, providing as they do a vague, unorganized opposition to government. But for the most part, the intellectuals remain alienated from the centers of public life. They are disillusioned and unhappy about the course of events, including the government's inability to utilize their talents.

Intellectuals and Specialists: A new sector of the intellectual class is beginning to develop with chemists, engineers, accountants, statisticians, doctors, and lawyers forming the nucleus. This sector is more specialized and professional and less generally interested in cultural and political matters. It could, however, form the basis for future stable and progressive societies. Though small in number, the high prestige of these people, especially in the cities, enables them to influence acquaintances, clients and others outside of their professions. Nevertheless, they usually lack direct political influence and a popular following.

Overseas Chinese form a significant part of these intellectual groups only in Singapore and Malaya, where educated Chinese outnumber educated Malays. Elsewhere, in Southeast Asia, however, the professional classes include only a few Chinese members. In addition to the frustrations affecting other intellectuals, the Overseas Chinese intellectuals tend to be susceptible to the appeal of association with the mainland and fear discrimination because of their alien origin.

Upper-Rank Military Officers. Most of the upper-rank military officers are young men strongly desirous of technological improvements within the society. At present, many senior officers have been Western-trained either in the West or by Western methods; many have received a technical education in engineering colleges and are thus more favorably disposed toward Western life. If the Army itself is not in power, senior army officers often maintain close contact with the ruling elite.

Voluntary Associations and Interest Groups

There is a growing body of private and voluntary associations and interest groups whose influence will undoubtedly increase in the future. Although few in number at present, trade union and employers associations, professional and business associations, and welfare organizations perform significant functions on behalf of their members, including providing regulations for those within the association or

negotiating and living with each other. Until recently, the family or village circle played this role and provided for such needs. Both the Philippines and Indonesia have a large number of such associations; their numbers are growing in Burma, South Viet-Nam and Malaya. In Thailand, Cambodia and Laos, individualism and ideas of personal responsibility make associations less popular.

These associations often are subject to governmental interference and political influence, but they constitute at best an extra arena for the practice of democracy and group responsibility outside the official life of the country.

VALUES

The transitional societies of Southeast Asia, contending with the disruptions accompanying modernization, appear simultaneously confounded, dismayed and enlightened by the changes occurring in their societies. As they become caught in the economic and social tide inseparable from the age of technology, many people undergoing urbanization remain uprooted and divorced from their traditional cultures and values, without acquiring adequate substitutes.

Practically all of the Southeast Asian nations are culturally and ethnically heterogeneous, traditional values strongly centered in religious orthodoxy are powerful among them, belief in the efficacy of supernatural forces is common, xenophobia is characteristic, kinship and stratification promote particularistic loyalties, lack of technological skills and illiteracy prevail and internal communications remain inadequate. Nearly all these nations confront a preponderant peasant majority, which, if it is not apathetic and withdrawn into its parochial life, is quietly or actively resistant to efforts to modernize it.

In efforts to bridge the gap between traditionalism and modernity, the influence of "modernizing" indigenous elites and interested Westerners appears most successful if it includes an appeal to the more deep-lying values which are part of a country's patterns. New norms are most likely to be acceptable when they are carefully designed to harmonize with selected traditional values. Successful change can occur within the society when types of resistance are recognized and understood, when technological innovations bring with them products valued in the culture, when innovations are carefully planned and when the elite and rising middle class work closely together.

Principal elements of Asian cultures and values will be examined in order to determine their importance in Southeast Asia and to weigh their resistance or adaptability to change. These principal values include moral, spiritual and religious; those relating to knowledge and education; social status and the family; attitudes toward authority, obedience and cooperation; and economic factors including attitudes toward work and leisure.

Moral, Spiritual and Religious Values

Contrary to the basic sense of individual determinism commonly accepted in the West, the Asian lives in a universe determined by the will of God, not man. Throughout the Buddhist-Hindu arc of Asia, there is widespread acceptance that the material world is merely an extension of the "real world" of the spirit and that all striving for material success is but an illusion. Thus, Asians see man's relationship to nature and the universe as pre-determined, which leads to a fatalistic acceptance of life as it is—Asia's law of *Karma*.

Spiritual values dominate the lives of Southeast Asian people: their religion provides a system of morality, a guiding philosophic principle for the sophisticated believer, a source of inspiration for ardent nationalists and meaningful symbols for the religious devotees. Despite acceptance of the formal religions of Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam, animistic beliefs are also dominant among a majority of people in Southeast Asia.

Buddhism. Buddhism is probably the most important unifying cultural force in Southeast Asia. It predominates in every country except Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines and is an integral part of an eclectic Confucianism in South Viet-Nam. In practice and theory, Buddhism is not necessarily incompatible with or opposed to the development of science and technology. Like Christianity, Buddhism cautions man against undue materialism and insists upon the dominance of spiritual values. Freedom of man is proclaimed to a high degree in Buddhism as the doctrine of individual self-development but is tempered by the doctrine of *Karma*.

Fundamentally Buddhism stresses the rational processes of the individual in attaining salvation by understanding, and above all it stresses the concept of knowledge as a part of this process. Its stress on complete equality of caste, color and creed, its real brotherhood of man and its fundamental anti-materialism discourage selfishness and provide the basis for a social conscience. Unfortunately, in its sojourn among authoritarian governments, these aspects of Buddhism have not always been developed. Because of its tenets, Buddhism has and may continue to be used to support policies of neutralism as a middle path in a changing world.

Buddhism and Change. Buddhism teaches the inevitability of change. Social mobility, either upward or downward, is to be expected, and is made possible through various combinations of religious achievement—merit-gaining, favorable marriage, political success, and, increasingly, secular education. In the Buddhist countries of Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and to a limited extent, South Viet-Nam, identification with any form of Buddhism inevitably invests the participant with a high degree of social acceptability and facilitates his achievement of status in society.

Nevertheless, a contradiction appears in Buddhist countries between the acceptance of change and anti-materialist teachings. As more mate-

rial goods become available—particularly in connection with Western aid programs—conflict occurs within society, primarily in the urban centers.

The temporary dominance of *Karma* and anti-materialism often justifies the lack of positive action by Asian administrators, which in turn aids in discouraging mass political participation in economic and social programs. The knowledge that the world is sorrow, that present suffering stems from a previous incarnation, that the only hope of peace of soul is not to improve this world, but to escape from it, are powerful reasons for inactivity, and often for passive acceptance of external phenomena. Disasters are met with relative equanimity because of the conviction that in the next cycle, a fresh start can be made. This frequent attitude of passivity and reliance upon providence often makes it difficult to help Asians help themselves.

Westerners, guided by a sense of responsibility for performance in a limited time, may encounter annoying barriers and setbacks, which are often erroneously attributed to laziness or indifference. Reference to the Buddhist belief in change may help in overcoming local indifference or resistance in such situations.

Leading Buddhists are becoming increasingly aware that traditional concepts must be modified to tolerate certain Western influences. Many Buddhist leaders have recognized that Buddhism must seek accommodations with Western-induced changes if it is to preserve itself and its influence in individual and national affairs.

Islam in Indonesia and Malaya. Religion in Indonesia is an inextricable partner in politics, and proponents of theocratic and secular philosophies vie with one another for favor of the masses. As in Malaya, where Islam is also the dominant religion, many still profess devotion to Islam but are less observant of its rituals.

Indonesian Muslims share something in their common faith, but for most of them, Islam is not the unifying force that it has been in much of the Middle East. In addition, the underlying paganism of the Indonesians gives Islam a different undertone from Islamic practice elsewhere in the world. And regional differences come into play. Thus, although Islam is undoubtedly an influential force in Javanese cultural development, it can best be described as "folk Islam," while an evangelical Islamic purism prevails elsewhere in Indonesia. Although Islam is dominant in Indonesia, it also confronts other religions such as the Hinduism of the Balinese and the Christianity of approximately 2,500,000 Indonesians.

Islam and Change. Islam leaves less room for change than does Buddhism and within Muslim communities there is a stronger desire to maintain a status-oriented society. Life moves from day to day, and Indonesians and Malays alike feel that there is little need to look into the future. Time is not the moving backdrop of action that it is in the West. An indirect and subtle approach to problems is traditionally valued above directness and speed. This is changing among urbanized Malays and Indonesians, yet while socialized planning is becoming a watchword, the concept evidently appeals more than the reality of the approach.

Philippine and Vietnamese Catholicism. Catholicism dominates thinking in the Philippines, is influential among a small minority in South Viet-Nam, and aids in offering the society a purposefulness not often seen elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Significantly, it is the Church which has become the most potent organized political force outside the political parties.

Confucian Vestiges in South Viet-Nam. The existence of an eclectic Confucian doctrine together with Buddhism and Catholicism is important in shaping not only religion but a way of life in South Viet-Nam. Social organization rests on the Confucian doctrine of universal harmony in which heaven, earth and man each have their appointed place and their minutely prescribed relationships with each other. Confucianism stresses individual perfection whereby each, through education, learns to fulfill properly the role necessary to continue universal balance.

As a result, the individual Vietnamese is frequently faced with the impossible dilemma growing out of conflict between his own necessities and values and those values imposed by society. Humanist, individual and Marxist values have been particularly difficult to harmonize with approved Confucian values. His attempt to obey all these conflicting values has helped to earn the Vietnamese a reputation for insincerity.

Attitudes of Youth toward Religion and Morality. Not surprisingly, it is among the younger generation that traditional religious values are being challenged and changed most. Problems of delinquency and declining moral standards of youth are becoming more common throughout the area, particularly in the cities.

Attitudes toward Knowledge and Education. As one of the highest values on the Asian social scale, education is one of the most potent single factors of common concern to the many and varied countries of Southeast Asia. Significantly Southeast Asia and the West differ in their attitudes concerning education. In the former, the value of education rests more on the status and prestige it confers than on the substantive learning which it implies. Education is relatively difficult to obtain and is therefore a necessary qualification for advancement. In Thailand, for example, civil service pay is largely regulated by the number of degrees which an individual holds.

Although education is also considered a means of advancement in the West, it is primarily valued for its substantive content. The spirit of Western intellectualism is little understood in Southeast Asia, while the American tradition of the uneducated "self-made man" is non-existent.

Education in Southeast Asia is increasingly valued as a patriotic duty. This involves not only the pride of nationalism—providing a more deep seated and durable basis for national loyalties—but also a genuine desire to enter a new and better era. The elites are anxious to borrow foreign educational methods primarily to bring their country up to date.

Furthermore, literacy has become the necessary lubricant in the development of modern political machinery throughout the area. Illiteracy

not only closes off valuable channels of communication but, more importantly, perpetuates the immaturity of peoples incapable of grasping the problems and necessities of modernization. Leaders are aware that an illiterate population is easy prey to every pretender offering a glittering promise of a bright tomorrow.

Relationship of Education to Communications. In the capital cities of most Southeast Asian countries, the mass media are an important influence on the educated. In the rural areas, the teacher, in addition to the Buddhist priest or the village headman, assumes a highly significant role as a source of information and knowledge. Teachers are often expected to take an active role in public affairs, serve on committees and act as inspectors at elections. The teachers are very influential in persuading villagers to obey government policies and in introducing Western ideas and products.

SOCIAL VALUES

The Family. The high value placed upon the family and loyalty to the family is an important factor to be understood by any alien group attempting to work with Southeast Asians. Close family ties with the ensuing high rate of social interaction, particularly in the villages, produce intimate communities with little privacy, where news of interest can be spread rapidly via the "rice harp" or "bamboo radio" of word-of-mouth communications.

Apart from work, religious observances and holidays and family observances continue to constitute the main fabric of village life in Asia. This pattern is more enthusiastically observed in the villages than in the cities.

The structure and organization of the family have been and continue to be diverse among Southeast Asian countries. In South Viet-Nam and to a limited extent in Burma, the family is an extended or joint one—including a number of generations and subject to the control of a patriarchal head commanding a strict sense of obligation and duty.

In Indonesia (Javanese family), and Thailand, however, the small conjugal family—parents and unmarried children—is prevalent and considerable latitude in behavior is permitted. In such a system, kin ties are relatively weak, and other factors such as wealth, class, status, age, education, occupation, and religious affiliation draw men together or set them apart. In Indonesia (Sumatra) and Malaya, the neighborhood community (*rukun tangan*) is a territorial entity which acquires a kinship quality, and the sense of closeness and cultural obligation may be stronger between neighbors than between distant relatives—an important distinction for communicators.

As a result of urbanization, family life in Southeast Asia is changing rapidly. Change may be traced to disruption of the family as a producing economic unit caused by the migration of its members to the city, and by the increasing need to adapt to a monetary as distinguished from a subsistence economy. As the family system breaks down, and becomes less of a focal point, townsmen are disassociating themselves from tradi-

tional patterns and are beginning to respond to political parties, civic action groups and educational committees.

Particularly evident is the tendency for patriarchal authority to diminish, the status of women to be elevated, the high prestige of elders to wane, and increased individualism to characterize the society. This breakdown of informal social controls is manifest in problems of personal maladjustment and disorganization, juvenile delinquency, increased divorces, and in the acute nature of problems with which the changing family is often unable to cope in the urban setting, such as illness, unemployment and old age.

Some changes, however, must be recognized as desirable. These include the reduced despotism of the family head, the improved status of women and greater personal freedom. It becomes increasingly important for Asians to plan to use the new urban institutions such as schools, hospitals, playgrounds and day centers to deal with the problems of the changing family. There is a need to replace the disrupted social controls with such formal controls as police, courts, reformatories, prisons and child-labor laws. Information on establishing these controls is often lacking and informational materials on how these controls operate in other countries are often sought.

Social Problems. Lack of information and the inability to deal with and recognize the causes of new social problems often lead these countries to single out a scapegoat for their frustrations or to make harsh judgments on foreign societies which have similar problems. American family life and cooperative community action programs are little understood in Asia. Many Asians visiting the United States criticize Americans for lack of closeness, homogeneity and responsibilities to the family. Even knowledgeable Asians criticize the seeming breakdown in authority in many American relationships, including those between parent-child, employer-employee, teacher-student, government-people, and management-labor.

Although delinquency is becoming a problem in Asian cities, due primarily to changes in society, Asian leaders often blame this on the influence of American culture and criticize the United States for its "glaring" delinquency. Many attribute these problems to the fact that women have so much freedom, work and thus spend less time with their families—a problem which Asians also are beginning to face.

Respect for Age. Respect for old age has been a traditional aspect of life in Asia and remains a significant social value. Dependent old people look to their children and grandchildren to support them. Formerly, old people were entitled to complete respect, but today, particularly in urban centers, how much is given varies with the circumstances. Burma is an example of a country which is unusually age-oriented and all social intercourse is governed by the preferential treatment accorded to senior members of a given group.

This respect for old age has application for foreign agencies operating

in Southeast Asia. For example, senior Asian officials accustomed to respect because of their age and status are often insulted when confronted with young persons from a foreign country sent to work with them on an equal basis. And Americans are often criticized by Asians visiting the United States for not paying greater deference to their elders, and for not sharing responsibility for them. To them it appears that old people are unloved and neglected, forced to get jobs and to shift for themselves in loneliness. It is difficult for them to comprehend the social mobility and occupational opportunities which take children away from their parents or the fact that old people often prefer to live an active and independent life after passing their prime.

The Nature of Authority. The predominant tendency in Asia is for authority to be hierarchical. The highly traditional nature of the society places decision-making in the hands of persons who achieved their position largely but not solely through the qualifications of kinship, age, and sex. Thus, whole sections of the population have no share in the exercise of public authority. The chief effect of this hierarchical structure of authority is to generate either excessive submissiveness among the ordinary people or an extremist egalitarianism, by way of reaction against it. The social organizations necessary for the pursuit of private interests and for the exercise of influence are lacking for the most part. Insofar as people are adjusted to this they have little interest in democracy, little concept of their rights as citizens and above all are little inclined, unless there has been a fundamental break with tradition, to speak out their own views and preferences.

Status and Power. People of Southeast Asian countries attach great importance to status and power both in social and political life. Considerations of status and power permeate human relationships, adherence to Buddhism notwithstanding. Southeast Asians define any social and political situation by the relative status and power involved, and then establish their relationship to it on the basis of these elements.

Class and status consciousness predominate in urban areas; in rural areas less emphasis is placed upon status, although respect for authority remains high. In the cities, many urbanites adopt Western material values to accrue status and thus climb the social ladder. This may contradict Buddhist tenets denying material gains, but urban elites often justify their conduct on the basis of gaining "merit" by rising in the social order. In rural areas, however, status comes more from the maintenance of spiritual tenets and morality than from material advance.

Social mobility is common in Burma, which lacks a well-defined class structure. This has bred social insecurity or *ahnade*. Many Burmans seek power to gain security from controversy and criticism.

In countries such as Cambodia, Laos, South Viet-Nam, Thailand, Indochina, and to a limited extent, the Philippines, where there is little social mobility, the prerequisites for status are wealth, family, background, formal rank and office.

Practically applied, status-consciousness affects the entire question of

regionalism within Southeast Asia and makes cooperation difficult because elites of the various countries often consider their own nation eminently superior to that of their neighbors.

* * * * *

Cooperation and Consultation. Cooperation and consultation are strongly linked with familial respect and play an important part in the thinking of many Southeast Asians, especially the decision-makers. Often the desire for consultation and cooperation stems from the efforts of leaders to "save face," to prevent error and to avoid ridicule and criticism. But it must also be considered as part of the religious and kinship systems of the countries.

In Indonesia, great importance is attached to cooperation, consultation, avoidance of disharmony, and decision based on general agreement. These concepts operate principally in the communally-centered Javanese society and contrast sharply with the more individualistic areas in the outlying islands. *Gotong royong*, the pattern of mutual aid, is a central theme in Javanese social life. It is institutionalized in almost every aspect of village life. . . .

Attitudes toward Work and Leisure. Hard work, diligence, perseverance and punctuality are doubtful values in Southeast Asia: one does not work except if one must. Frequently, religious values related to passivity and reliance on providence condition these attitudes. Many Asians can and will work hard by any standards, but only for foreseeable ends. Work is not valued as an end in itself, and the Western idea that one should be ashamed of idleness is not found in Asia.

Leisure, especially in rural areas, comes from seasonal variations in work output. Leisure as well as work may be pursued for relatively long periods of time. Thus, individuals, and sometimes the whole country, may be given to what a Western observer would describe as veritable orgies of work and entertainment.

Gradually, ideas of leisure are changing, especially for younger people in the cities. As new forms of recreation replace old ones, adjustments on the part of all segments of the society are necessary before fear and criticism of the effects of new forms can be dispelled.

Cultural Values. As these countries attempt to seek a *modus vivendi* with Western cultural values and attitudes, concurrent pride in their indigenous traditional art, music, sculpture and religious philosophies remains a dominant factor. Some intellectuals and the political elite, often xenophobic and nationalistic because of their struggle for independence, consider the introduction of alien culture a disruptive influence. Criticism of what they consider the "debasing" features of American culture manifests itself as in the "anti-yellow-culture" campaigns of Singapore and Indonesia. This approach conflicts with and hinders the development of outlook and knowledge necessary for a "modernizing" society. A fusion of the best of Western and Asian forms might be a desirable compromise; so far, however, both have blossomed in separate or conflicting existences.

PSYOP Intelligence Methods

Although there are many methods used to collect and analyze intelligence, only five of the most important are illustrated in this section: intuition, direct observation, interviewing, sampling, and content analysis.

Intuition

The use of intuitive judgments, based on physical evidence of some form, is sometimes confused with guess work. However, intuitive reasoning in the PSYOP intelligence process should not be undertaken by persons who do not have expertise in the subject. In other words, it is only on the basis of a firm background that one should attempt to extrapolate and produce from such extrapolations guidelines for psychological operations. Intuition is the method of producing intelligence that is least reliable.

Direct Observation

Direct observation is an obvious—but often impractical—method of obtaining intelligence. Observation is highly desirable, but clearly, a trained observer is necessary to obtain optimum benefit from observation possibilities in many situations. Observation need not be by nationals of the intelligence-gathering state. Other friendly or neutral observers can serve the purpose equally well. Indeed, captured or surrendered enemy may have had access to certain PSYOP-relevant information by observation. (See "Interviewing" below.)

Interviewing and Interrogation

As a method of converting information possessed by individuals into usable intelligence, interviews can be a valuable tool. Interviewing can take a number of forms and can be applied to friendly, neutral, and hostile respondents. Interrogation may be considered to be a specialized form of interview.

The structuring of the interview and instrument validation procedure are required in all interview situations, whether PSYOP related or not. These are the major problems of interviewing as an intelligence assimilation technique. Another problem associated with the use of interviews is language. Translation of questions or questionnaires can be a very difficult procedure.

In the case of captured personnel, the problems of obtaining false intelligence and extracting intelligence from them are both difficult. A reasonable assessment of the reliability of the source and accuracy of the information gathered must be attempted but cannot always be accomplished. For surrendered personnel, the desire to please the interrogators may influence the content of the information given and therefore an equally stringent assessment of reliability is required.

Sampling

Sampling may be used in conjunction with direct observation, document analysis, or interviewing. It is a demanding procedure, usually undertaken (or at least planned) by extensively trained professionals. An original essay on sampling is included¹ in this section, in an attempt to present a brief, yet comprehensive picture of the major types of samples as well as common problems in sampling.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is a tool that has been refined and sophisticated for sociopolitical research over the years. It is now a powerful means of gathering information relevant to PSYOP. It can reveal the themes, appeals, and target audiences to which the psyoperator is directing his propaganda efforts, and it can also serve as a key indicator of enemy vulnerabilities, as seen by the enemy hierarchy. Content analysis also serves as a basis for counterpropaganda preparation. In spite of the sophistication of which content analysis is capable, it can also provide meaningful analyses without computerized support.

The papers in this section, then, illustrate but a few of the many possible methods of gathering and analyzing materials relevant to PSYOP intelligence needs.

METHODS FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF MAJOR PSYOP INFORMATION SOURCES*

BY PHILLIP P. KATZ

A discussion of the variety of methods available for deriving useful PSYOP-relevant information from a diversity of sources.

This essay will discuss major PSYOP intelligence sources and relate them to PSYOP EEI and the techniques used for gathering data. Figure 1** illustrates the PSYOP intelligence process and program implementation. This section will discuss only the first two elements of the scheme—information source and data collection and testing (method). As Figure 2 indicates, the information source plus the data-gathering technique provide the answers to the EEI for PSYOP intelligence. Both will be discussed. In addition, this section will relate the information source to the PSYOP target, utilization, and the appropriate collecting agency. (See Figure 3).

PSYOP intelligence input data are obtained from published (reference) material and current data sources. Current data are obtained from primary and other sources. Primary information sources are: (1) prisoners of

*Original essay by Phillip P. Katz.

**Repeated from opening essay in this chapter for reader's convenience.




Figure 1. A Schema of PSYOP Intelligence

INFORMATION SOURCE	DATA GATHERING TECHNIQUE					
	INTERROGATION	IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW	SAMPLE SURVEY INTERVIEW (General)	SAMPLE SURVEY INTERVIEW (Special)	SPECIAL SURVEY	CONTENT ANALYSIS
CIVILIAN (friendly)		●	●	●		*
CIVILIAN (neutral)		●	●	●		*
CIVILIAN (hostile)	●	●			●	*
DEFECTORS AND REFUGEES		●	●	●		*
PRISONER OF WAR	●	●			●	*
CAPTURED DOCUMENTS						●
OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS						●
BROADCAST MONITORING						●
NEWSPAPERS/PERIODICALS						●
ENEMY PROPAGANDA						●
INTERCULTURAL GUIDES						●
HANDBOOKS						●
SPECIAL STUDIES						●

*Content analysis of reports and evaluations provided by interrogators

Figure 2. Techniques and Information Sources Used to Obtain PSYOP Intelligence

INFORMATION SOURCE		TARGET							UTILIZATION	
		Enemy Military or Sponsor of Insurgency	Insurgent	Civilians (friendly)	Civilians (enemy)	Civilians (neutral)	Defectors	Target Analysis	Testing	Measuring Effect
CURRENT	PRISONER OF WAR	•	•		•			•	•	•
	CIVILIAN (friendly)		•	•	•			•	•	•
	CIVILIAN (neutral)	•	•	•	•			•	•	•
	CIVILIAN (enemy)	•	•		•			•	•	•
	DEFECTOR	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•
	OTHER INTELLIGENCE	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•
	BROADCAST MONITORING	•	•	•	•			•		•
	NEWSPAPERS/ PERIODICALS	•	•	•	•		•	•		•
	ENEMY PROPAGANDA	•	•		•					•
	UNPUBLISHED REPORTS	•	•	•	•		•	•		•
	CAPTURED DOCUMENTS	•	•		•		•	•		•
REFERENCE	COUNTRY STUDIES AND FAS HANDBOOKS	•	•	•	•		•	•		
	IC GUIDES	•	•	•	•			•		
	NATIONAL INTEL- LIGENCE SURVEYS	•	•					•		
	PUBLISHED STATISTICS AND REPORTS	•	•	•	•		•	•		

Figure 3. PSYOP Information Sources

war, (2) defectors and refugees, (3) the friendly, neutral, and hostile civilian population, and (4) broadcast monitoring. A few of the other sources for PSYOP information are published and unpublished reports, captured documents, including enemy propaganda, newspapers and periodicals, and reports from other sources.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Prisoners of War

U.S. Army or other intelligence agencies are primarily responsible for the interrogation of prisoners of war. Such interrogation for PSYOP purposes requires that the individual interrogator have a reasonable

understanding of the communication process and the manner in which PSYOP media use prisoners in programing. Generally, this understanding of PSYOP media requirements cannot be obtained from a list of questions (EEI). In the PSYOP intelligence questioning some things cannot be asked directly, and it is necessary for the interrogator to understand the use of the information in PSYOP programing and work out his own method for eliciting the desired information accordingly. Most military intelligence interrogators have little or no training in PSYOP, because the primary focus of military intelligence as a collecting agency is on the conventional combat threat. EEI for military intelligence are primarily concerned with number and disposition of troops, types and location of weapons, enemy supply and logistics information, enemy morale, and order of battle.

Interrogation for PSYOP cannot be adequately accomplished mechanically; it requires human and empathic consideration. For example, in one instance in Vietnam, an NVA prisoner being interrogated at JUSPAO complained that he could not cooperate because he had severe headaches. He was given a medical examination and eyeglasses were prescribed. Subsequently, he became a lucrative source of information for PSYOP programs.

If meaningful PSYOP intelligence data are to be obtained from prisoners of war, more is needed than the aforementioned EEI checklist. The history of PSYOP since World War II clearly reveals that information has to be gathered chiefly by PSYOP interrogators who live in the prisoner-of-war camps or detention centers. For example, in Europe during World War II, the intelligence section of the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) had operational control of PSYOP prisoner-of-war interrogators and document analysts who were deployed in the field with the army groups and field armies. Moreover, soon after D-Day (the invasion of Europe), special teams of PSYOP interrogators, operating directly under SHAEF PSYOP, conducted objective interrogations of prisoners for the purpose of studying the morale of enemy forces with a view to projecting trends in morale.

As far as can be determined, no specific format or EEI have been developed for PSYOP interrogation of prisoners or civilians in an insurgency environment. A suggested format for PSYOP interrogation of prisoners of war is the "Dicks-Shils Questionnaire #3 which was the basic interrogation form used by PWD/SHAEF interrogators during World War II.¹ It employs, in part, the open-ended interview technique and is mostly concerned with tactical PSYOP. It is apparent that PSYOP interrogations for an insurgency environment require a different perspective and emphasis; and that a questionnaire developed in 1944 for World War II requires some change.

For the most part, PSYOP research during the Korean War concentrated on the use of interrogations and prisoner panels for testing leaflets.

These studies were limited largely to one PSYOP communication medium (leaflets), and to one audience (the enemy military). The research was not done in close proximity to the operator and results were nearly always made available too late to be useful.

For PSYOP intelligence analysis to be of significant value it is important that research findings be integrated into an operational complex. Otherwise the data collected are usually only of historical interest. As far as can be determined, no PSYOP information system or significant doctrinal guidance resulted from the Korean PSYOP studies.

Open-ended interrogation techniques, which allowed maximum freedom for respondents to describe the situation in which they found themselves prior to surrender, were used in Korea. Such interrogations yield large amounts of varied information, the analysis of which requires particular care. Specific PSYOP questions used in the open-ended interrogations late in the Korean War in the study of Chinese and North Korean prisoners are intermixed and deal with motivation patterns, PSYOP vulnerabilities, communication patterns, and the effect of PSYOP leaflets. It is interesting to note that the interrogations were conducted by Korean civilians employed locally who operated under the supervision of American civilian researchers, mostly professional psychologists.

A necessary and important consideration with regard to exploitation of prisoners of war for PSYOP purposes is the international treaty provisions concerning the questioning and treatment of prisoners of war. The 1949 Geneva conventions for the protection of war victims have been ratified by the United States and came into force on February 2, 1956. They state:

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.³

Consequently, individual prisoners of war cannot be exploited for PSYOP unless they agree, and their exploitation is in accordance with policy guidance. However, it is important to understand that PSYOP can exploit prisoners of war in many ways: First, individual prisoners may agree to write and be photographed for PSYOP testimonials, prepare audio tapes, or assist in the preparation of PSYOP material (program implementation); second, prisoners may volunteer to provide information on the communication process, significant PSYOP targets, and the effect of PSYOP programs; third, prisoners may agree to cooperate in the testing of PSYOP communications, either individually or as members of a panel. In the first instance, the prisoner would be compromised and could be considered a traitor by his nation. However, as a technique to deter compromise, facial characteristics can be masked or blurred. The other ways of exploiting prisoners of war could be accomplished covertly, with little danger of compromise.

U.S. policy is that individual prisoners should not forcibly be exploited, but the good treatment of prisoners as a group is a PSYOP theme that should be exploited in a vigorous and aggressive manner.

As stated previously, during World War II, Dr. Dicks, the British military psychiatrist, used the technique of the in-depth interview on prisoners of war to construct what he termed the "psychological foundations of the Wehrmacht." This provided valuable insight into the attitudes and motivations of the German soldier. It also served to pinpoint PSYOP vulnerabilities that could be exploited by PSYOP programs (media).

The use of the in-depth interview requires highly qualified professionals; clumsy or aimless in-depth interviewers produce little if anything. This technique requires an officer qualified to use the latest clinical techniques. Moreover, he must have a thorough knowledge of the language and culture involved, and must intimately understand the target audience as a people. For example, William Daugherty writes that:

In the prison camps Dr. Dicks did not disclose his status as a psychiatrist. He was introduced to the respondents as a welfare officer interested in their problems as a prisoner. He interrogated large numbers utilizing a carefully prepared schedule of questions, carried on informal and friendly interviews with many, and kept carefully recorded notes of mass observations. The facts thus gathered were analyzed against the background of such other knowledge available to him concerning the Germans.³

Needless to say, since World War II, the in-depth interview has not been used by the military for the gathering of data from PSYOP sources.

PWD/SHAEP conducted regular attitude surveys in the prisoner-of-war camps. The polls were important in that they provided a quantitative basis for results found qualitatively by individual interrogations. During the Korean War, considerable use was made of prisoner PSYWAR panels to pretest and post-test leaflets especially in the years 1951-1952. In addition, ORO conducted a number of research studies designed to produce a model of a prisoner-of-war panel system and to examine situational and personal factors associated with the act of surrendering. The latter group of interrogations often took place in rear area enclosures weeks after the prisoner had surrendered.

In the Vietnamese War of the 1960s prisoners of war were interrogated at the tactical level for military information. Tactical PSYOP program exploitation, if any, took place at this time. After prisoners were interned at corps POW camps, PSYOP exploitation usually ceased, because of U.S. policy to scrupulously abide by the 1949 Geneva conventions. Consequently, prisoners were seldom used as a source of information or for the preparation of PSYOP programs and messages.

Defectors and Refugees

Defectors and refugees are valuable sources of PSYOP information, especially in an insurgency environment. In Vietnam, Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldiers who defected under the Chieu Hoi Program were not classified as prisoners; they could be exploited and used to obtain current information about the attitudes and motivation of the Viet Cong, to provide information on PSYOP vulnerabilities, to determine the best communication channels to reach the Viet Cong, to test communication

content, and to appear at mass rallies and in face-to-face communication programs.

Defectors and refugees can also be used as PSYOP writers, illustrators, announcers, and producers of programs. In fact, they can play an active role in all PSYOP programs.

Civilians

Friendly, neutral, and hostile civilians are important sources of information for PSYOP programs, with friendly civilians used extensively to provide information for all communication programs. Three profitable techniques for obtaining PSYOP data from friendly civilians are in-depth interviews, sample surveys, and panel surveys.

In addition to providing information, civilians can play a key part in social organizations and group discussions when they are used as programmed communication channels for PSYOP. Hostile civilians are especially important to PSYOP in an insurgency environment, but have been used infrequently. One of the basic principles for PSYOP-sponsored group discussions is that the "study" be collective—a truly group effort. The groups should be small and have a definite membership, with the same people meeting together over an extended period of time. Each group should have designated leader, who supervises the discussion sessions. Thoughts and ideas are expressed verbally and every member is encouraged to participate. Informal yet controlled, this technique usually finds acceptance among both rural and urban groups and provides for an extension of the more formal PSYOP media channels. Group discussion, as a PSYOP technique, is extensively employed by the Communist agit-prop cadres. This technique and channel could be a significant link in the communication chain for the restructuring of attitudes.

In some environments, opinion surveys (attitude reports) can be conducted on a regular or irregular basis. Such surveys may give a general (or quite accurate) impression of the attitudes of selected groups of the population on subjects of current interest.

The questioning of hostile civilian detainees is a police, not a military function. However, during sweeps, civilians are detained and questioned by the military concerning tactical information. Again it is stressed that PSYOP exploitation of certain civilian targets can be as important as the exploitation of military targets. For example, the civilian infrastructure is a vital element in the total insurgent movement and should be a key target for PSYOP exploitation. The civilian infrastructure is probably the most difficult audience to reach, since it is hardcore and highly motivated to support the insurgent cause. Consequently, current PSYOP-related data are needed to exploit both the infrastructure and that portion of the civilian population in contested areas that supports the insurgency.

Travelers and refugees provide significant current information that can be used to piece together the conditions of daily life in hostile areas, and sometimes it is possible to project the attitudes obtained from such people to the general population in hostile areas. PSYOP is concerned with the

total picture of society from the individual as well as the group viewpoint. To this end, current information is needed on the nature of the daily occurrences and relationships among the primary groups, secondary group, and the enemy administration. Specific and detailed information is needed on a variety of subject such as: (a) personal security, (b) travel restrictions, (c) police methods and surveillance, (d) the role of religion and the religious leader, (e) traditional versus "progressive" social patterns, (f) the role of the small entrepreneur in the "new social order," (g) specific prohibitions in connection with the communication process, (h) the "tone of social control, (i) the role of education in the "new order," and (j) the extent and adequacy of social services.

Broadcast Monitoring

Broadcast monitoring is conducted by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) of the U.S. government on a worldwide basis. In addition to selected radio broadcasts, news and wire service transmissions are also monitored on a daily basis for analysis purposes.

OTHER SOURCES

Captured Documents

Next to interrogation of prisoners and defectors, captured documents are probably the most important source for PSYOP data. PSYOP intelligence has found that some of the most effective communication delivered to the Viet Cong and NVA has been based on material from captured letters and diaries. For example, the slogan "Born in the North to die in the South," widely used in PSYOP publications, was obtained from a diary of a North Vietnamese soldier. Also, nostalgic poems and letters written by VC and NVA soldiers have frequently been mentioned by returnees and prisoners as having had great psychological impact on them. It has already been mentioned that content analysis of official reports and other documents prepared by VC cadres provides significant information concerning VC morale, the effect of GVN PSYOP programs, and definitive data on social, military, and political activities of the enemy.

Intelligence Sources

As of 1969 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were the only contributors of intelligence for overt PSYOP programs. They provided the bulk of the current information needed to conduct overt PSYOP in denied or enemy-controlled areas in that they provided such information as we now have in regard to target analysis, testing, and the measuring of effect of communication.

Overt PSYOP communication channels directed to denied areas primarily employ radio (shortwave and medium-wave bands) and printed matter. In order to effectively use radio as a PSYOP channel, it is necessary to know:

- a. The quantity and type (SW or MW) of receivers available to significant target groups;
- b. The listening habits—what are the prime hours for listening to broadcasts;
- c. What are the prohibitions and restrictions in owning and listening to “enemy” radio broadcasts;
- d. What is the strength (clarity of audio signal) for each station;
- e. What jamming techniques are used, and what is the pattern of jamming;
- f. What specific programs appeal to each target (news, drama, opera, and the like);
- g. What is the best length for an average program? can the target audience listen for five minutes or five hours; and
- h. What is the reaction of the power elite and specific target groups to the program.

In addition, to prepare appealing and credible radio programs, a great deal of information is needed about the everyday activities of average people in the society. This requires large quantities of information that can be used as the basis for political commentaries, skits, discussions, and “letters of complaint.” As far as can be determined, this type of information is not currently available to support PSYOP programs.

Furthermore, information of the following types is needed for PSYOP printed media programs directed to hostile and denied areas:

- a. The pattern and area covered by specific leaflet drops;
- b. The method used by the hostile regime to recover leaflets; do they use the police, security forces, school children, or others to pick up leaflets?
- c. The prohibitions imposed on the retention of leaflets;
- d. The reaction of the general population to the messages;
- e. The reaction of the power elite to message content and programs;
- f. The reaction of specific targets to message content and programs.

Of course, data concerning the above questions are obtained from overt as well as from covert sources. For example, data on PSYOP leaflet and radio programs directed to North Korea are obtained from interrogation of captured agents as well as from political defectors. In addition, some information is obtained from content analysis of newspapers and documents, and still more comes from broadcast monitoring. Radio Free Europe, a private radio network in Europe, has a vast network of correspondents stationed along the rim of the iron curtain who interview travelers and refugees and exploit other sources of information from Communist countries in order to gauge the effect of their broadcasts. Consequently, the exploitation of covert sources is essential, if consistent, rather than random, feedback is to be obtained. In theory, it is possible for a covert intelligence system to provide information on PSYOP programs by using the full range of exploitation techniques,

Governmental and Intergovernmental Sources

In perspective, research and analysis of USIA are concerned with the total aspects of PSYOP intelligence. The foci of PSYOP EEI contained in the PSYOP intelligence model of this report are of prime interest to international communication organizations, and in particular to the USIA. For example, Robert Elder notes the following research priorities within USIA:

- a. Studies of effectiveness of Agency programs (EEI No.5 in figure 1);
- b. Attitude studies designed to test Agency objectives, audiences, and themes (EEI No. 5);
- c. Studies of communication principles, techniques, and environment (EEI No. 4);
- d. Media reaction reports (EEI No.5);
- e. Studies of Communist and other propaganda activities (EEI Nos. 2 and 3).⁴

The USIA is not an intelligence-gathering agency and it is, rightfully, very sensitive about this. However, it is concerned with communication research and analysis, and it conducts scientific surveys and prepares appropriate studies and reports. Moreover, in addition to its formal research, the daily contacts of USIA officers constitute a lucrative source of information for PSYOP. Valuable information is obtained from: field posts, contacts with the local press, contacts with the international press, activities in binational cultural centers, reports from local national employees, and contacts with the local bureaucracy.

In Vietnam the combined (military) intelligence centers (CIC), starting at corps level, produced intelligence in response to requirements generated by MACV J2 (U.S. military intelligence) and the J2 of the RVN military intelligence. The centers were responsible for gathering and reporting on a variety of information related to PSYOP programs. For example, the Research and Analysis Branch of the CIC was concerned with such subjects as order of battle, strategic intelligence, area analysis, the development of targets, technical intelligence (VC taxation, food, medicine, and the like), political intelligence, sociological intelligence (information on social and ethnic groups), and PSYOP intelligence for strategic programs. Studies produced by CIC dealt with:

- a. Effects of B-52 strikes;
- b. VC infrastructure;
- c. VC manpower procurement;
- d. VC outlook on life;
- e. VC tax collection in RVN;
- f. Vulnerability of NVA soldier in Vietnam;
- g. VC financial and economic structure.

Through content analysis, these reports reveal valuable information for PSYOP target analysis and possibly the effect of communication programs, and this data can be put into the PSYOP data bank.

Published Material

Published material contains the basic data that are the starting point for obtaining the answers to PSYOP EEI. Naturally, it does not provide current data about existing attitudes and the effect of PSYOP programs. However, an example of its importance is the library of the research element of Radio Free Europe. It contains over 34,000 volumes, over half of which are in the languages of the target nations, and the rest in Western languages. About 4,000 new volumes are received each year. In addition to books, the library handles the subscriptions and distribution of 700 Western and 550 Eastern European periodicals. Every month about 3,000 copies of various publications are routed through the library to the various editors, evaluators, and researchers.⁵

Foreign Area Studies of The American University publishes handbooks on many foreign countries that contain information on the general character of the society, the physical environment, historical setting, ethnic groups and languages, social structure, social values, political values, economic systems and values, and public information and propaganda.

In a similar way, the American Institutes for Research (AIR) Intercultural Communication Guides provide a source for political information, major social characteristics, cultural factors relevant to the communication process, and psychological principles for effective communication. They provide an introduction and clues to target analysis and the development of communication strategy.

The *National Intelligence Survey* provides information concerning military, political, and economic aspects of a particular national society. This information provides significant insights into PSYOP targets and communication media.

Publications from the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Department of State, USIA, the United Nations, and other private research organizations are also valuable sources of information in analyzing targets. Often published texts, scholarly journals, novels, and other literature can provide important insights into the society and the communication process. However, published material should be thoroughly analyzed, evaluated, and the data confirmed prior to use in PSYOP programming.

SUMMARY

The function of PSYOP is the use of communication to influence behavior. Human communication involves action; it is not mystical or magical. To understand communications one must, in a very real sense, understand people. PSYOP intelligence is the basis for understanding human actions in PSYOP.

The essential or basic elements of information required from PSYOP intelligence are: (1) a definition of key audiences; (2) an understanding of the attitudes and motivation of the individuals and groups in the selected

audience; (3) an analysis of PSYOP vulnerabilities; (4) a determination of appropriate message content and the best communication channels to reach the audience; and (5) a measurement of the effect of PSYOP programs.

PSYOP target analysis is important in order to identify meaningful population groups and subgroups as specific PSYOP targets. Further, target analysis provides important clues about the attitudes of the selected audience. In addition, it provides the data needed to anticipate possible resistance to communication content and the data for determining the most meaningful and effective communication strategy for a particular target. In sum, target analysis tends to bring the selected target closer to the PSYOP communicator.

In testing messages it is important to check the respondents for psychological as well as sociological representativeness. Moreover, in testing there are no clear-cut rules because each instance is unique. Before an estimate can be made of the reliability of a proposed test, careful consideration should be given to the following: (a) the nature of the communication, (b) the type of respondents available, (c) the overall psychological atmosphere in which the test is to be conducted, and (d) the techniques used to obtain the information.

Measuring the effects of PSYOP programs is of great interest to commanders, planners, and PSYOP programming personnel. Indicators of the effectiveness of PSYOP include immediate recall, delayed recall, repetition, "paper and pencil" behavior, physical response to the message, and content analysis.

This essay has discussed the exploitation of major PSYOP intelligence sources and related them to the PSYOP EEI. The various PSYOP exploitation techniques were discussed as they relate to: (1) prisoners of war, (2) defectors and refugees, (3) civilians (friendly, enemy, neutral), (4) broadcast monitoring, and other sources such as captured documents, intelligence sources, governmental and intergovernmental sources, and published and unpublished material.

NOTES

¹ This refers to the "Dicks' Questionnaire No. 3," which Dicks brought to its final stage as a "structured interview susceptible to quantification, in collaboration with Edward A. Shils. It was authorized for PWI use in POW enclosures on the continent by Colonel Gurfein. It was administered mainly by the Special PWI Team at SHAEF ('Kampfgruppe Rosenberg') and their results were tabulated and evaluated by Morris Janowitz." See Daniel S. Lerner, *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to V-E Day* (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1949), pp. 121-124.

² Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, July 1956, para. 93, p. 37.

³ William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 447-458.

⁴ Robert E. Elder, *The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968), p. 114.

⁵ Robert T. Holt, *Radio Free Europe* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 110.

ASIATIC GUERRILLA MOTIVATION

BY JOHN M. LITTLE

An example of intuitive analysis with major PSYOP implications for appealing to insurgents.

Though underfed, poorly-equipped, ill-trained, and forced to inhabit the least desirable areas of a country, Asiatic guerrillas fight extremely well. What makes possible the achievements of these semi-literate peasants who lack air cover, high-speed mobility, artillery, and the other refinements of more sophisticated armies?

Promises or threats of terror do not seem nearly adequate in explaining why.

Most of our literature on counterinsurgency simply ignores the prime factor—motivation. We are much concerned with tactics and techniques for guerrilla fighters, but we seldom dig into motivation, the real soil from which successful military effort must grow.

The enemy pays considerable attention to combat motivation and discipline. Mao Tse Tung and Vo Nguyen Giap in particular emphasize and reemphasize it. Moreover, they do not just mention it in passing and then move on to tactics and grand strategy. Detailed concern with human behavior permeates their writing. Its effect in turning out first-rate regular and irregular fighters in Asia was seen in China, Korea, Malaya, Vietnam (*Viet Minh*), Laos, the Indian Frontier, and now again in Vietnam (*Viet Cong*).

We have attempted to rationalize their success at motivating their fighters, but not to explain it.

.... In describing motivation and discipline, the enemy speaks of it as "internal democracy" or "democratic centralism." Perhaps the use of such terms in a system so totalitarian as Communism causes us to overlook their real meaning. Being products of our system, a representative-type democracy, we immediately shrink from this as meaning that the troops will elect their officers and vote on which objective to hit or which column to ambush. We brush it aside as obvious propaganda. We must remember, however, that when Mao or Vo speak of democracy they speak of Communist democracy and not our system. Nor do they mean the ideal of Communism where the "utopia" is achieved and a "dictatorship of the proletariat" is the government. They mean democracy in the practical, present-day revolutionary sense of Communism where members are encouraged to criticize themselves and others, but within bounds of the party line. This is the meaning of the terms "internal" and "centralism."

*Excerpts from "Asiatic Guerrilla Motivation," *Infantry*; LVI (January-February 1966), p. 83. Reprinted with permission of *Infantry Magazine*, copyright holder.

The individual is encouraged to participate critically in discussing the means, but is not allowed for a moment to consider the end. That has been decided for him. They have no concept of parliamentary balloting in the ranks, and the performance of their armies should make this quite clear.

The enemy outlines this "democracy" as a critique, plain and simple, but with all unit members being encouraged to participate. Rather than a debriefing or critique by a superior to subordinates, it is a unit discussion group, guided by the superior, of course. Once again, grave doubts arise in our American minds for we visualize the pointless "gripe" session which many of us have seen tried, usually only once, by a well-meaning superior. This is not at all the case.

The discussion and criticisms are directed specifically toward the military soundness of actions and orders in an exercise, move or battle. Though political results are the ultimate end and are given lip service in revolutionary slogans, the individual is guided toward constructive criticism of tactical decisions and choice or application of techniques. Though the guerrilla is expected to end his statement with something like "we must avoid petty-bourgeois individualism," "to crush the national and class enemies," or "in the process of its transformation (*Viet Minh*) into a regular and modern army, our army always remains a revolutionary army, a people's army," he is also expected and encouraged to give of himself to that "great cause."

Even if little value comes from suggestions made or errors brought out by privates, though this possibility should not be too readily discounted, the 5 or 10 or 15 individuals in the unit are made to publicly belong, almost completely. *This is the essence of their combat motivation.* Once recruited by whatever means, the individual strips himself naked before his comrades, admits his own weaknesses, and vows to strive for better accomplishment of the mission in the future. He has subordinated his individuality to the unit and is under much greater pressure to make good the vow "next time," since all his teammates have heard him make it. He is much more highly motivated now than if it was a personal, secret vow made to himself while a superior was chastising him in a standard debriefing. Each individual in turn faces his fellow soldiers and speaks out, sharing with them the very personal fears, anxieties and emotional reactions or physical failings experienced under fire or in a gruelling march. They share these experiences and in so doing they weld themselves together. As most combat veterans in our own ranks will agree, the bonds between men who have been under fire together are strong indeed.

In this way the enemy draws his small units together into tight, cohesive groups that strive toward what we frequently call "fanatical" performance. They fight like this because they know that their comrades' eyes are upon them and they are going to have to face up to their conduct publicly at the first break in the action.

They fight like this because the semi-literate peasant of Asia has

recognized quite clearly what our highly-educated researchers have been telling us since early in World War II. Namely, that men fight, whether enlisted or drafted, primarily for the men they fight beside and for the image they present to their fellow soldiers. All the tactics and techniques and training in the world won't move a man against enemy fire with firm purpose if he doesn't care what his buddies think. He is not an unthinking, Prussianized robot. He is very, very conscious of the group and his place in it.

Direct Observation

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE—THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ROLE OF SPECIAL FORCES*

BY WILLIAM P. YARBOROUGH.

Special Forces are often in a position to observe developments that may have important ramifications on the attitudes of target areas, as well as the actual audience attitudes.

The Special Forces of the United States Army were designed for employment in several types of environments each having pronounced psychological overtones. In their primary role, that of unconventional warfare, Special Forces will be in contact with friendly guerrilla forces and will provide a positive link between the irregulars and the conventional commands. The nature of the unconventional warfare structure, which produces the guerrillas with which Special Forces work, must be understood in order to appreciate the importance of the psychological component of the Green Beret's make-up.

Guerrillas are an action element of the total unconventional warfare system but they do not comprise it entirely. Moreover, guerrillas will not appear as the first manifestation of a well-conceived and organized resistance movement.

A guerrilla warfare capability of any significance is normally based on a broad clandestine and covert support structure. The latter is rooted in the civilian population and usually numbers many times the strength of the guerrilla units it serves. The underground which makes guerrilla operations feasible does not develop automatically nor spontaneously. A great deal of careful, sophisticated, patient and time-consuming work on the part of highly motivated resistance architects goes into its design.

Members of a resistance underground live and work surrounded by great danger to themselves and to their families. It is evident, therefore, that the stakes for which they are willing to risk everything must be high. These are usually political. Sacrifice in serving in an underground organization that is hounded by special police and by counterintelligence agents can be justified in the minds of those who feel most deeply that their

*Original essay by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) William P. Yarborough.

future and the future of their country can be made better through their efforts. Guerrilla forces which grow from the underground recruiting processes must have the same convictions—many with a firm political base. The mechanics of keeping guerrilla and underground forces' zeal at the required level must involve inspirational approaches which are simple, powerful, consistent, and persistent.

It is necessary for the outside forces who work with guerrillas to understand the vital part that belief in cause plays in the making of an irregular soldier. Granted, there are classical pressures which are used to force an individual into guerrilla ranks against his will. Frequently a combination of inspiration and terror are used to move a "volunteer" from his village to a guerrilla camp in the jungle. In any case, both the guerrilla and the vast infrastructure which supports him are dependent upon psychological considerations more than any other.

The history of resistance movements shows conclusively that guerrilla leadership must be indigenous—not imported from outside. This being the case, U.S. Special Forces would be ill advised to seek command of guerrilla forces with which they have been placed in contact. Nevertheless, the interests of the United States, which in the first place led to the introduction of the Special Forces teams, must be appropriately served. It follows that the Special Forces soldier must have a clear understanding of what his country's interests are and he must seek, with judgement, finesse, firmness, and diplomacy to serve them in dealing with the guerrilla leaders. He can, of course, attempt to guide the indigenous guerrilla leader toward desired tactical objectives by regulating the flow of supplies and resources from U.S. stockpiles. This kind of persuasion, powerful as it is, may not always work.

The greatest guarantee of cooperation from irregular forces can come from the close personal rapport which a mature, carefully selected and trained Special Forces team leader can develop with the guerrilla leader. Even when the relationship is close and there is a mutual respect and confidence, the nature of the guerrilla's commitment to his political cause and future may preclude his acceding in every respect to the United States' requirements voiced through the Special Forces Commander. The latter must be the type of individual who can understand the nuances and intangibles that make his role in the irregular warfare scheme so different from that of a liaison officer with foreign conventional forces. Historical accounts of problems stemming from personality clashes between Draza Mihailovic and Colonel Bailey, the British liaison officer to the Yugoslav partisan headquarters during World War II, point up the extra-ordinary impact that human emotions can have on official negotiations.¹

United States Special Forces introduced into a conflict arena to work with guerrillas could find themselves enmeshed in several kinds of situations, none of them simple. The guerrillas may be fighting for their own government under siege by an invading enemy. In this case, the motivational propaganda which sustains them would come from that govern-

ment. The latter would of necessity be compatible enough with U.S. aims to have warranted introduction of U.S. Special Forces in its support. In such an environment, U.S. Special Forces would be expected to do nothing which would interfere with the mental conditioning of the indigenous resistance mechanism. Here the requirement for intensive indoctrination and meticulous selection of the Americans is apparent.

In recognition of the difficulties surrounding psychological operations carried out by resistance forces, U.S. Special Forces should provide appropriate assistance beginning with matériel and instruction in its use. Guerrilla forces should be taught field expedients for leaflet production and distribution. The value of simple slogans painted on walls and of face-to-face persuasion should be stressed. Finished intelligence, received through the U.S. link with Special Forces Operations Base and which can assist in psychological targeting, can be provided by the U.S. Special Forces to the guerrilla leaders.

Generally, the propaganda content of guerrilla psychological operations activities should not come from U.S. Special Forces. Rather it should come from the guerrillas' own government through the established communications system of the friendly underground. Thus the U.S. Special Forces contribution would consist largely of advice in planning, training in simple techniques, and provision of certain supplies and equipment from U.S. resources.

Another type of unconventional warfare situation in which U.S. Special Forces might be used could be that in which guerrilla forces supported by an underground resistance movement were challenging a government, which for various reasons was unacceptable to the people of the country. In such a case, the introduction of U.S. Special Forces would be preceded by the most exhaustive analysis of the situation to determine whether U.S. interests actually demanded involvement in what might seem to be another country's internal affairs. Lessons of current history seem to place this kind of projection of Special Forces use fairly low on the probability scale. In the event, however, that Special Forces were used, their psychological role would probably not be limited to the provision of training and materials to the forces of the resistance. Certain aspects of the United States own psychological campaign against the enemy government could be reflected through Special Forces to the friendly guerrillas and their supporting infrastructure.

Intelligence is the life blood of effective psychological operations. Special Forces deployed in contact with guerrilla forces are in a position to gather the kind of intelligence that bears most intimately upon the attitudes of the people at grass-roots level. Propaganda programs which are shaped in the absence of extensive knowledge of feelings and persuasions of human target groups are likely to succeed only through rare luck and in defiance of the laws of probability.

In his classical work, *Psychological Warfare*, Paul M. A. Linebarger points out that some of the worst blunders of history have arisen from

miscalculations of the enemy state of mind. He indicates that psychologists can set up techniques for determining how people really feel about certain conditions and situations. Special Forces, in carrying out the psychological aspects of their unconventional warfare missions, need to be trained in or at least familiar with such techniques so that the products of their intelligence collection can be usable for something other than order of battle refinement.

The opportunities for intelligence collection concerning popular attitudes are widely available to Special Forces assigned to missions bearing upon internal defense and stability of an ailing foreign country. The activity, which was once termed "counter-insurgency" by the United States Army and which involves everything from civic action to counter-guerrilla warfare, is still carried as a valid type of employment for Green Berets. Students of "counter-insurgency" will recognize immediately the pitfalls inherent in the application of the accepted doctrine which has developed during the last decade. Nonetheless, certain aspects of what is held as valid and is taught in intern¹ defense and stability instruction are being implemented quietly and with success. In every case, the acceptability of the Special Forces personnel in the country where they are to operate is of overriding importance.

NOTES

¹ C. N. M. Blair, *Guerrilla Warfare*, London: Ministry of Defense, 1957.

Interviewing

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION BY AMERICANS WITH THAI*

BY IMOGENE E. OKES**

After researchers determined the objectives of American communications in a foreign country, they evolved a multi-step research method. This approach channeled the knowledge of experts to ascertain whom the Americans should contact, what they should say, and how their messages should be presented.

....A psychologist, a social psychologist, sociologists, an historian and international relations scholars devised the research method. The problem was to (1) realize the American's objectives, (2) select the audiences most susceptible to his objectives and, at the same time, most effective in taking action on those objectives, (3) reduce the number of objective-audience combinations to those desirable for intensive study, (4) develop ideas appropriate for appealing to the audiences, (5) identify the key symbols in the appeal ideas, and (6) provide information regarding media and communication customs to be observed in transmitting the ideas.

*Excerpts from "Effective Communications by Americans with Thai," *Journalism Quarterly*, XXXVIII (1961), pp. 337-341. Reprinted with permission of *Journalism Quarterly*, copyright holder.

**The author is indebted to Prof. Kempton for suggestions on format, Dr. F. Loyal Greer for advice in interpreting the research method, and to Dr. Kenneth P. Lang, for reviewing the Thai data.

USE OF CONSULTANTS AND MAILED QUESTIONNAIRES

Considering the limitations of budget, research staff and time, it was decided the most effective and economical method for systematic collection of objective data would be to use American consultants as sources of information and mailed questionnaires as research instruments.

Americans familiar with the country could supply an abundance of current information. Use of numerous consultants would serve as a safeguard for objectivity. Agreement among experts would enhance the probability of the results being valid.

Questionnaires would stimulate the thinking of the American specialists and channel their knowledge so that the desired information could be obtained and the responses compared. The research would be conducted in phases as dictated by the several parts of the total problem. Within each phase, there would be a series of steps: a great volume of information would be collected; this would be sifted; only the data surviving evaluation would be offered as the basis for the next phase of the research.

By mailing the forms to the respondents, they would be able to work alone beyond possible biasing by other consultants or by the researcher. Furthermore, a large number of respondents could be utilized inexpensively by resorting to correspondence.

Forty-one Americans proficient in Thai affairs participated in one or more phases of the research. Their names had been secured from bibliographic listings, government offices, private foundations, professional organizations and nominations by other consultants. They had quite varied backgrounds. All were college graduates and 17 held doctorates. They had first-hand knowledge of Thailand from having resided there recently for an average of three years.

ENUMERATION OF OBJECTIVES

The research committee, very realistically appraising the current competitive international situation, listed 10 objectives for the American communicator in Thailand. These are, briefly, as follows: promote good will toward the United States, promote expectation of success for the United States and its friends, encourage cooperation with the United States, show importance of developing new energy sources, arouse hostility toward Chinese Communists, discredit the Communists, show appreciation for Thai accomplishments, convince of non-interference by the United States in internal affairs of Thailand, instill hope for the future and strengthen common ideals for Thai and Americans.

SELECTION OF AUDIENCES

In selecting audiences best suited for American purposes, researchers scanned the literature and made up an initial list of 16 identifiable groups. They were categorized as occupational, ethnic, religious, family-kinship, political, leisure time, social class and age-sex. Each was described ac-

cording to physical appearance, ethnic origin, language spoken, occupation, level of education, etc. The list of 16 audiences was expanded to 24 by consultants.

In the next step, consultants ranked and rated audiences for effectiveness ¹ within their own country and for susceptibility ² to American overtures. Since research resources were limited, this procedure permitted focusing on the audiences most valuable for communication purposes.

At this stage of the research, a statistical technique ³ was employed to ascertain the degree of agreement among consultants. Average intercorrelations between the seven consultants ranking effectiveness was $+.63$. Had the research results been compared with those of another seven consultants, the predicted correlation for effectiveness would be $+.92$. Average intercorrelation between the seven consultants rating susceptibility was $+.54$. Had the research results been compared with those of another seven consultants, the predicted correlation for susceptibility would be $+.89$.

Adding the statistically converted consultant opinions on effectiveness to those on susceptibility and arranging the results in numerical order produced a ranking of audiences according to importance for purposes of the research. The 10 specific audiences selected ⁴ were Administrators, Buddhist Priests, Central Thai, Chinese, Mass Media Personnel, Military-Political Forces, Professional Classes, Royalists, University Faculties and Students, and Western Educated Elite. To provide information for the country generally, Thailand as a Whole was added.

Communication specialists rank ordered the objectives according to relative importance. Again observing research limitations, there followed another reduction step which served to focus energies of consultants on the most important objective-audience combinations. (Here, and in the ensuing research, assignments were made to consultants according to their self-appraised knowledge of specific audiences considered in the study.) Obviously, all objectives should be covered for Thailand as a Whole. Consultants were then asked to register their opinions as to the feasibility of accomplishment of each of the 10 objectives by each of the 10 specific audiences. Of the 110 possible objective-audience combinations, only 43 were selected for intensive study.⁵

DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF APPEAL IDEAS

For the 43 objective-audience combinations consultants were asked to develop appeal ideas which would gain and hold attention, be readily and completely understood, be believed and accepted, arouse appropriate motives and emotions, affect all members of a particular group similarly, and be effective in the foreseeable future. Consultants were also asked to explain the appeal idea in terms of cultural factors relevant to the particular audience.

Since the key symbol often is solely responsible for inducing the desired response from a particular audience, the identification of the key symbol

by the appeal writer was especially important. The key symbol is considered potent when it causes audience identification, automatic acceptance of the appeal, predisposition toward the objectives of the communicator and/or strong emotional response consistent with the appeal.

The 150 appeal ideas developed were rated by another group of consultants for persuasiveness or the likelihood that the appeal idea would lead the audience to think, feel and/or act favorably toward the American objective. An appeal idea created by one person was evaluated by three other consultants. Appeal ideas of low persuasiveness or boomerang effect were eliminated. Fifty-seven appeal ideas survived this screening; 39 were for the four most important objectives.

Researchers stressed that the resultant appeals were merely ideas intended only as guides for the American communicator and were not to be considered as finished messages ready for transmittal.

Typical of appeals rated relatively high is the idea developed for Professional Classes in order to show American appreciation for Thai achievements. The audience would be reminded of the words to the chorus of the popular song, "Thai Ancestors," in which Thai are challenged to uphold the tradition set by their ancestors who were bold and steadfast in their determination to preserve Thai territory for their descendants.

A highly evaluated appeal idea suitable to Thailand as a Whole for arousing hostility toward Communist China would be a picture of a Red Chinese dragon (with North Korea, Tibet and North Viet Nam in its belly) attacking a Thai. The caption would read, "The Chinese dragon has always sought to gobble up Asia." Consultants said that a crocodile could be used instead of a dragon as both are symbols of greed. This appeal idea should remind the Thai that Chinese expansionism today is a continuation of past policies.

All the 83 key symbols identified in the appeals were indexed by word association, by category and by picture for the convenience of the communicator. He was reminded that symbols can change meaning according to context and consequently must be used with caution if employed for purposes other than those indicated.

An analysis of the 57 appeal ideas revealed that they were based on six main themes: equality, economic strength, friendship, nationalism, anti-Chinese Communism and self-interest.

INFORMATION REGARDING MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION CUSTOMS

In an effort to gather information of value to the American communicator in transmitting his messages, consultants were given a questionnaire designed to draw out their knowledge regarding mass media and communication customs. Though information was solicited for specific audiences, it was generally found that the data were applicable to all audiences. Information for a particular audience was given when it was

especially significant. Some sample findings were that word of mouth is still the best means of communication in Thailand, that movies are popular throughout the country, and that radio receiving sets are widespread. Printed materials have less appeal since the people are not conscientious readers.

Thai would consider the cartoonist rude who characterized a man, even one greatly disliked, as an animal. By custom, the Thai expect modesty and courtesy in personal conduct and place emphasis on usage of titles. Their tonal language easily lends itself to double meaning. Thai gestures, especially those pertaining to the head (respected) and the feet (contemptuous) carry much significance. The Thai place great faith in supernatural beings.

Though Thai take pride in their own culture and uphold certain traditions, they generally tend to look to the future. Thai are very curious about all things in the United States; they are critical of American lack of knowledge about Thailand and Asia; but so admiring of some American ways as to imitate them.

CONCLUSION

By a multi-phase process, information was obtained for the American communicator regarding his objectives, audiences, appeal ideas, symbols, and media and communication customs. Series of questionnaires within each phase of the research permitted the collection of a wealth of material from numerous area experts and evaluation of their data. By this funneling process, only potentially useful material was offered to the American as guides to more effective communication in the foreign country.

The important attribute is that the systematic and objective method devised for the research can be readily adapted to similar studies.

NOTES

¹ For details, see George E. Okes, "Effective Communication by Americans with Thai" (unpublished Master's thesis, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³ Charles C. Peters and Walter R. Van Voorhis, *Statistical Procedures and their Mathematical Bases* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1940), pp. 193-201.

⁴ Okes, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-24.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-32.

Sampling

THE SAMPLING PROCESS FOR PSYOPERATORS*

BY RICHARD H. ORTH

Good sampling is an effective means of reducing the number of persons contacted to develop a relatively accurate picture of the sample population's attitude and opinion.

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.

INTRODUCTION

The basic unit for a survey is the population of the area in which it is being performed. It is not usually possible to include the entire population; rather, people are selectively chosen to participate in a survey. Because the way in which these people are selected to participate is very important to the utility of the results, great care must be used in the selection process. This essay discusses the problems that are involved in deciding who will be in the survey and who will not be in the survey and also what kinds of selection procedures the PSYOP analyst can use.

WHY USE SAMPLES?

The basic notion behind sampling is that an analyst can gain accurate knowledge about a population by measuring only a portion--or sample--of it. There may be some instances when one would not wish to sample--for instance, when the population is a very small village or when social or religious customs do not allow certain persons to be interviewed. Also, in some cases, interviewing a few, well-informed persons may be more efficient than taking a sample of the whole population. In most cases, however, there are good reasons for sampling, one of the foremost being cost limitations in terms of effort, time, and money spent. Clearly, the more people included in a survey, the greater the cost. Another reason for sampling is that when one wishes to assess a change in the attitudes of a population, the initial assessment of the attitudes may well spoil the accuracy of the second measurement. Thus, if the entire population were used in the initial assessment, it should not be used in a second assessment to determine the amount of change. There are several reasons that people generally perform differently on a second attitude questionnaire than they do on the first:

1. They may be able to determine the kinds of answers that the tester is most pleased with.
2. They may become aware of things that they were not aware of before but were brought out by the questions that were asked.
3. Performance changes with practice.

The second reason mentioned above is often called sensitization. As an example, suppose that a PSYOP campaign is being carried over a specific radio program. In attempting to measure the success of that campaign, people within the broadcast area are asked if they listen to the program. This would give some indication of how well the campaign is reaching the target. This could easily arouse the interest of some persons who would not otherwise have been interested and therefore would not have listened to the program. On the follow-up measure, consequently, there may result an artificially high success rate because more people tuned in to the program than would normally be the case. (It should be noted that this may be used as a device to obtain listener support, but it could backfire if used too often.)

The way to solve this difficulty is to use only a part of the population--by sampling, the analyst may greatly reduce his costs and not "spoil" the entire population for repeated measurement.

There are several problems involved in sampling, and great care must be taken in using sampling techniques. One must face, from the beginning, the question of accuracy. It is easy to see how the measurement of only a portion of the population could greatly reduce the accuracy of the results. Besides the size of the sample, another factor that can operate to reduce accuracy is the representativeness of the sample. Both size and representativeness affect the applicability of the generalization to the population as a whole. When the analyst chooses a sample from a population, his purpose is to be able to generalize--to derive a general conclusion from particulars (the sample)--to the whole population. A generalization is justified to the extent that the sample represents the population. In the following portions of this essay, size and representativeness will be discussed in greater detail along with different types of samples and when and how to use them.

DEFINING THE POPULATION

The first thing the PSYOP analyst must do is to define the population he wishes to study. To do so he must ask himself three questions:

1. "What am I trying to find out?"
2. "Who can tell me what I want to know?"
3. "To what population do I want to generalize?"

The answers to these three questions provide the information for defining the population. The following sequence of questions shows how this works. Assume the answer to the first question is "The effectiveness of a PSYOP campaign aimed at a particular tribe in South Vietnam." The answer to the second question will then be "The members of that tribe." The answer to the third question will be: "The tribe." Therefore, the population is defined as the tribe. Rather than questions number two and three always being the same, they provide an interactive process that allows resolving the difference between availability of individuals and the generality of the results.

TYPES OF SAMPLES

After defining the population, the PSYOP officer must then decide what kind of sample he will draw. Ideally, he will seek a sample that is as efficient and inexpensive as possible while still being representative of the population. There are basically two kinds of samples: *nonprobability* samples and *probability* samples.

Two terms that will frequently come up in the following discussion of different samples are: (1) *random* and (2) *chance*. There is often a problem associated with their use in that they have common-language connotations as well as their denotative meanings which come from statistics and mathematics. As used in the following discussion, the terms will be

used only in their denotative sense. Thus, random refers to an unknown probability level that can be calculated only if all the elements of the universe can be specified. However, it is sufficient to say that each element has an equal likelihood of appearing on any one trial. If one has an infinite number of trials, each element will have appeared the same number of times. On the other hand the term "chance" is usually used as an adjunct to an implicitly or explicitly known probability level. Thus, one can say that there is a 20 percent chance of rain today. It must be noted that both of these terms imply an orderly occurring set of events that can be reduced to mathematical equations.

Nonprobability Samples

Accidental Sample

The accidental sample is the easiest to select, but it usually is not representative of the population from which it is drawn. (In fact the ease of selection is due to the fact that there is no overt selection. Only individuals who come to you are included.) For example, an accidental sample may be drawn by going to a street corner and interviewing every person who goes by. Many people believe that because the interviewer cannot control whom he interviews that this is a random sample. Although there is an appearance of certain amount of chance attached to the drawing of an accidental sample, actually it is not a random process, because one cannot determine the probability of any person being included in the sample. In other words, this kind of sample does not meet the requirements of a random sample. The accidental sample may not represent a population fairly but rather may be seriously biased, because the sample will represent only those people who are in a particular place at a specific time. Many kinds of people may never go to that street corner; the ones who do go may be of a type not representative of the whole population.

When Should An Accidental Sample Be Used? Almost never, or only when no alternative seems available. However, it may be better to have poor data than no data at all. If this method is used, one must keep in mind its lack of representativeness. Poor data are, in fact, worse than no data at all.

Quota Sample

A second type of nonprobability sample is called the quota sample. This means that each interviewer is given a number of persons of a specific type, for example, farmers, merchants, ex-soldiers, women, or elders to interview. The advantage of the quota sample over the accidental sample is that the former is designed to include desired numbers or proportions of different types of persons. In the accidental sample, on the other hand, there is no assurance whatsoever of representativeness, so that certain types of persons may be missed completely.

In the quota sample, the person who will actually be interviewed is decided upon by the interviewer in the field. For example, he may wish to compare the reasons that North Vietnamese soldiers entered the Chieu Hoi Program with the reasons that the Viet Cong entered the Chieu Hoi Program. Since these people (called *hoi chan*) remain in the camp only a short time, it would be very difficult to perform a carefully drawn random sample, which involves having a list of the population. Therefore, the PSYOP analyst may simply say that he would like to have a certain number of North Vietnamese defectors and Viet Cong defectors interviewed. The interviewer then enters the camp, finds out into which category (North Vietnamese or Viet Cong) the particular individual he is addressing falls. He indicates the category on his interview record and proceeds with the interview. If he already has his quota from the category this individual is in, he can skip this interview. When he has filled the quotas of both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (the number of each type that the analyst requested), the data collection part of the study is completed.

There are obviously some problems associated with this sampling technique. One must consider the representativeness of a sample drawn in this manner. The major threat to representativeness is the manner in which the interviewer obtains the sample. Most likely he will administer the instrument to those people who are most available or willing to talk. Clearly, they constitute a special segment of the population. Nevertheless, this limitation does not rule out the utility of quota samples in many instances.

When Should a Quota Sample Be Used? Only when the analyst knows exactly what type of person he wants to interview; this type is fairly easily recognized. The advantage of quota sampling is that it does not require the population lists or dwelling-unit maps that are needed for probability sampling. The disadvantage is that there are some doubts about the representativeness of the population. It would be better to use a probability sample if the situation allows.

Probability Samples

The next three types of samples are probability samples. This means that each element of the population has a known probability of being included in the sample. The PSYOP analyst must draw a probability sample if he wants to be able to generalize to the whole population from which the sample is drawn. The nonprobability samples just discussed (the accidental sample and the quota sample) do not give him any knowledge of the probability of any person in the population being included in the sample.

Simple Random Sample

In a simple random sample each person in the population has an equal probability of being included in the sample. For example, if a sample of ten persons were to be drawn from a population of 100 in a simple random

sample, each person in the population has a known $1/10$ or .10 percent chance of being in the sample because of the way the sample is drawn.

The drawing of a simple random sample proceeds as follows. Assume that there is a population of 600 and that the analyst wants to choose a sample of 100. Thus he wants to take every sixth person. Imagine that he has a six-sided die with a number on each side from one to six, with no number repeated. He also has a list of the people in the population, a residence list, or a list of numbers taken from a numbered dwelling-unit map (see the following section on population lists and dwelling-unit maps). He tosses the die and starts in the population list at the number that comes up taking every sixth name. Now it can easily be seen that any side of the die has the same chance of coming up as any other side. Thus, the starting point on the list could have been any of the first six names, with an equal chance for each name. Finally, since all the other names depend on the first, they also are determined by chance.

The same thing can be done by having slips of paper numbered from 1 to 6, in this case mixing them up in a container and drawing one of them out to determine the starting point. The total number to use is determined by the size of the sample needed (see the section on sample size) and the size of the population. Another alternative, of course, would be to put a number for each individual in the population on a slip of paper. One can draw out enough slips of paper to cover the entire sample. However, this method usually takes much longer and does not insure any more "randomness."

When Should a Simple Random Sample Be Used? When one wants to be able to generalize to the whole population from which the sample is drawn, or when one wants to use inferential statistical techniques, this is the simplest kind of probability sample. It requires no knowledge of the population other than a list of its members or dwelling units.

Stratified Random Sample

There is another kind of probability sample called a stratified random sample. Here, each individual in the population does not have an equal chance of being in the sample. The analyst divides the population into two or more strata on the basis of one or more characteristics. Each stratum then is treated like a different population, and a simple random sample is drawn for each. These subsamples are then combined to form the total sample.

For example, assume that the analyst wants to find out the relationship between amount of wealth and certain attitudes and he knows that there are (in a population of 100) 20 wealthy, 60 average, and 20 poor persons. Then, in a simple random sample, there is too little chance for the wealthy or the poor to be included. Because he is studying the attitudes of the total population, he wants information on all income groups. Thus he needs a sufficient number from every group to be relatively confident that their views are accurately expressed. The population is divided by the

characteristic of wealth into the above three groups, and same number of each subgroup is sampled separately.

When Should a Stratified Random Sample Be Used? The stratified random sample may be used when it is known in advance that a special segment of the population would not have enough persons in the sample if a simple random sample were drawn. As prerequisite for this type of sample one must know the characteristics on which the strata are chosen and one must have a population or residence list.

Cluster Sample

A third type of probability sample is the cluster sample. It is often profitable to do the sample on a cluster basis when the population from which a sample is to be drawn is very large and distributed over a large area. This means that the population is divided into geographic areas. The sampling process is the same as it is when individuals are being sampled, except that it is geographic regions that are being sampled. As the sampling proceeds the areas become progressively smaller as the following example illustrates. First, draw a random sample of states, provinces, or large regions, as described under random sampling. Then, in the states or large regions that were drawn in the samples, repeat the process for counties or smaller areas, then cities or villages, and, finally, for persons within each of the cities or villages. If the sampling is done on a random basis at each step, the end-result will be a random sample of people in the country. In this way, the need for population lists for the entire country is avoided. Population lists are not needed until relatively small geographic regions are arrived at.

When Should a Cluster Sample Be Used? When the population to be sampled is very large. It requires a population list or a dwelling-unit map of the city or village, but not for the entire country.

POPULATION LISTS AND DWELLING-UNIT MAPS—TOOLS FOR SAMPLING

Most of the sampling theory and practice has evolved in the United States and other developed nations. Consequently, many problems arise when using them in developing countries. For example, one of the most common assumptions in sampling theory and practice is the availability of census data such as population list, residence lists, or dwelling-unit maps. While these are readily available in the United States, reliable lists or maps are often unavailable in developing countries, and thus a probability sample is often impossible to obtain.

Another problem of sampling on the basis of population lists is ending up with respondents who are great distances apart. In such a case, the PSYOP officer might do well to phase the survey so that he reaches the people in one region during one phase and the people in another region during another phase. This solution is not without its problems. For example, suppose that you are doing an attitude survey in South Vietnam

and you want to determine how the people feel about retaliatory F-52 strikes against North Vietnam. If you do the study in two phases (it could actually be any reasonable number of phases), something could occur during the time interval that would result in a change in the attitudes—that is, a village in the area you are testing could have been bombed by accident. Because of the time factor, a preferred technique would be to divide the staff between the two areas and to sample concurrently but independently. Although this could cause some difficulties in the administration of the survey, it could yield quicker and more germane results.

If population or residence lists are not available, the most obvious solution is for the analyst to draw up his own list. This, however, is usually too costly, since it amounts to taking a census for the area. One alternative is to use dwelling-unit maps of the area, although there are some areas in which obtaining a map is not the simple process that it is in the United States. Also, if the area studied has a high proportion of nomadic people, dwellings may appear and disappear at very short intervals, making any dwelling-unit map quickly outdated.


Under the above circumstances, the most convenient method of obtaining a dwelling-unit map may be as follows. In most areas where military intelligence is gathered, the military has aerial photographs of that area. If the PSYOP analyst can get copies of these photographs, they can be used as maps or as the basis for maps. In fact, military intelligence units often will construct the maps from such photographs.

If dwelling-unit maps are not available, the PSYOP analyst, if he wishes to expend the time and money, can draw accurate maps from a survey of the area. Alternatively, he can go through the streets of the villages and lay out the dwellings on a map that contains only gross characteristics of the area to locate the residence pattern according to landmarks as in the following figure.

Once a map is obtained, give each residence on the map a number, make a list of the numbers, and draw the sample of dwelling units like a random sample.

Still another technique to help in drawing the sample is the grid method.¹ This method requires any drawn-to-scale grid map of the area being studied. The number of intersections on the grid must be more than the sample size. Then, one randomly picks an intersection on the grid and samples the nearest dwelling to that intersection (by use of triangulation and a pedometer, for example). The random selection of points on the grid is done in the same way as the random selection of people described above or by using a random number table. All that the grid method really does is to approximate a map of the dwelling units of the area, for if the grid were sufficiently accurate each dwelling would be represented by an intersection on the grid.

The type of person to be interviewed in a particular dwelling unit—that is, head of household, first person seen—must be chosen beforehand.



Dwelling-Unit Map

Devices exist that can be used to select the specific individual according to some known probability pattern. However, there are several pitfalls for using such a method in another culture or in a region in which little data exist about household characteristics. For example, there may be religious or other reasons for a woman's not talking to strange men, or women may hold a place in the culture that makes them noncredible sources. Under such circumstances it may be better to limit the individuals interviewed to those who represent the household and to guard against making generalizations beyond heads of households. The basic point is that the PSYOP analyst must have some knowledge of the culture before deciding upon the individuals to be included in the sample.

SIZE OF THE SAMPLE

A final step in the sampling process is determining how many people will be included in the sample. It may be beneficial to begin discussing sample size by using an analogy. As an illustration suppose a man owns a car that rattles every time he hits a bump. He takes it to a body shop and one of the men there takes the car on a road test. The tester must drive the car far enough to be able to hear the rattle, for if he drove it only one block, and the road was smooth, the rattle might not be detected. On the other hand, he does not want the tester to drive the car 50 miles because that would be a waste of his time and money. The size of a sample must, likewise, strike the appropriate balance. It must be large enough to do the job, but small enough to be workable.

In this regard, cost and accuracy should be considered when determining the size of the sample. Although these factors will be treated separately here for ease of discourse, the analyst must keep in mind the fact that they impact on each other.

Since cost limitations are usually available before the survey begins, these will be discussed first. Thus, the psyoperator should consider the cost per person interviewed when deciding on the size of the sample and, further, he should determine the number of man-hours that will be spent in collecting the data. Once transportation to the locale has been provided, later interviews may be less expensive than the first ones. One item that is all too frequently overlooked is the cost of analysis of the data that have been gathered. Even though the data collection phase of the survey may be very inexpensive, the analysis of those data may be quite costly. In other words, the analyst must consider the cost of the entire survey, not only the cost of the data collection. The same argument can be made in terms of time. The psyoperator may have a limited amount of time to complete the survey and to perform the analyses. This means that the sample size must be guided by the usable resources of the person who is conducting the survey.

On the other side of the coin is the degree of accuracy desired or demanded by the situation. Recall the analogy to road-testing a car. The farther the repairman drives the car, presumably the more accurate his

judgment will be about the location of the problem. In sampling, it is obvious that the greatest precision will be achieved when the entire population is tested, and as the proportion sampled gets smaller, so will the precision of the results.

There is an additional consideration that affects the number of individuals needed for accuracy, and that is the way the population is expected to divide in their responses. Suppose the analyst asks a sample of people a question that can be answered with one of two alternatives. He wants to be quite certain that the percentages in the sample really represent the population percentages. (In survey research, 95 percent certainty is the usual goal.) The size of the sample depends on the amount of difference in the percentages and on how accurate the analyst wishes to be.²

Table 1 shows that if there are large differences in the population, a small sample will bring this out clearly; but, if the differences are small a large sample is required. To summarize, the important thing to remember when thinking about the size of a sample is that accuracy and cost are often in conflict. The PSYOP analyst must achieve a balance between the two.

Table 2 is an overview intended to help the analyst decide on the sample technique he will use. It should not be considered as a substitute for the preceding text, nor should it be used uncritically. Recall that the accidental and quota samples (numbers 1 and 2 in Table 2) are nonprobability samples: there is no knowledge of the probability of an element of the population being included in the sample. They should be used only when a probability sample is not possible. Simple random, stratified random, and cluster samples (numbers 3, 4, and 5 in Table 2) are probability samples: each element of the population has a known probability of being included in the sample. They should be used when one wants to be able to generalize to the whole population from which the sample was drawn. The table below shows sample sizes for 3 levels of accuracy and two statements about the distribution of responses. Clearly, it is very useful to have some idea about response distribution.

TABLE 1:
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION, ACCURACY, AND SIZE

Certainty that the sample mean is within .1 standard deviation of the population mean	No assumption about the distribution of responses	Assume that the responses are normally distributed
90%	1,000	272
95%	2,000	384
99%	10,000	707

TABLE 2

SAMPLE TYPES

Sample Type	Characteristics	Example	When to Use
1. Accidental	Haphazardly drawn, with no consideration given to the population to which generalization will be made	Going to the street corner and sampling the persons that walk by	Almost never, only when no alternative seems available. It may be better to have poor data than no data at all. If this method is used, one must keep in mind its lack of representativeness
2. Quota	Each person in the sample is selected by the interviewer, but he is constrained by rules of inclusion that are determined by the study director. The individual is selected on the basis of some characteristic that he possesses. The number of persons of each type is determined by the study director on the basis of the needs of the analysis. The probability of a person's inclusion is not known.	If someone wanted to compare the attitudes of village headmen with attitudes of the religious leaders in a certain area, he could simply instruct his interviewers to go out and get responses from, say, 30 of each	A probability sample would be better, since there are some doubts about the representativeness of the sample of the population. It can be used only when the important characteristics are known and fairly easily recognizable. It does not require the population lists or the dwelling-unit maps that are needed for probability sampling
3. Simple random	Every person in the population has an equal and known probability of being included in the sample.	If there are 100 persons in the population and the sample is of 20 persons, then each individual has a 20 or 1/5 chance of being sampled.	This is the simplest probability design and requires no knowledge of the population other than who the members are. It must be used for inferential statistics and generalization to the whole population
4. Stratified random	The population is divided on some known characteristic and each portion is sampled on a simple random basis	If there are in population of 100, 20 wealthy, 60 average, and 20 poor persons, then, in a simple random sample there is too little chance for the wealthy or the poor to be included. If the population were divided and then each segment were sampled separately, enough of the extreme cases would be included for analysis.	When it is known in advance that a special segment of the population would not have enough persons in the sample if the sample were drawn randomly. It also allows the use of inferential statistics.
5. Cluster	The ultimate set of persons is determined by a series of probability samples from increasingly smaller geographic areas	First a sample of large areas is chosen, then a set of smaller areas from this sample, and so on until the final set of persons is decided upon	When the population to be sampled is very large. It requires a list of persons or a dwelling unit map. This sample also allows the use of inferential statistics.

SUMMARY,

In summary, samples are used to gain reasonably accurate knowledge about a population without having to interview every single member. There are several types of samples. First, the *accidental sample* is easy to obtain but can be seriously biased and misleading. Second, the *quota sample* includes predetermined numbers or proportions of different types of persons. The selection of individual persons within each type is left to the interviewer's discretion. Third, the *simple random sample* gives each member of a population a known chance to be selected. Fourth, the *stratified random sample* includes proportions of a population divided on known characteristics in order to not underrepresent any relevant subgroups. Fifth, the *cluster sample* starts with a country or large area and progressively samples smaller areas. Although random samples are generally more accurate, the PSYOP officer with limited time or resources may find it necessary to use the less accurate quota sample. Methods of drawing the samples using population lists and dwelling-unit maps were considered with discussion of field problems. There was also a discussion of cost and accuracy factors that enter into the decision regarding the size of the sample to be used.

NOTES

¹ C. W. McNett, Jr. and R.E. Kirk, "Drawing Random Samples in Cross-Cultural Studies: A Suggested Method," *American Anthropologist*, LXX (February 1968), pp. 50-55.

² Wilbur Schramm, *An Introduction to Communication Research for Developing Nations* (Stanford, Calif.: Institute for Communication Research, 1967).

³ *Ibid.* p. 60.

Content Analysis

FACTORS INFLUENCING NORTH VIETNAMESE MORALE*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

Content analysis is illustrated in this article. The technique is used to study the will of Ho Chi Minh and to relate his last testament to psychological factors affecting North Vietnamese morale.

In his last will and testament, executed a few months before his death in September 1969, Ho Chi Minh exhorted his people to continue the fight until the goal of national independence was achieved, until the last foreign troops were driven from Vietnamese soil. To realize this goal, the Vietnamese people are asked to be prepared to continue fighting for another 15 or 20 years, more if necessary.

Prospects of 15 to 20 additional years of war would appear at first examination to be extremely discouraging to a people who have been in

*From "PSYOP Intelligence," a Special Report (SRI-71) of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Research Intelligence Division, 7th PSYOP Group, 11 February 1971.

an almost continual state of war since 1945. Ho's statement appeared to present opportunities to opponents of North Vietnam to mount a psychological campaign against the North Vietnamese. Indeed this seemingly demoralizing pronouncement on the possible duration of the Vietnam War has been seized upon by U.S. and allied propagandists in efforts to weaken the fighting spirit of VC and NVA troops in South Vietnam as well as civilian support of the war effort in North Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh has been labeled many things by his opponents throughout his long political career, but never a fool. Both the message and the vehicle that conveyed his last admonition were selected for the greatest impact on the North Vietnamese people. Ho Chi Minh was loved and truly venerated by his people almost to the point of being considered a god. The last will and testament was his final formal communication to his people, an expression of what he wanted to be carried out after his death. This testament is constantly referred to in North Vietnamese mass media. The Hanoi leadership effectively invokes the memory of Ho in attempts to motivate the population to greater efforts in all aspects of national life.

In making such a last statement, Ho Chi Minh was drawing heavily upon the Vietnamese past. He was reminding people of the tactics by which the Vietnamese people have won wars throughout history. Usually faced with an enemy vastly superior in strength and arms, as the Chinese or more recently the French, the Vietnamese have traditionally employed the only resources available to them: terrain suitable to their tactics; a brave determined people; and time.

To the Vietnamese the most important of these was time. The Vietnamese have won wars throughout their history by fighting for a longer time than their opponents thought possible. Seven Chinese invasions were successfully repulsed. The Vietnamese struggle with the Mongol hordes lasted 31 years before the Vietnamese drove them from their territory. Wars lasting 30 to 40 years are not uncommon in Vietnamese history. The ability to wage such protracted wars, the tenacity with which the Vietnamese continue to fight, regardless of the time required to defeat the enemy, is the quality with which the Vietnamese people have won their wars.

The Vietnamese people, both North and South, are intensely proud of their history. Until modern times, and with the exception of brief periods of Chinese domination, the Vietnamese have maintained their national independence. They have always maintained their identity as a people regardless of the political situation. Pride in history and military achievements is shown by the manner in which streets in both Vietnams are named. Almost without exception streets are named honoring military and political heroes who have led the people against foreign invaders, usually the Chinese.

Given this apparent ability to outlast the opponent, it is of interest to note Hanoi's thinking about the American people in this regard. A basic

tenet on which Hanoi strategists have based their present war tactics, protracted warfare, is the conviction that the American people are psychologically incapable of staying with a long-term war. The North Vietnamese predicted early in the conflict that the American people would soon tire of the war. The U.S. public would eventually react against rising casualties and rising war costs and force the U.S. government to end the war, thought North Vietnamese strategists.

Accurately gauging the present state of morale in North Vietnam is a difficult task. Government control of the communication media, the small number of visitors permitted in the country, restriction on the travel of the visitors, and particularly the complete absence of unsupervised contacts with ordinary citizens are factors contributing to the scarcity of information.

* * * * *

A French reporter, who traveled extensively in North Vietnam on two different occasions stated that his most vivid impression on the second trip, six weeks after Ho's death, was the absence of change throughout the country. Everywhere he traveled he saw again the same posters seen during the bombing period urging the population to remain war-conscious, warning against any relaxation while the enemy still threatens. Bomb shelters were much in evidence, as were antiaircraft sites, which were constantly manned. Almost no effort had been made to reconstruct destroyed or damaged buildings, although main arteries of transportation were restored or under repair.

* * * * *

The draft in North Vietnam is not popular. However, there is no indication of efforts to avoid conscription. Correspondence from troops outside the country is infrequent, although exploits and resounding victories of Peoples' Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are continually related to the population through the mass media.

There is no question that the vast majority of North Vietnamese people want peace. They have suffered much as a result of two decades or more of war. An entire generation has never known peace. Notwithstanding the desire for peace and relief from the hardships borne by the people as a result of the war, there is little evidence to indicate that popular resolve to support the North Vietnamese Government's war policy has been appreciably lessened.

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, AND PSYOP, INTRODUCTION PERSUASION*

BY IRVING L. JANIS

An overview of recent research and conceptualization in the field of persuasive communication, a major area of PSYOP.

The art of "winning men's minds by words" has occupied the attention of philosophers since long before the time of Plato's and Aristotle's commentaries on rhetoric. But not until the twentieth century has there been any concerted effort of empirically oriented scholars to describe objectively the conditions under which persuasion succeeds or fails.

Pioneering contributions. In a recent survey of current knowledge about persuasive communication, four social scientists who made pioneering contributions during the first half of this century have been singled out as the founding fathers of the new field of research on persuasive communication (Schramm 1963). One is the political scientist Harold D. Lasswell, who carried out the first detailed descriptive studies of major propaganda campaigns, focusing on the communications issued by national elites during World War I and by totalitarian movements that tried to influence the masses during the period of the great depression. Lasswell formulated a set of theoretical categories for analyzing the effects of persuasive communications and initiated the development of systematic techniques of content analysis (Lasswell et al. 1949).

A second major figure is the sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld, who worked out new methods for investigating the impact of mass media on voting behavior and on the beliefs, judgments, and values of the mass audience. Using poll data from U.S. election campaigns and panel surveys of public reactions to a wide variety of radio programs, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues have described the complex communication networks and cross pressures that exist in modern communities. Their studies (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955) highlight the influential role of local opinion leaders, who function as "gatekeepers" by promoting or rejecting the evaluative judgments transmitted in the mass media by political parties, business organizations, public welfare authorities, and intellectuals.

A third outstanding contributor to scientific research on social influence is the psychologist Kurt Lewin, whose studies emphasized the powerful barriers to change that are created by the primary and secondary groups with which the individual is affiliated. One of his major

*Excerpts from "Persuasion," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 12, The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 55-63. "Persuasion" by Irving L. Janis. Reprinted with permission of the Publisher from THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, David L. Sills, Editor-in-Chief. Volume 12, pages 53 to 63. Copyright © 1968 by Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Inc.

explanatory concepts to account for resistance to new sources of social pressure is the counterpressure arising from the existence of group norms, in which attitudes are anchored. When attempting to understand why a person accepts or rejects a persuasive message, according to Lewin (1947), the investigator should examine the person's anticipations about whether or not he will be diverging from the norms of his reference groups, such as his family, his work group, and the social organizations with which he identifies. . . .

Another psychologist, Carl I. Hovland, is the fourth contributor to have helped build up systematic knowledge about communication effects and the processes of persuasion. Hovland initiated broad programs of experimental research designed to test general hypotheses concerning the factors that determine whether or not the recipients of a persuasive message will be influenced. Some of the studies by Hovland and his collaborators (see, e.g., *Personality and Persuasibility* 1959) bear directly on the hypotheses put forth by Allport, Lazarsfeld, and Lewin, while others have led to unexpected discoveries and new theoretical analyses of the psychological processes underlying successful persuasion. . . .

The sections that follow present some of the main generalizations drawn from these and other studies in order to indicate representative hypotheses and empirical findings. . . .

Resistance to persuasion. During recent decades many self-styled experts in propaganda, journalism, advertising, and public relations have promoted an image of modern man as highly gullible. The new field of mass-communications research, which developed from the work of these four pioneering social scientists, has shattered this image along with other popular preconceptions concerning the alleged power of the mass media to manipulate, exploit, or "brainwash" the public. A review of the evidence accumulated from relevant research studies indicates that mass communications generally fail to produce any marked changes in social attitudes or actions (see Klapper 1960). The slight effects produced by the press, films, radio, and television are usually limited to a reinforcement of the pre-existing beliefs and values of the audience. Campaigns designed to persuade people to change their values, to modify social stereotypes, or to foster a new political ideology generally mobilize powerful resistances in the public. So pervasive are these resistances, according to the documented accounts of numerous investigators, that one could characterize "successful persuasion" by the mass media as a relatively rare social phenomenon.

Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953), in their analysis of factors that influence attention, comprehension, and acceptance of persuasive messages, call attention to essential differences between educational instruction and persuasion. Most of the differences pertain to the audience's initial expectations, which have a marked influence on motivation to accept or reject the communicator's conclusions. In the case of instruction,

tional communications, where high acceptance is readily elicited, the educational setting is typically one in which the members of the audience anticipate that the communicator is trying to help them, that his conclusions are incontrovertible, and that they will be socially rewarded rather than punished for adhering to his conclusions. In persuasive situations, on the other hand, interfering expectations are aroused, and these operate as resistances. The authors point out that the findings from experiments on communication effects seem to converge upon three types of interfering expectations that operate to decrease the degree of acceptance: (1) expectations of being manipulated by the communicator (e.g., being made a "sucker" by an untrustworthy source, who has ulterior economic or political motives for trying to persuade others to support his position); (2) expectations of being "wrong" (e.g., making incorrect judgments on a controversial political issue or overlooking antithetical evidence that would be grounds for a more cautious or compromise position); and (3) expectations of social disapproval (e.g., from the local community or from a primary group whose norms are not in accord with the communicator's position).


This third type of resistance, which reflects Lewin's "social anchorage" concept, has been most extensively investigated. Many studies indicate that when the members of an audience are exposed to a communication advocating a position that goes counter to the norms of one or more of their reference groups, their resistance will vary directly with the strength of the formal and informal sanctions put forth by the norm-setting group. Quite aside from any special sanctions applied to those who violate the group norms, the mere perception that the vast majority of other members accept a given norm operates as a powerful force on the individual to conform to that norm (Lewin 1947; Asch 1952; Kiesler & Corbin 1965).

DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL PERSUASION

Most of the substantiated propositions about successful persuasion designate factors that help to decrease psychological resistances when the recipients are exposed to a persuasive communication (see Janis & Smith 1965). Exposure requires not only adequate physical transmission of the message but also audience attention, which will not be elicited if the communication is perceived as deviating markedly from pre-existing attitudes and values or as violating the norms of an important reference group. If a persuasive communication evokes sufficient attention to surmount the exposure hurdle, its success will then depend upon *comprehension* (i.e., the extent to which the audience grasps the essential meanings the communicator intended to convey) and *acceptance* (i.e., the degree to which the audience is convinced by the arguments and/or is responsive to the motivational appeals presented in the communication).

The main types of factors that have been investigated are those specified by Lasswell's classic formula for communications analysis: *Who*

says *what* to *whom* with *what effect*? Janis and Holvand (1959) present a paradigm of interacting factors that enter into successful persuasion (see Figure 1). Communicator characteristics, the content of the message, the manner of presentation, and other crucial situational factors shown in column 1 are considered to be stimulus variables capable of touching off the key mediating processes (represented in column 3)—attention, comprehension, and acceptance—that give rise to the various effects designated as attitude change (column 4). The magnitude of the influence exerted by the stimulus variables also depends on different types of predispositional variables (represented in column 2).



* The categories and subcategories are not necessarily exhaustive but highlight the major types of stimulus variables that play a role in producing changes in verbalizable attitudes.

Source: Based on Janis and Hovland 1959

Figure 1—Major factors in persuasion

Communicator and content factors. The most thoroughly investigated propositions bearing on the processes of persuasion are those that specify how one or another of the stimulus attributes is related to successful persuasion. Sometimes communications research has merely confirmed certain of the well-known prescriptions formulated by experts in the art of persuasion. But research occasionally leads to the discovery of unexpected limiting conditions or hitherto unknown relationships that call into question the commonly accepted assumptions about how people can be influenced to change their beliefs or attitudes.

Prestige and " sleeper" effects. Studies of prestige effects have confirmed some "obvious" assumptions and refuted other, equally "obvious" ones. Several communication experiments have shown, as might be expected, that there is an immediate gain in acceptance of persuasive communications when the message is given by someone who is initially accorded relatively high prestige by the audience or when the arguments are attributed to a relatively trustworthy source. But, contrary to expectations, it has been found that in the long run, persuasive communications from low-prestige sources turn out to be just as effective as those from high-prestige sources. This phenomenon has been termed the " sleeper" effect (see Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 254-259; Kelman & Hovland 1953). Both positive and negative prestige effects seem to wear off over a period of several weeks. When a communication comes from a nonprestigious or distrusted source, the audience tends at first to reject the message. But as time goes on, acceptance of the originally discounted statements has been found to *increase*, evidently because with the passage of time, the content of the message is no longer spontaneously associated with the source.

One-sided versus two-sided presentations. Another issue that has been systematically investigated is whether persuasion is more effective when it concentrates exclusively on the arguments supporting the propagandist's position or when it includes discussion of the opposing arguments. Hitler and other Nazi propaganda strategists have claimed that in appealing for a specific line of action, no rival or opposing ideas should ever be mentioned, because they invite comparisons, hesitation, and doubt. But the available evidence indicates that this principle holds true only under very limited conditions, such as when the audience is unaware of the arguments for the other side of the issue. When the audience is strongly opposed to the position being advocated, a persuasive message is generally more effective if it includes the opposing arguments than if it presents only the arguments in favor of one side of the issue (see Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 105-110; Hovland et al. 1949, pp. 201-227; Klapper 1960, pp. 113-116). Moreover, even when the audience is not initially opposed to the communicator's position, a two-sided presentation will be more effective in creating sustained changes in attitudes if the communication is given under conditions where the audience will subsequently be exposed to countercommunications presenting the opposing arguments.

Inoculation devices. When the members of an audience are pre-exposed to the opposing arguments along with some refutations, they are to some extent "inoculated" against subsequent countercommunications, because the new arguments will be much less impressive and more readily discounted (see Lumsdaine & Janis 1953). This type of inoculation has been found to produce a "generalized immunization effect" under certain conditions, notably when a communication advocates recommendations that the audience already regards as being in line with commonly accepted norms, such as simple health rules. Thus, inclusion of a few arguments that momentarily shake the confidence of members of the audience in cultural truisms they had always taken for granted will reduce the chances of their being influenced by subsequent counterpropaganda, because they become more resistant both to the counterarguments specifically mentioned and refuted in the original two-sided communication and to new counterarguments which might otherwise shake their beliefs (McGuire 1961).

Another simple inoculation device has been found to be effective in reducing the influence of unconventional communications that take issue with cultural truisms of the type that people are seldom or never called upon to defend. This device consists of stimulating the members of an audience to build up defenses by warning them in advance that their hitherto unchallenged beliefs will soon be exposed to strong attack (McGuire 1961; 1964; McGuire & Papageorgis 1962).

The well-known "freezing" effects of public commitment to a newly adopted policy or course of action form the basis for another type of communication device that prevents backsliding. Experimental studies indicate that resistance to subsequent countercommunications can be built up if, after presenting impressive arguments and appeals, the communicator uses his persuasive influence to induce his listeners to endorse the position publicly—for example, by voting openly for it, signing a petition, or showing other overt signs of acceptance that will be seen by people in their community (see Lewin 1947; *Attitude Organization and Change* 1960).

Other types of inoculation procedures have been studied to determine the conditions under which acceptance of a new attitude or policy recommendation will be sustained despite subsequent exposure to frustrations, threats, or setbacks that arouse strong negative effects. For example, after having been persuaded to adopt a communicator's recommendations, the audience may subsequently be exposed to warnings or punishments that stimulate avoidance of the recommendations. The emotional impact of the subsequent setback will tend to be reduced if the audience has been given inoculating communications that predict the threatening event in advance, thus eliminating the element of surprise and, at the same time, stimulating appropriate defenses (see Janis 1962). Similarly, in the case of "bad news" events that generate pessimistic expectations about the future, preparatory communications that present grounds for

maintaining optimistic expectations can help soften the blow and enable the audience to resist being unduly influenced by the impact of the disturbance (Janis et al. 1951). In general, the eventual success of any attempt at persuading people to carry out a given course of action is likely to be attained if the communicator frankly discusses the possible subsequent difficulties and countercommunications, presenting them in a way that helps to create a cognitive frame of reference for discounting or minimizing them if they do, in fact, materialize.

Effectiveness of "primacy." Since most inoculation devices involve familiarizing the audience with counterarguments, two-sided communications might be more advantageous in the long run, even in circumstances where a one-sided communication could be expected to be more successful in producing immediate changes in a higher proportion of the audience. There are, of course, many different ways of arranging the opposing arguments in a two-sided communication, and some ways of inserting them have been found to be more effective than others. For example, when the audience is not familiar with the opposing arguments, a two-sided communication from an authoritative source tends to be more effective if the opposing arguments are presented *after*, rather than before, the favorable arguments that support the communicator's conclusion. By giving strong favorable arguments first, the communication arouses the audience's motivation to accept the communicator's conclusion, so that when the negative material subsequently occurs, it can be better tolerated. Furthermore, if a strong case is made for the communicator's position at the outset, there is a greater likelihood that the recipient will make an early decision to accept the communicator's position and thereafter tend to minimize dissonance or conflict by ignoring the opposing ideas (see Brehm & Cohen 1962; Festinger 1957; 1964; Janis 1957; 1959). This *primacy effect*, when tested with communications designed to induce opposing attitudes toward the same social objects or policies, proved to be extremely pronounced under conditions where the contradictory material was not spontaneously salient and there was no time interval between the first set of arguments and the second, contradictory set (Asch 1946; Luchins 1957a; 1957b; Janis & Feierabend 1957). Under other conditions, however, such as where the audience is very familiar with the opposing arguments and has initial doubts about the communicator's honesty, a *recency effect* might predominate, making it more advantageous to give the counterarguments first, with the main affirmative arguments saved for the end of the communication (see Hovland et al. 1957, pp. 130-147.)

Emotional appeals. It is commonly recognized that when a person remains unmoved by repeated attempts to persuade him with rational arguments, he might nevertheless show a marked change as soon as emotional appeals are introduced. Probably the most widespread form of emotional appeal in modern Western culture involves the arousal of fear by emphasizing anticipated threats. Antiwar propaganda, public health

campaigns, and other efforts at mass persuasion frequently rely upon emotional shock devices to motivate people to carry out preventive measures or to support policies designed to avert potential dangers (for example, promoting a ban against a nuclear weapons test by emphasizing the horrors of war). For maximal effectiveness, this device requires not only that the communications succeed in arousing fear but also that the recommendations function as effective *reassurances*. The latter term refers to verbal statements—plans, resolutions, judgments, evaluations—that are capable of alleviating or reducing emotional tension. Many communication experiments have been designed to test popular claims about the effectiveness of emotional appeals and to determine objectively the conditions under which such appeals are successful.

Political leaders and public health authorities often assume that the protective actions or practical solutions they advocate will be more readily accepted, the more they succeed in frightening the audience about the dangerous consequences of failing to adhere to their recommendations. This assumption may occasionally be correct, as in the case of recommendations concerning immediate escape actions (e.g., evacuation of a danger area within a few minutes after an emergency warning is issued). But the assumption appears to be questionable in many instances, especially when the goal is to induce delayed actions or sustained attitude (e.g., evacuating at some future date, if the threat materializes; supporting a disarmament movement; favoring prodemocratic policies). The available evidence indicates that presenting fear-arousing material in a persuasive communication tends to stimulate the recipient's vigilance and his need for reassurance. But this does not necessarily increase his motivation to accept authoritative recommendations about ways to avert or cope with the danger, since the person may find other ways to reduce his fear. Whenever fear is aroused to a very high level, resistances tend to be strongly mobilized. This will reduce the effectiveness of a persuasive communication, unless it is outweighed by certain other factors that could facilitate attitude change (Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 56-98; Leventhal 1965). Among the facilitating conditions that increase an audience's tolerance for a strong dosage of fear-arousing material in a persuasive message is the inclusion of one or more highly specific recommendations that offer an apparently good solution to the problems posed by the threat, with no obvious loopholes (Leventhal et al. 1965). When this condition is not met, as is often the case in "scare" propaganda, the use of a strong emotional appeal may produce much less acceptance of the communicator's recommendations than a milder appeal, since the audience will then become motivated to attach little importance to the threat or develop some other form of defensive avoidance that enables them to alleviate their fear. Sometimes strong emotional appeals attain spectacular persuasive effects, but it is difficult to predict accurately that a very high dosage of fear will not exceed the optimal level. Preliminary "program assessment" research with cross-sectional samples of the intended

audience is usually needed to make sure that the version of the communication containing a strong appeal is more effective than a version containing a more moderate appeal.

Implicit versus explicit conclusions. Many claims are made about effective strategies for inducing people to change their attitudes and values, but some of these claims are difficult to assess empirically. One such notion is that a *nondirective* approach—similar to that used by many counselors and psychotherapists when dealing with people who seek help in making conflictful decisions of an upsetting nature—will generally be more effective in mass communications than a more directive approach . . . One testable implication of this notion is that a mass communication will sway more people if instead of stating an explicit conclusion, the communicator allows the audience to draw its own conclusions from the facts, arguments, and appeals that he presents. Undoubtedly, there are some circumstances where direct suggestions are likely to meet with such insurmountable resistances that an indirect approach is the only hope for exerting any influence whatsoever. But for informative communications dealing with relatively impersonal issues, the available research evidence indicates that it is generally more effective to state the conclusions or recommendations *explicitly*, even when the propagandist is regarded as biased or untrustworthy (see Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 100-105; Klapper 1960, pp. 84-91, 116-117). One of the main advantages of stating the conclusions explicitly is that it helps to prevent the audience from missing or distorting the essential point of the arguments.

Effects of role playing. One type of indirect persuasion that has been carefully investigated involves the use of a special role-playing technique. It has been repeatedly found that when a person is required to play a role entailing the presentation of a persuasive message to others in his own words, he will be more influenced than if he were passively exposed to the same message. This "saying is believing" tendency has been found to occur even when role playing is artificially induced by asking people to take part in a test of their public-speaking ability or to write essays (Janis & King 1954; Kelman 1953). Experimental evidence indicates that mere repetition of a persuasive message has little effect as compared with an improvised restatement and elaboration of the arguments and conclusions (King & Janis 1956). The success of improvised role playing might be attributed to several different psychological processes. Festinger (1957) suggests that the primary gain from role playing comes from efforts to reduce dissonance between what one is saying publicly and what one actually believes, and a number of experiments offer some supporting evidence (e.g., Brehm & Cohen 1962; Festinger & Carlsmith 1959, Festinger 1964). An alternative explanation is in terms of self-persuasion; when attempting to convey the message to others, the role player is likely to think up new formulations of the arguments, new illustrations and appeals. These are likely to be convincing incentives to himself, especially if he regards the improvised ideas as his "own" (see Hovland et al. 1952,

pp. 228-237; Janis & Gilmore 1965; Elms & Janis 1965). This theoretical issue has not yet been settled, and the differential predictions from the alternative explanations are currently under investigation (see Carlsmith et al. 1966; Rosenberg 1965).

Personality factors. Numerous studies have shown that social attitudes are frequently resistant to persuasion because they satisfy deep-seated personality needs. Such attitudes are likely to remain unchanged unless self-insight techniques or special types of persuasive appeals are used that take account of the adjustive and ego-defensive functions of these attitudes (see Katz & Stotland 1959; Lasswell 1930-1951; Smith et al. 1956). It is logical, therefore, that assessment of personality attributes should help in predicting whether a given person will be responsive to persuasive messages that deal with a particular topic or that employ one or another type of argument. Studies of authoritarian personalities, for example, indicate that any communication fostering rigid, antidemocratic controls over political dissenters and minority out-groups will tend to be more readily accepted by one particular type of personality (see Adorno et al. 1950). An outstanding characteristic of this personality is a strong latent need to displace hostility away from in-groups toward out-groups—as manifested by symptoms of intense ambivalence toward parents, bosses, and other authority figures, combined with a high degree of inhibition of normal sexual and aggressive activities.

Table 1 shows a set of hypothetical diagnostic categories, worked out by Katz (1960), that might prove to be useful for predicting individual differences in responsiveness to persuasion on important social issues. The first step would be to determine which of the four basic types of functions (column 1) is served by the person's current attitude on the issue in question. The type of need fulfilled by each function is shown in the second column of the table. If one could assess the status of these needs accurately, one would presumably be able to predict the types of situations that would arouse the attitude (column 3) and the general conditions that would have to be met in order to change each individual's attitude (column 4).

One of the main reasons why Katz's hypothetical schema is regarded as a promising functional approach to the study of attitude change is that it helps to explain why the conditions required for changing certain attitudes, particularly those diagnosed as serving an ego-defensive function, are not satisfied by the usual forms of persuasion to be found in the mass media. The material in this table carries the implication that no simple psychological formula can be expected to subsume all instances of attitude change. This implication confirms clinical observations, which indicate that unconscious dynamics as well as conscious processes are sometimes involved when a person clings unyieldingly to his stand in the face of strong persuasive arguments or when he readily gives in, without any opposition, on an important social or political issue (see Lasswell 1930-1951). It also agrees with experimental evidence indicating that

even when dealing with conscious attitudes, we cannot expect to find only one type of cognitive process that will account for successful persuasion. For example, the striving for consistency among cognitions bearing on the same issue—which Heider (1958) has postulated as a fundamental human tendency in response to all meaningful communications—sometimes appears to be an important determinant of reactions to persuasion, but it does not account for certain instances where other motivational factors, such as pleasurable anticipations of gain, may become the dominant determinants (see Rosenberg & Abelson 1960).

Individual differences are to be expected, not only in response to persuasive pressures from arguments that create cognitive inconsistencies but also in response to emotional appeals (see Janis & Feshbach 1954) and group pressures induced by giving information about the consensus of judgments made by one's peers (see Crutchfield 1955); these are called "content-bound" predispositions. Some research evidence also points to specific personality needs, preferences, and sensitivities that predispose certain persons to be highly responsive to one or another limited type of communicator (Janis & Hovland 1959); these are termed "communicator-bound" predispositions. In Figure 1, all such sources of individual differences are represented in the second column by the box labeled "specific predispositions."

In addition to specific types of predispositional factors, there are also certain personality attributes that predispose people to be swayed by, or to be resistant to, any persuasive message, irrespective of what is said, how it is said, or who says it. This *general persuasibility* factor (represented by the box at the top of the second column in Figure 1) has been inferred from research on the consistency of individual differences. Such research indicates that when a large audience is exposed to many different types of persuasive communications on many different types of issues, some persons are consistently resistant, whereas others are moderately persuasible, and still others are highly persuasible (see Abelson & Lesser 1959a; Janis & Field 1959a; 1959b). Among the personality factors found to be predictive of low resistance to all forms of persuasive influence are (1) low self-esteem; (2) inhibition of overt aggressive behavior; (3) high fantasy imagery and strong empathic responses to symbolic representations; and (4) other-directed rather than inner-directed orientation, that is, a value system stressing adaptation to the social environment rather than inner standards for regulating one's conduct. It is a puzzling fact, however, that these relationships have been found only in samples of men, since no such relationships have been found as yet in samples of women. These findings have been attributed to differences in the social roles prescribed for women and men in our society, which may also account for the repeated finding that women are more persuasible than men on social and political issues (see Hovland & Janis 1959).

Table 1.—Determinants of attitude formation, arousal, and change in relation to type of function

Function	Origin and Dynamics	Arousal Conditions	Change Conditions
Adjustment	The object of the attitude has proved to be useful for satisfying important needs, it increases one's chances of gaining rewards or decreases one's chances of being punished	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Activation of needs 2 Salience of cues associated with need satisfaction 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Failure to gain usual satisfactions from the attitude 2 Creation of new needs and new levels of aspiration that are not satisfied by the attitude 3 Shifting of rewards and punishments so that the attitude is no longer reinforced 4 Impressive demonstration of new and better paths for need satisfaction
Ego defense	The attitude helps to protect the person from internal conflict or from becoming highly disturbed by external dangers	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Posing of threats 2 Appeals to hatred and repressed impulses 3 Rise in frustrations 4 Use of authoritarian suggestion 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Removal of threats 2 Apathy which reduces the need for defense against pent-up impulses 3 Opportunity for development of self insight
Value expression	The attitude helps the person to maintain his self identity and his self-esteem, it allows him to express himself or gives him a sense of independence	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Salience of cues associated with values 2 Appeals to individual to react to self-image 3 Ambiguities which threaten self concept 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Some degree of dissatisfaction with the self 2 Impressive demonstration of the greater value and sense of a new attitude for enhancing one's self-image 3 Loss of usual environmental supports to such an extent that old values are undermined
Knowledge	The attitude satisfies the need for understanding, for meaningful cognitive organization, and for consistency and clarity	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Re-encounters with the original problem that required a solution or encounters with related problems 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Ambiguity created by new information or by a marked change in environment 2 Meaningful information about a different way of analyzing the problem or about new ways of solving it

Source: From Katz 1960, p. 132

CURRENT STATUS OF RESEARCH

The hypotheses summarized in the foregoing review of social-psychological studies of persuasion do not constitute an exhaustive propositional inventory of all available findings but, rather, serve to highlight major relationships that have emerged from systematic research. Supporting evidence comes from carefully controlled experiments, but the studies usually have been carried out with small subpopulation samples, most often limited to American high school or college students in a classroom situation. Consequently, the generality of the hypotheses and the limiting conditions under which they hold true have not yet been adequately explored. There is some reason to expect, however, that the relationships initially observed in the limited experimental situations will have fairly wide applicability because: (a) they appear to be in line with observations from other, less well-controlled investigations of social influence (such as panel studies of opinion trends during political campaigns, market research surveys on widely advertised products, and case studies of responsiveness to psychological counseling or psychotherapy); and (b) in a number of instances where replications have been carried out with other subpopulations in other types of communication situations, confirmatory evidence has been obtained (see Janis & Smith 1965).

In any case, the development of experimental techniques, attitude scales, and sophisticated methods for analyzing the effects of many different causal factors and their interactions have now reached the point where we can obtain relevant and cumulative knowledge from systematic studies of the conditions under which persuasive communications are effective or ineffective (see Campbell 1963). As new techniques and methods are used in the rapidly expanding field of communications research, we can expect a fuller account of the influence of the variables discussed, as well as new discoveries concerning the ways in which communication stimuli and predispositional factors interact in the processes of persuasion.

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ANTHOLOGIES, SYNTHESSES, AND EXPLORATIONS:

AN ATTITUDE CHANGE SAMPLER*

BY GERALD R. MILLER

Social science research on attitude change is particularly relevant to PSYOP. This article reviews the subject of attitude change from several perspectives.

*From "Anthologies, Syntheses, and Explorations," *The Speech Teacher*, XX, no. 1 (January 1971), pp 78-84. Reprinted with the permission of *The Speech Teacher*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

As I have indicated in a recent *QJS* (*Quarterly Journal of Speech*) article, the study of human communication, from Aristotle to the analysis of variance, has reflected a pervasive interest in the persuasive process. In particular, the past several decades have produced a printed explosion consisting of both new insights and old ideas revisited—insights and ideas ranging from grandiose theorizing to microscopic empiricism. As Gustav Bergmann would put it, both the “cloudhoppers” and the “clodhoppers” have had their say.

The 14 books reviewed below—all published within the last five years—capture the flavor of this ongoing scholarly dialogue on persuasion. While they represent a collective outpouring of 4008 pages, they do not exhaust the behaviorally-oriented volumes on attitudes and attitude change printed during this time span. Moreover, spatial limitations have necessitated exclusion of two types of works: those which contain considerable material appropriate to the study of attitude change but which deal with other problems as well (e.g., Feldman, ed., *Cognitive Consistency*) and those which note relevant theories and research but which emphasize the practice of persuasive communication (e.g., Minnick, *The Art of Persuasion*).

For purposes of convenience, the books are grouped in three categories, although no claim is made for either their exclusivity or their exhaustiveness. Five of the volumes are *Anthologies*; they are primarily collections of earlier published articles. Four are *Syntheses*; they represent attempts to organize, combine, and present diverse theoretical, empirical, and methodological writings. Finally, five of the works are *Exploratory*; they seek to expand the frontiers of knowledge concerning processes of attitude formation, attitude change, and persuasion.

ANTHOLOGIES

Two of the more ambitious anthologies are Fishbein's *Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement* and Rosnow and Robinson's *Experiments in Persuasion*. The former contains eight articles dealing with historical foundations of the study of attitudes, 23 concerning various methodological aspects of attitude measurement, and 20 describing differing theories of attitude formation and change. The latter assembles 30 well-known studies dealing with the effects of certain source, message, recipient, and channel variables on the process of persuasion.

Examination of the Fishbein volume impresses the reader with the amount of material that has been written about attitude measurement. Even here, as Fishbein points out, the articles chosen cover only part of the territory; they deal exclusively “with the theory underlying attitude measurement rather than with the measurement process per se.” The classic articles on standardized measurement techniques are all included: the interested reader can discover the genesis of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale; Thurstone and Likert-type scales; Guttman scaling, and the semantic differential. In addition, there are articles dealing with

multidimensional measurement techniques, alternative measurement techniques, and problems and prospects in attitude measurement.

The fact that 21 of the 23 articles deal entirely with scaling and measurement problems which use as their data base some form of paper-and-pencil response is more a commentary on the state of the art than on the representativeness of the selections. The two exceptions are an article by Campbell on the indirect assessment of social attitudes, which takes note of doll-play techniques, and one by Cooper and Pollock, which discusses the use of galvanic skin response to identify prejudicial attitudes. While one or two other articles might conceivably have been included (e.g., Eckard Hess' work with pupillary dilation could not be reprinted due to copyright problems), the conclusion is inescapable that we know much more about measuring verbal indicants of an attitude than we do about measuring other attitudinal behaviors. Elsewhere, I have stressed the need to rectify this shortcoming.

The section dealing with differing theoretical approaches to the study of attitudes strikes an appropriate balance between various strains of theorizing. There are eight articles on consistency theories, an approach that in recent years has undoubtedly spawned the largest research literature. Five of the articles are rooted in behavior theories; while a final section, "Problems, Prospects, and Alternatives in Attitude Theory," not only contains articles presenting the peculiar contributions of such theorists as Bem, Katz, and Kelman but also provides several papers appraising the present status of the most popular theoretical viewpoints.

While Fishbein's volume stresses attitude measurement and attitude theory, Rosnow and Robinson focus on the experimental literature dealing with the persuasive process. The book's organization conforms with Smith, Lasswell, and Casey's famous definition of communication: "*Who* (Source section) *says what* (Message section) *to whom* (Recipient section) through which *medium* (Channel section) with what *effect* (Effects section)." This organizational approach makes generally good sense, with the possible exception of the Effects section. Here, the articles included struck me as a persuasive potpourri covering a variety of problems. Moreover, labeling one section "Effects" is somewhat misleading, for the staple commodity of all five major divisions of the volume is effects-centered research.

Each section contains a number of landmark studies—in some instances, I would have preferred less reliance on the old standards and more attention to research of recent vintage—plus several original summaries, prepared by the editors, of the various research enterprises. These summaries are one of the book's major assets; they produce a sense of unity often lacking in collections of reprinted articles.

Both the Fishbein and Rosnow and Robinson volumes are useful additions to the literature for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate persuasion courses. Their utility is partially dependent upon experienced instructors, although the original summaries in Rosnow and

Robinson might permit its use by a teacher with less grounding in the behavioral study of persuasion.

Jahoda and Warrent's paperback, *Attitudes*, is an anthology in the fullest sense. Except for a brief introduction and seven one paragraph statements preceding each of the major sections, the book contains no original material. There are 27 classic articles, most of them excerpted, dealing with such topics as the concept of attitude, attitude research, attitude theory, and attitude research methodology.

The volume will make a useful supplement in beginning courses in persuasion or public opinion and propaganda. Its use in advanced classes could contribute to poor scholarly habits, primarily because of the brevity of the excerpts. For example, Campbell's 70 page *tour de force*, "Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioral Dispositions," is represented by a single page. As I recall, such "ouickie" summaries used to be eagerly sought out by harried doctoral students preparing for comprehensives. Hopefully, times have changed.

In attempting to produce a volume suitable for unified, indepth undergraduate and graduate study of attitude change, Wagner and Sherwood's *The Study of Attitude Change* juxtaposes theoretical and research articles. Beginning with a well-written introduction by Wagner, the book's general pattern is to present a particular theoretical position, followed by a study generated by that position. While most of the articles are reprinted, there is a good original paper on cognitive dissonance by Sherwood, Barron, and Fitch. To illustrate how results of a given study can be interpreted in more than one way, Bem's elaboration of self-perception as an alternative to cognitive dissonance and Brehm's criticism of Elms and Janis' incentive theory explanation of counter-attitudinal role-playing are included in the volume. Finally, McGuire's article on inducing resistance to persuasion and Howland's classic reconciliation of experimental and survey approaches to the study of attitude change are deemed to be of sufficient general interest to warrant inclusion.

The book's most serious shortcoming is its minimal attention to learning-behavior theories of attitude change. In fact, save for the inclusion of one or two articles, it would have been appropriate to insert the inevitable scholarly colon at the title's end and to have appended a subtitle noting the cognitive theory bias. On the plus side, Wagner and Sherwood's volume, like Rosnow and Robinson's *Experiments in Persuasion*, possesses the virtue of unity. Moreover, the scope of the book permits thorough coverage of its contents in a one-term course in persuasion. On balance, it is a useful addition to the literature.

The last of the five anthologies, Elms' *Role Playing Reward, and Attitude Change* reflects the inevitable outgrowth of constantly increasing specialization in the study of persuasion. All of the 15 articles are concerned with one problem: variables influencing attitude change following an individual's active involvement in counter-attitudinal role-playing. Elms justifies this specialized approach by asserting that "this is an

exciting area of social psychological research. The central issues are not difficult to grasp, and the implications are of broad importance."

For the initiated reader, the controversies are familiar. Beginning with the classic study by Festinger and Carlsmith, the volume captures the continuing debate about the role of justification in inducing attitude change following counterattitudinal role-playing. Both the dissonance theorists—e.g., Cohen and Brehm—and the incentive theorists—e.g., Janis and Gilmore and Elms and Janis—are given their intellectual day in court. In addition, there are articles on the role of relative anonymity and of decision freedom in the process of counterattitudinal advocacy, as well as Bem's familiar interpretation of the process from a self-perception framework.

Obviously, the volume is too narrowly focused for a survey course in behavioral persuasion research. For advanced classes that concentrate on the problem of counterattitudinal role-playing, the book is a valuable instructional asset. Moreover, it effectively demonstrates the theoretical disagreements often accompanying a body of accepted research findings. In all of the articles, the disagreements are not about what is observed, but rather about how to interpret and explain these observations. In fact, skeptical readers may conclude that the book is little more than a scholarly tempest in a teapot: that researchers should be more concerned with their findings and less engrossed with the interpretation of them.

My one general criticism of these five anthologies concerns their redundancy. Three contain some version of McGuire's paper on inducing resistance to persuasion and of Bem's self-perception analysis of the role of justification in counterattitudinal advocacy. Numerous articles are duplicated in at least two of the anthologies. To argue against such repetition is not to detract from the scholarly stature of these popular papers; rather it represents a pragmatic pitch for maximum availability and coverage. Hopefully, forthcoming collections will result in a better balance of academic supply and demand in the attitude change market.

SYNTHESES

The four books categorized as syntheses differ widely in scope and purpose. Two of the titles suggest primary concern with the critical analysis of theories of attitude formation and change, and the fourth emphasizes practical dimensions of the influence process.

While the Insko volume is titled *Theories of Attitude Change*, its author indicates he is at least equally concerned with summarizing the research literature generated by each of the theoretical positions—that a theory-centered organization of the literature was chosen in preference to a problem-centered approach. Following an introductory chapter that probes some of the problems of attitude research methodology, there are 12 chapters dealing with contemporary theories of attitude change. The book concludes with a brief evaluative chapter on the general historical development of attitude theory and research.

The 12 theory chapters have identical organization: first, the essentials of the theory are presented; next, relevant research is summarized; and finally, the theory's current status is evaluated. The chapters cover reinforcement theory, assimilation-contrast (social judgment) theory, adaptation-level theory, logical-affective consistency theory, congruity theory, belief congruence theory, balance theories, affective-cognitive consistency theory, dissonance theory, psychoanalytic theory, inoculation theory, and several type theories.

The book's strongest point is its comprehensive, detailed summary of the research literature; it provides an excellent synthesis of the work through 1965. For instance, the chapter on dissonance theory—granted, it is one of the longest—contains a 75 page research review. Even though McGuire's recent excellent synthesis in the second edition of the *Handbook of Social Psychology* is more current and wide-ranging, Insko's thoroughness is praiseworthy.

A prevailing ponderous, dry style represents the volume's greatest liability; insomniacs will likely discover that it beats counting sheep hollow. This criticism reflects more than the reactions of a cantankerous reviewer, for I have used the book in a graduate course and numerous students have commented on its dullness. Perhaps Insko's awareness of this characteristic led to his remark that "In describing the research it would have been very easy to summarize and comment upon a group of experiments without going into the details of procedures, statistical tests, etc. Indeed many readers may strongly wish such an approach had been taken. *Certainly this would have made the book more entertaining and readable* (italics mine)."

Whether the objective of detail could have been achieved without such a complete sacrifice of lively style is for the reader to decide. Still, in fairness to Insko, my decision to adopt the book reveals that, for me, its strengths exceed its stylistic shortcomings. One caveat: the book should not be assigned to beginning students not only because the detail may prove formidable but also because it is apt to convince them that the study of persuasion is not much fun.

Keisler, Collins, and Miller attribute *Attitude Change* to their conviction that "very little detailed criticism of individual theories or comparison among the several disparate approaches was available." Certainly, their volume makes considerable headway in eliminating his vacuum; in fact, I was uncertain as to whether it should be categorized as a synthesis or an exploratory work. Final consignment to the *Syntheses* section is, at best, an arbitrary judgment.

The book opens with chapters on the concept and measurement of attitude change. The authors next turn to detailed discussions of stimulus-response and behavioristic theories, consistency theories, dissonance theory, social judgment theory, and functional theories. Although the literature summaries are not as comprehensive as those of Insko, *Attitude Change* is eminently more readable. At times, the book

wanders organizationally; for instance, although the authors offer a lame excuse for its inclusion, the summary of Campbell's paper on acquired behavioral disposition seems out-of-place. Perhaps his position as one of the volume's two patron saints best explains this organizational decision.

One other negative reaction is worth noting. Several of the authors' statements reveal a tendency to conceive of the behavioral study of persuasions as mysticism, rather than science. Consider, for instance, this assertion, which I found particularly perplexing: "Since there is often more to a theory than is publicly recorded, an experimenter 'trained' in a theoretical tradition is probably more likely to replicate than an investigator who must rely on publicly recorded versions of the theory" (p. 7). For my money, this strange view of science—which, unfortunately, seems to be in vogue among disciples of certain research positions—is poor stuff for fledgling persuasion researchers to consume. What "more" is there to a scientific theory than its publicly specified primitives, constructs, logical operators, formal relationships, and bridging principles? Is the invariateness of a scientific law dependent on a particular scientist's intellectual alma mater? Must I have studied with Galileo to replicate his experiments on inclined planes? Obviously, by all rational definitions of science, the answers to these questions are negative. The beauty of scientific method lies in its publicness and reproducibility. If certain experiments fail to meet these criteria, their scholarly advocates should subject them to re-examination, instead of invoking mystical, extra-empirical defenses.

Still, this occasional tendency to rely on nonscientific rebuttal is more than offset by the excellent research summaries and thoughtful criticism accompanying the discussion of the various theories of attitude change. Teachers of advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate courses in persuasion should welcome the addition of *Attitude Change* to the available literature.

Halloran's *Attitude Formation and Change*, written under the auspices of a British Television Research Committee is one of a series of papers investigating "the extent to which the developing techniques of research of the social sciences can be used to examine the influence of television on the formation or altering of attitudes and moral concepts" (p. 7). The book rudimentarily treats such topics as the study of attitudes, their nature, their formation, their functions, and variables influencing attitude change. Numerous landmark studies are cited, and there is a useful appendix by Jahoda acquainting the consumer of research with the steps involved in formulating and investigating a research problem. The volume is neither comprehensive nor current enough for an advanced class, but it could be used in an introductory course.

The final synthetic work, Zimbardo and Ebbesen's *Influencing Attitudes and Changing Behavior*, is unique because of its emphasis on the research utilizer: the communication practitioner whose task is to apply the results of behavioral persuasion research to solving policy questions and developing communication strategies. This does not imply that the

book is of no value to potential researchers, for the authors describe their twofold purpose as follows: "to turn the reader on to the potential value and excitement inherent in the study of attitude change, and to provide the serious student with a primer which may be an impetus to further academic study."

The first five sections of the book closely parallel numerous other volumes reviewed above. The first section discusses approaches to posing problems in attitude and behavior modification, the second deals with available resources for answering these questions, the third examines the experiment as a possible source of information, the fourth provides a framework for critically analyzing attitude research, and the fifth discusses the role of theory in attitude research. In all cases, the material is readable and interesting.

It is primarily in Section 6, "Focusing upon Practical Applications of Principles of Attitude and Behavior Change," that the volume makes its unique contribution. Specific practical problems are posed, and the application of research knowledge to problem solution is then illustrated. For example, a case situation with the intriguing title, "When It's April in Uruguay, Only Science Sells Curtains," first details some of the sales problems faced by an upholstery firm in Montevideo, problems stemming from a conflict between the firm's preferred selling policies and purchasing habits of Montevideo's residents. The next several pages are devoted to a cogent analysis of strategies available to the company, with emphasis placed on the centrality of attitude research in strategy formulation. Repetition of this approach across several case situations convincingly illustrates that research can contribute to the solution of "real world" problems, if ingenuity is used in applying results to these problems.

The book concludes with four *Postscripts*, the most valuable of which details a method for outlining experiments. The interesting mixture of scholarly material and application procedures results in a book of potential utility in a variety of classes ranging from beginning courses for individuals primarily concerned with knowledge utilization. The authors have achieved a balanced, interesting approach.

Taken together, the four synthetic works reviewed provoke several generalizations. First, the interested reader is likely to be impressed by the number of studies conducted in the last 30 years. Moreover, as the volumes ably document, there is no shortage of competing theoretical positions; persuasive outcomes can be explained in various ways. Still, with all the sound and fury, there remains the uncomfortable feeling that we are not very confident about many of our findings and that the parts have yet to be fitted into a satisfactory whole. Perhaps the synthetic volume of a decade hence, buttressed by the kinds of exploratory ventures reviewed in the section below, will assuage this discomfort. Or on the other hand, since the behavioral study of persuasion is an ongoing process, such uncertainty may be a healthy omen.

EXPLORATORY WORKS

The works reviewed above paint a backdrop picturing where the behavioral study of persuasion has been; the volumes reviewed below provide a glimpse of where it is going. Of course, not all of the material found in the five exploratory works is new or revolutionary; obviously, any faltering steps forward must proceed from the groundwork of past accomplishments. Still, numerous fresh insights are contained in these books; insights that may serve as intellectual signposts for behavioral persuasion scholars of the 1970's.

The Greenwald, Brock, and Ostrom volume, *Psychological Foundations of Attitudes*, emerged partially as a reaction to the recent scholarly dominance of consistency theories. The editors assert that "While the cognitive consistency principle has done the valuable service of attracting much attention to the psychological study of attitudes, at the same time this attention has tended to obscure a number of important attitude-theoretical developments that do not make references to the consistency principle."

The book has four major sections: an historical introduction to the development of attitude theory, a section on the contributions of learning-behavior theories to attitude theory, a section on the contributions of cognitive integration theories, and a concluding section dealing with definition of the *attitude* construction. The contributors to the theory chapters interlace explication of the major theoretical propositions with summaries of prior relevant research and suggestions for future inquiry.

Each reader's theoretical biases will dictate his chapter preferences. In the realm of learning-behavior theories, I found the chapters by Staats and by McGuire particularly interesting: the former describes some inhomogeneous [sic] applications of Hull-Spence learning theory to attitude research, and the later represents an impressive effort to introduce the *systems* concept to the study of attitudes. In the cognitive integration section, Brock's chapter on the implications of commodity theory for value change and Baron's functional analysis of attitude change following counterattitudinal advocacy struck me as especially provocative.

The volume provides a lively stimulus for persuasion researchers and is likely to determine many future empirical thrusts. Instructors of advanced courses who want their students to be on the frontiers of attitude theorizing should read the volume carefully, for there is much to both stimulate and excite.

Two selections deal with the contributions of the Sherifs to attitude theory and research. The first, Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall's *Attitude and Attitude Change* explicates the social judgment theory of attitude change and reports previously unpublished research bearing on the theory. The chapter headings convey the basic dimensions of, and the critical variables associated with, the social judgment theory. Following a general introduction, there are chapters on latitudes of acceptance and

rejection, ego-involved judgmental priorities, evaluation based on own categories, assimilation and contrast, and the frame of reference for attitude change. The volume concludes with a summary statement about the theory's contemporary status and its relevance to attitude change research.

Attitude, Ego-Involvement, and Change, edited by Sherif and Sherif, contains 13 original papers, four of which are primarily concerned with the social judgment theory of attitude change. The Sherifs present a restatement of the theory, along with some relevant research findings; Triab reports the results of a study comparing social judgment-involvement and semantic differential measurement procedures; Whitaker provides further data on the relevance of social judgment theory to the issue of communicator-communicatee attitude discrepancy, and Bieri examines the relationship between latitude of acceptance—a key construct in the Sherifs' theory—and affective arousal. In addition, there are interesting papers on such topics as attitude formation in children, conceptual systems and attitude change, the components of interpersonal attitudes, and political attitudes of emerging nations.

Those familiar with the Sherifs' writings know that their style is lively and their ideas controversial. Ringing loudly throughout both volumes is a plea for the importance of ego-involvement: for recognizing that in everyday human affairs, certain attitudes are more central and important than others. While a WCTU member may favor both prohibition and ratification of a fishing treaty between the United States and Canada, she is likely to respond differently to communications arguing against implementation of the two policies. If this fact is not recognized, and if researchers concern themselves only with her attitudes toward fishing treaties, the danger exists, as Nebergall has suggested, that we will develop theories of communication dealing only with trivial issues.

Their concern for relevance and importance is doubly manifested in the Sherifs' research: First, they conduct studies on highly ego-involved issues; and second, they rely heavily on field, rather than laboratory experimentation. These procedural preferences led to their 1960 field studies of the presidential election, studies sampling from strongly committed Democrats and Republicans. This research, reported in Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, convincingly illustrates the significance of ego-involvement in determining latitudes of acceptance, noncommitment, and rejection for incoming persuasive communications.

To be sure, others have offered criticisms of the method used to measure ego-involvement. Still, the Sherifs have unquestionably put their fingers on an important variable, one that will command much attention in future research. All serious students of persuasion should read these two volumes, for they underscore a dimension of the attitude change problem not widely recognized in other selections.

Rokeach's *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values* is reviewed in this section with some trepidation, since the volume consists mostly of previously

published papers. Included are chapters on the organization and modification of beliefs, experimental analysis of the organization of belief systems, the effects of race versus shared beliefs in determining social choice, the comparative predictive power of the belief congruence and congruity models, the nature of attitudes, attitude change and behavioral change, and organization and change within value-attitude systems. Finally, there are two appendices: one applying some of the theoretical material to advertising communications and the second exploring some paradoxes of religious belief.

In Chapter 7, Rokeach argues that *value* should replace *attitude* as the central construct for persuasion researchers. This departure from tradition is primarily responsible for my decision to define the book as an exploratory work. Rokeach presents three reasons for his proposed change: First, value is a more dynamic concept than attitude; second, value psychologically encompasses attitude; it is a determinant of both attitude and behavior; and third, since people have fewer values than attitudes, value is a more economical theoretical construct. Rokeach goes on to state that emphasizing values would reduce concern with problems of *persuasion* and heighten interest in problems of *education*.

Whether Rokeach's elevation of the value construct to primary importance marks a significant breakthrough in persuasion research remains to be seen. Certainly, many readers may agree with him that the attitude construct has produced a scientific dead-end, that it is of limited fertility. Other more cautious readers may hold that intellectual infancy, rather than construct inadequacy, best explains the paucity of knowledge about persuasion. Or Rokeach may be over-optimistic, for the same problems plaguing attitude researchers may rear their ugly heads for the value researcher. Whatever one's position on the intellectual issues, his proposed reorientation will likely have practical implications for future persuasion research. Interested students should, therefore, be conversant with his position.

The final book reviewed, Bem's *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, also defies clear categorization. Although much of the volume's material is synthetic, numerous extended examples both suggest avenues for future research, and as Bem puts it, "make it (the book) unmistakably a personal essay." For instance, a paper—not surprisingly it is coauthored by Bem's wife—"Case Study of a Nonconscious Ideology: Training the Woman to Know Her Place," provides grist for persuasion researchers and the Women's Liberation Front alike. Likewise, the brief discussion of the relevance of determinism to the political preferences of behavioral scientists, while not novel, struck me as both insightful and interesting.

Bem's lively and often humorous style ensure the book's popularity in undergraduate courses in persuasion. But hidden among the colorful adjectives and the amusing quips are many suggestions for potentially fruitful research lines. As a result, more sophisticated readers should also examine the volume carefully.

Lacking omniscience, I cannot predict which, if any, of the five exploratory works will capture the imagination of tomorrow's persuasion researchers or furnish the impetus for major scientific accomplishments. One thing is certain: opportunities for exploration and accomplishment are there for ambitious scholars of persuasion to seize. Hopefully, the books reviewed above will provide them with some of the conceptual, methodological, and empirical tools necessary to expand the frontiers of knowledge about the persuasion process—a process central to man's continued existence and betterment.

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A MODEL OF COMMUNICATION EFFECTIVENESS*

BY A. EDWARD FOOTE

An effort to develop a mathematical model of interpersonal and mass media communication effectiveness is described.

Since Shannon and Weaver's [1] introduction of a mathematical theory of communication two decades ago, many speech and communication theorists have acknowledged that it would be beneficial to be able to relate quantitatively the factors that compose the communication process. However, the absence of any simple mathematical model of interpersonal and mass media communication effectiveness is not surprising. Most speech and communication theorists shy away from any commitment to a rigid, quantitative approach to an area with so many nebulous variables; nevertheless, several have hesitatingly explored the applications of such a model. For example, Harrah [2] made a definite contribution with his model, which is based primarily on mathematical set theory, and Cherry [3], Osgood [4], Stephenson [5], and others have recognized the desirability of measurement and quantification of some of the variables that are the determinants of effectiveness.

But a simple mathematical model, which could improve the understanding and prediction of communication effectiveness, has seemed to elude most scholars in the field. Abelson [6] probably provides the best quantitative insight into the relationships among message determinants of effectiveness in a computer simulation model, but even he does not present a symbolic representation of effectiveness. Although Abelson does not develop a desirable codification for effectiveness, his propositions help clarify the direct and inverse mathematical variations. For example, he makes these axiomatic statements:

Individual *i* will be more apt to accept assertions made by *s* (sender) the more favorable *i*'s attitude toward *s* and the higher *i*'s receptivity to *s*.

An assertion is especially apt to be accepted by *i* if it is consistent with his predisposition toward that assertion, and under no circumstances will be accepted if it runs counter to his predisposition.

An assertion is less apt to be accepted by *i* if it is inconsistent with his position on the issue.

When *i*'s attitude toward *s* is negative and his receptivity to *s* is very low, assertions made by *s* not previously encountered by *i* and not consistent with his position will tend to promote acceptance by *i* of converse assertions.

The direction of such attitude position change is toward *s* if *i*'s attitude toward *s* was initially positive, and away from *s* if *i*'s attitude toward *s* was initially negative; the degree of such change is a direct function of the difference between the positions of *i* and *s* [6].


*Excerpts from "A Model of Communication Effectiveness," *The Journal of Communication*, XX (March 1970), pp. 81-91. Reprinted with the permission of *The Journal of Communication*, copyright holder and the courtesy of the author.

In transferring the dependent and independent variables into information processing language Abelson has attempted to satisfy four desiderata:

- (1) Influence will be successful (i.e., new assertions will be accepted) under a fairly wide range of conditions, particularly when the influencee has a mild position on the issue but is sufficiently interested to have exposed himself to ... stimuli.
- (2) However, there are definite resistances to influence, particularly when the influencee has a strong position on the issue and, or a negative attitude toward the communicator.
- (3) If resistances are very strong, there may be a "boomerang effect" whereby the influencee accepts new assertions opposite to those intended and a new position farther away from that of the communicator.
- (4) However, there is some way of influencing almost everybody to some degree [6].

These four criteria and the 49 axiomatic statements were freely consulted in designing the theoretical framework of the proposed model, which mathematically relates the variables of the communication process, including the amount of information, the sender and receiver's places in the social-psychological system both real and perceived, and the effectiveness of the message, in a simple straightforward manner.

The communication represented in the model is restricted to a persuasive message, and the destination of the message must be an individual instead of a machine. A horizontal line, designated AB and composed of many sub-continua, is used to signify the master continuum on which every person finds himself in relationship to all other people. For example, a sub-continuum a_1, b_1 might be considered as the limits of all political positions in this country from "far left" to "far right." Each individual can be placed somewhere on a_1, b_1 relative to all others in the population. The political spectrum can then be represented like this:




In every case, a person's position on this hypothetical scale is determined by his socioeconomic status, group memberships, heredity, and all the experiences that go to make each one of us different. If an individual's position relative to others can be placed on a hypothetical scale for politics, it can be placed on a hypothetical scale that stands for degrees of differences from "far left" to "far right" for each possible existing variation affecting our relationship with others. The summation of all these hypothetical scales, each weighted according to its importance in influencing the real position of the receiver, is the continuum AB, which can be stated symbolically as:

$$AB = f_1(a_1, b_1) + f_2(a_2, b_2) + \dots + f_n(a_n, b_n).$$


A prospective receiver's position on this line is not static, because the

individual is in a constant state of readjustment of his position. Many of these changes are so minute that they are quite immeasurable with existing methodology. The forces, which must assume a state of equilibrium with respect to the AB component, determine an individual's location on the continuum and are signified by $R_1, R_2, R_3, \dots R_n$. When a state of imbalance exists the receiver will readjust his position until the AB component reaches required equilibrium. Generally speaking, this portion of the model is in agreement with the tradition of the "balance" theorists, including Heider [7], Newcomb [8], and Festinger [9].



The sender's position on the AB continuum is at a point where it is perceived by the receiver. The subject of the message, and in turn the content used to support it, may be two of the strongest influences determining the social and psychological distance, as perceived by Q. Other variables, including the speaker's introduction, his ethos, personality, etc., influence the distance between the real position of the receiver and the perceived position of the sender significantly.

In addition to the horizontal component, each of the forces has a vertical component whose total CD is defined as Q's predispositions on some subject J_k .




As a result of forces $R_1, R_2, R_3, \dots R_n$, there will be predispositions, the CD component, either in the positive direction, in the negative direction, not at all, or in both directions. In reality a CD component probably will not exist for each and every force, since the CD component is present only when the force R_i affects an individual's predispositions on subject J_k . For example, membership in a car pool may have absolutely no effect on religious predispositions, and yet, this same membership may have great effect on political predispositions, depending on the topics of discus-

sion, other group memberships, and a finite number of other variables.

From the model it becomes clear that predispositions are completely independent of the social and psychological distance, because prior attitudes can only be determined by the real position of the receiver, a resultant of the R_n forces. In other words, predispositions are not altered in intensity by the perceived s-p distance from the sender. Since receiver Q cannot move in the CD direction, neither are the predispositions toward subject J_k of opposite signs necessarily equal. Assume that two individuals are located on the scale AB with S the sender and Q the receiver, keeping in mind that the position of S is important only as perceived by Q. Then, assigning the letter Y as the difference on the continuum between the receiver and the perceived position of the sender, the formula becomes:

$$Y = Q - S.$$

Also let us assume that a message of magnitude M is sent by the sender S and received by Q.



This message is either reinforced or depreciated by the resultant of the positive and negative predispositions, and therefore,

$$X = M + P_1 + P_2.$$

P_1 and P_2 are the magnitudes of the positive and negative predispositions.


The positive direction is selected as being in the direction of the intended effect as preceived by the sender. For example, if the sender is attempting to gain votes against a proposed ordinance, the direction remains positive so long as that is the direction of the effect intended by the sender. Likewise, negative dispositions refer to those predispositions whose force is in the direction opposite to the intended effect of the message.

Now, with the relationships among message, predispositions and the sender's perceived location on the continuum defined, it is easy enough to define the effectiveness of the communication M. This effectiveness is the ratio

$$\frac{X}{Y}$$

Since mathematically, $\tan \theta = (X/Y)$ and $\theta = \text{Arctan } (X/Y)$, the degree of effectiveness of a communication is defined as the number of degrees in the angle θ , and the angle θ is referred to as the *Angle of Effect*. The size of the angle results directly from combining quantitatively the factors generally accepted as influencing the effect of the message.

The model can best be represented in this form:



WHERE

- AB = continuum
- S = sender
- Q = receiver
- θ = angle of effectiveness
- P_1 = predisposition in positive direction
- P_2 = predisposition in negative direction
- X = message plus predispositions
- Y = difference in S and Q on the continuum
- CD = vertical coordinate


NOT SHOWN:

- R_n = forces (see text)
- M = message
- J_k = subject of message

From the model, it immediately becomes apparent why messages directed to other cultures often have little effect. In such cases, the difference between S and Q on the scale AB approaches or may even reach infinity, and regardless of the magnitude of the message M, the communication cannot be effective, since θ approaches 0 as Y approaches infinity. What happens to the effectiveness of the same message on two different receivers, Q_1 and Q_2 ? If Q_1 is located close to the sender on the hypothetical scale AB, and Q_2 is located far away from the sender, the same message will have much greater effect on Q_1 , even when both have equal predispositions. Being dependent on the magnitude of the predispositions, a message will often have a total negative rather than a positive effect. Since

$$X = M + P_1 + P_2,$$

X will take a negative sign and θ will become negative when the magnitude of P_2 is greater than $M + P_1$, resulting in a "boomerang" effect. With an inverse relationship between social-psychological distance and the negative or "boomerang" effect, the size of the angle becomes the number of degrees in the complement angle ($90^\circ - \theta$) and takes a negative



If the message has an effect opposite to that intended by the sender, then the greater the social and psychological distance, the greater will be the *Angle of effect*. A message is incorporated as a force R_n from the sender's beginning assertions; therefore, in addition to its attitude changing strength, the message has a strong influence on the social-psychological distance. With the receiver in constant readjustment of his position and re-evaluation of the s-p distance from the sender, the early portions of a message may well increase this distance and directly reduce its overall effectiveness, or indeed the opposite may occur.

The introduction of this model raises many interesting questions: What units of measurement must be used if the proposed formulae are to be algebraically manipulated? Do overt and covert effect ranges overlap? At what angle does the effect become behavioral? The significance of the model lies in its apparent usefulness for predicting communication effectiveness. Theorists have developed many valid models, but the concept of an *Angle of Effect* is new to communication theory. Obviously the concept is useful in reaching a total Theory of Communication Effectiveness, which can only come after additional discussion.

A model that attempts to relate so many variables in a rigid, mathematical way cannot be completely free of weaknesses and errors; therefore, criticisms are justified. However, with an "anchor point" established, a more refined mathematical model can now evolve, where previously the prospects were limited at best.

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THE MEASUREMENT OF SPEAKER CREDIBILITY*

By R. BARRY FULTON

The author contends that the credibility dimensions of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and culture are positively and significantly related to an independent measure of the attractiveness of a public speaker who is judged only by those overt cues which the listener perceives during the speech act.

Trustworthiness and expertness, the two factors of credibility suggested in 1953 by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley,¹ have been identified more recently in factor analytic studies reported by McCroskey² and by Bowers and Phillips.³ Nevertheless, there are those who insist that this representation of credibility doesn't capture the full complexity of the phenomenon. For example, in a study conducted by Schweitzer and Ginsburg, 28 different factors emerged in the rotated factor matrix for the low-credibility condition, accounting for 74 percent of the variance; under the high-credibility condition, 27 factors accounted for only 60 percent of the variance.⁴ Although Schweitzer and Ginsburg reasonably conclude from this interpretation of their data that the factors of trustworthiness and expertness do not adequately represent the complexity of the concept "credibility," their analysis does little to explicate the underlying relationship.

Lying between the reported extremes are a number of factor analytic studies which appear to systematically represent a greater portion of the complexity involved in a judgment of credibility. Berlo and Lemert reported a factor analysis study in which three dimensions were found: trustworthiness, competence, and dynamism⁵. In addition to these three factors, Whitehead has found a fourth major factor: objectivity.⁶ Norman and his associates have identified five factors in a series of studies which have served as the basis for the research reported here. These five factors along with the scale items used in their measurement are compared in Table 1 to factors found in two of the other studies mentioned above.

The genesis of the dimensions which emerge from any factor analytic study is not an unimportant consideration in their acceptance, for no factor analysis can extract factors which were not represented in the original scale items. The Norman scale items had their origin in Allport and Odbert's search for personality traits in a standard dictionary; in 1936 they reported finding some 18,000 terms. From the 4,504 terms which

* Excerpts from "The Measurement of Speaker Credibility," *The Journal of Communication*, XX (September 1970), pp. 270-279. Reprinted with the permission of *The Journal of Communication*, copyright holder.

Allport described as the "real" traits of personality, Cattell selected 171 terms to represent synonym groups. By means of cluster analysis, Cattell further reduced his number of 36 bipolar pairs from which he has reported finding 12 stable personality factors. Analyses by other researchers have revealed as few as five recurrent factors.⁷

Norman used four scales from each of the five dimensions in a number of studies in which subjects nominated one-third of the members of some peer group on Pole "A" and one-third on Pole "B" of each scale. A varimax rotation of a factor analysis of the data revealed, as hypothesized, five orthogonal personality factors.⁸ In a later study by Passini and Norman, the same five factors emerged with subjects whose contact was limited to being together for less than 15 minutes without opportunity for verbal communications.⁹

Table 1

A Comparison of Hypothesized Dimensions of Credibility

BERLO-LEMERT	NORMAN	McCROSKEY
Trustworthiness	Conscientiousness	Character
Just-unjust	Responsible-undependable	
Kind-cruel	Scrupulous-unscrupulous	Honest-dishonest
Admirable-contemptible	Persevering-quitting,	Virtuous-sinful
Honest-dishonest	fickle	Unselfish-selfish
	Fussy, tidy-careless	Friendly-unfriendly
		Nice-awful
	Agreeableness	Pleasant-unpleasant
	Good-natured-irritable	
	Not jealous-jealous	
	Mild-headstrong	
	Cooperative-negativistic	
Competence	Culture	Authoritativeness
Experienced-inexperienced	Intellectual-unreflective,	Qualified-unqualified
Expert-ignorant	narrow	Expert-inexpert
Trained-untrained	Polished, refined-crude,	Informed-uninformed
Competent-incompetent	boorish	Valuable-worthless
	Imaginative-simple, direct	Intelligent-unintelligent
	Artistically sensitive-	Reliable-unreliable
	artistically insensitive	
Dynamism	Extroversion	
	Talkative-silent	
Aggressive-meek	Frank, open-secretive	
Bold-timid	Adventurous-cautious	
Energetic-tired	Sociable-reclusive	
Extroverted-introverted	Emotional	
	Stability	
	Poised-nervous, tense	
	Calm-anxious	
	Composed-excitabile	
	Non-hypochondriacal-	
	hypochondriacal	

A follow-up analysis by Norman and Goldberg revealed that, even with this minimal contact among subjects, there was some degree of rater relevance in the choice of scale items. Their explanation for this relevance is based on what Cronbach has termed an "implicit personality theory":

If, for example, it were generally held within the implicit personality theories of these raters that persons who are *irresponsible* and *undependable* are also *careless*, *unscrupulous*, *fickle*, and *slovenly* and if the shared stereotype of the person who is *careless* and *slovenly* included aspects of dress and grooming, then a rater who gave such an appearance in this setting was, in the absence of more specifically relevant information, apt to be rated as possessing all traits in the set.¹⁰

If the five factors of personality reported by Norman and associates are accepted, it follows that these same factors might operate as underlying dimensions of credibility during the speech act; this proposition is explored in this article.

EXPERIMENT I

Through an analysis of the literature on interpersonal attraction an attempt was made to identify those *credibility cues* which might serve as indicators to a respondent of some set of underlying *credibility dimensions*.¹¹ The suggested pairing follows:

<i>Credibility Dimension</i>	<i>Credibility Cue</i>
Agreeableness	Disposition, Manner
Conscientiousness	Dress, Physical bearing
Culture	Language
Extroversion	Body type, Delivery
Emotional stability	Delivery

Method

Two speakers, undergraduates chosen for their speaking and acting abilities, were trained to represent opposite poles of the five dimensions by speaking and behaving in such a way as to provide for their listeners the cues suggested above. Each of 246 undergraduate subjects heard one of the two speakers deliver (in person) an eight-minute persuasive speech prepared by the experimenter.

The abbreviated scale labels for the 20 items used in the Norman studies were used as labels for opposite ends of 20 semantic differential-type scales. By assigning values of one through seven for each of the responses by subjects and summing for each of the five dimensions, responses to the two speakers could be compared. Subjects also responded to the following two scales. "I feel that I would probably like this person very much" vs. "I feel that I would probably dislike this person very much," and "I believe that I would very much enjoy working with this person in an experiment" vs. "I believe that I would very much dislike working with this person in an experiment."¹² These poles were placed at opposite ends of semantic differential-type scales; responses were scored by assigning values of one through seven and summing as a measure of *attraction*.

Results and Discussion

For each of the dimensions except *agreeableness*, the two groups of subjects differ significantly on their responses to the two speakers. Likewise, the speakers were judged to be significantly different on the measure of *attraction*. The results are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2
Mean Ratings of Attraction and Five Dimensions of Credibility
for Positive (P) and Negative (N) Speakers

Condition	N	Mean	S D	t
Attraction				
P	119	9.41	2.37	5.37*
N	127	7.84	2.21	
Agreeableness				
P	119	17.97	3.05	0.88
N	127	17.65	2.70	
Conscientiousness				
P	119	20.41	2.67	11.93*
N	127	15.91	3.20	
Culture				
P	119	20.09	3.06	11.84*
N	127	14.76	3.92	
Extroversion				
P	119	18.39	3.35	5.19*
N	127	15.92	4.07	
Emotional Stability				
P	119	21.19	3.29	7.15*
N	127	17.87	3.93	

* $p < .01$, one-tailed t test.

A multiple correlation analysis was conducted using *attraction* as the dependent variable and five credibility dimensions as independent variables. The following relationship was found to be significant at the .01 level ($F = 4.48$, $df = 3/242$) with a multiple correlation coefficient of .65.

$$\text{Attraction} = .29 \text{ Agreeableness} + .10 \text{ Conscientiousness} \\ + .20 \text{ Culture} - 1.68$$

A second multiple correlation program was run in which the five dimensions of credibility, their inverse, their natural logs, and all pairwise multiples were used as independent variables. The following relationship was also significant at the .01 level ($F = 5.46$, $df = 2/243$); once again, the multiple correlation coefficient was .65.

$$\text{Attraction} = .01 \text{ Agreeableness (Culture} + \\ \frac{1}{2} \text{ Conscientiousness)} + 3.46$$

As both of the equations account for the same amount of variance, the choice between them is rather arbitrary. While the first is simpler be-

cause it expresses a linear relationship, the latter is more interesting simply because *agreeableness* appears as a multiplier of the two factors most often cited in the literature on credibility: *competence* and *trustworthiness* (or, as here labeled, *culture* and *conscientiousness*).

It is shown in this analysis that three of the five credibility dimensions are positively and significantly related to an independent measure of the attractiveness of a public speaker who is judged only by those overt cues which the listener perceives during the speech act. One's assessment of interpersonal attraction will change as more information becomes available; this information will in turn interact with existing judgments to modify or reinforce the evaluation of *agreeableness*, *conscientiousness*, and *culture*. Since those additional variables which contribute to attraction (e.g., shared attitudes, propinquity) may be assumed to have been constant among groups in the experimental study, the dependent variable in the equations above is more properly identified as *credibility*, a subset of *attraction*. The following study is an attempt to substantiate the validity of this relationship.

EXPERIMENT II

Using the findings of the previous analysis, a second study was directed at examining the credibility of the seven leading Presidential candidates (November 1967) in terms of the three dimensions which were found to be significantly related to attraction.

Method

As the study described here was used to illustrate and partially validate the means of measurement described above rather than to provide a comprehensive assessment of the credibility of the various candidates, no effort was made to select a sample of some voting population. Instead, 126 undergraduates at the University of Illinois were asked to judge one of the seven men on the 12 scales which represent the three dimensions which were being studied. In addition, each subject was asked to rank the seven candidates in order of his preference for President in 1968. The sample included 59 Republicans, 42 Democrats, and 25 who were Independents or expressed no political preference. In order to balance the analysis, the responses of 17 Republican subjects were randomly discarded; there remained an equal number of Republicans and Democrats in the sample. Responses were made between November 13-21, 1967.

Results and Discussion

The mean ratings for the seven candidates on each of the three dimensions of credibility are represented graphically in Figure 1; each of the dimension evaluations has been normalized to fall within a range of -3 to +3. (The numbers in Figure 1 designate the various candidates by rank order of credibility, represented above in Table 3).

For each of the candidates, the mean ratings on each of the dimensions were used in the following equation to arrive at a quantitative measure of credibility:

$$\text{Credibility} = .01 \text{ Agreeableness (Culture} + \frac{1}{2} \text{ Conscientiousness)} + 3.5$$

The scores for the seven candidates appear in rank order in Table 3.




Figure 1
The Positions of Seven Presidential Candidates on Three Dimensions of Credibility

Table 3
Credibility Scores Calculated by Multiple Regression Equation

Rank	Candidate	Score
1	Percy	10.16
2	Reagan	8.94
3	Kennedy	8.72
4	Rockefeller	8.61
5	Romney	8.38
6	Nixon	8.29
7	Johnson	7.22

A comparison of the rank orders of the credibility scores and the Presidential preference scores revealed a significant ($p < .05$) Spearman correlation of .38. Although this empirical relation may partially validate the methodology, more convincing is a subjective examination of Table 3 and Figure 1. The reader will probably find the results intuitively reasonable for a November 1967 sample of midwestern undergraduates. Because of the insufficiency of the sample in regard to actual voters, a systematic comparison of these findings with nationwide popularity polls could contribute little to the argument being made here.

CONCLUSIONS

Five personality factors were suggested as underlying dimensions of credibility. Three of these dimensions were found to be significantly related to attraction in an experimental study in which two speakers had been trained to represent the opposite poles of the five hypothesized dimensions. The resulting relationship, expressed as a nonlinear regression equation, was used to assess the credibility of the seven leading Presidential candidates among a sample of University of Illinois undergraduates in November, 1967. The analysis was not meant to represent a particular voter group, but instead to illustrate and partially validate the three dimensions—*agreeableness*, *conscientiousness*, and *culture*—and their relationship to *credibility*. While it seems reasonable to suggest that the same three dimensions may be applicable to the study of credibility and interpersonal attraction within a given culture, it seems just as reasonable that the relationship among these dimensions may differ significantly among different subcultures. Nevertheless, a framework is suggested here for the study of credibility and interpersonal attraction which could serve as a basis for theoretical description and further empirical study.

That the dimension of *agreeableness* is significantly related to *credibility* seems to be of some significance in a field of study which has essentially ignored this nonrational dimension. Indeed, without this dimension it becomes impossible to explain the charismatic appeal of some speakers. In summary, the isolation here of three dimensions of credibility provides empirical support for the three constituents of *ethos* suggested by Aristotle: "As for the speakers themselves, the sources of our trust in them are there, for apart from the arguments there are three things that gain our belief, namely, intelligence, character, and good will."¹³

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CHAPTER VIII

MEDIA, METHODS, AND TECHNIQUES

INTRODUCTION

After policy objectives and operational goals have been established (see Chapter VI) and at least part of the intelligence requirements have been met (see Chapter VII), difficult decisions about media, methods, and techniques need to be made. These decisions must in large part focus on at least three areas of concern: (1) the selection of the audience; (2) message composition—that is, the preparation, development, and production of the message; and (3) the channels of communication.

Operationally, to achieve a predetermined purpose, the communicator selects a target toward which to direct the message. He develops a theme and writes a message. He then decides on one or more appropriate channels through which to deliver the message, adapting the channels and selecting the time of delivery according to the particular characteristics of the target. Because there are no predetermined intellectual formulas in the preparation and delivery of a PSYOP message or appeal, all of these areas of concern must be carefully considered in each situation faced by the planner. Decisions should be supported by previous experience, but the last two decades have shown clearly that a message or appeal that was highly effective with one target group may not work as well with another. An effective message or appeal communicated by radio may be totally ineffective when communicated by other means. A message or appeal may be more effective with a certain target group when delivered to coincide with a religious or political event, or at a certain time of day or year. When few ordinary channels seem appropriate, the innovative PSYOP planner may fall back on improvised programs or devices, some of which are risky, but may, under the right circumstances, prove effective.

Audience Selection

Broadly speaking, psychological operations is an attempt to influence opinions, attitudes, emotions, and behavior; and in very simple terms, the target or audience is the individual or group of individuals whose attitudes or actions the psyoperator wishes to influence.

The target of psychological operations may encompass an entire society, or it may be made up of a very small and select group of individuals. As part of the total process of planning a PSYOP campaign, the communicator first decides on what changes need to be produced to accomplish the objectives of the campaign. Then he decides which audience in the larger population should be reached and influenced to produce such change, and whether to appeal directly to the target group or through existing channels such as prestigious persons or key communicators.

Because the audience is the key to the desired change, it becomes quite evident that target selection based on a sound understanding of how individuals within the target group think and behave under certain conditions is a critical aspect of PSYOP.

Certain factors in communication related to the psychological and physical set of the population positively or negatively predispose the receptivity of target groups to specific kinds of messages. For example, reference groups play a particularly important role in establishing the delivery circumstances of a PSYOP campaign. Membership in a group requires some commitment on the part of the members, and the success of a psyoperator in drawing an individual away from his group will depend heavily on the kinds of pressures exerted by the group on its individual members. Commitment may be lessened by environmental conditions. In this connection, we have learned from post-World War II experience that the drudgery of jungle warfare in an intolerable conflict situation, where the health and well-being of individuals are threatened, may render them malleable to outside inducements to give up, no matter how highly committed they were previously.

Timing is also an important consideration in the planning of psychological operations. Time of day, time of year—along with the physical and social setting—all contribute in some way to the receptivity of the target group and thus to the success or failure of the campaign.

A proper balancing of these and other factors will depend in large part on the psyoperator's knowledge of the target population. He is not only responsible for determining which group to direct the message or appeal to, but also the most propitious time for doing so.

Message Composition

When planning a PSYOP campaign, a message must be designed to stimulate the desired change in attitudes, opinion, or behavior. Depending on which channel is selected, the message will be composed of spoken or printed words, pictures, sounds, or acts, or a combination of these and perhaps other devices used in PSYOP.

Whatever the techniques used, however, the message or appeal must perform three tasks: it must find, attract the attention of, and be received by, the selected target population; it must be simple enough so that its meaning is understood by the target population; and it must provide enough stimulus to get the target population thinking or behaving in the preplanned direction.

To achieve all of this, the PSYOP planner must give attention to some important factors. Care should be taken with language, where a minor blunder may destroy a well-planned campaign. The planner must pay attention to content so that the message is culturally acceptable, geared to the needs of the reader, balanced in logic and emotion, mainly positive in approach, and consistent with past and future communications. He must attend to style, presentation, and tone so that the message will gain

the respect of the target audience and the planner will gain credibility as a source of information. And finally, the PSYOP planner must have some method of pretesting his messages so that he can determine in advance what effect they will have on the target population. He can do this through area experts, surveys of persons similar to the target population, or use of enemy sources such as defectors and POWs.

Exploitation of Channels of Communication

At the same time, the psyoperator must select the means through which his message or appeal will be conveyed to the target group. Essentially, he must adapt the media to the audience (targeting). Because the target group is the key to the desired change, the media should be selected to suit the target group. Two primary factors limit the range of media choice: the ability of the target group to receive and understand the message and the availability of facilities. In this sense media choice is situationally influenced. The ingenuity of the PSYOP planner in devising unorthodox methods for unusual circumstances may reduce the external controls on media selection, however.

Communication channels may be directed toward targets varying in size from an individual to large groups. Moreover, they may allow simultaneous emission and reception of the message, or its transmission may be delayed. Further, channels of communication may concentrate on any of the senses—sight, hearing, touch, taste—although the choice is usually between printed and audio visual channels.

The choice among the various channels available is often determined actually by the nature of the situation. Formerly, radio was less useful than leaflets in tactical PSYOP. However, technological innovation has made radio-based appeals highly useful in some tactical situations in Vietnam. (See "Earlyword" in this chapter and Colburn B. Lovett, "Effective Combat PSYOP in the Delta," Chapter VI of this casebook.) Face-to-face PSYOP is conducive to the transference of ideological motivation by revolutionary groups.

Unorthodox Techniques

Very often the PSYOP planner is faced with unusual circumstances where traditional or ordinary PSYOP methods and techniques do not seem to be appropriate or where innovative approaches will have a particularly high pay-off. In situations like this, the planner must depend on his own ingenuity to improvise and develop what may be considered as gimmicky ways of reaching the target group. These devices may be either verbal or nonverbal forms of communicating. The use of gossip and rumor and "black" propaganda are illustrations of the verbal type; symbolic acts, especially fear-arousal acts such as terrorism and saturation bombing, are of the nonverbal type. In any case, their purpose is to arouse an emotional state or a series of memories, which, when touched off, will elicit the desired change in attitude and behavior.

Some of these techniques have been used successfully; others have led to negative results. Controlled gossip, for example, is one of the methods that has been used successfully under the right conditions. Threats and terrorism,¹ or any other kinds of fear-inducing acts, although used successfully in some situations, are potentially dangerous and susceptible to boomerang effects. They have been shown to be of little long term value in changing opinion.

NOTES

¹ See Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror As a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Chapter VI of this casebook.

AUDIENCE SELECTION

The essays in this section emphasize the need for a proper understanding and selection of target groups in PSYOP campaigns. The lead essay, "Groups and Attitude Change," explains how groups exert pressures on members in a way that tends to generate resistance against persuasive messages and appeals originating from outside the group. "Prestigious Persons and Key Communicators" characterizes the influential persons in a society who function as information "gatekeepers" and opinion leaders with respect to the flow of information. "Reindoctrination Centers" suggests that in some situations the selection of a smaller, more homogenous group is required for effective persuasion. In spite of the effort that may go into selecting a discrete target group for a specifically tailored propaganda message, other groups not intended to be part of the target may also receive the message. Such groups and the problems related to them are discussed in "The Unintended Audience." Consideration of the environmental conditions affecting the receptivity of target groups to PSYOP messages and appeals is the focus of "The Decision to Defect."

GROUPS AND ATTITUDE CHANGE*

BY RICHARD H. ORTH

This essay explores the effects that groups have on the perpetuation of people's attitudes and on their resistance to attitude change. This purpose should be considered within the context of the basic principles of the formation of norms and group needs.

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A person's reference group ** provides his social identity. When he

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.

**Reference group is a group serving an individual as his frame of reference for self-evaluation and attitude formation (cf. Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* [New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957]).

asks "Who am I?" or when he is asked "Who are you?", most often the answer will be in terms of his reference group. Thus, overseas he may reply "I am an American," when this reference group is the most salient, that is, the one that is most obviously called upon in the situation. He is just as likely to reply "I am a soldier," if the military is his most salient reference group in the context of the question. Simply stated then, the reference groups provide social identification for the member, even though the particular group that serves as the person's reference varies depending on which one is most salient at the moment.

GROUP ACHIEVEMENT

A group often helps to achieve some goal. The individual who is a member of the group (sharing the goals of the group) thus benefits from the achievement orientation of the group. For example, a labor union serves its members in gaining economic goals. To the extent that the individual member ties his goals to the achievement of the group, he is reminded of his group membership when these goals are the part of any communication directed at him.

GROUP COHESIVENESS

Another principle of groups and group membership involves the cohesiveness of the group: the more cohesive the group, the more power it has over its members. There are many sources of cohesiveness. For example, a group may be cohesive due to: (1) personal attraction among its members, (2) effective performance in a task, or (3) prestige accorded to individuals by the fact of membership. In any of these cases, the group provides satisfaction for its membership. Because it provides satisfaction, the group takes on the values of the members. The members, then, are really conforming to their own values as embodied by the group.

There is some variation in the degree to which individual members adhere to the values of the group. The member who is confident of his place within the group does not feel as much pressure to conform as one who is not confident of his place. In other words, in order to further benefit from the activities of the group, those individuals who feel that their group position is tenuous strive to solidify their positions by adhering firmly to group norms.

Moreover, when attraction within a group is strong, a favorable disposition toward other members of the group develops. Consequently, members of the group will show more trust and attribute more credibility to each other as sources of information than they will to individuals from outside the group. In the process of changing attitudes or opinions, this means that communicators from inside the group will be more effective in influencing that change than communicators from outside the group.

SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION AND PERSUASION

What does the fact that reference groups provide social identification mean to the process of changing attitudes? Clearly, a person's attitudes are in large part determined by his self-perceptions. He must act and feel in accordance with what he thinks he is. For example, if a man perceives himself to be a soldier, he acts and feels as a soldier, not as a civilian. We have often seen how a soldier out of uniform may temporarily act somewhat differently, but when he is reminded of his reference group, he will quickly revert to the behavior expected of him. This consideration is most important in attempting to change the attitudes of an individual to a point where they are in opposition to those sanctioned by his reference group. One factor that clearly enters the picture here is the salience of the group. As the situation above illustrates, when the salience of the group is low, its effects on the individual are also low. Assuming an individual can be made to forget that the military is his reference group, his attitudes formed as a result of membership in that group will be much more vulnerable to change than they would otherwise. However, manipulating the salience of the individual's group is difficult at best, and hence the PSYOP planner must usually work within the existing framework of group salience.

For example, a labor union often serves as an individual's reference group. His attitudes toward management in industry are guided by the union. In order for that individual's attitudes toward management to change, the union's power over him must decline or the union must cease to be his reference group. If he meets socially with people from management, he may be more likely to express favorable attitudes toward management. Indeed, the farther removed from reminders of his union membership, the more amenable he will be to attitudes contrary to those supported by the union. However, when a reminder of his union appears, it may bring about a multitude of other behaviors congruent with his reference group. He may suddenly begin to recall arguments against management that have been provided him by the union and may begin to use them to counter any management arguments in support of changing attitudes.

DEFENSE MECHANISMS

In addition to providing identity for its members, the group also provides defense mechanisms that aid in the perpetuation of group-centered attitudes. One such mechanism is the counterargument which in effect provides alternatives to the content of appeals persuading members to take on attitudes different from those in support of the group. If an individual is made aware of the fact that he is a member of a labor union, he begins to recall arguments in support of that role, using them to counter anti-union statements. These arguments often do not occur to him in the presence of other union members, or when his identity as a member of this group is not salient to him.

FORCED MEMBERSHIP AND PERSUASION

It should not be assumed from the foregoing that the easiest way to influence an individual is to try to cut him off from the other members of his group. As mentioned previously, an individual whose membership in the group is threatened usually adheres more strongly to the values of that group than members who feel their group position secure. Indeed, members of the group who operate on its periphery, if they value their membership in that group, are usually most adamant about adhering to group values. Furthermore, persuasion that runs counter to group values may be resisted even if membership in the group is compulsory rather than voluntary. For instance, an individual may be a member of a group because the group holds a threat over the individual. That does not mean that the individual enjoys membership, but he may be nonetheless committed to remain a member of the group. Ordinarily, the less an individual is committed—for whatever reasons—to remaining in the group, the more susceptible he is to persuasion that is counter to group-supported attitudes. If he is committed to the group *either* for personal gratification *or* because the group holds a threat over him, then he will be highly resistant to persuasion that is counter to the group's attitude.

In an insurgency environment, this is clearly a problem for the psyoperator. He fully understands that a local population not supportive of an insurgent group in the area should be favorably disposed toward anti-insurgent propaganda. However, so long as the insurgents have control over or are active in an area, the local population may be coerced into some level of commitment and resist persuasion from the outside. In such a situation, it must be demonstrated to the local population that the insurgents do not have the capability to enforce commitment to their side before any successful PSYOP campaign can be launched. Again, this applies to individuals who are not attracted to the insurgent group.

In an environment where group pressures must be overcome, what hope does a psyoperator have of reaching individuals with his persuasion? First of all, he must know at whom to aim his campaigns. Often, there is a temptation to aim campaigns at individuals who are not in the core of the target group. Nothing could be more erroneous. Any argument that goes counter to the attitudes of a group should be aimed primarily at those individuals who are certain of their position. These persons operate with much more freedom than do peripheral members. They are much more innovative and likely to adopt new ideas. Moreover, they spread the more positive new ideas to other members of the group, and, by means of their central position within the group, they exercise a great deal of persuasiveness.

CULTURAL TRUISMS AND PERSUASION

Another factor mentioned above that must be kept in mind is that reemergence of the awareness of group membership will often bring with it recollection of group-supported arguments. These arguments can be

used to counter attempts at persuasion. However, there are some attitudes so universally held in a group that they are never threatened. Consequently, no arguments relating to them are ever presented. These are known as "cultural truisms." An example in American culture is the value of brushing teeth. Since no argument is ever brought up against brushing teeth, no counters to such an argument are readily available. If the psyoperator can locate such universally held attitudes, he may find a fertile area for persuasion campaigns. In this case, the saliency of the group to the individual would not matter.

SUMMARY

Several problems that membership in a group poses for effective persuasion have been discussed without entering into detail concerning the effects different kinds of groups may have on individual members (that is, potential differences between reference groups and membership groups, or between primary groups and secondary groups). It is enough for the psyoperator to be aware of the presence of group pressures on individuals to conform to the norms, values, and attitudes of the groups, and the effect this might have on PSYOP campaigns. Some sources of group pressures were mentioned in the hope that the psyoperator will use these to his benefit. However, many of these forces are interrelated and should be considered in terms of their potential consequences for each other. In the final analysis, it is not that communication will necessarily be ineffective in the face of group pressures. These pressures only require more work to overcome, and they limit the areas in which any effect can be expected.

PRESTIGIOUS PERSONS AND KEY COMMUNICATORS*

BY RICHARD H. ORTH

The prestigious persons and key communicators who are most likely to be perceived as trustworthy and credible communicants in their own social grouping are important in persuasion and may at times be crucial. They are central figures who have a large voice in determining the direction of future attitude trends.

PRESTIGIOUS PERSONS


The basis of difference between the prestigious person and the population on the whole is demographic, that is, the former tends, generally, to be richer, older, and better educated. To locate the prestigious person, a single classification is not sufficient. For example, although prestige is often associated with being a male, this does not mean that in certain cultures *only* males have prestige, nor does it mean that in *all* cultures

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.

the prestigious persons are males. There societies in which a woman may have high prestige as monarch or prime minister.

Another reason for not classifying persons as prestigious on the basis of one factor alone is the prestige enjoyed by the clergy of most nations. A specific instance of this is shown by the Buddhist monks of certain areas in Asia. Even though these monks do not have any material possessions, they clearly enjoy a great deal of prestige.

It is often said that the community or area leaders are the prestigious persons. While prestige is often associated with leadership, not all prestigious persons have an official designation. This can be thought of in terms of two sets of people in the larger of which are all the prestigious persons and in the smaller, all the leaders in an area:



The figure above indicates that community leadership is a subset of the larger set of the prestigious persons in an area. In other words, to locate the prestigious persons in an area, always consider the factors that are outlined above, and do not stop with merely locating the political leaders.

Thus, although there are certain factors, such as sex, wealth, age, education, and leadership that are generally associated with prestige, these factors should not be taken individually to determine who the prestigious persons are. It is best to take all the factors in combination or to use as many as the situation will permit.

Another method that has been used to locate the prestigious persons is called the *nomination technique*—asking the people in the area who the prestigious people are. In conjunction with this approach, one can also use what is called a self-nomination technique, that is, asking people if they consider themselves to be prestigious persons.

The nomination technique proceeds as follows. One decides on the specific type of prestigious person one wants to locate—for example, political leader or wealthy person. Then, one asks local people about who is the village headman, who is the landowner, who owns the radio, and the like. It might be that a single characteristic will enable them to tell the PSYOP officer who is the person being sought, or it may require a combination of factors. In either case, the PSYOP officer must be aware of the characteristics he is interested in before he tries to locate the prestigious person according to the nomination method. Often several persons may be nominated by an individual, but there should be enough

agreement on one person for the officer to be sure that he is the one being sought.

KEY COMMUNICATORS

The key communicator is more difficult to differentiate from the rest of the society than the prestigious person. In the most general sense, a key communicator is a person who has the function of spreading information to the various segments of the group to which he belongs. More specifically, the characteristics of the key communicator are as follows:

- He is more highly exposed to the mass media and other sources of information and is usually the one who receives the news from the mass media and spreads it to the rest of the group, at the same time interpreting it for them so they can understand it.¹
- He is usually the one who begins the process of popularizing a technological advancement.
- Although found at all social and economic levels, he has a central place in the society. He tends to be socially integrated to a greater degree than most other members of the group; that is, he more closely represents the values of the group. One of his main characteristics is that he tends to be more like the group within which he functions than the prestigious person.
- In the spheres of public affairs, agriculture, and medicine, he tends to be high in socioeconomic status.
- He tends to be well-educated.
- He tends to be young.

There are two types of key communicators: (a) those who have influence in one sphere of influence, and (b) those who have influence in several spheres. In traditional societies, key communicators are more likely to be influential in several areas, whereas in transitional or modern societies the other type is more prevalent.²

Although the key communicator is sometimes referred to as an "opinion leader," one must not confuse him with the innovator, that is, the one who tends to be first in adopting new things. The latter is usually somewhat of a deviate from society, while the key communicator is not. Once an innovation is acceptable, however, the key communicator spreads information about it.

A study of urban Thailand found the key communicators to be, in order of importance: monks; professionals; military officials; and, to a lesser degree, government officials; teachers; and merchants.³ Education was a highly important characteristic of Thai key communicators. Younger persons tended to be more aware of foreign news than older persons. Thai key communicators in general were (1) heavily exposed to the mass media (especially printed media), (2) had responsible roles, and (3) were advice-givers in word-of-mouth communications.

To summarize, the key communicator is generally a frequent user of

the mass media, is better educated, and possesses a central place in the society.

How does one locate key communicators? Three methods of identification have been distinguished: ⁴

1. In the sociometric technique, members of a group are asked to whom they would go for advice or information on a topic;
2. In the key informants method, the surveyor selects persons who appear well-informed and asks them who the key communicators are;
3. In the self-designating technique, a respondent is asked a number of questions that bear on his quality of being a key communicator. In one study, for example, respondents were asked: "In the last six months, were there persons who sought you out in order to discuss their serious problems with you?" and "Are there any persons whom you know who consider you a reliable source of news?" ⁵

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE PRESTIGIOUS PERSON AND THE KEY COMMUNICATOR

It is often important to distinguish between the prestigious person and the key communicator. One source of distinction is the function that each serves in the society with respect to the flow of information. Oftentimes the prestigious person has been called a *gatekeeper*. He decides what is passed on to the ordinary people from a higher echelon than his. For example, in developing nations he may decide for the people which advances they should know about and which ones they should not know about. By controlling the flow of information, he controls the movement and the direction of the movement of the particular society.

In a sense the key communicator also controls the movement of a particular society. However, in the key communicator's function as *opinion leader*, he contributes to the flow rather than the control of information. By the fact that he is integrated into the society, he has a great amount of influence and uses this influence. He is usually considered to be an intermediary between the people and the mass media.

There is a two-step flow between the mass media and the people.⁶ Although people may have direct access to the mass media they may still want what is said in the media to be interpreted by the key communicator.

In summary, the two types of persons may be distinguished from each other on the basis of their communicative relationships with the rest of the society. In addition, they may be distinguished on the basis of their degree of social integration in terms of their adherence to the norms of the society. The key communicator more closely represents the values of the group than does the prestigious person. The difference between key communicators and prestigious persons is not always strong, however. Moreover, there are key communicators among the prestigious people just as there are among other groups.

NOTES

¹ Mayone J. Stykos, "Patterns of Communication in a Rural Greek Village," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1952), pp. 59-70.

² Everett M. Rogers and D.C. Cartano, "Methods of Measuring Opinion Leadership," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVI (1962), pp. 435-441.

³ Milton Jacobs, Farhad Farzanegan, and Alexander R. Askenasy, "A Study of Key Communicators in Urban Thailand," *Social Forces*, XLV, No. 2 (December 1966), pp. 192-199.

⁴ Rogers and Cartano, "Methods of Measuring Opinion Leadership."

⁵ Jacobs, Farzanegan, and Askenasy, "A Study of Key Communicators."

⁶ Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on an Hypothesis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXI (1957), pp. 61-67.

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNINTENDED AUDIENCE*

BY PAUL M.A. LINEBARGER

Despite the best efforts of the communicator, the target of a propaganda message may not always exactly coincide with the actual audience receiving the message; some members of the audience will receive the communicator's message whether he intends them to or not.

One of the continuing problems of mass communications in military situations is that of the unintended audience. The unintended audience can, in one form, come in by listening to radio broadcasts which are not meant for him, by reading our own newspapers and magazines addressed to our home public or our own troops, or even by seeing American movies which have not been edited for specific foreign areas. The other kind of unintended audience can get the American action and words second-hand. Messages originally meant for Americans cross, either in the original English or in translation, into another culture and produce results far from the original utterance. Humor suffers badly in this transition, as it almost always does when transferred from one culture to another. The statement of General Joseph Stilwell, "I claim we took a beating," was meaningless in Chinese, either in a word-to-word translation or in any sort of reasonable context; his statement, which was pleasantly idiomatic and robust for the home audience and for other American soldiers, was weird and inexplicable by the time it reached the unintended audiences.

In a later context, the use of the term "special warfare" by the American Armed Forces in 1961-62 may easily have produced apprehension in the Far Eastern area. "Special" means "secret police," "through bribery and assassination," or by means of espionage—in the light of the particular use made of the word "special" in the experience of the former Imperial Japanese Army, or in the "special" sections of the Kuomintang party network when it was ruler of the mainland of China. This kind of unintended reaction may be prevented in a few cases. Given a world

*Excerpts from "Essays on Military Psychological Operations," unpublished study, 1965, pp. 52-56.

audience, it is impossible to prevent some misunderstandings from arising. The two most effective defenses against this could be found in:

First, sustained coordination with the Voice of America for the dissemination of acceptable translations of new American terms, slogans, and particular symbols;

Second, clearance through Pentagon level of the approved Army translations into foreign languages, for major audiences at least, of new military terms which may touch unintended audiences in the wrong way.

This problem, while annoying, is less than catastrophic.

The larger problem of "unintended audience" is more serious. *Partial understanding of the United States, taken directly from American channels, can lead to an extreme hostility toward the United States for reasons which are misconceived or merely verbal.* The audience which does not even think that it understands Americans may be animated by a human curiosity or even by an elementary friendliness toward something novel and entertaining. This is the group which believes that it understands Americans, but does so on incorrect conceptions which have been derived from American sources. The fact that the source is itself American makes the misunderstanding so much the harder to cure.

An extreme case of this can be taken from India and Pakistan, both beneficiaries of the United States. The fact that English is the common elite language in each of them makes Indians and Pakistanis feel that they already understand Americans. They cannot get much unintended Russian-to-Russian material, because very few of them know enough of the language to intercept intra-Soviet mass communications, whether newspapers, magazines, or radio. America, they are sure they understand—and they are more wrong than right. The word "socialism," has come to India and Pakistan from British English; in their context it means *social welfare* plus a modicum of public ownership, not much more. By their own definition, the United States ought to be recognized as the most "socialist" nation on earth, since our welfare expenditures certainly surpass those of the USSR. But the Americans themselves deny that they are "socialist." This simple twisting of an apparently familiar word puts the Americans in the position, year after year, of seeming to insist that we want our poor suffering, our old suffering, our old starving, our sick neglected or in debt, and our children unprotected. We mean no such thing. The misunderstanding persists and in the case of many Indians and Pakistani, even a visit to the United States does not cure the trouble.

Here the trouble does not lie in translation but in the English itself. There is needed a dictionary of ideas, supplementary to the various country handbooks for which the Army has already contracted, to indicate major sectors of misunderstanding which come from the unexpected eavesdropping of foreign audiences on American-to-American communications. A civic action program will have to de-gauss, as it were, the magnetic fields of rigid misunderstanding which Americans carry with them. The problem, one might hasten to add, is particularly an *American*

one, because—of all the empire-builders and peace-keepers the world has ever known—it is we, more than Macedonians, Romans, Franks, French, or British, who feel the need to be understood and to be liked. The British felt it was enough to be respected and feared. We, in our time carry the neighborliness of our inward traditions with us and insist on making friends with our allies and even with our enemies, once we have conquered them. Much of the resistance to us comes from people who—meeting American friendliness and activity for the first time—mistake it for blood-brotherhood, for an immediate crusade, or for some other element in their own culture. The partially “Americanized” personality is a more formidable, more misleading antagonist than the person who has nothing but Soviet lies on which to base his misconceptions of the United States.

Part of the remedy for this situation would consist of a more careful checking of the foreign press in areas where U.S. forces are stationed, or expected, to make sure *military professionalism* is included in almost every story concerning our trained units. Their home state, their commander's personality, their marvelous new equipment, their previous assignment—all these are secondary to the critical issue: “Will they fight well, if they must?” Unless this question is answered, and answered very well, the rest of our overseas public relations might as well go by the board.

THE DECISION TO DEFECT*

BY LAWRENCE E. GRINTER

PSYOP planners, particularly in tactical operations, must take into detailed account the physical as well as the psychological environment of the audience so that messages do not require physically impractical responses

When a member of the Viet Cong decides to break with his old way of life and ask the GVN for amnesty, he must consider the safest way to leave the insurgent organization. In this regard many problems immediately arise. The act of surrender can be very dangerous. If communist cadres realize that a man is wavering toward surrender, they usually take immediate action, such as “reeducation,” imprisonment or worse. Many *hoi chanh* (ralliers) were interviewed who had waited months before slipping away because of the lack of opportunity or the fear of discovery. Even when they did leave the Viet Cong, it could be difficult getting safely into Government areas. The following story seemed typical of the kind of problems that often arose.

One defector explained:

*Excerpts from “Amnesty in South Viet Nam: An Analysis of the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program in the Republic of Viet Nam,” M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967. Reprinted with the permission of the author, copyright holder.

It is never easy to rally. I walked up to a Popular Force soldier and I told him, "I am a Viet Cong and I want to surrender." He was quite frightened. I did not know how to say *hoi chanh*, so he pulled out a pistol and pointed it at me. I told him to search me, that I wanted to surrender. He wasn't entirely ready to believe me. He went and got a platoon of Popular Force soldiers and they found my buried documents and gun and then they believed me.¹

Another rallier who worked as a communication agent in Phu Yen province was typically pessimistic about the ease of escaping.

There's no generally safe way. Since many Viet Cong have rallied, the VC maintain a much tighter control. Even if you want to go fifty meters away from your unit, you have to inform the squad leader. A Viet Cong can only escape when he goes on a mission to some village.²

One officer, who became a commander of an Armed Propaganda Team in Hue, found that the necessity of producing a Safe Conduct Pass (SCP) to GVN authorities as a guarantee of intentions added to the difficulties of defecting. While it is doubtful that the pass hindered defection more than it aided it, the officer's experience was duplicated time and again during the defection process. For example, a number of *hoi chanh* indicated that they had to hide SCP's in their shirt cuffs or collars, especially when V.C. cadres had just witnessed leaflet drops.

Some *hoi chanh* never were able to defect. For example, in the summer of 1966 in Binh Duong province, forty-one Viet Cong Phu Loi Battalion soldiers were killed in action with safe conduct passes hidden on their bodies.

The decision to defect from the Viet Cong often became a time of agonizing delay. The insurgent was not sure; often he was barraged with feelings of uncertainty and doubt.

I waited for five months before rallying because I was very suspicious. I told no one—not even my children. I was afraid they would talk about it. Finally, I told my wife I could not stay with the Viet Cong any longer. She came with me.³

Another rallier responded this way:

Q. Was it hard for you to rally once you decided to do so?

A. It was two months between the time I decided [to rally] and the time I actually did. The difficulties were the battle in my own mind; for example, I had doubts as to whether the Government would treat me well or not, and I also had trouble because I was so well indoctrinated and had been in the Party so long. I had been in Communist ranks for twenty years and eight months.⁴

When *hoi chanh* did defect, they usually came out alone or sometimes with token help from a relative or friend. This rallier, a Viet Cong village chief, had a plan:

I sent a letter to the Chief of Police in Long An by way of an ex-policeman whom I knew very well, and we specified a place. I went to that place and the Chief sent a policeman to greet me there.⁵

Thus the problem of making the process of defection simpler does not seem to be remediable by the Government. The GVN has broadcast numerous methods whereby ralliers can defect more safely, but in the final instance it all depends upon the rallier and his ingenuity in evading the Communist control system and convincing local GVN authorities he is sincere.

NOTES

¹ C. H. 7, p. 32. Notes refer to unpublished interview schedules administered during interview sessions with *hoi chanh*. The interviews were conducted by the SIMULMATIC CORPORATION in South Vietnam June 1966-January 1967. Title of the project was: "Improving the Effectiveness of the *Chieu Hoi* Program" OSD/ARPA-AGILE ARO #877, August 1967.

² C.H. 44, p. 25.

³ C.H. 17, p. 7.

⁴ C.H. 66, p. 49.

⁵ C.H. 64, p. 25.

MESSAGE COMPOSITION

The articles below emphasize different aspects of message preparation, development, and production. Simple and obvious themes should be used, appealing to human emotions in a manner congenial to the particular cultures involved in PSYOP campaigns. The effects of appeals showing a favorable attitude toward the audience are illustrated in, "The Soviet 'Peace and Progress' Broadcasts."

The proper idiom, language, and accent are called for in "Brief Observation on the Importance of Up to Date Language in 'Black' or 'Grey' Propaganda." "Films From the Viet Cong" illustrates the point that overemphasis of themes, along with poor production qualities, may fail to arouse the desired emotions among members of the target groups. In "The Viet Cong Slogan Slip" and "Leaflets at a Glance," the view is advanced that short and punchy messages, easily received, visible, and readable, may be more effective with some target groups than more elaborate and expensively produced messages. The importance of offering alternatives to the audience, the mediating qualities of prior communications, and the timing of the communication with certain auspicious events are underscored in "Golden Bridges," "Incitement to Revolt," and "Sihanouk's Appeal to the Monks of Cambodia."

In spite of the precautions taken in the preparation of persuasive political communications material, the effects of psychological operations are apt to be fortuitous and unpredictable. For this reason, message content should be pretested in order to estimate the effects of a PSYWAR campaign in advance.

SELECTION OF THEMES*

BY CARL BERGER

Leaflet messages, particularly in tactical leaflets, should avoid ridicule of the target and use of sophisticated political propaganda themes, and should concentrate on the use of simple messages directed to the target's basic and immediate needs and wants

*Excerpts from *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets*, Documentary Study No. 1, The American University, Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D C., 1959, AD 220 821, pp. 27-33.

In writing or preparing a propaganda leaflet, it is clear that there are no hard-and-fast principles one can follow. The final report of the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, states flatly, "There can be little descriptive material on the subject of how to write a leaflet," and suggests the propagandist simply must stay alert to the changing military picture, must study the intelligence reports on the various target groups, and must be aware of the limitations under which he is operating (that is, his government's policies).¹

However, the leaflet writer should be aware of some general approaches which have proved profitable in the past. For example, there is a recommended approach for appealing to enemy troops in the field. According to Richard Crossman, under these circumstances the whole art of the leaflet "is to appear as a simple, honourable offer by one honourable soldier to another, saying, 'You have fought very gallantly, now is the time when you have a perfectly good reason for giving in a little earlier.'" ² Crossman's view is endorsed by the experiences gained by other Allied propagandists of World War II. The Fifth Army Combat Propaganda Team reported on its experiences against the Germans:

We have learned, partly from the effect of German leaflets on our own troops, partly from other evidence, that hostile, condescending or sarcastic leaflets—no matter how much fun to write—defeat their own purpose. In a war among soldiers, recognition of the enemy's soldierly qualities, credit for bravery, soldier-to-soldier talk (where these matters are pertinent and justifiable) are like butter on bread—they make it swallow easier.³

Similarly, in the Leyte campaign during the liberation of the Philippines, a Seventh Division leaflet writer strongly objected to the sarcastic approach to the Japanese soldiers. "Why," he asked, "should we address them as 'Rats in a Trap' or caricature them as 'Sad Sacks?' These things only infuriate them and provide their officers with something to create unity in trying circumstances and to further their resistance." ⁴ Language specialists with the Seventh Division, who interrogated Japanese prisoners, agreed that American leaflets should include such things as praise for the Japanese soldier for his heroic conduct and a brief statement of the tactical situation, without exaggeration. "Any ridicule of the individual Japanese soldiers," they reported, "belittlement of his equipment, or insulting his leaders was found to create an adverse effect." ⁵

Rule Number One, then appears to be: In a tactical leaflet, ridicule should be avoided and the writer should stick to the military facts. The enemy should be treated as honorable soldiers who are not to blame for the unfavorable circumstances they find themselves in. [Italics added.]

Another general leaflet rule is: The simpler and more direct a leaflet is in language, the more chance it has of being understood by the target audience. Long political harangues would seem to have little place in leaflets. [Italics added.] This is true of both tactical and strategic propaganda. For example, the early British leaflets dropped on Germany in September and October 1939 were made up of long political arguments. One such leaflet stated (excerpts):

German Men and Women. The Government of the Reich has, with cold deliberation, forced war upon Great Britain. It has done so knowing that it must involve mankind in a calamity, worse than that of 1914. The assurances of peaceful intentions the Fuehrer gave to you and to the world in April have proved as worthless as his words at the *Sportspiaast* last September, when he said, "We have no more territorial claims to make in Europe."

Never before has any government ordered subjects to their death with less excuse. This war is utterly unnecessary. Germany was in no way threatened or deprived of justice.

Was she not allowed to reenter the Rhineland, to achieve the *Anschluss* and to take back the Sudeten German in peace? Neither we nor any other nation would have sought to limit her advance so long as she did not violate independent non-German peoples. . .

It is not us, but you they have deceived. For years their iron censorship has kept from you truths that even uncivilized peoples know. It has imprisoned your minds in a concentration camp. Otherwise, they would not have dared to misrepresent the combination of peaceful peoples to secure peace as hostile encirclement. . . .⁶

An American travelling by train through Germany in the last months of 1939 reported one German fellow passenger's reaction to the British propaganda: "How foolish it is of the British to think that by their stupid leaflets they can separate the German people from their Fuehrer!"⁷ These early strategic leaflets may have satisfied the soul of the writer, but they had no noticeable effect on the German people. Indeed, in England a story began to make the rounds about the first bombs dropped on Germany, carrying the label: "You are lucky; this might have been a leaflet."⁸ Needless to say, British propaganda quickly took on a more appealing tone.

The Soviets in particular during World War II were addicted to stuffing their leaflets with long political harangues, full of Communist verbiage and Marxist dogma. Many Soviet political officers insisted that the Red leaflets dropped on the German soldiers be "revolutionary," when battle conditions made such ideological leaflets meaningless. Similarly, the Chinese Communists in their leaflets to the American soldiers during the Korean War spoke of "Wall Street imperialists," and the like, to no meaningful purpose. Toward the end of both wars, however, Russian and Chinese leaflets began to improve when the Communists came to understand the necessity of divorcing ideological themes from combat propaganda.

Concerning the subject matter of tactical leaflets, Martin Herz, chief leaflet writer of the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, commented that "there is in most cases no need for sophisticated political propaganda themes. The soldier in battle has a closely restricted horizon. When high explosive shells are bursting around him and he hears our tanks moving up, ideological considerations take a distinctly secondary place in his mind."⁹

At least one enemy soldier of World War II, a Japanese captured on Tinian Island in August 1944, held the same opinion. Questioned by Allied interrogators, this prisoner offered the view that conflicting ideologies of war had little relation to the practical problem of inducing troops to surrender. He said that the Japanese of Tinian treated American leaflets

as a joke; he objected in particular to appeals made on political or ideological grounds (for example, "You have been misled by the military clique"). The Japanese soldier, he reported, was not interested in the crimes of the military caste; he was simply fighting for his country and regarded as nonsense any suggestion that he do otherwise.¹⁰

In general, ideological approaches should be avoided in propaganda aimed at enemy soldiers. In the final report on U.S. Army operations against the Germans in World War I, the writers responsible for the U.S. leaflet operation suggested their rules for future Army leaflets. They should contain simple, accurate statements calculated to suggest the thought of surrender to the average private. In addition, leaflets should take into consideration the condition of enemy morale, the general military situation, and the special character of the enemy unit aimed at. These recommendations may still constitute the best "rules" to follow in the preparation of tactical leaflets.

NOTES

¹ SHAEF PWD Report, p. 34.

² R. H. S. Crossman, "Psychological Warfare," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, 97 (August 1952), p. 324.

³ Psychological Warfare Branch Hq. Fifth Army, *Functions of the 5th Army Combat Propaganda Team* (April 1944), p. 16.

⁴ Hqs. Seventh Infantry Division (G2), letter to ACofS, G2, USAFPOA, 10 Jan. 1945, sub: *Psychological Warfare*. In Hq SWPacArea Records Group No. 975-A45-43, Drawer No. 1, No. 650.1, Folder 4, "Effectiveness of Frontline Broadcasts in Inducing Surrender and Lowering Enemy Morale," p. 70. Federal Records Center, hereafter FRC.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Robert Powell, "Warfare by Leaflet," *Living Age*, 357 (Dec 1939), p. 326.

⁷ Oswald Garrison Villard, "German-British Propaganda Duel," *Living Age*, 357 (Feb. 1940), pp. 508-11.

⁸ Lindley Fraser, *Propaganda* (London, 1957), p. 111.

⁹ Martin F. Herz, "The Combat Leaflet—Weapon of Persuasion," *Army Information Digest* (June 1950), pp. 37-43.

¹⁰ "Reaction to Propaganda, Fifteenth Report," 15 Dec 1944. In Hq SWPA Records Group No. 975-A45-43. Drawer No 1. No. 650.1, Folder 4, "Effectiveness of Frontline Broadcasts in Inducing Surrender and Lowering Enemy Morale," p. 173, FRC.

ONE PAIR OF SHOES*

By REUBEN S. NATHAN

PSYOP should cater to man's deep psychological needs, his inability to understand the events that create anxiety. It is the task of the psyoperator to lower the level of this anxiety by simple appeals to fundamental human needs

The most significant sentence I ever found in an interrogation came from a Viet Cong defector, a naive and not overly intelligent fellow, who, when asked why he had defected, said: "You must understand that here

*Original essay by Reuben S. Nathan.

in Vietnam people do not like to be killed. . . ." He reduced many questions to a fundamental human element, an element so pathetically obvious that it is often forgotten.

THE HUMAN EQUATION

The psyoperator seeks the human equation. Only great writers can get at the basics of the human mind. Lesser men need at least a measure of empathy with others, a deep concern with the human condition, and love of one's fellow man to understand what makes him tick. Hatred yields nothing of value—yet, as PSYWAR is usually concerned with enemies, much of PSYOP intelligence is tainted by enmity. How then does one get at the truth on which effective PSYOP must be based? How many sources possess the required empathy with other men, not to mention enemies? How many dare to love in war, to take a chance on being considered weak or ridiculous? It is safer to rely on statistics or on the techniques of public opinion polls—no matter how unreliable. Quantitative approaches are in vogue.

Yet the fact is that the answers to the really important questions lie largely in ourselves. To be effective, PSYOP must appeal to fundamental human emotions. These are the same everywhere: hope and fear; wanting to live; to have a chance, if not for oneself then for one's children. Germans, Poles, Chinese, Cambodians—all fall in love precisely the way we do. People everywhere aspire to the recognition of their dignity.

Kipling was wrong when he claimed that East is East and West is West and that the twain shall never meet. They have met: close to a billion Asians live by the concepts of a white German, Karl Marx, if only because they must. It is true enough that historical, cultural, political, climatic, and other differences exist but they represent a relatively thin layer superimposed on the essential identity of mankind. It is important to know of these differences because they dictate the language one must speak. But it is even more important to realize that these differences matter less than the basic human condition—of which we know because we share it. The American Indians have a prayer: "Grant that I may not criticize my neighbor until I have walked a mile in his mocassins." An Estimate of the Psychological Situation cannot be too far off if one concludes from one's own emotions about those of the enemy, provided one defines correctly the conditions under which he lives and puts oneself in his mocassins.

SIMPLE AND OBVIOUS THEMES

There are, after all, so many ingredients of our art that are as yet hardly understood. I had a visitor, a senior government officer, FSO (Foreign Service Officer)-1. We had worked together many years before. He read my PSYOP plan for the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and confessed to being disappointed. "When I heard you had been recalled," he told me,

"I had visions of a truly sophisticated program. Instead you came up with only such simple and obvious themes."

He was quite right. But I was not ashamed of the simplicity of my annex, I was proud of it. In the business of propaganda and PSYOP, simplicity is the apex of sophistication, the result of the most painstaking efforts. This is in fact one of the very few things on which Madison Avenue and PSYOP are in agreement.

It is essential to reduce complex appeals to what I call the terms of one pair of shoes. When our troops entered Auschwitz, one of the Nazi extermination camps, they found two mountains of children's shoes, 600,000 altogether. Photographs of these pitiful monuments to the horror of Nazi barbarism appeared in many newspapers. But what could the readers do? Nobody is capable of facing up to the murder of 300,000 little kids, to the misery of their last hours, alone, terrified, uncomprehending. So one turns the page, has another cup of coffee and tries to forget. But when some time later the press reported that a little boy by the name of Nubby was doomed to die of leukemia and that his parents had decided to give him a last Christmas many months before the real Christmas would come around, tens of thousands of people sent him presents. People can identify with one little child, with one father's and one mother's grief, but not with the fate of hundreds of thousands. That is why good propaganda must talk in terms of one pair of shoes, in terms people can easily understand and accept.

But there are other reasons for the utmost simplicity. The most effective medium of propaganda is face-to-face persuasion. That means that the essential message must be so formulated that it can be projected by great numbers of people—not all of whom are sophisticated enough to communicate involved appeals. Repetition is the mother of propaganda, and who could, or would, repeat complex claims ad infinitum?

I had long before started preaching that the secret of good propaganda is the reduction of the scores of possible appeals, which usually emerge from a sound PSYOP plan, to the smallest possible number of the simplest possible themes. When one finally defines them and puts them on paper, they look very easy, obvious, and unimpressive. That accounted for my friend's criticism and the small regard in which he held my annex. Things like that can hurt one's pride. But then, if "a policeman's lot is not a happy one," that of a conscientious psyoperator is even more trying. We must console ourselves with the feeling that we are trail blazers. We may yet be making the grade. Meanwhile we had better learn to live with the probability that there are no Distinguished Service Medals in our immediate future.

THE SOVIET "PEACE AND PROGRESS" BROADCASTS*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

The receptivity of the audience to a message or appeal may hinge, at least initially, on the perceived attitude of the communicator. A radio broadcast projecting a favorable attitude toward the target audience, depicting the motive to communicate as altruistic, portraying communicator objectives as being in the intellectual and social interest of the target audience, and making no appeals for radical behavior may be viewed by the target audience as congenial communication and should be more favorably received than a neutral or hostile one.

On 1 March, a special broadcast in Mandarin for the "Chinese People" was inaugurated in Moscow. The broadcast is called "Peace and Progress" and is a definite Soviet psychological operation against the present Government of the Chinese People's Republic. The sponsor's appeal to the listeners in inaugurating the "Peace and Progress" broadcast is important and interesting. It spells out Soviet guide-lines and goals for this propaganda action, and gives some idea what Soviet experts on China believe might win over Chinese. For this reason, the entire text of the 1 March broadcast is reproduced here:

We representatives of Soviet mass organizations would like to extend our hand of friendship to you heroic Chinese working class and the glorious millions in the rank and file of Chinese Communist fighters. To the diligent Chinese peasants, we send you our regards and earnest affection.

To our fraternal Chinese younger generation, listen, here is our appeal to you Chinese young men and women: Mao Tse-tung and his clique are attempting to dislodge you from the right track, that is, the revolutionary path.

We also send our regards to the members of the Chinese people's Liberation Army which in the past has always been together with the people and fought for their freedom and happiness.

May our voice also reach you Chinese activists of literature and arts.

This *Peace and Progress* station has been created to express the Russian people's friendship and sense of justice to Chinese friends.

In these programs we shall introduce to you Soviet public opinions toward the undertakings of your country. You shall hear of the Soviet people's growing anxiety and concern for the Chinese people. In our programs we shall voice the opinions of the representatives of the Soviet people, their indignation and denunciation of the attempt by Mao Tse-tung and his clique to undermine the fraternal friendship of the two peoples which was forged with the red blood of their distinguished children shed in the struggle against the common enemy and for their common undertaking.

This station shall alert you to (the) danger of Mao Tse-tung's policy to the Chinese people and the fruits of the Chinese revolution. We shall introduce to you the truth about the events taking place in your country, although Mao Tse-tung and his cronies are attempting to conceal them by keeping mum.

* * * * *

We shall report to you news made available to us concerning the events taking place throughout your great country, and introduce to you materials on Chinese events as reported by mass communication media of other foreign countries.

*Excerpts from "The Soviet 'Peace and Progress' Broadcasts," *Communist Propaganda Trends*, Issue No. 628 (January 1968), pp. 14-16.

including those of the capitalist countries. You shall be informed of the happiness enjoyed by the enemies, the imperialist countries, as a result of Mao Tse-tung's betrayal and splittist policy. Mao Tse-tung is carrying out an anti-people struggle, splitting the revolutionary anti-imperialist united front, and sabotaging the support for the struggling Vietnamese.

Our station shall invite world Communists and progressive activists to convey to you at length their opinions on the events in your country. All of you shall know that the hearts of all the righteous in the world are with the Chinese people, and all progressive people are unanimously denouncing Mao Tse-tung's policy and his struggle against the socialist states and fraternal parties.

We believe that the voice of our station shall become the symbol of support of the Soviet people and all contemporary revolutionary forces for our Chinese friends, and a symbol of our concern.

We believe that the great Chinese people, under the leadership of China's genuine Communists, will be able to put their country back on the road of friendship and fraternal solidarity with the Soviet and world socialist peoples, and all revolutionary anti-imperialist forces.

Comment: This presents an opportunity to analyze Soviet propaganda efforts aimed at mainland China. The source is of course the USSR. This government-sponsored program probably is the result of a good amount of time and money, in planning and in future projection. It can also be thought, it would seem, that the organization behind this project is the part of the USSR propaganda machine with established intelligence and information channels, the China propaganda section. The source makes no attempt to conceal its identity despite personal attacks on Mao; the program uses what authority the Soviet Government may have to increase its credibility.

The content of this propaganda seeks to establish the source as an all-knowing organization in possession of the "big picture" and true facts about all agents in China. Not only does the "Peace and Progress" station have these facts, it seeks to share them in a friendly manner with the isolated Chinese audience. The content seems aimed at stimulating a normal human thirst for knowledge; for the knowledge-starved mainland China audience "Peace and Progress" promises to utilize communication resources of the Soviet Union to give people the truth that the Chinese Government attempts to conceal. The content reveals the results of Soviet analysis and evaluation of the susceptibilities of the mainland Chinese audience.

While the Soviet propagandists desire to appeal to an entire cross section of the Chinese population, three specific target groups are mentioned: youths, intellectuals, and the army. The selection of these target groups evidently indicates that Soviet propaganda analysts believe these three groups have promise of being susceptible and are effective anti-Mao groups in Chinese Communist society. The People's Liberation Army, "which in the past has always been together with the people and fought for their freedom and happiness," would seem to be a criticism of the PLA's present status.

In summary, "Peace and Progress" might be fairly effective. Even the name "Peace and Progress" was probably derived from a study of Chinese mainland attitudes. . . . The problem is whether wide listener-

ship can be achieved. During this [Cultural Revolution] crisis, and possible future troubles, the Chinese population itself probably becomes the world's greatest "China-watcher" and will welcome information from any source. Possibly, surveillance of foreign radio listeners will be lax. The Soviet Union is trying to exploit this, possibly, and also the world brotherhood of Communism against charges of excesses committed by . . . [Chinese leaders]. Chinese individuals might listen to these broadcasts if they are aware of them and have access to a radio. The "Peace and Progress" project might become a "symbol" for some anti-Government activities, even though this opposition remains Communist.

BRIEF OBSERVATION ON THE IMPORTANCE OF
UP TO DATE LANGUAGE IN "BLACK" OR
"GREY" PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS*

BY MARTIN F. HFRZ

Inattention to language style and usage defeats covert propaganda campaigns.

During World War II the Americans dropped some leaflets on Japanese cities in the form of "Extra" editions of Japanese newspapers. I have two such leaflets in my collection, each headlining bombing attacks. One was supposed to be an extra edition of the Asahi Shimbun, the other of the Osaka Asahi Shimbun. The language of both of them was archaic, and easily determined to be the work of emigrants.

The Asahi Shimbun facsimile leaflet reads as follows in translation: "ANOTHER NATION-WIDE AIR RAID. OUR PRESS CANNOT KEEP SILENT ANY LONGER. The Government authorities may misunderstand our belief which comes from sincere patriotism. Our press may be closed down. But come what may, we consider it our duty as a newspaper to report the truth. THE MILITARISTS CONCEAL THEIR DEFEAT AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN VICTORY FROM THE EYES OF THE NATION. It has been a well-known fact, even before the war, that the American 'flying fortresses' are capable of bombing our country."

"Our occupied territories in the South Seas do not and cannot serve the purpose of outposts against the American air raids of our country. Our industries will be bombed again all over the country in the near future. EVACUATE THE INDUSTRIAL AREAS. SAVE YOUR INVALUABLE LIFE. The militarists started the war to satisfy their rapacious greed, We cannot remain silent, even if it means the violation of wartime regulations."

*From *Falling Leaf Magazine*, VIII, no. 1 (March 1967), pp. 19-20. Reprinted with the permission of the author and courtesy of *Falling Leaf Magazine*.

Recently I showed this leaflet to a colleague in the Japanese Embassy and asked him to help me in translating it. His observations are given below:

"This leaflet, though its Japanese is excellent, is written predominantly in the style of 'bongobun' (the literary form of the Japanese language) with a slight admixture of 'kogobun' (the oral form). This was the style of Japanese newspapers in the second and third decades of this century. Toward the end of the twenties, they switched completely to 'kogobun.'

"The peculiar and obsolete style of the leaflet is exactly that of the Japanese newspapers published for the American-Japanese community in the States, which was a constant source of amusement to us when I served in Washington. All these papers were edited and published by old 'issei' (first-generation Japanese immigrants) who had been doing small-time local newspaper work in Japan before coming over to the States and who were unable to discard the style to which they were accustomed."

My Japanese friend pointed out, in particular, two words which he regarded as immediate give-aways of the origin of the leaflets. The word air-raid in the leaflet was rendered in Chinese characters as "ku-geki," consisting of "ku" meaning sky and "geki" meaning attack. He commented on this as follows:

"Ku-geki is a perfectly possible combination, but the fact is that we Japanese simply do not use this word. We would have said either 'ku-shu,' meaning air-attack, or 'baku-geki,' meaning bombing attack."

Another instance was the rendering of the term "flying fortress" into Japanese. The writers of the leaflets used "tobu-yosai" (from "tobu" for flying, and "yosai" for fortress). While this was not incorrect linguistically, it simply did not correspond to actual Japanese usage. The term used in Japan was "sora-tobu-yosai," "sora" meaning sky.

The meticulous attention to language in leaflets of all kinds, but the special importance of using the enemy's terminology in "black" or "grey" leaflets, has often been remarked upon. As a former writer of German combat leaflets in World War II, I know that we were guilty of occasional use of incorrect terms also in the European theatre. To avoid this, we often checked our leaflets with cooperative prisoners. To know the enemy's language is not enough; one has to be up-to-date in the latest changes of his spoken word.

Nothing made our American soldiers laugh more, for instance, than the use of the term "doughboys" in some early German propaganda leaflets. Eventually, the Germans realized that the new term was "G.I.," but up to the end of the war there were numerous solecisms in German propaganda leaflets.

FILMS FROM THE VIETCONG*

By PETER GESSNER

The use of films as a propaganda device may lose its impact on an audience because of overemphasized themes and poor production techniques.

Some half-dozen films produced by the National Liberation Front of Vietnam are making their way around the country, shown for the most part in poor screening conditions to limited audiences. . . . Despite the difficulties imposed by a sound track loaded with hyperbole and slogans (the English narrations have all the literary grace of a pamphlet), and despite the deteriorated physical condition of the films which makes many of these screenings little more than mysterious lantern shows, the very existence of these films merits attention.

As a record of the face of the war in Vietnam, and even more as an indication of what the film makers want "us" to know about them, the NLF films are a humbling experience to the viewer. In one (dated 1965), there is a brief sequence in a Vietcong-held village where, during a lull in the fighting, a Western-style ballet is performed within a ring of watching guerrillas. Even the hardened view which says that such things don't happen spontaneously, that they are arranged for the visiting camera, must cope with the fact that these people, the Vietcong, engaged in a brutalizing struggle, have thought it important to include dance in the midst of footage of a vicious guerrilla war.

If this instance indicates that the Vietcong's vision of itself in some sense includes an awareness of the human implications of the kind of war it is forced to fight, its interpretation of events in the United States appears to be filtered through the prism of ideology. For example, one is saddened by repeated references throughout these films to the "progressive American peoples" linked to shots of domestic anti-war demonstrations. Rather than realistically assessing the size and shape of current anti-war sentiment in this country, the film makers seem to have chosen to plug in the appropriate ideological platitude. It may be that, as James Cameron put it in his recent series of articles in *The New York Times*, "too many officials speak an English or French that was actually learned in slogans"; one also suspects that the twenty-year heritage of civil war brings with it a certain hardening of thought, an impatience with the niceties of language and distinction-making.

Once the narration is peeled away, and the images themselves are allowed to live for what they are, the texture of life in Vietnam forces its way through. Another film contains an extended sequence about captured equipment which begins as an apparent ode to self-sufficiency, only to move in a quite unexpected direction. From neatly stacked piles of guns and machinery, the camera turns to people making candleholders from

*Excerpts from "Films from the Vietcong," *The Nation*, 202, no.4 (January 24, 1966) pp. 110-111. Reprinted with the permission of *The Nation*, copyright holder.

what seem to be spent shells, to still others cutting jeep tires into sandal patterns. For a moment, the gulf between these people and a civilization which, even in peacetime, has managed to institutionalize the notion that *things* wear out, seems to loom larger than any logistical speculations about how the Vietcong supply themselves.

Of the six or so films now making the rounds, only one seems to go beyond the momentary revelatory glimpse to create a more whole impact. It was produced, probably by the NLF or a militant wing of the Buddhists, sometime after 1963 (there is no more precise internal evidence), and deals with the wave of demonstrations which followed the Diem government's suppression of the Buddhists.

It begins with what is a prologue of almost abstract battle footage: a montage of swooping planes, machinegun rattles and barbed wire, not unlike Lewis Milestone's *All Quiet on the Western Front*. Abruptly, we are swept into a slow processional of Buddhist priests going out into the streets of Saigon to demonstrate for what, to Americans, would seem to be the most basic of liberties—the freedom to worship. Great bales of barbed wire are unrolled in front of them by soldiers; the younger priests, whose faces strangely recall those of the early civil rights workers in the American South, quietly place their hands around the wire as the soldiers begin to try to cordon them off. A tear-gas grenade lunges across the street, streaming white smoke like some kind of mythic Oriental paper beast.

The Diem soldiers, in camouflaged battle dress and holding shields which resemble the tops of garbage cans and which they seem to use to ward off objects thrown at them by the crowd, begin to move against the priests; at this point, the film takes on the qualities of an ominous pageant play. Oddly incongruous Western symphonic music replaces the English narrator (who with good sense, has kept quiet throughout most of the demonstration sequence), and an unpredictable concordance of sound and image occurs: stock movie music joined with startling images raises the film to an entirely new level, toward a totality of emotion quite difficult to describe precisely. It is one of those rare moments in motion pictures when one plus one equals three. (Something of the sort happens in Luis Bunuel's *Land Without Bread*, a 1932 documentary of an impoverished region in Spain, in which Brahms's *Fourth Symphony* is used throughout the film *not* as a handy contrast but rather in an almost architectural way to provide a vaulting, an unattainable ceiling of emotion which hovers over the sordid level of human action.) Generally, the NLF film makers do not employ music in such ways; the music in other films is of an indeterminate martial nature, used conventionally to fill in behind the narrator.

The Buddhist film, in many ways the most successful of the NLF group, seems to have received less circulation than what is perhaps the most widely seen but unfortunately the least interesting of the lot. This picture, dated 1965 and bearing the title "Foreign Correspondents Visit the

National Liberation Front" (at any rate, something like that), records *Humanité* correspondents Wilfred Burchette and Madeleine Riffaud eating and singing with happy peasants. The film is almost completely uninformative and comes close to being embarrassing—Mlle. Riffaud is more than effuse in her desire to kiss and fondle young Vietcong guerrillas. The quality of the print is mercifully poor and a good portion of all this is practically invisible.

* * * * *

Although the NLF movies draw unexpectedly large audiences (mostly students) wherever they are shown, their net effect is ambiguous at best. They seldom exploit the motion picture as a particular form of communication, nor do they explore the special qualities that set it off from pamphlets or slide shows. The films do not achieve a sense of the camera's own participation in events, a sense present in the footage of volunteer cameramen for the Spanish Republic (*To Die in Madrid*). Judged by the standards we apply to works of art, or even against the more vague measure of some kind of immediacy of feeling, the work is crude and conventional. One responds with something of the suspicion Trotsky felt, perhaps unjustly, for the work of the poet Mayakovsky: "[he] shouts too often where one should speak; and so his cry, where cry is needed, sounds inadequate."

* * * * *

THE VIET CONG SLOGAN SLIP*

By the JUSPAO PLANNING STAFF

The slogan slip, containing short and succinct messages and appeals, has, because of its size, the advantage of being covertly distributed in enemy-held areas.

[One] tool in the Viet Cong communication armory is the slogan slip. This is a small slip of paper (some as small as two by three inches) which contains a short message expressing one idea. The most terse, for example, might read, "Down With the U.S.-Lackey Clique." Use of the slogan slip apparently stems from the experiences gained by the Soviet communists who have raised sloganeering to a high pitch. Of course revolutionaries have for generations used the slogan as a rallying cry, particularly among the less educated. For example, Patrick Henry's "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death." Or the Loyalist slogan of the Spanish Civil War: "It is better to die on your feet than live on your knees." Or Lenin's cry: "Land to the Tillers." Or almost anything from Madison Avenue.

One of the primary uses for [the] slogan slip by Viet Cong cadres is to help raise revolutionary consciousness. Villagers are encouraged to draft, produce and distribute slogan slips.

*Excerpts from "The Viet Cong Slogan Slip," JUSPAO Memorandum, February 9, 1966.

A captured Viet Cong directive for example declared that:

The slogan is a form of agitation that concentrates the determination of the masses to struggle, expresses the attitudes and actions of the masses to make revolution, and lowers the prestige and power of the enemy . . . They are of three types: those which praise our policies; those which express hatred especially for enemy crimes; and those which support the *binh van* proselyting movement.

It went on to say that slogans could be written on paper, on wood panels, carved into tree trunks and also lettered on walls or on large banners to be hung across roads leading into villages. The directive added:

Slogans may be written in the form of poetry, in verses of six or eight words, or in the form of words to popular songs. . . But all slogans must be written in serious and dignified form and not scrawled. Many slogans now used are disorderly. These must be improved. The masses must be taught to write slogans properly, hang them in public places, and protect them from enemy soldiers during clearing operations.

The directive gave an example of villagers protecting their slogan:

In one village the people wrote slogans on the bark of tree trunks. The enemy soldiers came to the village and saw the slogans on the tree and said, "We think we should cut down these trees with those offending words." The people replied to them: "If the Liberation soldiers had written the slogans on bridges would you blow up the bridges?" The soldiers were forced by this logic to withdraw, without cutting down the trees.

Slogan slips are generally distributed covertly. They are slipped into women's shopping baskets at markets, tossed in parked vehicles in the cities, placed at night in school room desks or simply scattered along paths and walks where they are apt to be found by pedestrians.

A . . . study . . . of 144 slogan slips, collected at random from throughout the country, indicates both the priority of audiences currently maintained by the Viet Cong as well as a general overview of current themes.

As far as language was concerned the vast majority of the slogan slips, about 90 percent, were in Vietnamese, with Montagnard dialects and English following in that order. The largest single target for the slogan slip was the general rural population; fifty percent were omnidirectional. The largest single target was members of ARVN, with Montagnards, youth, specifically rural, civil servants, Americans and Hoa Hao.

More than two thirds of the total number of slogan slips were devoted to two themes: support for the Viet Cong effort and proselyting of military and civil servants; these ranked about 40 percent and 30 percent respectively. Then came anti-U.S. themes of 12 percent (although anti-U.S. themes appeared as secondary themes in a majority of the sample), followed by 15 other themes of less than three percent each.

LEAFLETS AT A GLANCE

BY the EDITORS

Bold lettered leaflets were used in Vietnam to gain the attention of an audience in a rigidly controlled environment.

Even the most carefully designed message satisfying well-known effectiveness criteria such as comprehension and appeal may be a wasted effort. An essential condition for effective communication is that the attention of the audience is secured. In the case of printed matter, the minimal condition is that the message at least be seen; the desired effect is that the audience also read the message.

Seeing a message is no problem if the targeting is accurate; reading it, on the other hand, may constitute a grave danger to the recipients if the audience is in a controlled environment. For example, leaders of Axis and Communist forces in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam imposed severe penalties for reading Allied propaganda. Interviews with captured North Vietnamese and Viet Cong prisoners as well as captured enemy documents revealed that the reading of Allied propaganda could lead to harsh punishment, and possession of such leaflets could even mean death. Quite understandably, then, many of those disenchanted with their conditions were fearful of being caught by their leaders reading or possessing Allied leaflets.

A major problem facing psyoperators in Vietnam, as well as in earlier conflicts, was how to induce cadres in enemy ranks to read a message in an environment that was rigidly controlled. Allied psyoperators tried many techniques to overcome enemy countermeasures, and certainly one of the most interesting of these was "Leaflets-at-a-Glance" material. They were printed in bold letters so that they could be read from a distance with minimal danger to the audience. Of course, leaflets of this type are usually not suitable for directive purposes in a controlled environment; they are clumsy to carry or hide. They can, however, lower morale by reinforcing existing feelings of suspicion or duress. Moreover, "Leaflets-at-a-Glance" can fulfill a specific informational objective such as indicating where to look for or hide other Allied messages.

GOLDEN BRIDGES*

BY REUBEN S. NATHAN

Because one of the important elements of PSYOP is offering options, the absence of reasonable alternatives in the content of the communicator's message is counterproductive in a conflict situation, for instance, it often leaves the target audience little choice but to rally behind parties against whom the communicator was directing his message, whether they want to or not.

*Original essay by Reuben S. Nathan.

One of the main objectives of propaganda in times of war is to build Golden Bridges, to persuade the enemy that there is a way out, that there is no need to fight to the end. Leaving room for maneuver does not mean abandoning national objectives. War aims at changing governments, at eliminating hostile regimes which resist an equitable peace. People are eternal—they will be there after they and their governments have been defeated; they will continue to live and must be lived with. That is why good propaganda must see to it that they are not cornered, for cornered people will fight and kill until they die, and the people they kill will be one's own.

WORLD WAR II

We sensed at the time of the Casablanca conference—and we now know this supposition was correct—that the demand for unconditional surrender would make it next to impossible for the Germans opposing Hitler to overthrow him. They had nothing to offer to the people, no expectation that they would be able to negotiate an acceptable compromise.

Deprived of the opportunity to build Golden Bridges by the call for unconditional surrender, the Allied propagandists of World War II were severely limited in potential effectiveness. The war would be decided by guns; words that might conceivably have shortened it and so saved lives, had been disarmed.

According to Robert E. Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, President Roosevelt told his aide "We had so much trouble getting those two French generals [Giraud and de Gaulle] together that I thought to myself that this was as difficult as arranging the meeting of Grant and Lee—and then suddenly, the press conference was on, and Winston and I had had no time to prepare for it, and the thought popped into my mind that they had called Grant 'Old Unconditional Surrender,' and the next thing I knew I had said it."

In other words, the most important PSYWAR decision of World War II had not been the result of deliberate PSYWAR thinking. It had just "popped" into the President's mind. Admittedly, there were very few PSYWAR experts on the Allied side, apparently none on the staff of any of the leaders who met at Casablanca. One wonders whether Hitler would have made an equally momentous decision without consulting with Dr. Goebbels. One need not wonder what Stalin would have done for that is a matter of record. When the armies of the Soviet Union entered Germany, Ilja Ehrenburg's blunt anti-German line was abruptly dropped. Soviet propaganda instead proclaimed that Moscow had been fighting the Nazis but was aware that they would come and go and that the German people would remain—to be lived with. Soviet propaganda did not go in for brainstorming. Fictional propaganda seldom does. It relies on experts.

NORTH VIETNAM

Less than ten years ago we faced a similar situation in the decision to bomb North Vietnam. We know² that the first strikes were ordered in retaliation for attacks on U.S. barracks in Pleiku, and the following

"sustained reprisals" in response to increasing Viet Cong violence and direct North Vietnamese involvement in the war. The situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating; a close advisor to the president felt that defeat was "inevitable" unless the United States put pressure on Hanoi. If there was any reference to psychological considerations, they came from former President Eisenhower who did not think that air strikes against the North could prevent the North Vietnamese from infiltrating men and supplies in to the South, but who seemed to feel that they would help South Vietnamese morale.

There is no mention that U.S. Information Agency directors attempted to present the case for psychological operations. Yet, there was a case to be made. It is possible that it should have been overruled for compelling military and political reasons, and probable that it would have been overruled, but it had sufficient merits to be taken into consideration.

First, we had, at least theoretically, an excellent opportunity to demoralize North Vietnamese troops fighting in South Vietnam. They had had a very hard time getting to South Vietnam. Presumably, many of them were tired and ill. They were cut off from their families, not even permitted to write home or receive letters, and their lines of resupply were tenuous. They had been told that they would fight imperialist American aggressors but there were not many Americans in Vietnam in the Spring and Summer of 1965, and they found themselves fighting other Vietnamese. Many of them may not have understood why. They were, in sum, tailor-made targets for PSYWAR, the operator's wishdream.

Bombing North Vietnam changed that. Suddenly all North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam had a reason to fight, a reason any one of them could understand. The Americans were threatening the lives, limbs, and homes of their families. Fathers, husbands, brothers, sons began to have a personal stake in the war.

Second, the air strikes put an end to any hopes to divide the people of North Vietnam at home. It is axiomatic that there is no such thing as a permanently united nation. Even the most fanatic totalitarian governments face a domestic opposition—voiceless, it is true, but opposition nevertheless. We might have strengthened that opposition by making people question the wisdom of Hanoi's warring in South Vietnam—the casualties, the draft, the cost, the sacrifices, the austerity. But it is also axiomatic that bombing attacks make people rally behind their government whether they like it or not. There is nowhere else to look for leadership and protection. The British were never as united as they were behind Winston Churchill while German bombers, buzzbombs, and rockets threatened their lives. Yet only a few months after the threat had ended, they repudiated the man who had united them. They returned to "normalcy," division, and opposition. It is interesting to note that the termination of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam immediately created problems for Hanoi. French and Canadian reporters related them: black-marketeering, indifference of youth, goldbricking, a

slackening of disciplined production. Hanoi was forced, time and again, to remind the people that the war was still on and that they had duties.

Nobody can say whether we would have succeeded in demoralizing North Vietnamese troops or in driving wedges between the people and the government of North Vietnam; the point is that there was a chance to do so, that this chance might have weakened Hanoi significantly, and that the bombing of North Vietnam deprived us of that chance. It follows that the case should at least have been given a hearing. We had no such hearing in Casablanca, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, or when the decision to bomb North Vietnam was made. This must change if the enormous capabilities of PSYWAR are to come into their own.

NOTES

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), p. 696.

² Lyndon B. Johnson, *Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 124 ff

SIHANOUK'S APPEAL TO THE MONKS OF CAMBODIA* By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

Because the success of PSYOP depends heavily on the receptivity of the target audience, a good sense of timing and skill in exploiting an opportunity become important elements in the delivery of a message or appeal.

Peking NCNA International carried a message from Prince Norodom Sihanouk to the Khmer Buddhist monks on September 17th. In his message [one of four] he asked the monks of Cambodia to join him in his struggle to regain his throne.

The gist of his message was designed to impress upon the Buddhist monks their duty to stand on the side of the city poor, the exploited workers, and the peasants rather than with people who "have sold the country to U.S. neo-colonialism." In this regard, he felt that the Lon Nol group did not deserve support from monks because of the manner in which it took over the reigns of government.

In order to oppose this neo-colonialist undertaking of the Americans, [Sihanouk continued,] it is necessary for the people of Asia to reconcile with one another, unite and fight together, regardless of their beliefs and ideology. It is absolutely wrong to distinguish believers from atheists, non-Communist from Communist. For the safety, freedom and independence of our Asian countries, it is necessary for us to create a union and solidarity among all the Asians determined to fight for an Asia free from imperialism and neo-colonialism. It is necessary for us to expose the renegades in Asia and to fight against those who, prompted by ambitions and personal interests, serve the unjustifiable cause of U.S. imperialism.

In the next portion of Sihanouk's message he points out five cases in which people with seemingly good paying jobs and happy families have

*Excerpted and adapted from "Sihanouk's Appeal to the Monks of Cambodia," "Communist Propaganda: Highlights: Trends and Analysis," Issue No. 41-70 (9 October 1970), pp. 41-4-41-9.

left their jobs and family to join him. According to Sihanouk these people now have only very modest pay but feel they are working for a good cause. "In one case," Sihanouk said, "those students living abroad who agree to support Lon Nol have received big rewards (some have even been given 300 U.S. dollars each). In Europe, the student members of the National United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK) remain poor. They lack money, and sometimes they have only one meal a day."

Let our monks and Samdech, head of the sect, take pains to ask themselves why all these young and old patriots agree to such sacrifices and such hardships. Let them ask themselves why our citizens of the provinces, young and old, men and women, yesterday in hundreds and today in thousands, agree spontaneously to leave their houses, rice fields, farmland, livestock and carts, etc., in order to join the people's heroes Khieu Samphan Hu Nim, and Hou Youn in the jungle.

* * * * *

In this regard, I would like to state precisely for our Buddhist monks that first, the said Communist states of Eastern Europe have not given their official recognition to the Lon Nol government which was born of the coup of last 18 Mar; secondly, some of these very European Communist states have recognized officially, while others admitted publicly, that Norodom Sihanouk remains the legal head of state of Cambodia; thirdly, the political parties, the people's fronts, and the people of these very countries have officially given their recognition to the NUFK as the only representative of the Khmer people and have time and again and most expressly affirmed their support to our people and their NUFK in our struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys and for national salvation and the liberation of the Khmer motherland; fourthly, the refusal by certain European Communist governments to recognize the RGNK by no means signifies that they support or like the regime of Lon Nol.

This refusal might be explained by certain interests of their own of these governments. This should lead our Buddhist monks to think over the policies, attitudes, maneuvers, and actions of certain powers in Asia which seem unwilling to see the Asians become complete masters of the destinies of their Asia and of their Asian countries

* * * * *

Therefore, [said Sihanouk in closing,] if our Buddhist monks and Samdech, head of the sect, like our nation, agree to look these realities straight in the face, I am sure that they will not fail to march on the just roads towards a future which would not be in contradiction to the national ideals of pure patriotism, peoples democracy and genuine freedom.

Comment: Sihanouk broadcast his speeches at a time when the people were about to observe their oldest and most significant Buddhist ceremony, the Festival of the Dead. Offerings of food and garments are made to the monks during the first 15 days of the tenth lunar month. The reasoning behind the broadcast of the speeches at this time is that the monks have a great deal of influence on the people and many of them probably have not lost all loyalty to Sihanouk. He knows that if he can possibly get the support of the monks at this time, he would also keep the support of a large majority of the people.

The four speeches, employing kaleidoscopic verbosity, suggest that the people come back to the pure and simple life. He appears to be trying to sway the Khmer by explaining that others in seemingly good paying jobs have given up everything to support him, hoping that the monks and their followers might heed the advice and actions of these people and join him. Sihanouk would like the Khmer to think if they do not join him they will be dishonoring the Kingdom of Cambodia and the sacred Buddha.

There are several points of view about Sihanouk and the Buddhists. Some say the Buddhist clergy no longer are charmed by Sihanouk and thus would be unlikely to try to persuade their followers. Others believe that Sihanouk still has a pretty strong hold on the Buddhist clergy and, through them, on the people.

THE FAMOUS "MIG" LEAFLET*

By CARL BERGER

Subsequent results of messages will not always be predictable; it is therefore incumbent upon the communicator to scrutinize messages carefully and attempt to detect the potential for unintended effects, both positive and negative.

Occasionally, a special leaflet operation will produce important side effects. This was the case with the special offer made by the U.N. Command in April and May 1953, an offer of \$50,000 to any Communist pilot who would deliver a MIG jet fighter or other modern Soviet jet to the United Nations forces in Korea. An additional bonus of \$50,000 was promised the first pilot to bring in a plane.

The offer was disseminated by airdrops of special leaflets written in Korean, Chinese, and Russian. In addition, the offer was carried in these languages over the U.N. radio network. Both the leaflet and radio media gave detailed flight plans where Communist pilots could bring in planes safely under escort by U.N. fighters.

Not until several weeks after the July 1953 Armistice in Korea, did a North Korean jet pilot come out of the skies, land at Kimpo airfield near Seoul, and ask for political asylum. The pilot said he had never heard of the jet offer, but since American truthfulness was at stake, the U.S. Air Force paid the pilot the \$100,000 reward and the offer was withdrawn. But this was not the whole story. General Mark Clark, U.N. Commander, later reported that the Air Force not only got its \$100,000 worth in information from tests on the Russian jet, but the operation had had important military side effects.

According to Clark, the Communists' first reaction to the offer

was to ground all MIGs for eight days. It might have been because of the weather, or because they wanted time to screen out the politically unreliable pilots. Most likely, it was the latter. An eight-day break in MIG operations in Korea was most unusual. For whatever reason, the Communist MIG pilots who were permitted to fly after the offer was made were the worst—on their record—of the whole Korean War. They flew far fewer missions in those last ninety days than in the preceding three months, but American Sabrejet pilots shot down twice as many planes. In fact, the Sabres destroyed 165 MIGs against three friendly combat losses—a record ratio of 55 to one.

Conceding that the pilots knew of the offer—and Communist reactions appear to grant that point—here was an instance of a measurably successful psychological operation.

*Excerpts from *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets*, Documentary Study No. 1, The American University, Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C., 1959, AD 220 821, pp. 74-76

Since 1953 this type of leaflet operation has been used by the Chinese Nationalists, who have dropped leaflets over the Communist mainland, offering Red pilots who defected to Taiwan with MIG planes from 1,000 to 4,000 ounces of gold, depending on the model plane they brought in. As far as is known, no Chinese Communist pilots have taken advantage of the offer. The Nationalists also have scattered leaflets offering Chinese Communist naval personnel up to 100,000 ounces of gold (\$3,500,000) if they brought in a light cruiser.

NOTES

¹ Mark Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: 1954), pp. 205-207.

PRETESTING THE PRODUCT*

BY WILBUR SCHRAMM

Pretesting the content of propaganda messages to assess in advance their potential impact on an audience will increase the chances of their being effective.

The problem in all types of psywar operations is to predict or estimate the effect of a psywar operation without being able to measure freely the actual responses of the target audience.

There are, in general, three ways to evaluate the effect of a psywar product in this difficult situation. Admittedly each one is only an approximation. None of them is as satisfactory as an uninhibited study of the target audience itself would be. Yet an evaluation of what psywar is accomplishing is so enormously important to planning and practice that any psywar operation stands to gain tremendously from whatever it can learn from these methods.

EXPERTS

The simplest of these methods is the *jury of experts*. These should be persons who are thoroughly acquainted with the target country, its culture, and its people. They should preferably have lived in the target country for a long time and should have left it only very recently. Ideally they should be natives of the target country. Their absolute loyalty to the country that wants to use them as jury members must, however, be beyond question.

The procedure is for this jury to be asked to read or listen to the psywar material being directed at the target in question and predict what its effect will be within the target. Will it attract attention? Will it be understood? What reaction will it produce? Will it be accepted and believed? Will it change any minds or lead anyone to take the action desired? How could it be made more effective?

*Excerpts from *The Nature of Psychological Warfare*, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Md., September 1953.

The jury, of course, can be asked to *pretest* as well as to *posttest* the psywar output. That is, a leaflet designed for the target can be shown to the jury *before* it has been disseminated, and the criticisms and predictions of the experts can be used either in revising it or in deciding when and where to disseminate it. This is also possible, though less convenient, in the case of radio broadcasts.

The report of the jury will be valid only to the extent that the jury is truly expert, that is, to the extent to which it can put itself in the place of the target audience and anticipate the processes by which the audience will respond to the psywar material.

SAMPLE OF PERSONS

A second method of evaluation is the use of a *sample of persons as similar as possible to the target audience*. These can be refugees, defectors, POWs, or other natives available to the psywar planners. Continuous effort should be made to match the sample as closely as possible to the actual target audience. For example, if there is any reason to think that different groups within the target might react in different ways to the propaganda, then representatives of each of these groups should be included in the sample. Thus if three-fifths of the target population is illiterate, a sizable proportion (ideally, three-fifths) of the sample should be illiterate, so that their reactions will be reflected more prominently in the results than the reactions of literates. If there is a powerful trade union group in the target, with opinions and probable reactions of their own, then trade unionists should be represented in some such proportion in the sample.

Ideally, then, the sample should be a perfect miniature of the target audience. The picture as regards sex distribution, age distribution, geographical distribution, occupation distribution, economic status, educational levels, political viewpoints, and the like, should be the same as within the target. Practically, this is very hard if not impossible to achieve. It is considerably harder to put together a reliable miniature sample than to put together a panel of experts, for the miniature sample is only as good as it is really representative.

But if a representative sample can be obtained, then very useful results can be expected. The procedure is simply to expose the panel to the psywar material, and find out, from responses to before-and-after questions, what happens to the readers or listeners. Did they read or listen to all of it? What did they think of it? Did they understand it? Did they change any opinion as a result of it? What made them believe it, or kept them from believing it?

There are some real dangers involved in both methods, even when the experts using them are really expert and the sample is really representative. One of these dangers is that the members of the jury or the sample may give the opinions they think the questioner wants to hear. This is especially likely when the respondents are impoverished and insecure (for

example, refugees, defectors, and prisoners highly dependent on the income or preferment promised them for their cooperation and perhaps reluctant to criticize the questioners' propaganda unfavorably). It is still more likely when prisoners of war are used for the jury or the sample, since they may give deliberately false answers in the hope of making the propaganda ineffective. The evaluators must therefore investigate potential jury or sample members as carefully as possible before retaining them. Subsequently, these members must be tested from time to time with, for example, deliberately planted propaganda that is known to be poor or to differ in some important way from the material previously given, so as to find out whether their answers change with the changing material.

ENEMY SOURCES

The third kind of evaluation consists of a number of techniques, all of which in one way or other belong under the rubric of *intelligence*. The psywar unit should use every available avenue of intelligence in its attempt to find out about the effects of its propaganda on the target. Here are some of the ways in which intelligence sources can be used: [See Chapter VII of this casebook.]

Undercover Agents. These can be used as participant observers to report on the way psywar material is being received in their areas, and on the effects it produces. This is perhaps the most reliable single device; the agent can discuss the psywar with members of the target audience, listen in on conversations about it, and observe any actions that appear to result from it. All this calls, of course, both for an able agent and a good channel through which he can report.

Prisoners of War. These can be interviewed soon after capture. They can be asked what psywar material has come to their attention, what their own reactions are to it, what are the reactions of their fellow soldiers and superior officers, and what is the general state of opinion and morale in their military units.

Routine Intelligence. News, intercepted letters, captured documents, statistical reports, and information from defectors and other persons interviewed can and should be screened for information bearing upon the effectiveness of our psywar.

The Enemy's Actions. These often tell us something about the effects of our psywar messages. For example, variations in the number of surrenders are often revealing. So are the enemy's countermeasures. His counterpropaganda, monitored and analyzed, sometimes tells us which of our campaigns are proving especially bothersome. In the case of broadcasting, the programs he jams may tell us what we are accomplishing with what messages.

No psywar unit will rely on any one of these methods exclusively. Not to use all possible evaluative information out of available intelligence is inexcusable. Any operation will be able, without too much trouble, to set

up a small jury of expert observers; a representative sample is not beyond the resources of most field operations. But the information obtained from any one of these methods ought to be checked against what comes from the others; for example, what the jury says about a leaflet ought to be checked as often as possible with POWs who are being interviewed, and also with the information that comes out of the target country. When the judgments from the various methods tally, the presumption in favor of their validity is greatly increased.

EXPLOITATION OF CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

Use of different media forms to simplify the flow of messages and appeals from communicator to target is discussed in the papers in this section. The psyoperator's choice of media will depend on the size and distribution of the target and the cultural ways of the audience. In some cases the audiences for the same message will be diverse, yet circumstances may preclude tailoring the message to individual groups within the larger audience. The use of visual communications in the Nigerian civil war is an example of such a situation.

The third essay points out that media choice should also depend on the control authorities may have over the means of communication. This is a special consideration, particularly when developing propaganda campaigns for totalitarian societies. "New Broadcasting on Soviet Radio and Television" indicates the specific place radio and television broadcasting have in Soviet agitation and propaganda.

Leaflets, magazines, and wall posters are three widely used channels of communicating propaganda messages and appeals through printed matter. Technical matters such as the attention-getting features of magazine content, particularly when geared to intellectual groups, are of major importance. The wall poster, as illustrated in "Tatzepao: Medium of Conflict in China's Cultural Revolution," one form of mass media which does not depend on a high degree of literacy and availability of receivers, is one of the most dramatic means of communicating political ideas.

Accessibility of the target to the psyoperator's messages and appeals has been a serious problem in PSYOP campaigns. Some unusual techniques include the use of loudspeakers in broadcasting appeals from captured enemies, the use of postage stamps, and the use of cannon and balloons. The Vietnam experience in the development of aircraft as a PSYOP medium is reviewed in "Psychological Operations and Air Power: Its Hits and Misses."

Culturally designed techniques of communicating political ideas have been used extensively in Southeast Asia. Theater is not widely used as a propaganda device in the Western world, but in some cultures where the tradition is strong, drama teams, as political communications, may be one of the most important means of reaching a largely illiterate rural population if the messages are congenial to audience predispositions. Similarly, the North Vietnamese government uses songs to generate greater loyalty among its citizens.

The symbolic act may be referred to as a form of nonverbal communication. The authors of "Symbolic Acts as Psyop" see the importance of the symbolic in the meaning that it conveys to the target group and not in the physical impact that may result from it.

The use of individuals as channels for communicating messages and appeals is taken up in the last two essays of this section. "The Old Vietnamese as a Communicant" ascribes to aged individuals in Vietnamese society the role of disseminating ideas. In "An Unknown Warrior," the use of ralliers or returnees as a medium for reaching guerrillas and their families is discussed.

Many of these essays focus on a single incident or technique. In the final essay of this section, Morris Davis indicates the diverse communication interaction taking place simultaneously in the course of a civil conflict.

COMMUNICATION AND THE USE OF MASS MEDIA*

BY JOHN DENNIS LANIGAN

Making it easy for the target audience to receive a propaganda message or appeal will depend in large part on the communicator's choice of media.

No matter how primitive or oppressed a society is, there will normally be more communication presented to it than can possibly be received by everyone. We can only listen to one radio station at a time and can only read so much material in a day. . . . Hence, communicators (propagandists, of course included) should attempt to make it easy and beneficial for a target audience to "tune in." That is, they want to decrease the effort required to receive a message and increase the expectation of reward that will accrue from having received it. [Although] the problem of increasing the expectation of reward is primarily one of message content, . . . decreasing the effort required to receive a message is highly dependent on the media used to propagate it. . . . For this reason, we shall discuss the types of mass media in some detail.

THE MASS MEDIA

Numerous studies have been conducted to test the effects of the various forms of mass media on the understanding and retentive capabilities of a target audience. Such studies and experiments should be interpreted carefully. Laboratory tests may suggest that television is the most effective means of electronic communication. However, this result would prove to be virtually meaningless if the "real world" audience with which we wished to communicate had different characteristics than the "test" audience; or, in the extreme, if there was only one television set per

*Excerpts from "A Media Allocation Model for Psychological Operations," M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, California, June 1968, AD 841104. Reprinted with the permission of the author.

million people in the "real world" audience. The point to be made is that laboratory results do not necessarily reflect "real world" happenings. There is no hard and fast set of rules to govern choice of media. The attributes and drawbacks of the various forms of mass media will take on different values for different target audiences. For instance, depth of treatment is considered to be one of the attributes of print, but this "attribute" would be of minimal import if the target audience was illiterate. Hence, the general considerations of each form of mass media discussed below should be interpreted liberally.

FACE-TO-FACE DISCOURSE

Almost all studies on the subject of advertising or psychological operations are in agreement that face-to-face discourse is the most effective individual instrument of persuasion. The following psychological advantages are considered to be the primary reasons for its success:

1. It is more usually engaged in and will often attract an audience that would not trouble itself to receive the same information by other forms of mass communication.
2. The perpetrator of face-to-face discourse can mold his manner of presentation to suit a particular target audience. In this way, he can largely reduce resistance to his message.
3. By expressions of pleasure or displeasure, the target audience can be rewarded or punished for their reaction.
4. The source of face-to-face discourse may be a trusted or intimate friend of the target audience from whom information is believable; e.g., a clergyman.
5. It is sometimes possible to accomplish objectives without first instilling conviction. For instance, if the leader of a local young men's organization tells its members to sign up for service in the militia, some may join just to keep from discrediting themselves in the eyes of their leader.

We recognize that there are many cases when face-to-face discourse is not a practical method of communicating with a target audience. It would hardly be worthwhile for the United States to try to infiltrate men behind the "Iron Curtain" or into Communist China to start a program of face-to-face confrontations on the evils of communism and benefits of "free world" life. The costs would be great and the gains comparatively small. The Nationalist Chinese have on occasion attempted to infiltrate men into the mainland of China to instigate dissatisfaction in the populace. In every recorded case they have been captured almost immediately upon entering the country.²³ (We pre-suppose that the people of Communist China are more afraid of the consequences of not reporting an intruder than they are willing to chance a possibility of bettering their way of life; that is, the expectation of reward is negligible as compared to the effort required.)

Face-to-face discourse may also be considered to include the spectrum of discussions that take place daily throughout the world. Tests have

shown that casual conversations, as differentiated from formal addresses, are potentially more influential than any form of formal communication.²³ For this reason, the proponents of a propaganda campaign should be careful not to alienate any major fraction of the target audience, for the initial harm done could be greatly magnified through dissemination of discontent from that portion of the target audience alienated.

RADIO

In the recent past, radio proved to be an efficient means of mass communication to various target audiences. In the field of psychological operations, Radio Free Europe and The Voice of America have been broadcasting for years in an effort to "educate" peoples of the Communist world. The advantages of radio include: ²

1. The number of people that can be reached at one time is usually large.
2. The propagandist can gain a nation-wide audience by using networks or by increasing the power of this transmitter. He can also pinpoint a specific target audience by properly establishing a low-power transmitter.
3. Audience selectively can also be gained by scheduling at different times and by use of different types of radio programs.
4. It has a special persuasive quality as a companion, a friend, and a prime source of information for the listener.

When we consider the use of radio in communicating with a target audience we should not only be concerned with the present density of radios within the population. We should also project the costs and benefits that would accrue if we were to distribute radios to members of the population. In some cases it may be more cost-effective to give ten or twenty radios to every village within a country than it would be to attempt to communicate with the people by any other means. Of course, if we are considering giving away radios we must also consider that our intended audience may, in fact, use the radios to tune in on our enemies.

PRINT

The printed word, whether it be in the form of newspapers, magazines, leaflets, or any other form, has distinct advantages over the other types of media. The primary ones are: ²³

1. The reader is able to pace himself as he desires. He can ponder over important points and skip those that hold no interest for him.
2. Printed matter remains available for the reader to peruse for months or even years after the initial reading.
3. Difficult or complex topics can be treated in depth for the reasons given in (1) and (2) above.
4. It is possible to specialize appeals by utilizing the knowledge that certain people read particular types of magazines or sections of the newspaper.

5. Print may have greater prestige than the other forms of mass media. This is attributed to the fact that it is one of the oldest of the mass media and that print and "culture" have been traditionally associated.

A recent radio advertisement stated, "Montaigne once wrote, 'What do we do about those people who will not believe anything unless they see it in print?'" The advertisement went on to give the answer, "Print it, of course." As one might guess the advertisement was for a printing and lithographic company. However, it is probably true that some of these people who will not believe anything unless they see it in writing, will believe anything that is written.

When planning the use of print, we must take into account the literacy of the target audience. (The fact that a certain audience may be illiterate may not negate the use of print but it will certainly affect the amount of pictorial or symbolic material required.) We also need to consider the ease of dissemination. If we control the press it will certainly be much easier to reach the people than if we have to rely on covert publications or leaflet drops.

SCREEN

When we consider the use of screen, television or movies we are implicitly assuming that our audience is indigenous to a country in which we have some degree of control. The present state of the art in television is such that signals cannot be projected satisfactorily over great distances without a purposeful receiving station in the proximity of the target audience. Further, a television signal is considerably easier to "jam" and the prevalence of television sets in the areas of the world that are of major concern in our propaganda efforts is low. Likewise, there is little opportunity to show movies favorable to the "free world" in such countries as Cuba, Russia or Communist China. Hence, the benefits that we ascribe to the screen are greatly diluted by the opportunity for its use. The benefits are:²

1. Concrete visual material is presented.
2. Recall of what has been seen is generally excellent.
3. Children are particularly impressed by what they see.

INTERACTIONS AMONG MASS MEDIA

Almost every propaganda campaign will include the use of more than one type of media to communicate with the target audience. If the target audience receives the same message by more than one medium, his belief in what he is receiving will normally be fortified. However, if different messages relating to the same incident or different interpretations on a particular propaganda theme are received via two different media, then, the target audience becomes confused, probably believes neither message, and loses some faith in both media. Credibility is hard to establish initially, but virtually impossible to re-establish once it is lost; hence, a cardinal rule for the use of mass media is to be consistent in all communication.

* * * * *

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VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR*

BY MORRIS DAVIS

Pictures may well be "worth a thousand words" in impact, but they are not necessarily an objective source of information

Like Vietnam, the Nigerian-Biafran War involved not only men and material and words, but widely disseminated visual representations. It was a television war, a picture-magazine war, a newspaper-photographs war. Nigerian officials never really understood this sector of communications. When (to demonstrate their quick justice) they executed before the cameras the Nigerian officer who had a short time earlier (to show his serious intent) executed before the camera a captured Biafran, all they accomplished for most viewers was the piling of one revulsion upon another. The Biafrans, too, did not fully appreciate the graphic media. They rarely disseminated pictures, either directly or through the Bernhardt agency [see Chapter IV of this casebook]. Nor did they carry through with Robert Goldstein's plans for a full-length color film. But they really did not have to accomplish any of this for themselves. The sole necessity was that photographers and cameramen be let in; and that Biafra quickly learned to do.

In visual reporting, Nigeria could not win and Biafra could not lose. Pictures of nice Nigerian soldiers feeding and playing with smiling children in recaptured areas of the East looked phony and staged, no matter how frequent and genuine such conciliatory practices may have been. Pictures of malnourished, pain-wracked, half-dead Biafran children were instantaneously moving and plausible. Some of the imbalance in photo-coverage, to be sure, was due to Nigerian failures to cooperate with visiting crews. (The C.B.S. program "60 Minutes" struggled manfully in an effort to present a balanced report from both Biafra and Nigeria.) But even if Nigeria had been more adept and open-armed, its Biafran opposition would still have garnered most of the favorable visual reporting.

*Excerpts from "The Structuring of International Communications about the Nigeria Biafra War," a paper prepared for delivery at the Eighth European Conference, Peace Research Society (International), London School of Economics, August 20, 1971. Reprinted with the permission of The Peace Research Society (International), copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

Television presentations were often compelling enough to stir other significant actors to important decisions. An ITN telecast viewed by an Oxfam staff member was apparently a major contributory factor in that organization's precipitous mounting of a large relief campaign. (Oxfam, incidentally, found to its surprise that Biafran officials in London could provide it with no pictures at all of starving children—the only photographs they had were of the 1966 massacres—and it had to rely on friends in the popular press for the picture which, in a cropped form, it featured in its publicity materials.) Similarly, a New York television appearance by Abie Nathan in late 1968 was seen by a member of . . . [a U.S. Senator's] staff and was responsible for a chain of conversations which awoke the Senator to the importance of the war and convinced him to visit the area early next year. Quite obviously, the mass media did not communicate just with the masses.

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MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION AND PROPAGANDA*

BY B. S. MURTY

The choice of means to communicate a message or appeal across national boundaries will often depend on the control the communicator has over these means

The medium employed indicates the speed and reach of the communication and the expectations likely to be formed about its impact on the audience. The following are the most common media of communication employed by the strategists:

HUMAN BEINGS

. . . Travelers, traders, students, scholars, agents of political parties, people working in secret intelligence services, public information agencies of governments, all serve the function of channels of dissemination and/or intelligence. The extent to which each of these classes of persons functions, and their efficacy, indeed vary. [There are] advantages that strategists may derive by organizing or disintegrating groups, and by controlling intragroup communication processes.

. . . The elite which vigorously employs the ideological strategy generally takes to organization of strictly disciplined groups in its own state and in the opposing states. It also builds transnational political parties and tries to infiltrate men into other groups, either to disintegrate or gain control over them.¹

MAILS

In addition to written and printed materials transmitted through the mails, postal markings and stamps may be used to disseminate prop-

*Excerpts from *Propaganda and World Public Order*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1968. Reprinted with the permission of Yale University Press, copyright holder

aganda symbols.² As a means of transnational communication the potentiality of mails is limited, for the territorial authority may censor, refuse to transmit, or confiscate the mails if anything is found in or on them prejudicial to its interests.

Censorship of mail serves another purpose also, and that is to learn some secret information which the opponent is suppressing. Especially during war, censoring of mail may yield considerable useful information regarding the enemy.³

PRINTED MATERIALS

These constitute a very important medium of communication. When used as a means of transnational communication, the effectiveness of the medium can be minimized by the government of the territory to which the materials are despatched by adopting measures such as seizure at the customs posts.⁴ If the opposing elite tightens the frontier controls, printed materials may be transmitted by air-dropping, shooting leaflet-shells, and dropping by means of plastic balloons.⁵

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Under this head may be included telegraph, telephone, and wireless communications transmitted either in Morse code, or by teleprinter, or in the form of multidirectional radio communications.⁶ Although these channels provide very rapid means of transmission of intelligence to processing centers and the processed materials to centers of dissemination, the extent to which strategists could use them in ideological strategy is limited by one factor: the government of the territory in which the transmission or reception points are located may exercise a high degree of control, weeding out anything likely to prejudice the government's interests.

RADIO BROADCASTING

This is by far the most effective means of mass communication available now to reach instantaneously audiences practically all over the world, and is believed to be the most efficacious means of transnational communication. The government that does not make use of this medium is exceptional. The Soviet Union initiated its use for transnational propaganda and all the leading states have, since the 1930s, copied its example.⁷

The government of the state to which transmission is made may, however, attempt to prevent its people from listening to the broadcasts by prohibiting listening to foreign broadcasts, jamming the radio waves, and denying to the people radio sets capable of receiving foreign broadcasts. Limiting reception to transmission by wire is another device. It was reported in 1951 that in the Soviet Union 18 percent of the receiving sets were capable of direct reception and the rest were useful only for reception by wire.⁸ In addition, the Soviet Union's jamming operations were at one time employed on a colossal scale.⁹ However, restrictive

measures such as these to prevent listening to foreign broadcasts may rouse the curiosity of the audience and induce them to adopt a good number of devious methods to circumvent the measures.

TELEVISION

Television may, for all practical purposes, be included in the category of radio broadcasting. It supplies additionally the advantage of combining visual image with aural communication.¹⁰ The advent of the communication satellites has tremendously increased the reach of television broadcasting.

MOVIES

Movies are a very effective medium of mass communication. But they can be used in an opposing state only within the limits permitted by its government.

It is not possible to say categorically that one medium of communication is more effective than another. Each has its merits and shortcomings. There is little doubt, however, that the most effective means of influencing the audience are communication by mass media followed by face-to-face contact by human agents.¹¹

* * * * *

NOTES

¹ See generally, Sington and Weidenfeld.

² For instances, see *New York Times*, March 27, 1957, the United States for Freedom postmarks were placed on mails transmitted from the U.S.A. to Hungary and stopped by the Hungarian government. For controversy between the governments of India and Pakistan over similar use of postal markings by Pakistan, see 6 *Foreign Affairs Record* 86 (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, External Publicity Division, 1960). See also in this connection the editorial in the *New York Times*, April 19, 1962, on Communist propaganda through mails.

³ See Koop, p. 5 et seq.

⁴ In September 1963, Soviet officials searched 92 Chinese passengers, army officers proceeding to the U.S.S.R. for training, at the railway station at Zabaikalski; when they refused to surrender some newspapers and printed materials alleged to be anti-Soviet, they were not permitted to proceed further and were sent back. See *New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1963.

⁵ For a description of the operations of leaflet drops by plastic balloons, see *New York Times*, February 11, 1956, balloons were used as early as 1871 (Whitton and Larson, p. 24).

⁶ For a description of the various means by which telecommunications are currently used to transmit news, see F. Williams, *Transmitting World News, A Study of Telecommunications and the Press* (Paris: UNESCO, 1953).

⁷ The Voice of America, in 1956, broadcast in 43 languages to Europe, Latin America, the Near East, South Asia, Africa, and the Far East, see Martin, p. 28. The B.B.C., by 1946, was broadcasting on 31 transmitters, in 46 languages, for 616 hours weekly, *ibid.* p. 8. In regard to the U.S.S.R., see *ibid.* p. 47, Whitton and Larson, p. 50, regarding Communist China, see Hour, pp. 156-58.

⁸ Inkeles, p. 238 also see H. N. Graves, Jr., *War on the Short-Wave*, Foreign Policy Headline Series No. 30 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1941), p. 52. The author says that the Nazis introduced a receiving set called the "People's Set" which was incapable of receiving foreign transmissions. In 1938, only about one third of the sets in Germany were capable of receiving foreign transmissions. After the war broke out, listening to

foreign broadcasts was banned. See also Singleton and Weidenfeld, p. 145. In Japan, from 1933, possession of short-wave sets was banned and penalties were provided for listening to foreign broadcasts. In occupied territories, as for example in Burma, the receiving sets of the people were remodeled. See Peter de Mendelssohn, *Japan's Political Warfare* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1944), p. 33. Communist China uses extensively wire-transmission (Houn, pp. 162-66).

⁹ For details of the transmitters used for jamming when the cold war was intensifying, see 21 *Dept. of State Bull.* 312 (1949); also, the speech of the U.S. representative before the U.N. General Assembly (G.A.O.R., Fifth Sess., 3rd Committee, 1950, p. 279). However, in recent years there has been a progressive decrease in jamming operations. President Kennedy reported at a press conference on October 10, 1963, that for many months the Voice of America broadcasts had not been jammed by the Soviet Union. See *The Hindu*, Oct. 11, 1963.

¹⁰ It is said that at present, apart from the United States, 82 nations have television broadcasting. There are about 56 million receiving sets and 995 broadcasting stations outside the United States. In the United States there are over 500 TV broadcasting stations. See Gordon, Falk, and Hodapp, pp. 137-38.

¹¹ For detailed information see J. T. Klapper, "The Comparative Effects of the Various Media," W. Schramm, ed., *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, pp. 104-05. and the editorial note, p. 91 et seq. Four factors, it is said, are relevant in this context: (1) *time-space* (i.e. whether the communicator has control over the material to be communicated and when to introduce it); (2) *participation* (by the audience in the communication process); (3) *speed*; and (4) *permanence*. Printed material has the advantage of fairly good time-space control and of permanence, but is not useful if the audience cannot read, and is slower than radio broadcasting. In favor of radio broadcasting are factors 2 and 3, but not 1 and 4. Human agents have in their favor factors 1 and 2.

NONGOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR*

By MORRIS DAVIS

A discussion of the multiplicity of communication channels in an internationalized "domestic" crisis.

To describe accurately and clearly so complex a quasi-system as that of the [unofficial] international communications about the Nigerian-Biafran War involves difficulties not unlike Joyce's attempt to convey the boredom of church sermons in his *Portrait of an Artist* without at the same time boring the reader. Phenomena and their descriptions are, to be sure, separate in theory, but their separation is in practice still quite difficult to achieve. In the comments below we shall try to describe facts usefully and yet not impose more of a "system" on activities than they reasonably bear.

* * * * *

*Excerpts from "The Structuring of International Communications about the Nigeria-Biafra War," a paper prepared for delivery at the Eighth European Conference, Peace Research Society (International), London School of Economics, August 20, 1971, pp. 1-12. Reprinted with the permission of The Peace Research Society (International), copyright holder and the courtesy of the author.

STUDENTS ABROAD

Many Nigerians and Biafrans—particularly students—lived away from their homeland during the war. Often they kept in touch with their government's local officials and would receive various propaganda material. For at least two interconnected reasons, however, they were rarely crucial communicators in their country of domicile. On the one hand, the withdrawal of Ibo leaders left most overseas Nigerian organizations without sophisticated and experienced direction. On the other hand, students loyal to Biafra were politically inhibited by the fact that continued residence under a Nigerian passport was somewhat a matter of sufferance.

The extent of the inactivity should not be exaggerated. Nigerian students from the Rivers State, for example, managed to form a cause group in Britain that attracted considerable notice; and they received material encouragement from the High Commissioner and his public relations advisers. Some members of the Biafra Union were similarly willing to be demonstration fodder at Trafalgar Square rallies, at Whitehall burnings in effigy, and at Shell petition marches. In general, though, the fairly dense network of Nigerian and Biafran organizations abroad strove after mutual support and good fellowship. Their members were better at running dances in St. Pancras than lobbying or pamphleteering. They were bound to be ineffective communicators anyway, since—as foreigners—their interventions in domestic politics would tend to be either resented or ignored. They were really nobody's constituents; and their communications influence has surely been much overstated.

FOREIGN PRESSURE GROUPS

Indigenous pressure groups were politically better situated to communicate in their own countries about the Nigerian-Biafran War. This fact, reinforced perhaps by Ibo clannishness, helps explain why the "Biafra lobby" in Britain (to use that country as an example) was so lily-white. Of those groups which arose solely because of the Gowon-Ojukwu* struggle, only the Friends of Biafra, a relatively minor organization, had a sizeable African component. The others—the Britain-Biafra Association, Save Biafra Committee, Biafra '69, an unnamed association of ex-colonial officials, and even the rather tardily arranged and short-lived Coordinating Committee for Action on Nigeria/Biafra—were almost entirely Caucasian. An occasional foreigner, from Israel perhaps or from the United States or Germany, participated prominently, just as a person from Britain might play an important role in a counterpart American group, but the overwhelming impression is that the Biafra lobby exemplified typical British cause group development.

*Nigerian Prime Minister, Lt. Gen. Yakubu Gowon and Biafran Chief of State C. Odumegwu Ojukwu

With rare exceptions, all persons who mattered in the Biafra lobby had had a previous material connection with Nigeria, often an extended period of residence or travel in the former Eastern Region. Their experience made it easier for them to champion Biafra authoritatively; but it also made them less susceptible to outside control or direction. They were certainly not tools of the Biafran government or its London office. Biafra did not arrange for the pressure groups to be established nor did it intervene in their policies or funding. Indeed, the groups were usually shoe-string affairs; and what little monetary flow there was moved in the other direction, small sums occasionally being raised for Biafran humanitarian or political purposes. Individual lobby members did not lack informative ties to the Biafran government—they were in frequent contact with Biafra House, sometimes met visiting Biafran officials, and on rare occasions even made brief sorties into the enclave—but it was generally they and not Biafran officialdom who initiated and shaped the interactions.

The multiplicity of Biafra lobby organizations in Britain reflects disorganized competitiveness as well as yeasty enthusiasm. Their variability, however, also permitted a useful division of labor. The ex-colonial officials, for example, utilized long-standing relationships with persons in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, prepared lengthy and reasoned position papers, and circulated petitioning letters to Members of Parliament. The Britain-Biafra Association published intelligently partisan booklets and circularized a handy and usually reliable weekly newsletter specifically aimed at a British readership. (Initially, the BBA based its news of events inside Biafra on Bernhardt releases mailed from Geneva; but later it discovered that it could obtain almost identical material days earlier from telex messages posted in Biafra House.) The Association also attempted some low-keyed contacts in Parliament. Other Biafra lobby groups adopted more overt or impassioned communications. Biafra '69, for example, tapped a moneyed stratum through champagne dances and Albert Hall musicals, while the Save Biafra Committee . . . engaged in rallies, marches, sit-ins, and similar forms of pseudo-violence.

As with many other cause groups, the leaders of the Biafra lobby frequently lacked normal family lives. With depressing regularity they were divorced, separated, unmarried. Still, this did mean that they could put their whole heart into their organization's communicative work and into monitoring the activities of friend and foe. Not until the last half-year of the war, to be sure, did most of the lobby groups (and others) join any formal Coordinating Committee. And not until a year after that did three still extant groups—the Britain-Biafra Association, Friends of Biafra, and Save Biafra Committee—meld their efforts in a single project, a rather wan exhibition about the war and its origins. The leading lights in the various organizations had been keeping in touch all along, however, through telephone messages from house to house, casual or arranged meetings, conversational linkages provided by concerned ex-

perts like news analyst Suzanne Cronje and economic consultant George Knapp, and in due course reading about one another's activities in the pages of the militantly pacifist journal. *Peace News*.

Similar judgments—about white dominance, independence of Biafran governmental control, complexity of structure, functional division of labor, and only partial and often informal coordination—apply to the emergent American, Canadian, and Dutch pro-Biafran group ensembles of which I have knowledge; and I would imagine that analogous comments apply elsewhere in Europe. Pressure groups that arose to favor the Federal Nigerian cause, by contrast, were scarce indeed. The only such organization I know of in Britain is the United Nigeria Group; and it began in fact as a front inspired by Nigeria's public relations consultant. Its small membership included establishment types with business, military, and government backgrounds, who were easily discouraged when their turgid pronouncements were not eagerly accepted by a grateful press; who usually had wives and children and a normal life to engross them; and whose performance, however sincere their views, was characterized by a zealous concern for personal thrift and by yawning lassitude. In all this they resembled, for good or ill, the Federal regime they ostensibly supported.

FOREIGN LEGISLATORS

Legislators, especially but not exclusively those who favored Biafra, often saw in the war a vehicle they could ride to prominence in hearings and debates, and hence in the media and in the minds of their constituents. . . . And even when constituency pressures were absent, . . . it was the legislator who chose his own approach in the light of his own preconceived doctrines. Members of Parliament . . . who visited Nigeria and/or Biafra, played a featured part in the many debates and questions on the Biafran struggle that roiled the Commons after the first year of the war had passed. They were also able to get letters and articles about their trips into the press and their views fleetingly memorialized on radio and television. American Congressmen . . . who journeyed to Africa . . . received similar though muted coverage, the United States all during this time being primarily concerned with . . . Vietnam.

Except for personal visits, most ordinary legislators, in Britain and elsewhere, were limited to much the same sources of information as lay publics. They could listen to the pronouncements of Gowon or Ojukwu and their entourages, though these would be subjected to a heavy, almost total, discount. They received professionally edited materials from the public relations firms retained by the governments—a little for Nigeria, a mountainous heap for Biafra—but these too, with the exception of some Galitzine-produced materials that a few M.P.'s found signally worthwhile, they almost automatically consigned to their "circular files." (Many pro-Biafran M.P.'s considered the snowdrift of releases blowing in from Geneva a dysfunctional embarrassment.) They could rely

on the position statements offered by their own government, or by their party leaders, or by their party research offices, all of which supported a generally pro-FMG [Federal Military Government] position. They could rely on one another, either through open debates recorded in Hansard, or private conversations singly and in unofficial parliamentary and semi-parliamentary committees. (The three committees most relevant to this narrative were all on the Federal Nigerian side. Biafran sympathizers in Parliament made do with informal tête-à-têtes. This off-the-record communicating was not accessible to large publics.) Legislators who favored Biafra could also obtain information processed by indigenous pressure groups, receiving it either directly or through intermediaries whose sound judgment they particularly trusted. Finally and perhaps most crucially, newsmakers though they were, it was to the news media, and particularly the quality press, that M.P.'s turned both for reporting (which in its most arresting versions . . . often had a strongly pro-Biafran slant) and for editorial opinion (usually subtly pro-Nigerian, but sometimes . . . blatantly so).

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Elected and appointed governmental executives supplemented public sources of information with more discreet materials. Diplomatic cables and reports moved continually between the Nigerian land-mass and the home capital. International comity being what it is, most Western countries sustained better contacts with the authorized Lagos government than with its Biafran rival. And even in that Federal domain, views and facts were usually obtained only from a narrow, establishment-favoring stratum. Conflicting accounts from Nigeria, and almost everything issuing from Biafra, were typically suppressed or ignored. Nonetheless, executives in the United States, Holland, Britain, and elsewhere could speak with genuine assuredness, since they did have access to otherwise unavailable information—or at any rate to otherwise unavailable devices for carrying that information. . . .

The authoritative tone which the executive branch adopted on Nigeria-Biafra, as on foreign policy questions generally, was enhanced by a feeling common in Western capitals that the Nigerian government was incapable of presenting its side of events. Biafra, in the view of many foreign ministries and of the State Department, was good at self-justification, and Nigeria simply was not. What Nigeria could not do alone, therefore, the friendly Western governments tried to do for it. Their bureaucracies issued statements, speeches, bulletins, and even booklets defending the Nigerian cause—which was, after all, their cause, too. They affected diplomatic reporting and editorial policies by constant thematic reiterations at open news conferences and closed background sessions. They subjected newsmen returned from Biafra to hostile debriefing sessions, while they deftly manipulated their much prized relationships with other correspondents in order to moderate criticism and induce more

favorable evaluations. In all this the British government apparently took the lead, while the behavior of the United States and other Western countries was similar but fainter. At the least, America's "policy of not intervening in the internal affairs of African nations while at the same time, distinguishing between non-interference politically and the humanitarian obligation to help lessen human suffering," to quote a former State Department official, meant that it would do nothing to staunch the British flow of material and verbal support for Lagos, that indeed its own gentler trend of language and action would move along nearly the same lines.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Foreign businesses like Shell and United Africa Company lay low during the war. Their business, so they think, is business, not politics; and a native war was not seen as a boon to them. Fundamentally, they wanted to be on a profitable footing no matter how the war ended. Except for certain grudges against the Ibos, they did not care much who won the struggle or what the ultimate political map of Nigeria resembled. Their greatest desire was to retain their customers, markets, and skilled workers throughout the entire area. As a result, expatriate firms (until close to the end of the war) generally avoided public statements about the struggle. In private they were more ready communicators. They were willing to meet with Biafran officials and their lawyers during the early days of that regime and discuss oil royalties and rents. They were willing a year later to endure a harsh tongue-lashing by Nigeria's Chief Enahoro in the City of London. Not unlike canny operators making political contributions in American two-party cities, they understood the advantages in extending financial support to students from both Biafra and Nigeria who were taking courses abroad. Such communication was careful and quiet. Its obvious aim was to reduce the intensity of public discussion about the war.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

Relief and eleemosynary organizations played their role far more openly. Some with particularly close links to government did prefer imperceptible modes of communication—thus, the Presbyterian Church in Canada and the Save the Children Federation in Britain—but most turned skillfully to the mass media. Religious groups often used these public channels more effectively than their secular counterparts; but the excellent, though shortlived, propaganda efforts of Oxfam indicate that religiosity was scarcely a necessary condition for such an ability. A better explanation for much of the difference is that responsibility for relief efforts behind the Federal lines, where needs were less sensational and where only natural and bureaucratic obstacles, not anti-aircraft fire, impeded logistics, fell to a largely secular consortium headed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Relief efforts in

Biafra, where the story was far more colorful, were by contrast most notably undertaken by an ecumenically Protestant-Catholic organization, Joint Church Aid (JCA).

Organizational proclivities and human resources within the ICRC and JCA themselves, however, also help explain their differing communicative behavior. The ICRC was centralized, ponderous, and bureaucratic. It was enmeshed in a time-honored legalistic ("juridique") tradition. Its past achievements and future intentions made it leery of being considered partisanly political; but that is precisely what its preoccupation with international legal norms constrained it to become. (The result was that ICRC efforts were an adjunct of Nigerian, but not Biafran, activities. The howl that emanated from ICRC headquarters, when the organization was charged by the *Nigerian* government with political interference and bias is, therefore, sadly understandable.) As for JCA, many of its constituent groups worked in Federal Nigeria as well as Biafra; but the consortium itself, unlike the Red Cross, never entertained any vain hope of operating simultaneously effectively in both jurisdictions. It had no need, therefore, continually to strike poses of objectivity; and it readily became identified as a Biafran champion.

To obtain funds the ICRC activated many time-worn connections to Western governments; but it also avoided behavior that might jeopardize that network for the future. JCA—as a temporary, one-cause group—was less inhibited. Through secondment it enjoyed the talents of component organizations in Holland, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, and Italy, as well as those of distribution teams in Biafra and of many religious groups throughout the world. Leaders in JCA . . . quickly learned how to make descriptively harrowing and numerically impressive statements to the press. It was to such religious figures, too, rather than to Biafra's special representatives or its public relations firms, that newsmen increasingly turned for information or for help in obtaining entry into the Biafran enclave. Even more impressive in their totality were discussions and articles and fund drives at the parish and local church levels. For while JCA, like the ICRC, depended primarily on governments to fund its relief activities, it always sought a wide constituency of private contributors as well.

Despite JCA's genuinely ecumenical structure, many persons viewed Biafran relief as primarily Catholic in inspiration. The prominence of Catholicism in Biafra helps explain this, as does the anti-Catholicism expressed by some of its opponents. . . . The exceptional communicative skills of many Catholic spokesmen also pressed in the same direction. One can cite in evidence many Holy Ghost Fathers, in Biafra and Fernando Po and in the sorties outside; the film "Flight to Uli," which focused on that Order's activities; JCA press releases issued in Geneva by the Overseas Office of Catholic Relief Services, [and the like]. . . . Such a superabundance of talent became almost too good for its own advantage.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Other international bodies besides the relief agencies also commented publicly and effectively on the Nigerian-Biafran war. The three to be discussed here—and the three most important . . .—all furnished crucial support to Nigeria's regime.

The United Nations, in the person of U Thant, came down squarely in favor of Nigerian territorial integrity. The failure of the issue to be debated in any United Nations forum worked more subtly to the same end, for it deprived Biafra's supporters of a floodlit opportunity to present their views. The frequently reiterated stand of the Organization of African Unity, favoring the Federal regime and requesting a virtually unnegotiated Biafran surrender, helped justify U Thant's position as well as that of most Western governments.

It was Nigeria's canny decision in late 1968 to invite an international team of military observers into the country, though, that was most instrumental in re-establishing the moral probity of the Lagos government. One can justifiably object to the ease with which the Team was satisfied on evidence as well as the narrow syllogism with which it apparently reasoned (a. Wartime conditions are usually hell; b. Things are hell in Nigeria; c. Everything is as it should be); but clearly the Team's several Reports did help undercut Biafra's genocide claims. Indeed, *this* genocide charge, unlike an earlier one stemming from the 1966 massacres, was so easily deflated that one must view its propagation as a serious communications blunder.

In any event, the excellent (from a Nigerian standpoint) and consistent findings of the International Observer Team, findings that were reprinted by the Nigerian government in batches of 50,000 and widely quoted by leaders of friendly countries and the world's press, and the care with which the U.K., Poland, Canada, and Sweden were selected as Team members, have led some analysts to see in this the Machiavellian hand of Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It was too brilliant a stroke, they think, for Nigeria to have hit upon itself. Such a conclusion is hardly fair. The Federal Military Government was, throughout the war, better at high-level than widely publicized communications. And besides, even if they were acting on Britain's suggestion, they did at least exhibit a rare capacity for accepting good advice when offered it.

THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS

From the beginning, Biafra was more concerned than Nigeria about the foreign press. Even before secession the Ojukwu regime had issued many booklets and communiques, while the Lagos government sniffed about washing dirty linen in public and retreated into virtual silence. That kind of difference persisted all during the war too. Nigeria rarely welcomed journalists. It was often achingly slow about issuing entry permits; and when it did welcome an occasional reporter or news team, it usually was discouraged by the results and became even less cooperative

in the future. The protracted post-war exclusion of journalists from the former combat areas, and especially from the East-Central State, after a brief period in which barriers to reporting had been removed, strikingly illustrates this persistent Nigerian tendency.

Biafra, by contrast, continually courted outside newsmen. During the first year of the war it leaned heavily on its public relations firms. Robert Goldstein, for example, helped organize a press conference for Ojukwu in Biafra, reporters from Canada, the United States, France, and Britain being in attendance. With great care the Bernhardt staff subsequently arranged for a select group of British journalists to tour the country during the week of April 21, and to dispatch a dramatic drumroll of stories to their papers. As the war continued, however, Biafra got the hang of inviting and squiring reporters by itself, while they in turn resorted to Biafra's special representatives or to church officials with Biafran ties in order to obtain an entry permit.

Throughout the war Biafra was good copy. It was a plucky and determined nation fighting against great odds. Its leadership was articulate and dynamic. An aroma of oil pervaded the whole contest, while the struggle not only saw brave soldiers fighting and dying but civilian installations undergoing wanton and terrorist bombings. In the midst of all this there arose the specter of mass starvation and the cowboy exploits of the international relief operation. The alarming and horrific facts could be handled in a brashly sensational manner by the popular press and in a quietly sensational manner by its quality counterpart. The Biafran government made the filing of stories easier by giving reporters access to its telecommunications link with Geneva on a daily basis, without censorship, and at standard rates. Biafra's success with newsmen sometimes induced Nigeria to follow suit, as when it had its public relations firm arrange for British journalists to tour its domain a month after Bernhardt's master stroke. But because Nigeria's efforts were half-hearted and its story less interesting to relate, the results usually discouraged it from sustaining a receptive attitude.

Nigerians could take solace from the sympathy accorded them by crucial portions of the press, even though most reporting proceeded otherwise. Thus, it received constant editorial support from the *New York Times*, despite the often hostile war coverage in its news sections. It obtained favorably balanced coverage in the establishment weekly *West Africa*, and insightful analysis by the *Financial Times* correspondent. . . . An occasional defection in the ranks of Catholic journalism . . . also gave Lagos reason to rejoice.

While the bulk of press commentary unquestionably favored the Biafran side, the breadth and dependability of the commitment should not be exaggerated. Biafra was lauded as a brave country, valiantly fighting against insuperable odds and struggling to retain semblances of normalcy even under wartime chaos. Its dead and dying, and especially its displaced and starving civilians, evoked great cries of sympathy. Such facts

moved humanitarian organizations to prodigious labors and caused common folk to dig deep into their pockets. Yet, these same facts neither convinced governments to come to Biafra's *political* aid nor induced their mass citizenry to insist upon that choice. Valor and decimation, after all, cut both ways. If they furnished reasons for Nigeria to relent, they also furnished reasons for Biafra to surrender. As Ibo leaders like Asika and Azikiwe, who came over to the Federal cause kept remarking: "Enough is enough." To many Ojukwu's determination to continue resistance eventually suggested a callous disregard of his people's survival; and when, for alleged military and security reasons, he rejected the daylight relief flights into Uli that the FMG announced it would permit, nearly all his friends in the press began deserting him. Biafra's genocide-starvation theme thus revealed itself as doubly unwise. It comported poorly with elite-centered *Realpolitik*, for it was an argument from dire weakness. It was also a dubious choice for broad-scale communication, since its logic required that the Biafran regime appear morally superior to its opponent. Once that was no longer so evident, the theme in fact became a serious obstacle to sustained public support for Biafra's separate existence.

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NEWS BROADCASTING ON SOVIET RADIO AND TELEVISION*

By F. GAYLE DURHAM

Domestic news broadcasting in the Soviet Union serves to generate political support for governmental policies and programs and further the development of a Communist society

We may gain a direct insight into the Soviet conception of the functions of radio and television from the following explicit statements made in a resolution by the Party Central Committee:

The main task of Soviet radio broadcasting and television is the *mobilization*** of our country's working people for the successful implementation of the Seven-Year Plan and the entire program of the comprehensive construction of Communism in the USSR for raising labor productivity and stepping up progress in all branches of the national economy. Radio and television must *inculcate* in all Soviet people a Communist attitude toward labor and the need for participation of every Soviet person in socially useful work. Radio and television must *demonstrate* the people's condemnation of loafers and good-for-nothings who try to live at the expense of others and must describe in concrete terms how labor becomes a need of Soviet people.

*Excerpts from "News Broadcasting on Soviet Radio and Television," Research Program on Problems of Communication and International Security, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 1965. The research for this paper was sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense. Reprinted with the permission of the author, copyright holder.

**Ita's are author's.

Radio broadcast must *help people to think through* the historical changes in the life of mankind that have occurred mainly through the heroic deeds of the Soviet people who are building the most advanced and just society. It must tell of the advantages of socialism over capitalism, *unmask* the falsity of imperialist propaganda, and *train* Soviet people to be irreconcilable toward bourgeois ideology. It must *educate* them in a spirit of pride in their motherland, and in their work, and in a spirit of patriotism and internationalism.¹

The very verbs used to indicate the functions of these two media show the breadth of influence which they are expected to play in the lives of their listeners. Far from being instruments of passive entertainment or of education in an informative sense, radio and television in the U.S.S.R. are pledged to act as active instruments of socialization for Soviet citizens in order to speed up the formation of the "future Communist society." They are viewed as instruments of indoctrination in Communist values and ideology as interpreted by the Party leadership at any given time, and as translated into economic, social, or political policy; further, they are agents of agitation for implementation of those policies. Not surprisingly, newscasts as a component part of "political broadcasting" play a leading role in this propaganda and agitation.

The specific place of radio and television in the network of mass media which report news has fluctuated considerably from time to time, depending upon the rigidity of censorship at any given period. Thus, for example, complaints were rampant during the early and middle fifties that news broadcast on radio and television was simply a rehash of those items which had appeared earlier in the pages of *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. The reasons for this are related to the sources of information and mechanisms of clearing of content of broadcasts. At certain times the main source for approach and commentary, and often for the actual news item itself, was the official Party organ, *Pravda*. Whatever items *Pravda* selected for emphasis, and whatever view *Pravda* took for presentation and interpretation served as the governing approach for radio and later, television newscasts as well. Thus, radio could not perform the functional role in news reporting which it has traditionally occupied in the Western mass media system—that of being able to present the news almost as soon as it happened, "ahead of the headlines." Complaints of the tardiness of broadcast news became widespread, not only among members of the populace at large, but increasingly among members of the radio and journalistic professions. Gradually the complaints crystallized, and the result was the official, published resolutions of 1960 stating the following change in policy:

The central radio stations in Moscow must first of all assure timely broadcasts of important political information, effective commentary on domestic and foreign events, and the organization of various artistic programs. . . . Because radio should give the population the important news before the newspapers do, TASS has been instructed to transmit news immediately to central and local radio stations.²

The handbook prepared by the State Committee on Radio and Television, published in 1963, specifically states: "Radio should communicate to the population all important news earlier than do the newspapers."³ Recent audience research has indicated that news broadcasts now rank among

the most listened-to programs. Because of their frequency and because news begins and ends the broadcasting day, for most citizens the news provides a framework for the entire broadcasting day.

Besides providing the population at large with information on and interpretation of events, news broadcasts also serve the very influential function of acting as an important source of interpretation for the widespread network of Party agitators and other specific segments of the population. These agitators learn a great deal about selection of items for emphasis and Party policy from the approach which a radio newscast or commentary takes toward any specific event. Thus the news items broadcast are expanded, amplified, and elucidated by the personal efforts of agitators.

NOTES

¹ In the Party Central Committee: "On Improving Soviet Radio Broadcasting and on Further Developing Television," *Partnaya Zhizn*, No. 4, February, 1960, pp. 26-34.

² Ibid.

³ Boglovskii, T., and L'vov, Z., *Poslednyye Izvestiya po Radio* (The "Latest News" on Radio), published by the Scientific-Methodological Department of the State Committee on Radio and Television, USSR, 1961, p. 5.

STRATEGIC LEAFLETS*

BY CARL BENGER

Strategic leaflets have been employed for varied purposes such as news, directives, and political arguments and for appeals to target groups to prepare them for certain military activities.

In both World War II and the Korean conflict, the strategic leaflet came into play soon after the outbreak of fighting. Ninety-six hours after Hitler's armies marched into Poland in September 1939 and set off World War II, Britain's Royal Air Force dropped six million leaflets on Germany.¹ Their purpose was strategic—to explain to the indoctrinated German people the British version of the causes of the war and to warn of the consequences of continued support of the Nazi regime. The bulk of all Allied leaflets used in Europe continued in fact to be strategic until after the successful D-Day landings had changed the military situation to a more fluid state, in which tactical leaflets would be appropriate and useful. Similarly, in late June 1950, within 72 hours after the Communists launched their Aggression against the Republic of Korea, the U.S. Far East Air Force began disseminating 100,000,000 leaflets over the peninsula, telling of the "cease fire" orders of the United Nations, revealing to the North Koreans "the duplicity of their leaders," and bringing "encouragement to the people of the Republic of Korea."²

*Excerpts from *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets*, Documentary Study No. 1, the American University Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C., 1959 AD 220 821, pp. 7-19.

In both cases the start of hostilities provided an opportunity, not usually found in peacetime, to break the totalitarian monopoly of news and information; that is, to speak directly to enemy peoples through the printed word. (Radio, of course, is available in both peace and war but, enemy jamming efforts aside, one can rarely be certain who is listening.) These early strategic leaflets, besides trying to restore a balance to the distorted version of events given the people, also sought to undermine confidence in the existing regimes. As the fighting continued, leaflets were used for a variety of military and humanitarian purposes, for example, to give bomb warnings to specific communities, to disrupt enemy factory production, or to cause internal dissension.

Most strategic leaflets of recent international wars were prepared, written, and printed in rear areas, where the necessary large production facilities existed. Paris and London were the centers for the large-scale production of Allied leaflets in World War I, while in the second World War the bulk of the leaflets dropped over Europe was produced in London. In the war against Japan large printing facilities in Australia, Hawaii, and the United States also produced millions of leaflets for strategic purposes. Japan was the center of U.N. leaflet production during the Korean War.

The purpose of disseminating strategic leaflets to occupied and presumably friendly countries has often been simply to give news of the outside world in an effort to keep up morale and encourage the people not to give in to the enemy. In World War II, prior to the Allied landings in Europe, about half of the Allied strategic leaflets went to Germany, about 43 percent to occupied France, and 7 percent to the Low Countries. But once the Allies were back on the European mainland, 90 percent of the strategic leaflets were directed against German targets and the remainder against the French, Belgians, and Dutch.³

During Britain's struggle against Communist terrorists in the Malayan jungles, the bulk of leaflets dropped was strategic and long-term in the following sense: their primary aim was "to condition the minds of the Communist terrorists in such a way that when affected by physical factors, such as food shortages, pressure by Security Forces, or internal dissension, they would defect and take advantage of the Government's invitation to surrender."⁴

* * * * *

During the Middle East crisis of July-August 1958, the strategic leaflet was brought into play by the United States government. A million copies of an Arabic-language special leaflet, signed by President Eisenhower and illustrated with his photograph, were disseminated by aircraft over Lebanon. The English text was as follows:

TO THE CITIZENS OF LEBANON

The forces of the United States have entered your country at the request of your own established government. These forces are here to assist you in your efforts to maintain the independence of Lebanon against those who desire to interfere with your affairs and who have endangered the peace and security of your homeland.

The American officers and men have left their homes to assist in the protection of your way of life, your prosperity and your families. They will leave your country as soon as the United Nations has taken measures assuring the independence of Lebanon.

The American government has acted in response to an appeal for help from a peaceful nation which has long had ties of closest friendship with the United States.⁵

This leaflet is an excellent example of the uses to which the strategic leaflet can be put. Leaflets of this nature have been described as "long-range in scope and . . . designed to orient the opinions, attitudes, emotions and ultimately the behavior of the target audience towards the broad objectives of United States policy."⁶ Used in wartime against an enemy target, strategic leaflets are aimed at increasing tensions and thus decreasing the enemy's emotional and productive capacity to wage war.

It is not surprising that the same strategic leaflet themes have recurred in various conflicts. For example, Allied propagandists in the first World War published the following leaflet in late 1917, reminding their German readers of the suffering they had undergone:

YOU POOR GERMAN PEOPLE!

Already you are in the 4th year of this war. One shudders to think of your suffering, which will increase this year. To the hunger, the pestilence, the cold, will be added the terrible campaigns on the front and the aeroplane attacks on your cities.

Three million dead, the flower of your nation, the future of your land, rest in foreign fields, one million of your best sons languish in prisons, millions of your children will have become poor, helpless orphans.

In the Korean action, American propagandists returned to a similar theme in strategic leaflets dropped on North Korean targets. In October 1952, their pungently worded leaflet, headed "A Third Winter of the Communists' War," bluntly charged: "Your bosses condemn you to a third winter of war—of death and misery! The Communists ignore your suffering. On orders from their Chinese and Russian masters, they refuse to accept a just and honorable peace. They prolong the war that lays waste to your land. They prolong your suffering. They bring death to your people . . ."⁸

Although the tone of these leaflets differ greatly, both were aimed at creating tensions within the enemy camp and lowering morale.

Another strategic leaflet dropped on the Japanese mainland in the summer of 1945 had as its purpose clarification of the Allied policy of "unconditional surrender." This leaflet, in the form of a special statement to the Japanese by President Truman, explained the phrase as follows:

What does military unconditional surrender mean to the Japanese people? It means the end of the fighting and the termination of the power of the militarists who have led Japan to the brink of destruction.

Again, it is the first step in returning soldiers and sailors to their families, their farming villages, and to the places where each has his job.

Furthermore, it means not prolonging the agony and suffering of the Japanese people, who are clinging to the dream of victory. It does not mean the continuation or enslavement of the Japanese people.⁹

The themes examined above are but a few of those which have been used in strategic leaflets in the past. It is clear that the theme of the strategic leaflet, under normal circumstances, reflects the nation's political and military situation.

NOTES

- ¹ *The New York Times*, September 5, 1939, p. 1.
- ² United Nations Command, Report of the . . . to the Security Council, August 16, 1950, in U.S. Senate, *Military Situation in the Far East*, Part 5, 82nd Cong., 1st Session (Washington: 1951), p. 3392.
- ³ Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., *Europe, Argument to V-E Day*, Vol. 3 of *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951) p. 494.
- ⁴ *Federation of Malaya Annual Report, 1954* (Kuala Lumpur: G. A. Smith, 1955), p. 403.
- ⁵ *The Psychiatric Society Bulletin*, No. 4 (Dec. 1958), p. 9.
- ⁶ Dept. of the Army, FM 33-5, *Psychological Warfare Operations*, (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 138.
- ⁷ George G. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918* (Stanford University Press, 1938), p. 106.
- ⁸ Far East Command, First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, Leaflet No. 1229, "Third Winter of Death," 24 October 1952.
- ⁹ Psychological Warfare Branch, U.S. Army Forces Pacific Area, Leaflet No. 137-J-1, "Significance of Unconditional Surrender," undated.

THE NLF LEAFLET*

By DOUGLAS PIKE

The frequency in the use of the propaganda leaflet by a revolutionary movement may be related to the development of the movement's organizational structure. The more highly developed the organizational structure, the more selective, less random, and less important does leaflet distribution become.

The traditional communicational tool of the revolutionary, the clandestine leaflet, was the major mass medium of the [National Liberation Front] (NLF) in its earliest days. Leaflets collected by the [Government of Vietnam] (GVN) in the 1958-1960 period were usually signed "Liberation Forces of the South" or Lao Dong Party. Typical titles were "Letters from Long An Lao Dong Provincial Committee to Rural Compatriots on the Thirty-Ninth Anniversary of the Founding of the Party" and "An Appeal by the Lao Dong Party South Vietnamese Executive Committee to Compatriots in the South." Many of these contained Ho Chi Minh's picture and at least one was issued to mark his birthday. Apparently they served chiefly to advertise the fact that the Lao Dong Party continued to exist in the South.

The NLF leaflet program reached its zenith of utility in mid-1963, after which it declined. The leaflets usually took the form of a two- or four-page

* Excerpts from *The Front of South Vietnam*, by Douglas Pike, with the permission of the publisher.

Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front, by Douglas Pike, Cambridge, Mass. 1966. Appendix B. Reprinted with the permission of the publisher.

tract containing several thousand words of text; a small leaflet (about 3 by 5 inches) containing a much shorter message; or a slogan slip, which was a strip of paper on which a single slogan was written. The leaflets were usually the work of cadres. The slogan slip was the work of the people themselves, usually as part of a struggle movement, and was a device highly prized by the leadership.

The tract and the miniature leaflet were usually written at the inter-zone agit-prop section and sent to the district or village where they were reproduced and distributed by local cadres. It is difficult to determine the scope of this leaflet activity; a *quy chanh* who had worked in the Kien Hoa provincial agit-prop section said that in September 1961, probably the high point of the NLF leaflet program, the provincial agit-prop section issued 500,000 leaflets of ten different types. An NLF internal report said that the Central Nambo zonal central committee produced three million leaflets dealing with the GVN's April 1961 elections.

The cadre directive stated that leaflets were to be used in areas where we are not able to organize demonstrations. They have the purpose of causing the masses to stand up and struggle. They are used in areas where we have no organization or only a weak one, such as a provincial capital. Butterfly leaflets create a willingness among the people to struggle against the enemy and heighten the prestige of the Revolution. In the areas where we are organized but the enemy still is in control we can use leaflets to make propaganda for our organizations. This should be the main objective in the use of leaflets. But also they should arouse public opinion, create confusion among the people, and give the masses subjects to discuss. Leaflets disseminate only general policies. Detailed treatment of a subject should be done in face-to-face agit-prop work. Do not rely too much on leaflets.

Leaflets were scattered by hand at night by agit-prop teams. They were surreptitiously placed in women's shopping baskets in small-town markets or left in public places, on buses and trains, in schoolrooms, or sent through the mail. Kites and balloons were flown over towns and military posts, carrying leaflets that were scattered by the wind when a mechanism released them from their airborne conveyors. In cities and towns cadres at night would soak leaflets in water and secretly spread them on the roofs of the taller buildings, the morning sun would dry them; they would come loose from the roof tiles and flow over the town. The NLF also employed a special hand grenade that exploded without injuring anyone and scattered leaflets over a wide area.

NFL cadres estimated that in a random leaflet-scattering operation in a GVN-controlled area, not 10 percent got into the hands of the population. Leaflets became less important as the organizational structure developed. A 1964 memorandum noted,

When we started [the NLF] we had no firm foundation and therefore needed many tracts and leaflets. Now we do not need as many. We need not distribute them in all places, only in the towns and in areas where the enemy is in firm control, in army posts, in refugee villages, and among religious groups. We do not need them in liberated areas except when enemy troops come through.

* * * * *

USIA's "LITTLE" MAGAZINE*

BY NATHAN GLICK

If educated groups from different cultures share particular interests or characteristics, printed matter such as the magazine representing these interests and characteristics will be better received by their cross-national audience and more likely to be effective in influencing opinion than communications directed at the larger public

Government sponsorship of magazines for foreign readers is not a new idea. The Soviet Union has been conducting such a program for many decades, and its highly ideological style has been emulated by Communist China and several East European governments. Before *Dialogue*, [a USIA publication launched in the spring of 1968], US publications for foreign audiences were mainly aimed at specific countries or areas. *America Illustrated*, a handsomely designed monthly which resembles *Life* in format, is distributed in the Soviet Union and Poland under a formal cultural exchange agreement. *Topic* is aimed at African readers, *Horizons* at Asians, and a number of USIS posts publish magazines for distribution within a single country. The only early exception to this area-targeted rule was *Problems of Communism*, a bi-monthly survey of developments in the Communist world, which started in 1952 as a product of the cold war but has since become widely regarded in academic circles as the most authoritative journal in its field.

Against this background, *Dialogue* was novel in avoiding any specialization of either audience or subject matter. Its outlook and ambitions were suggested in the editor's "note to the reader" in the first issue, which said in part.

Dialogue addresses itself to what one writer recently called the "intellectual public," those readers who have a compelling interest in ideas, social problems, literature and art. We hope to avoid facile popularization and irrelevant scholarship, and to publish articles that link special knowledge to wider cultural influences or pressing human needs. Our title refers primarily to the continuing discussion among Americans of matters ranging from education and culture to politics and economic development. But there is also a reciprocal character to intellectual discourse which leaps the barriers of geographical frontiers of political systems. One of the redeeming features of man's often melancholy history has been the international fraternity of intellectuals—a common concern for humane values and a common responsiveness to imaginative art. . . . We hope that our magazine will contribute to this international dialogue of ideas and aspirations.

Having been involved in magazine work most of my adult life, and having some knowledge of the short and inglorious histories of many high-minded publications, I was acutely aware of the shadows that could fall between conception and creation. The first shadow requiring exorcism was the widespread suspicion in USIA that no single magazine could meet the interests of readers from very different backgrounds in five

*Excerpts from "USIA's Little Magazine," *Cultural Affairs* 12, Associated Councils of the Arts, New York, 1970

continents and more than a hundred countries. The response to the first issue provided a rather persuasive answer. Asians, Africans, Latin Americans, Europeans and Canadians—ranging from an avant-garde playwright in Brazil to an army general in Malaysia—seemed equally pleased with the magazine. Clearly, there existed a fairly homogeneous international audience at the university-educated level. None other than Professor Shils had remarked, in an article called "The Intellectual in Developing Nations" which *Dialogue* printed, that the educated classes in such countries have either been trained in the West or taught at home by Westerners or pupils of Westerners; and that their drive toward modernity is strongly influenced by Western standards. Beyond this ecumenical aspect of university education, there is the fact of almost instantaneous international communication which, at least superficially, provides the educated publics around the world with a common background of information and concerns.

Specifically, some of the most important ideas about modernization (economic, political or social) have been spawned in the technologically developed nations and perhaps most of all in the United States, which has the material affluence and political incentive to support a large corps of development specialists in the universities, AID, the World Bank, and elsewhere. Since by far the larger part of *Dialogue's* audience lives in the developing world, and since one of the main purposes of the magazine is to share useful and stimulating ideas, every issue so far has carried at least one article on problems of economic development. These articles have elicited more involved response than those on any other single theme—as judged by letters to the editor, reprints in indigenous publications, and extended comment in newspapers and journals.

* * * * *

At *Dialogue* we are very much aware that those we refer to as intellectuals in our own country and abroad are no longer members of a leisure class, but often excessively busy professionals who have the taste and capacity for intellectual stimulation along with limited time and patience. We have therefore experimented with editorial, visual and typographical approaches intended to make the magazine more attractive and serviceable. Although I am suspicious of the current tendency to view "communications" as a separate and special discipline, the experience of editing *Dialogue* has made me acutely aware of the pitfalls that lie in wait for the international communicator. At the same time it has convinced me that there is a widespread hunger for dialogue (with a small "d"), for a sense of participation in the contemporary issues that cross national boundaries and touch on men's common concern for social justice and their common responsiveness to imaginative art.

U.S.-SOVIET MAGAZINE PROPAGANDA:

AMERICA ILLUSTRATED AND USSR*

BY ANITA MALLINCKRODT DASBACH

Covert propaganda containing messages that are not favorable to the predispositions of the target audiences may gain the selective attention and interests of the target audiences when built into an overt framework.

PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

The messages propagandists use to convey themes aimed at inducing modifications of belief in audiences often are subtle and covert, frequently imbedded deeply in the body of an article. Significant, therefore, is the message's overt framework, built to capture the initial attention and interest of the reader, as well as to convey an impression of its own.

SUBJECT MATTER

An important part of the message's framework is subject matter. For instance, by presenting articles about new developments in various fields of the arts, a propagandist conveys the impression of a cultured communicator. He also gains the attention of readers interested in the arts. Once their attention is won by an article which promises subject matter attractive to them, they begin to read and so are exposed to the theme the propagandist has woven into the article.

What subjects, then, are U.S. and Soviet propagandists presenting to win and hold their audiences and to convey desired impressions? In brief, the 1960 and 1963 samples used in this study show *USSR* decreasing its emphasis on Government and Foreign Relations subjects and increasing emphasis on such subject matter areas as People and Science. Meanwhile, in 1963 *America Illustrated* increased its already heavy emphasis on Arts and Culture while talking somewhat less about Education, Foreign Relations, Government and other areas.

* * * * *

REPRINTS

In addition to subject matter, which can serve to gain reader attention, credibility, which gains reader acceptance, is another important aspect of the framework the propagandist constructs around his message. It has been felt, for instance, that if *America Illustrated* used articles reprinted from national U.S. magazines, Soviet readers would feel they were reading what Americans themselves read, rather than pieces tailored for Soviet consumption and so more "propagandistic." With this philosophy in mind, *America Illustrated*, in the four-issue basic sample covering the

*Excerpts from "U.S.-Soviet Magazine Propaganda" "America Illustrated" and "USSR," *Journalism Quarterly*, XLIII, No. 1 (Spring 1966) pp. 73-84. Reprinted with the permission of *Journalism Quarterly* copyright holder and the courtesy of the author.

1960 period, used reprints for 24% of the articles it published. By the 1963 period, the reprint rate has gone up to 32% for the basic four-issue sample.

NEGATIVE COMMENT

If *USSR* and *America Illustrated* are overwhelmingly dedicated to building a favorable national self-image, . . . one would expect the magazines' tone to be rosy, or what is termed "putting the best foot forward." This, indeed, is the impression gained from a casual reading of both magazines, as contrasted to, for instance, mass-circulation domestic American magazines.

However, even within the predominantly positive approach of both magazines, a reader spots negative comment. Two questions arise:

How much of the negative comment detracts from the "best foot forward" approach, as by presenting negative contemporary self-image, including even self-criticism?

This content is especially important because it is directly related to credibility, a high-priority goal among propagandists. For instance, many Soviet citizens believe the United States has problems, perhaps partially because their government has often said so. If we do not discuss problems when we write about our country, Soviet readers may feel we are evading the issue. Thus, without candor we may lose credibility. Furthermore by permitting the Soviet government's allegations regarding our problems to go unchallenged we miss an opportunity to put the problems in perspective. However, there are some who argue that if the magazine acknowledges the existence of U.S. problems such as slums, unemployment and racial discord, the Soviet reader will think, "Well, our government was right all along; race relations are a serious problem in the United States. In fact, if the U.S. magazine mentions this problem at all it must be even worse than they say it is, because that's how our government operates." While this argument may have some validity, it seems more risky to ignore social problems, and to avoid the negative comment necessary in their discussion, than to present them in perspective. Furthermore, by doing so, we have the advantage of disarming Soviet readers by our frankness.

What does the negative comment of political significance but of non-contemporary or non-self-critical nature say?

This area of negative comment has significance because it may reveal how propagandists see their nation's past, the world as a whole or a nation's citizens. In discussing these broader aspects having political significance, the use of negative comment lends an air of reality to the magazine. A magazine attempting to portray the life of a nation cannot do it in overwhelmingly rosy tones and expect to be believed. Simple logic says life just isn't like that.

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TATZEPAO: MEDIUM OF CONFLICT IN CHINA'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"*

BY BARRY M. BROMAN**

The wall poster is one form of mass media which does not depend on a high degree of literacy and availability of receivers, and is one of the most dramatic means of political communication.

One of the oldest forms of communication in China is the *tatzepao* or wall poster (sometimes called the big-character poster). Dating from imperial times when royal edicts were posted on village walls, *tatzepao* have played a variety of communication roles in China.¹ Under the Communists *tatzepao* became an efficient medium of mass persuasion guided by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter, the Propaganda Department). In the summer of 1966, as the conflict within China's highest political echelon reached crisis proportions, a new and radically different function was assigned to *tatzepao*.

This paper examines the phenomenon of *tatzepao* as an instrument of conflict during the so-called Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It looks at *tatzepao* as a unique form of mass communication which helps to explain the nature of the recent struggle inside Communist China.

Intimately linked with any discussion of *tatzepao* must be a discussion of the active agents in the cultural revolution, the Red Guards. The study focuses on a critical period of the cultural revolution beginning in June 1966, when Red Guard units began to appear and *tatzepao* emerged as their primary weapon, until early 1967, when the Red Guards were dispersed and the cultural revolution entered a new phase.

* * * * *

Broadly speaking, the cultural revolution was a struggle for the reins of leadership at the apex of the political pyramid. The conflict centered on two rival factions, with Mao-Tse-tung heading a Leninist-Stalinist minority faction. Supported by a small circle of intimates,² Mao managed to survive through the aid of Lin Piao and a substantial segment of the army—and the Red Guards, an organization Mao created in 1966 to prosecute the cultural revolution. Opposed to the Maoists was a diverse group of party faithful which foreign observers have united by the term "anti-Maoist." Under the nominal leadership of Liu Shao-ch'i this group,

*Excerpts from "Tatzepao: Medium of Conflict in China's 'Cultural Revolution,'" *Journalism Quarterly*, 146, No. 1 (Spring 1969), pp. 100-104, 127. Reprinted with the permission of *Journalism Quarterly*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

**The author wishes to thank Professor Alex S. Edelstein of the School of Communications and Henry G. Schwartz of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute for their assistance and comments.

which is believed to include the majority of party leaders, sought to follow a policy line toward modernity that the Maoists branded "revisionist."

* * * * *

With large segments of the official media "captured" by anti-Maoists, Mao Tse-tung faced a difficult task in attempting to reach the masses whom he considered the crucial link in effecting his "revolution." The monolithic structure of the Propaganda Department further frustrated the Maoists since the department functioned hierarchically down to the village level through millions of cadres making up a "closed" ³ communications network. The system oriented all provincial propaganda departments toward Peking whence every important policy message originated. This structure was of critical political importance. Maoist attempts to regain control of the Propaganda Department apparently failed, necessitating the creation of a rival apparatus. The Red Guards emerged as the counterpart to the official propagandists, in function if not in form, and *tatsepao* became their primary medium.

Tatsepao brought the power struggle into the open on May 25, 1966, when, symbolically, the "first" wall poster of the cultural revolution was written. Its primary author was Nieh Yuan-tzu, a woman teaching assistant in the philosophy department at Peking University who, acting apparently on Mao's personal instructions, attacked the University's president and others. Among the indictments was a charge that University officials had discouraged support for Mao and discouraged the writing of *tatsepao*:

To counter-attack the sinister gang which has frantically attacked the Party, socialism, and Mao Tse-tung's thought is a life-and-death class struggle. The revolutionary people must be fully aroused to vigorously and angrily denounce them, and to hold big meetings and put up big-character posters is one of the best ways for the masses to do battle.⁴

This poster signaled a deluge of *tatsepao* and set the stage for the pattern of conflict to follow. Mao Tse-tung personally was credited with having "discovered (this) the first Marxist-Leninist big character poster in the country and approved its publication for the country and the world."⁵

Soon more posters appeared attacking anti-Maoists by name. Typical of these was a poster entitled "Important Directive Given by Chairman Mao at the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Meeting on 8 September (1966)" in which two powerful anti-Maoists were attacked.⁶

... Unlike the official media, which referred vaguely to "the persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road," *tatsepao* attacked the anti-Maoists by name, frequently citing "crimes" of doubtful authenticity.

... The conflict thus was brought into the open through *tatsepao* in a manner that left those condemned defenseless against the relentless and often anonymous charges.

* * * * *

The choice of *tatzepao* by Mao as the medium through which to "reveal" his enemies to the people is understandable. Eight years earlier he had expressed his faith in the utility of the medium as an instrument of conflict:⁷

The big-character poster is an extremely useful new type of weapon. It can be used in cities and the countryside, government and other organizations, army units and streets, in short, wherever the masses are. Now that it has been widely used, people should go on using it constantly.⁸

Accordingly, on August 5, 1966, as the battle lines of the conflict were being drawn at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a wall poster bearing Mao's own signature appeared. Entitled "Bombard the Headquarters - My Big-Character Poster," according to a Maoist source, it "blasted the lid off the struggle between the proletarian revolutionary line and the bourgeoisie headquarters [i.e., the anti-Maoists] which had existed in the party for a long time."⁹

* * * * *

The Maoists hoped that the pressures brought about by the *tatzepao* and Red Guard violence would reduce the effectiveness if not the will of the anti-Maoists, but the degree to which the leaders of the cultural revolution could control the Red Guards decreased rapidly as schools closed and millions of youths surged forward to wage "revolution." In short, the campaign got out of hand.

Apart from the small group that was charged with directing the cultural revolution there was little direct control by Maoist forces over the Red Guards. What controls that existed were rapidly dissipated in the days following the massive August rallies as the ranks of the Red Guards expanded faster than the Maoist organization could assimilate them. At this point Red Guard newspapers emerged in an attempt to give direction to the increasingly ill-disciplined youths who roamed throughout China leaving havoc in their wake. The appearance of these newspapers signaled the institutionalization of the cultural revolution.

The newspapers became the internal control medium for the mobilization of youths and a link between the Maoists' leadership and the rank-and-file Red Guards. They enjoyed a wide geographical distribution and established policy for the Red Guards. The small-circulation publications were circulated by hand to cadres and to a lesser extent to the Red Guard masses.¹⁰

By the end of 1966, with the aid of *tatzepao*, over 250 leading editors, propagandists, and leaders of the arts had been removed from their posts,¹¹ including men who had held key positions within the party since the hard days of Yenan before the Second World War.

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¹ For a discussion of communications in imperial China, see James Markham, *Voices of the Red Giants* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1967). For a treatment of *tatze-pao* under the Communists prior to the cultural revolution, see Vincent King, *Propaganda Campaigns in Communist China* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965) and Frederick T.C. Yu, "Campaigns, Communications and Change in Communist China," in Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm (eds.), *Communications and Change in the Developing Countries* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967).

² Besides Lin, Mao gathered around him Chiang Ch'ing (Jiao's wife) and Ch'en Po-ta (Mao's former secretary) both of whom held key posts in the special group that was charged to direct the cultural revolution.

³ This term is used with reference to the special training and vocabulary required of cadres in interpreting messages of the Propaganda Department. See Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 58.

⁴ Quoted in *Peking Review*, Sept. 9, 1966, p. 20.

⁵ *Peking Review*, March 10, 1967, p. 5.

⁶ Tao Ghu was the short-lived director of the Propaganda Department between June-November 1966. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Party Secretary General, is considered one of Mao's most influential opponents.

⁷ It is interesting to note that Mao's first public writing was in the form of a *tatze-pao*. The poster was written when Mao was about seventeen and it proposed that Sun Yat-sen be made President of China. Mao later described it as "somewhat muddled." Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1963), p. 136.

⁸ Mao Tse-tung, "Introducing a Co-operative," April 15, 1955, quoted in *Peking Review*, Sept. 11, 1967, p. 16.

⁹ *Peking Review*, Sept. 11, 1967, p. 8.

¹⁰ A Japanese journalist, Miss Chie Nishio, reports that the only Red Guard newspapers she saw during an extensive tour of China in early 1967 were at Peking University but that she was not permitted to read them. Personal communication.

¹¹ For a description of the pattern of purge, see "The Cultural Revolution Broom," *China News Analysis*, Nov. 17, 1966.

EARLYWORD

By the EDITORS

A key concept behind Earlyword was that using recently captured or surrendered personnel to appeal directly to former comrades would enhance the timeliness and therefore the credibility of the message.

Vietnam proved no exception to the problems associated with the PSYOP targeting of swiftly moving adversaries. Reaching the audience with credible appeals was often futile in tactical PSYOP unless the messages were timely. The Allied quick-reaction capability was poor—especially early in the conflict—largely because of a lack of understanding of, or an inability to meet, the basic conditions for effective combat propaganda. Often, the problems began with the exploitation of recently captured enemy soldiers.

Particularly in the early stages of American involvement in Vietnam, the typical priority was to exploit a captive for battlefield intelligence. Even if the prisoner were captured by American elements, he usually

was turned over to the Vietnamese National Police or ARVN who interrogated him for a lengthy period. After the interrogation period, the captive was placed in a camp with other prisoners. There, the prisoner could learn from fellow inmates the words and actions that would be most likely to elicit the desired responses from his captors. By the time psyoperators were able to take their turn at interrogating him, the prisoner was usually "stale," particularly from a tactical vantage point: He might no longer know where his former unit was operating; he would be less aware of the prevailing mood and dispositions of even his closest comrades; and he was likely to be influenced in his responses to questions by a modified state of expectations, in part learned from fellow prisoners. In many critical respects, then, the captive was no longer "typical" of even his closest former comrades.

"Early word" was an Air Force-devised system with the objective of enhancing the Allied tactical propaganda capability. The captive would speak into a standard military ground radio and the voice appeal would be picked up and broadcast on either live or delayed basis through the Earlyword's 1800-watt speaker system as the aircraft circled the location of the enemy unit. With the introduction of Earlyword in 1969, it became possible for a *Hon Chanh* (rallier) in Allied hands on the ground to speak directly to his former comrades within minutes after rallying. No single technique can assure effectiveness, but Earlyword at least significantly increased the timeliness of tactical PSYOP.

POSTAL SUEVERSION*

By MICHAEL CHOUKAS

Stamps can be an effective medium of communication. In this case, the attempted counteraction helped broaden the potential audience.

Not all groups are equally accessible to a propagandist; nor can they be reached by the same means. The group to be manipulated may be an enemy group, a neutral one, or the propagandist's own group, perhaps even a subgroup within these groups. Facilities of communication will differ from group to group, and so will other aspects of group life such as values, predispositions, current problems and issues. The questions that propagandists will have to answer are: How accessible is the group? What is the best way to contact it? And how can manipulation of it best be pursued? The answers, naturally, tend to differ from case to case.

Take our desire to reach those behind the Iron Curtain. Access to those people through the modern media of communication has been denied to, or made most difficult for our propagandists, both official and private. However, the latter did succeed in overcoming such obstacles and estab-

*Excerpt from *Propaganda Comes of Age*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1965. Reprinted with the permission of Public Affairs Press, copyright holder.

lishing a sort of psychological "beachhead" across the Iron Curtain by utilizing channels that were still open. In the press one reads, for example:

HUNGARY PROTESTS POSTAL "SUBVERSION"

Budapest, March 8 (AP). The Foreign Ministry protested to the United States and Canada today over the cancellation marks of stamps of letters received in Hungary.

The postmarks were illustrated in the Communist newspapers Nepszabadsag. The one from the United States said "Support your Crusade for Freedom." The Canadian envelope bore the legend "Pourquoi attendre au printemps (Why wait for spring?) Do it now."

"What else does that imply," the newspaper asked, "but the most outspoken, in fact amazingly unconcealed interference in the domestic affairs of another state?"¹

From another newspaper account,² one learns that the permission to have the "Support Your Crusade for Freedom" postmark used by the Post Office Department for a specified time (January 1 to March 31, 1957), was officially granted to the Crusade for Freedom organization, a private group supporting Radio Free Europe and Free Europe Press; also, that "The organization (Crusade for Freedom) has been denounced by the Soviet Union on the ground it is trying to incite subversive activity within Communist countries."

Our propagandists not only managed to send their message to the Hungarian people but, by the counteraction they aroused, they succeeded in having it spread widely among other people as well. The Communists were in fact shortsighted in giving the message such wide publicity. They apparently did forget a basic maxim of successful propaganda, not to argue the opponent's case in public.

NOTES

¹ Associated Press Dispatch, March 8, 1957.

² New York Times, March 31, 1957.

MAINLAND POUNDED BY BALLOONS

IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

An old technique of message dissemination is vigorously used by the government of the Republic of China.

The Psychological Warfare Department of the Defence Ministry disclosed in Taipei recently that the government has sent 101,614,528 balloons to Mainland China in the past seventeen years.

The load carried by these balloons ranges from 35 grammes to 4,763 grammes. The two large-sized balloons, measuring 10 x 13 feet and 10 x

* Excerpts from the Cosmorama Pictorial, reproduced in *Falling Leaf Magazine*, IX, No. 2 (June 1968), p. 53. Reprinted with the permission of the Chinese Information Service, copyright holder.

18 feet, can rise as high as 40,000 feet and fly to reach as far as Tibet and Sinkiang.

More than 213,000,000 pamphlets were flown to Mainland China by these balloons. They carried messages aiming not only at inspiring the people with enmity towards the Mao Tse-tung regime but also of bringing good tidings from the Republic of China. The recent shooting down of the two Communist MIG-19 jets was among the news spread by these balloons.

Apart from pamphlets, the balloons also dropped food, toys, household goods, daily commodities and national flags. Another item included in the delivery is a 'passport' which permits would-be defectors to come safely to Taiwan. Many former Communist airmen, journalists and Red Guards have already landed in Taiwan with these passports.

QUEMOY: POP GOES THE PROPAGANDA*

BY LEE LESCAZE

Propaganda exchanges are often an alternative to hostilities and provide a means of saving faces short of backing down completely

QUEMOY—Remember Quemoy? Not so long ago, it was widely hailed in the United States and elsewhere as a pivotal frontier of freedom—an outpost as important as West Berlin. When President Eisenhower visited Taiwan in June, 1960, Communist Chinese artillery batteries fired 174,854 rounds at Quemoy in protest. Later that year, presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon's conviction that Quemoy and Matsu had to be defended became a central part of his televised debates with John F. Kennedy.

Quemoy is still being defended by a large but secret number of Nationalist Chinese soldiers plus five U.S. army advisers, and there is still shelling from Chinese guns. But the last explosive shells were those Peking fired in anger over the Eisenhower visit, and President Nixon's trip to Peking [1972] did not spark any artillery protest by Nationalist China.

Now following a well-established and comfortably lived-with pattern, the Communist guns fire only shells containing propaganda leaflets and the Nationalist guns here give counter-battery fire in kind. This shelling is restricted to odd-numbered days and the object is to avoid causing any damage.

"Of course it hurts people if they get hit with a fragment or a bundle of leaflets, which would be bad propaganda, so the Communists try to avoid that and we do the same thing," a Nationalist army officer explains.

*Excerpts from "Quemoy: Pop Goes the Propaganda," *The Washington Post*, March 12, 1972, p. C-5. Reprinted with the permission of *The Washington Post*, ©, copyright holder.

SMALL VICTORIES

Quemoy's propaganda battles are, perhaps unavoidably, a matter of small victories. Although it is not official Taiwan policy, it appears the officers here try to insure that their guns get off a few more leaflet shells than the Communist's each firing day. Last Monday, for example, the Communists lobbed in 46 rounds and the Nationalists quickly returned 50.

The fall-out from the shells provides various sector commanders and their men with grounds-keeping chores. All Communist leaflets are picked up as quickly as possible and soldiers here assume that their counterparts on the mainland are also busy part of every odd-numbered day rounding up the debris.

Leaflets are also exchanged by "air-floating and sea-floating." Balloons of three sizes, with the largest able to carry 178 pounds of leaflets up to 72 hours, are released from Quemoy whenever the wind is favorable which is generally from April to October, a briefing officer says.

The sea-floating operation is more aggressive. Speedboats manned by frogmen maneuver as close as is deemed prudent to the Chinese coast and jettison their cargoes of plastic leaflet containers, bottles and inflatable toys. The narrow strait separating Quemoy from China is undoubtedly the only line of armed confrontation in the world that without vigilant beachcombing would be littered with plastic ducks.

Yet despite the 12 years that have passed since the last high-explosive shell was fired, confrontation is still very real and very armed here.

Although officials refuse to put a number to Quemoy's garrison, well-informed sources say close to 100,000 Nationalist soldiers are on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu north of here.

One of the primary missions for these troops, briefing officers say, is to tie down "hundreds of thousands" of Communist Chinese soldiers who, the officer adds, would otherwise be free to "cause trouble for another part of the Free World."

Quemoy, which is a string of 12 small islands uninhabited by civilians, has gone underground since the late 1950s, when it was a headline story and presidential campaign issue—at least the army defenders have.

They live and stand guard in dozens of strongpoints dug deep into the main island and sometimes tunnelled into mountains.

... Strongpoint 133 is one of the frontline defenses of Quemoy. Its three tiers of firing positions look out over white sand and blue water at Communist-held islands and the Chinese mainland several thousand yards away. Its depth underground is secret, but officers say it is stocked with enough ammunition, food and water to fight without outside support for three to four months.

... At its closest point, Quemoy's main island is 2,310 meters from the nearest Chinese Communist territory. The spot, called Mashan, is the site for one of Quemoy's four loudspeaker installations—another aspect of the psychological warfare program here.

The Mashan loudspeakers are powerful enough to be heard 20,000 meters away, and they shout their message 18 hours a day.

Chinese Communist loudspeakers across the channel shout their message back, but the Nationalist officers say that the Communist speakers are much weaker. They are primarily designed not to reach Quemoy listeners, but to make enough noise on the Communist side to drown out Taiwan's message, officers explain.

A loudspeaker victory was scored during the last Mid-Autumn Festival, one officer says. The festival was a holiday for everyone in Taiwan and the loudspeaker operators made much of this, knowing that Mid-Autumn Festival was not being observed across the water.

"The Communists had to rush out and buy some noon-cakes (the festival's traditional treat) for the people within our range," a loudspeaker officer says happily.

Defectors and fishermen from China provide Taiwan with the best gauge of its psychological warfare program's efficiency. Briefing officers report that these people say they listen to Quemoy's loudspeakers and its radio and are "encouraged to choose freedom."

The last defector to Quemoy was a Chinese Communist soldier who swam to the island last September, officers say. A group of 30 fishermen got caught by bad weather and came ashore last December. They were the most recent visitors from China, and they chose to return after the Nationalists fed them and gave them small presents, in keeping with the government's policy.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND AIR POWER: ITS HITS AND MISSES*

BY ROBERT L. GLEASON

Although the Air Force has achieved significant PSYOP successes, the challenge remains to seek out more fully the PSYOP potential of aircraft as a medium of communication.

* * * * *

[VIETNAM]

In reviewing United States military experience in Vietnam, one is impressed with the vastly increased importance that must be attached to the psychological aspects of that conflict. These aspects emerge as both challenges and opportunities. In many cases the challenge has not been fully met, nor have the opportunities been fully exploited.

* * * * *

*This article was adapted from an address given to the graduation classes of the U.S. Army Psychological Operations Unit Officer Course and the Political Warfare Advisor Course, U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 25 June 1970. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Robert F. Futrell for his assistance in obtaining source material and for his critical review. The article was reprinted in *Air University Review*, XXII, No. 3 (March-April 1971), pp. 34-46. Reprinted with the permission of *Air University Review*, March-April 1971, Vol. XXII No. 3.

In 1961, in response to President Kennedy's order to all services to bolster their counterinsurgency capability, the USAF established the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron. Known as Jungle Jim, it later became the 1st Air Commando Squadron and finally evolved into the present Special Operations Air Force. Its original mission gave high priority to the conduct of psychological operations. Because of scarcity of experience in psyops, the Jungle Jim personnel turned to the [then] U.S. Army Special Warfare Center for some accelerated instruction in the subject. On 15 November 1961 they deployed to South Vietnam. On 4 December they flew our first psyops mission in C-47s equipped with belly-mounted loudspeakers, following the idea conceived during the Korean War. This mistake cost us about two years in redesign time. The systems proved to be totally unfeasible because of the Doppler effect. Like the train blowing its whistle as it comes down the track, the voice from the air kept changing pitch as the aircraft approached and departed, leaving no more than two or three intelligible words out of a complete sentence. Of course with the speakers protruding down and directly to the rear of the aircraft, circling techniques were out of the question. So back to the drawing board.

In 1964 the Air Force, still searching for its legitimate and complete requirement in the psyops area, contracted with . . . [a private firm] to survey just what was needed. Although the report identified many areas for USAF concentration and application, implementation of these recommendations has been slow and hesitant. For example, establishment of a USAF psyops school was recommended, but only one or possibly two classes were conducted. One reason might be the belief of some in the Air Force that we should merely be concerned with flying aircraft and that someone else will assure that the total psychological impact inherent in the tactical employment of aircraft will be properly calculated. Therefore if the psychological aspects of air power or air operations are to be maximized, most of the impetus, at least at present, must come from graduates of non-USAF psyops schools. Many of these officers (members of all services) will find themselves on joint staffs where they will have an opportunity to parlay their special talents by applying them to the extensive potential of air power. There is room for questioning whether this has always been adequately done in South Vietnam (SVN).

Besides the early SVN problems already mentioned, many people more recently have expressed disappointment at the failure of the limited bombing of North Vietnam (NVN) to completely disintegrate the morale of the North Vietnamese. Perhaps an indication of what we should have expected can be found by again reviewing the findings of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS]. In brief, it found that although the demoralizing effect of the bombing of Germany was almost complete, there were certain categories of people who retained an exceptionally high degree of resistance to morale erosion.¹ They can be categorized in three groups: (1) highly disciplined Nazi party members, (2) firm converts

to the philosophy of Nazism whether or not a party member, and (3) those who were convinced in their own minds that their government was doing everything possible to protect them from the bombing raids. Another point made by the Survey was that the psywarfare effect (not necessarily the total military effect) can reach a saturation point under prolonged and incessant bombing. This is brought about by the fact that after a period of time most of the vulnerable and weaker elements of a society flee from the cities and only the strong-willed and dedicated elements remain. This, of course, makes the psywar warrior's job much more difficult, for among other things it reduces the contagious effect of demoralization. A third significant finding of the USSBS was that a government can do much to prepare its citizens psychologically for nonatomic air attacks.²

Applying these lessons to the North Vietnamese campaign is rather provocative. We know, for example, that the North Vietnamese government was given ample time and warning by the slowly escalating nature of the U.S. air attacks, and did, in fact, move great numbers of people into the countryside before intense raids commenced. They also had ample time to prepare those remaining psychologically. Additionally, we expended a considerable amount of rhetoric describing the intense aircraft defense system employed in NVN. Was this not in effect telling the people of North Vietnam just how well their government was trying to protect them? Perhaps instead we should have launched a psychological campaign emphasizing that their defense was unable to halt our penetrations, that no single authorized target was spared, and that their government was not doing all it could to defend its people, for example, "Where was North Vietnam's air force?"

Many other parallels or reciprocals can be drawn between psyops past and present. The purpose of this article is to direct attention to the facts that in new and changing situations military planners must constantly re-evaluate their techniques and that in so doing they should not ignore the lessons of history. If they apply, we should use them. If they do not, we should disregard them. But in either event, we should consciously examine them.

[THE NEW CHALLENGE]

A new challenge facing psychological operations officers concerns the nature of today's conflicts. Before the advent of nuclear weapons, most wars involving major powers were fought to a conclusion: victory for one side, defeat for the other. Deficiencies and omissions that may have occurred in conducting the psychological aspects of those wars were to a great extent obscured by the euphoria surrounding the final and total surrender of the enemy. Today's conflicts are not fought to such black-and-white resolutions. Indeed, in today's wars a military operation may be judged a success or failure not by its tactical accomplishments but by the effectiveness of the psywarfare and military/political actions that

accompany it. Put more bluntly, many victories are victories because one side convinces the other, or neutrals, that this is so.

This situation places psywar in an entirely new context and demands a greater awareness of both the favorable and unfavorable psychological impact of every military action, even, for example, the selection of operational nicknames. Richard H. S. Crossman, the British authority, points out, "The central substance of effective propaganda is hard, correct information . . . and it is necessary to make truth sound believable to the enemy."³ Therefore, while such a name as "Operation Total Victory" (for the U.S. sweep into Cambodia [in 1970]) may have a euphemistic sound when used by friendly troops, it may provide grist for the enemy propaganda mill if the operation does not achieve the goal the nickname portends. This is not the first occasion when the choice of a nickname has been questioned from a psychological warfare viewpoint. In February 1951 the Eighth Army in Korea launched "Operation Killer," a nickname obviously in conflict with the accompanying psywar effort to persuade the Chinese troops to surrender. Similarly, the Fifth Air Force in Korea launched a railroad interdiction campaign as "Operation Strangle," a name that was counterproductive in that those who did not understand the real objective of interdiction were given a vehicle for proclaiming its failure.⁴

Finally, the psyops officer is challenged to conduct his programs and develop his themes in a manner to avoid their neutralization by information emanating from other sources. According to Sir Stewart Campbell, a British psywar expert, "There must be no conflicting arguments not only between outputs from the same sources but also those of different sources."⁵ Every conflict fought since the Crimean War (when the invention of the telegraph first allowed war correspondents to communicate on a daily basis with their home editors) has been subject to criticism from the press as well as the loyal opposition within the government.⁶ In wars where the vital interest of the United States is obvious, such as World Wars I and II, criticism from these sources has been minimal. In conflicts where our vital interest has been more obscured (albeit just as legitimate), the criticism can be expected to be more vocal and persistent. The psyops officer's challenge is to avoid the vitiating effects of this criticism to the extent possible and, above all, to resist the temptation to use the psyops arena to engage the press in any semblance of a military/political psyops argument. Steps in this direction would include limiting psyops actions as much as possible to military objectives and continually soliciting the cooperation of the press in the conduct of these efforts. This latter suggestion lends itself more to psyops activities than to conventional military actions, for the essence of psychological warfare is subtlety and truth, not secrecy or deception.

[CONCLUSION]

If this discourse appears somewhat critical of . . . Air Force participation in psywar operations, it is not intended to detract from the dedication

of aircrews performing these missions. In fact the first USAF crew lost to presumed enemy ground fire in South Vietnam during the early phases of the current conflict was on a psyops mission. This occurred on 11 February 1962.

* * * * *

Despite its initial shortcomings, the air psyops campaign has proved productive. For example, over ninety percent of the Chieu Hoi defectors first learned of that program from air-dispersed leaflets.⁷ More revealing are the reactions of the Communist world to our psyops efforts. One can easily detect a "whistling in the dark" attitude in an article contained in the *World Marxist Review* in which the author says, "... moreover [s] cattering leaflets urging the population to turn against their government in areas that were the cradle of the Vietnamese revolution is one of the stupidest blunders the 'psychological war' experts ever made."⁸ One wonders just what part this "blunder" played in causing North Vietnam to issue its infamous decrees "on the punishment of Counterrevolutionary Crimes" a few years later. These decrees list fifteen specific crimes that needed special attention and punishment, including treason, plotting to overthrow the people's democratic power, espionage, defecting to the enemy, undermining the people's solidarity, disseminating counter-revolutionary propaganda, and others.⁹ The necessity of issuing these strongly antipsywar decrees in the "cradle of the Vietnamese revolution" is perhaps our best evidence that our air war and psywar campaigns were having a telling effect against North Vietnam. The vastly increased importance of psychological warfare, especially in a restricted Vietnam-type war environment, is illuminated in the remarks of General Van Tien Dung, chief of staff of the North Vietnamese army, when he repeated an often emphasized theme that it is "the people, not the weapons, who form the backbone of [North Vietnam's] air defense."¹⁰ We should also remember that it is the people, not the weapons, who are targeted through psychological warfare.

NOTES

¹ Bernard Peters, Major, USAF, "The USAF and Psychological Warfare," *Air University Quarterly Review*, II, 4 (Spring 1949), p. 5.

² Peters, p. 15.

³ From an address by Richard H. S. Crossman to the British Royal United Services Institute, quoted by William E. Daugherty, "The Creed of a Modern Propagandist," in William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958), pp. 38 and 41.

⁴ Dr. Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), p. 436.

⁵ John C. W. Field, *Aerial Propaganda Leaflets* (Francis J. Field, Ltd., Kent, England, n.d.), p. 10.

⁶ Timothy Gowing, Sergeant Major, *Voice from the Ranks* (London: The Folio Society, 1954), p. xii.

⁷ Press Release, Director of Information, Hq Seventh Air Force, 2 January 1967.

⁸ Michel Vincent, "Vietnam Fights Back," *World Marxist Review*, VII, 8 (August 1965).

⁹ *Vietnam: Documents and Research Notes*, U.S. Mission, Saigon, 1968, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰ "China and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967," *Congressional Quarterly Background* (Washington Quarterly Service, 1967), p. 220j.

CHINA'S USE OF CULTURE FOR PROPAGANDA*

By JOHN S. BARR

Recognizing that the relative effectiveness of media varies significantly between different population groupings, mainland Chinese leaders employed a variety of media in order to reach and appeal to different population sectors.

When the Chinese Communists set up their regime in Peking in October, 1949, they established a Ministry of Culture and local bureaux of culture throughout the country, emphasizing the importance they gave to culture—partly or largely for propaganda. One very clever aspect of their cultural methods was that their variety enabled them to appeal to different sections of the population, but with a rather special attraction for youth. This article describes the initial methods used in the period 1949-1952.

FOLK DANCING

Folk dancing's natural appeal made it an ideal channel for propaganda. One dance for instance depicted the actions of a girl tending a machine in a cotton factory. This dance was rather beautiful, and many in the audience could understand and appreciate the significance of the simple movements. A similar appreciation was shown of a dance portraying the picking of tea leaves from the teabushes. Young men were also trained to perform some sort of military dance, falling down on the ground and pretending to be digging a trench on one side and then on the other. This militaristic feature went further when a jazz orchestra blared out patriotic song-music for social dancing.

One of the most spectacular examples of mass dancing was in the celebration of the National Day, October 1st, in 1952. The winter and spring of that year had seen the Five Anti Movement sweep all over the country, so that by the end of the summer, gloom and dismay were widespread. Deliberately, therefore, the keynote for the celebration was happiness, and for that purpose all the people were to be taught a simple dance. "all" meant all. The dance was extremely simple. The movements of the dance were taught—in the days preceding October 1st—to grandmothers and children, to housewives and to peasant women, to factory workers and to office staffs.

*Excerpts from "China's Use of Culture for Propaganda," *Eastern World* XXI, No. 11/12 (Nov./Dec. 1967), pp. 10-11. Reprinted with the permission of Foreign Correspondents, Ltd., copyright holder.

The songs that were taught were simple, tuneful and patriotic, and they were broadcast incessantly. For the celebration of October 1st in 1951, all the people were taught three short songs. Each factory would have its little band or orchestra, and the musicians would be dressed in colourful costumes. Red, in Chinese symbolism, stands for happiness. Not a trick was missed in the presentation of these new songs. Most meetings were opened with a practice of the current popular songs. Large numbers of people would sing in unison, and as in Western evangelistic campaigns or at football matches, the participation by a crowd of tens of thousands aroused emotions. A new National Anthem was taught, which had a rousing tune too; Arise was its opening word.

At first, all the emphasis was on training the masses to sing. The National Conservatoire was ordered to make this their first aim rather than concentrate on a few artistes.

THEATRE

Chinese love going to the theatre, and not a few are born actors; whether they understand all the words or actions is sometimes irrelevant. Shaoshing opera and Peking opera have been famous for many years and have always attracted large crowds. The Chinese Communists cleverly encouraged the continuance of the presentation of the old plays but—of course—favoured those in which the villain was a landlord or someone of that ilk. Many new plays were put on. Chinese people have a great sense of tragedy, so they would appreciate a tragedy showing sufferings inflicted by cruel landlords or Japanese militarists. As melodrama is also applauded, plays with an "American imperialist" as the villain were also very popular.

China is a vast country, and Westerners find it hard to believe that plays found in Peking or in Shanghai are also to be found in the countryside. But, the Communist regime saw to it that small troupes of actors would tour the rural areas and that scripts of new plays would be broadcast to outlying parts of the country.

CINEMA

Once again, a Westerner was at a loss in this field too. In the West, the cinema is an entertainment. A movie star will assert that his aim is to make people "happy"—that is to help them to forget their troubles. In China, the Communist aim was and is to use movies for propaganda almost exclusively, and rather cleverly. For example, during the Five Anti Movement, documentaries were made. When Shanghai people saw on the screen the misdeeds of a well-known drug factory, they were greatly impressed. A picture would be shown of a "wicked capitalist factory owner" who painted over rusty old chains that subsequently broke when in use in the fighting in Korea.

During the first two or three years after 1949, the best acting, musical and circus troupes were sent abroad, e.g., to Moscow and to Paris. When

the Chinese in the cities of China saw on the screen a documentary of their troupe being given vociferous applause in Russia and in France, their patriotic pride was naturally aroused with widespread effect. Popular documentaries dealing with current themes were shown simultaneously in 15 or more theatres. Group tickets issued through the schools and factories were extremely cheap, so that the percentage of the population who saw such films was high. Virtually all new films had patriotic themes as "The New-Man Village," "The Dove of Peace," "Stand Up, Sisters."

MINORITIES CULTURAL TROUPES

Cultural troupes included those of the Chinese Minorities as well as troupes invited from foreign Communist countries, such as North Korea or Eastern European States like Poland. In the years preceding the Communist regime the previous Chinese governments had paid little attention to the minorities—of whom the Communists listed more than forty—but the Communists straight away spent considerable money, time and effort on bringing minorities dancing and singing groups from the outlying areas of the country to tour all over China. This had the immediate effect of increasing the patriotic fervour, making the people appreciate the greatness of their nation in many new areas. Chinese appreciate colour, and the costumes of these troupes were decidedly colourful.

The visits of foreign troupes, in the early 1950s, was an adroit move. Peking had not been invited to join the UN; the U.S. had put on embargos; foreign tourists and connections were not too common. Hence, the appearance of these foreign artistes showed the Chinese masses that they did have friends in some foreign countries. This was complemented by the showing of films of Chinese troupes performing in these same countries. Chinese have been famous for their skill in acrobatics for a long time. With their ability in organisation, the Communists were able to procure outstanding performers from all over the country in acrobatics, in conjuring, in Chinese sword dancing. The result was that the performance was of such outstanding merit that it brought tremendous credit and fame to new China. In one circus troupe, one of the acts was performed by an old man and his two sons. The old man was about five feet three inches in height, and was quite slender. The climax of that act was when the old man sat on the floor, and drawing a small hoop—with a diameter of possibly eighteen inches—over his feet and legs, proceeded to squeeze his whole body through this hoop. A popular story had it that when this circus had performed in Moscow, the Russians had asked that this old man be X-rayed.

EXHIBITIONS

The Chinese used exhibitions in a big way, similar to their use of the cinema and radio for propaganda. For instance, the Land Reform Exhibition showed in clear, direct manner the way in which the peasants had

formerly been exploited by the landlords. Pictures, charts and implements all told an easily-understood situation. One could hear the onlookers comment, "Oh, yes, I knew this. I saw that." Skill in the technique of getting across a political message was also shown when there was an Agriculture and Forestry Exhibition. Special charts and pictures were supplied to illustrate how the urban folk could help those in the rural areas, and vice versa.

RADIO

Perhaps it is in the use of radio that the Communists have reached heights—or depths?—that would seem unbelievable to Westerners. Take the celebration of Labour Day, May 1st, in 1951, as one example. A two-day programme was put on, lasting four hours, from 6:30 p.m. to 10:30. Twenty-two items were listed for the first day, including speeches, shouting of slogans, band music, solos, etc. All factories and schools were expected to use their loudspeaker system for listening-in. The programme was designed to whip up enthusiasm for increased production, so that, say after one hour, one factory would telephone in and say, "We have been stimulated to pledge to increase production by ten percent." This, naturally, was immediately reported over the radio. Soon after, another factory would respond and go further by pledging to increase its production by fifteen percent.

In October, 1952, there was a Peace Conference in Peking and after that conference, Shanghai delegates reported it over the radio. Town women sat outside their houses on benches and seats to listen to these reports, and this was repeated all over the country. During one of the early thought-reform campaigns, the children of a prominent "reactionary" were even brought to the broadcasting studio to broadcast an appeal to their father to repent and reform. Another development was the seven o'clock morning physical exercises broadcast over the radio—exercises which were being performed in most parts of the country.

WALL NEWSPAPERS

After the Communist Government was installed in Peking, all aspects of life came under government control with politics pervading the daily life of China to an extent that would not be believed in Western countries.

One of the cleverest devices was in the use of wall newspapers, which might be on a wall or a blackboard or hoarding. Chinese people admire and love good calligraphy. The trick was to get the best calligraphist in the neighbourhood, whose writing was admired, and his material was supplied to him by a politically-progressive cadre. Usually a cartoon or funny picture was added for good measure to attract the passers-by. Also a special section might be devoted to services for the neighbours such as "lost and found," "to let." Items of particular interest to housewives might be added, such as "the daily menu," "how to weave."

In their first five years of government, the Chinese put out more issues of new stamps than many other countries would put out in ten years. These issues commemorated the birthday of Lenin, or a big Communist meeting in Peking, or tractors, or athletes, or the famous murals in the Tung Huang Caves. Matchbox covers had pictures of new factories or of tractors in the field. Wrappings for sweets would have similar scenes, and so would banknotes. Pocket diaries were produced and at the foot of each page covering one week, there would be a saying from Lenin or Stalin, or Mao Tse-tung, or some other Chinese Communist leader.

The lengths to which an individual in any particular walk of life would go to show his political progressiveness can well be illustrated by the following true story. One night in the spring of 1952, in a Chinese restaurant in Shanghai, a feast was being served at two tables. One of the dishes was a watermelon cooked in the Cantonese style. When the two melons were brought in, one for each table, it was observed that the chef had skilfully ornamented the rims not by a fretwork design but by carving out on one melon four Chinese characters for Resist America, Aid Korea, and on the other melon, Protect the Motherland, Assist the Nation.

The Chinese Communists are masters of the art of propaganda. They assign much time and personnel to political propaganda, and many people are employed full time in the propagation of the Party doctrines. For example, in one single district of Shanghai, 25 Youth League Workers who were subsidised by the government had as their full-time job the task of going to the Party branches or organisations in the factories and schools and lanes in their district to demonstrate the latest dances or songs or plays or to tell about radio programmes and the like.

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PLAYS AND PROPAGANDA: THEATRE AS A COMMUNICATION MEDIUM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

BY JAMES R. BRANDON

An account of the use of theatre to convey political themes in Southeast Asia

In all countries of Southeast Asia theatre has been more than just entertainment. In addition to providing aesthetic pleasure, emotional release through empathic response, and even a means for accomplishing communal celebration of ritual events, theatre has always functioned as a channel for communication. Traditionally, three major channels were open to southeast Asian ruling elites through which they could disseminate their ideas, beliefs, and value systems: the religious hierarchy,

*Excerpts from "Past and Present," chapter 15 in *Theatre in Southeast Asia*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, pp. 277-301. Copyright 1967 by the president and fellows of Harvard College.

scholars and scribes, and theatrical performances.¹ Of these, theatre has unquestionably been the most important in reaching the largely illiterate populations of the countryside and the cities. Priests, monks, and religious teachers have played their role in propagating religious ideas to large numbers of people but their work has often centered at court or in urban communities. The influence of the scholars and scribes has always been limited to the very small group of elite who could read and write. The use of theatre to educate and instruct an audience is not unique to Southeast Asia. Greek citizens were educated en masse at communally sponsored tragic festivals. Horace said Roman drama should "entertain and instruct." Through Morality and Mystery plays in the Middle Ages, pagans were instructed in Christian doctrine and practicing Christians were sustained in their beliefs. In modern times playwrights from Ibsen to Shaw to Brecht, Miller, and Genet have used the stage as a pulpit. Groups of all kinds, from the Nazis and the Communists to Moral Rearmament, have used theatre as well. What is notable about the theatre in Southeast Asia, as compared with Europe or America, is the degree to which it is involved in the educative process. It is not an exaggeration to say that, had the theatre not existed as a powerful channel for communicating to large groups of people, Southeast Asian civilization would not be what it is today. Through the medium of theatre performances, the complex religious, metaphysical, social, and intellectual values of the ruling elite were disseminated to the most unsophisticated villagers in the most remote areas.

The Khmer kings of Cambodia and the Brahmanic priestly class used theatre performances as a part of the ritual worship of the god-king. . . . The kings of Java, Bali, Sunda, Sumatra, and Malaya encouraged and sponsored recitations and performances of local versions of the same epics.

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Drama was the main medium through which Javanese, Sudanese, and Balinese religious and philosophic systems were taught to the people.

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On the Malay Peninsula, Islamic teachings penetrated . . . drama . . . deeply. . . .

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In Thailand, Burma, Laos, and Cambodia, Buddhist . . . stories have been widely performed for several centuries. . . .

To a certain extent Catholic missionaries utilized the appeal of theatre to gain converts to Christianity in the Philippines. Their aims were similar to those of the Moslem missionaries in Indonesia and Buddhist missionaries on the mainland of Southeast Asia. Their methods were not much different.

* * * * *

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when European countries and the United States had colonized most of Southeast Asia, local nationalists sometimes tried to use theatre performances as a means of arousing the people against foreign rule. Troupes performing at court . . . were seldom involved, for their repertoires consisted of classic plays and their livelihood depended upon court favor. Most anticolonial, pro-nationalistic plays were staged by troupes in the popular tradition. . . . Colonial authorities watched closely for any hint of opposition in theatre performances so that criticism was usually indirect or phrased as double-entendre language which European officials would have a hard time unraveling. . . . However, theatre was not an important weapon of nationalist leaders in their campaigns of harassment and agitation against colonial rule in pre-World War II days. The small nationalist movements were not prepared to use theatre as a propaganda medium in any major way. It would have been difficult to mount a concerted theatrical effort in the face of stern government controls. And, in any case, the nationalist leaders had little time to think of theatre; often it was all they could do to stay alive and out of prison, to say nothing of staging plays.

The largest concerted effort in modern times to utilize theatre as a propaganda medium in Southeast Asia was that of the Japanese occupation forces during World War II. Between 1940 and 1945 the Japanese gained control of every government in Southeast Asia. Through both civil and military channels, Japanese authorities pressed theatre into service to help explain the aims of their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Western countries were vilified through the drama, and Asian nations glorified. The Japanese clearly recognized the communication potential of the theatre and assigned considerable sums of money and numbers of personnel to the task.

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Few governments in Southeast Asia today attempt to use theatre as a medium of communication in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, in Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, governments rarely educate, inform, or indoctrinate people through dramatic performances. Only in Indonesia and in Vietnam is government propaganda regularly disseminated via the stage.² Civil ministries and the armed forces in both these countries organize and operate propaganda theatre troupes, and their efforts to harness the communication potential of theatre for national purposes are extremely interesting.

The largest theatre-as-propaganda program within the Indonesian government is administered by the Ministry of Information through its network of offices beginning on the national and provincial level, extending through regional, district, and city levels, and reaching down as far as the sub-district and the village. Most of the government's theatre efforts

are concentrated on the island of Java, where theatre traditions are strong and where more than half the population of the country lives. In its theatre program the Ministry has adopted an indirect and a direct approach. In its indirect approach the Ministry works through existing professional troupes. . . . Low-level Ministry of Information officials pass along propaganda material to professional troupes, hoping they will put the material in their plays. Materials usually are prepared at the provincial level by officials of the People's Information Section. They may be merely statements of government policy or they may be play scripts and scenarios which incorporate the desired propaganda themes. Up through the 1950's a good deal of effort went into the indirect approach. Many troupes were regularly contacted by information officials. . . . Efforts to work through professional troops have fallen off in recent years.

The Ministry's direct approach is to set up and run its own propaganda theatre troupes. Professional performers are hired as officials of the Ministry of Information. Their full-time job is to write, direct, or perform propaganda plays. The Ministry of Information got into the theatre business during the years of the Revolution (1945-1949), when Indonesia's struggling nationalist government sought ways of rallying the people's support. Conventional mass media—radio, motion pictures, the press—were in the hands of the Dutch. Nothing was more natural than to turn to . . . shadow drama, the traditional mode of cultural expression of the Javanese, as a means of telling the people about government policy. . . . Puppets were flat leather cutouts. . . . But they represented contemporary figures—Soekarno, Nehru, soldiers, Dutchmen, peasants—and they were cut and painted in realistic fashion. The puppets told stories of "national leaders and guerrilla soldiers in their struggle to obtain independence for their country." ³ . . . The Dutch controlled the cities, but it was easy for student-guerrillas to tote a dozen leather puppets, a small screen, and a lamp along backcountry trails. In villages along the route of their march the soldiers performed rousing stories of the fight against the Dutch. Plays were short, for the guerrillas often had little time; they were simple, so unsophisticated peasants could understand them. It is difficult to estimate how many troupes were operating during the Revolution. The Dutch thought . . . [these plays] effective enough to take the trouble, during the Second Military Action of 1948, to search for, confiscate, and destroy several hundred . . . puppets. When the Revolution ended in 1949 the main reason for [the plays] . . . ended as well. People began to see and to care that the puppets were crude and the stories blatant, and no audience would pay to have . . . [these plays] performed. [They were] kept alive only through performances sponsored and paid for by the Ministry of Information.

As the deficiencies of *wayang suluh* became more apparent, a new form of . . . [drama] was created which, it was hoped, would retain the mystic appeal and artistic excellence of traditional . . . [shadow play] while conveying a modern social and political message. This remarkable crea-

tion was called *wayang Pantja Sila*. It was conceived by Mr. Harsono Hadisoesen, puppeteer and leader of a government information unit. . . . According to Javanese mystic thought there are 144 human passions and characteristics. Puppet figures visually represent all these traits in traditional . . . [theatre]. It was not difficult, therefore, to select appropriate puppet figures to symbolize all the modern concepts of *wayang Pantja Sila*. Just as the puppets of . . . five . . . brothers [in a traditional epic] symbolized the five principles of the Pantja Sila, other traditionally "good" puppet figures symbolized Miss Freedom, Health Services, Education, Agriculture, and so on, while traditional demon puppet figures symbolized evils such as Plant Disease, Devaluation, Inflation, and Loss of Moral Standards, as well as the competing ideologies of Feudalism, Marxism, Individualism, Intellectualism, and others.

Wayang Pantja Sila was created by the Ministry of Information for its own performers, but it was hoped that audiences would take to the new form and that professional *dalang* would begin to perform it. This did not happen. Like . . . [its predecessor] and a dozen . . . [drama] forms created by Javanese princes in past centuries to glorify themselves, *wayang Pantja Sila* never caught on with the public. Likely its elaborate symbolism was too complex for villagers to understand (though in theory its symbolism was the strongest point in its favor). Perhaps professional . . . [puppeteers] shied away from it because it was so closely tied to government sponsorship. Government support for *wayang Pantja Sila* has declined drastically in recent years. Its mild, democratically inclined message is out of date.

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Concurrent with its efforts to develop . . . [these theatre forms] as communication media, the Ministry of Information has hired troupes of various standard genres to tell the government's story. . . . [Paper-scroll play] was experimented with, largely because it was simple and inexpensive to perform. A puppeteer to tell the story, some pictures painted on paper, and perhaps an assistant or two were all that was needed. Troupes of . . . comedians were sent touring through Central and East Java. *Dagelan* are the clown roles in *Ludruk* and *Ketoprak*; a dagelan troupe is made up of four or five performers, all of whom play comic roles. These troupes proved extremely successful with village audiences.

* * * * *

In addition to the Ministry of Information in Indonesia, the armed services also operate a few theatre troupes. The army especially is in a powerful position within the government. Its budget is by far the largest of any branch of the government. . . . Each major command of the army has a Morale Unit (URRIL) whose assignment is to entertain troops in the command. Soldiers assigned to a URRIL unit are performers of one kind or another, and each unit maintains several more or less separate

groups of performers. . . . URRIL officers say they usually choose "patriotic or fight" plays . . . as appropriate for their military audience. The primary function of military theatre troupes is to entertain. Their secondary function is to inform. . . . Similar morale units are found in all the armed services. Army, navy, and air force headquarters in Djakarta also sometimes send out professional troupes for one- to two-month tours of military posts on the outer islands.

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[Specific coverage of the theatre as a communication medium in other Southeast Asian countries has been omitted from this article.]

NOTES

¹ Robert Redfield, *Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Civilization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 98, quoting Milton Singer regarding India. The same can be said of Southeast Asia.

² The Burmese government may also be using theatre for propaganda purposes. Lack of reliable information on Burma at the moment makes it impossible to say for certain.

³ Indonesian Embassy, Washington, D. C., *The Arts of Indonesia*, mimeograph, n.d., p. 12.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF US-SUPPORTED CULTURE-DRAMA TEAMS*

BY THE JUSPAO PLANNING OFFICE

By establishing closer identification with the local population and clothing messages and appeals in traditional culture form, culture drama teams provide a congenial setting for the presentation of political communication. Under these conditions, the target population is more likely to be attentive to the messages and appeals.

INTRODUCTION

Culture-drama entertainment in rural hamlets is a traditional expression of culture in Vietnam. Roaming culture-drama teams began to operate in the days of Chinese domination and this tradition has continued through modern times. Because of the widespread familiarity of the peasant with the culture-drama and his wide acceptance of this traditional culture form, the Communists seized upon the concept and developed it into a PSYOP weapon. The Communist forces in Vietnam presently use culture-drama to bolster the morale of both combatants and non-combatants, to instill attitudes favorable to their cause, and to sustain *their attack on the political, military, social, and economic objectives* of the Government of Vietnam.

During recent years the Government of Vietnam, with support from United States organizations, has employed culture-drama teams to assist in accomplishment of its objectives. These teams have had varying de-

* Excerpts from "Organization and Operation of U S.-Supported Culture-Drama Teams," JUSPAO Field Memorandum Number 57 (Saigon JUSPAO Planning Office, August 21, 1968), pp. 1-8.

grees of success. The most successful program to date has been the U.S.-supported Van Tac Vu program, which over the past two years has operated from 13 to 20 teams, of from six to eight members each, in remote hamlets of South Vietnam.

Early in 1968 Van Tac Vu teams were increased from 13 to 20 and the plan was to effect an increase up to 26 by December 1968. This plan was rendered impracticable by national mobilization. Military conscription of Van Tac Vu personnel reduced the program from 20 field teams in March to 11 in May 1968; and by 1 August 1968 the number had been reduced to five.

In order to keep the culture-drama program operating at an effective level, it becomes necessary to identify or organize teams in the provinces, consisting of personnel assigned to ARVN military organizations, Revolutionary Development cadre, CIDG or Armed Propaganda Teams, and other personnel who are draft exempt or have draft deferment status.

A culture-drama team is a group of young and talented artists, organized to conduct PSYOP programs through the medium of entertainment. Each team should be composed of from five to nine members. Experience has revealed that a good balance is achieved by the formula of two-thirds male members, one third female. These teams tour the hamlets of remote and contested rural areas, entertaining the people and using entertainment as a medium for PSYOP messages in support of programs and objectives of the Government of Vietnam. Such programs and objectives include, but are not necessarily limited to, those of National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi, Revolutionary Development, the GVN Image, the Refugee and Police Programs, Phoenix, RF/PF and other pacification efforts. The teams perform not only in village/hamlets, but also in refugee and Chieu Hoi Centers and at RF/PF outposts. When necessary and feasible they operate in direct support of military operations.

GOALS OF CULTURE-DRAMA TEAMS

1. To revive the native culture-drama tradition and forge it into a tool of combat; in other words, to create a National Combat Culture-Drama.
2. To counter alien culture-drama forces adopted by the Communists.
3. To provide a medium whereby, through entertainment, PSYOP support may be provided to programs and objectives of the Government of Vietnam.

RESPONSIBILITIES

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United States organizations—military or civilian—which conduct psychological operations are encouraged to organize and/or support culture-drama teams at the province level, each to operate within a province. Such U.S.-supported teams should operate under the control of a local agency of the Government of Vietnam but may be supported

entirely or in part, according to need, by U.S. organizations. In no case should a culture-drama team use the title of a U.S. supporting agency in its publicity or during performances. Continuation of support must, of course, be determined on the basis of the effectiveness of the teams, as determined by the supporting organization.

THE PROGRAM OF THE CULTURE/DRAMA TEAMS

Culture-Drama Performances

The basic mission of a culture-drama team is to perform for populations of village complexes. Such teams normally perform once or twice a day. If the security situation permits, they conduct night performances.

The typical performance lasts for an hour or more and includes modern and traditional VN songs, a magic show, skits, plays and humorous tales. Dances may be performed if the requisite talent exists. Virtually all of the material is PSYOP-oriented, i.e., it serves the objectives of GVN programs.

Cultural Seed Planting

This activity is directed toward school children and other youngsters of elementary and early secondary school age. In Cultural Seed Planting sessions, children learn patriotic songs and develop pride in being citizens of Vietnam. Woven into the singing sessions are lessons designed to encourage children to respect their teachers, to obey their parents, to get along with their friends, to love their native country, and to identify themselves clearly with the elected Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Parallels are drawn between the present defense against aggression and struggles in past centuries against other invaders.

Cultural Seed Planting is conducted at schools, in parks, in orphanages and at any other location where children may be assembled. This is a regular, daily task for the teams. A normal session lasts from one to two hours.

PSYOP Civic Action Activities

In addition to the PSYOP content of their performances, culture-drama teams, by the nature of their operations, have an unusual opportunity to disseminate information and publications at the "rice-roots" level. This also is a daily major assignment.

Before leaving the provincial capital on an operation, the team should contact organizations conducting PSYOP in the province and pick up leaflets, posters, magazines, and other materials supporting current PSYOP programs for distribution in rural areas.

Culture-drama team members may conduct Chieu Hoi broadcasts at night, when the situation warrants, over ground public address systems. They attempt to communicate with the Viet Cong and with VC-connected families to explain the Chieu Hoi program and in this way to persuade members of the Viet Cong to return to the Government of Vietnam.

In order to create a strong identification between the people and the team, the team cadre engage in manual labor on small projects designed to help the people of the hamlet. They clear and dig drainage ditches, repair fences, sweep out marketplaces, help improve roads, wash babies, and tend to sick and wounded soldiers. In short, they perform any helpful task that is within their capabilities. Such activities are conducted daily—they are symbols of the bond that joins the culture-drama team members to the people. This spiritual aspect of their work is more important than the practical significance of the tasks performed, although each task must have practical benefit if the teams are to communicate with the villagers.

Popularization of Culture-Drama

A culture-drama team may organize local artists into hamlet and village culture-drama teams. Through this means, songs and dramas are woven into the daily lives of the rural population. Further, the formation of village/hamlet culture-drama teams opens up new possibilities for information and PSYOP activities. Culture-drama team cadre are able to concentrate on Cultural Seed Planting over longer periods of time and thereby to promote a more deeply-rooted sense of patriotism among young people.

To accomplish this task a team must live in a hamlet over an extended period of time. The goal was successfully reached by Van Tac Vu Teams at three experimental locations. However, this success engendered particularly strong and violent reactions from the Viet Cong and the program had to be suspended temporarily under 1968 post-TET security conditions.

This activity should be resumed as soon as practicable, since popularization of culture-drama can assist in accomplishing the pacification objectives of the GVN. The basis of this concept is: The strength of any given program is limited, but the ultimate strength of the people is boundless. Culture-drama aims to tap the strength of the people. At the same time it seeks to guide and motivate the people to identify themselves with the Government of Vietnam.

FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF OR ASSISTANCE TO TEAMS

Financial assistance to or support of culture-drama teams must be based clearly and directly on their effectiveness in psychological operations in support of GVN objectives. There is no justification for using U.S. funds for support of mere entertainment troupes.

U.S. organizations supporting culture-drama teams in whole or in part must provide adequate funds for such support. The cost of maintaining one team of eight members for one year is, at present wage levels, approximately one million piasters, not including any initial cost of equipment.

... All pay systems should be as uniform as circumstances permit.

There should be no competing for talent by one organization offering higher pay than another.

In any case, it is essential that the pay scale adopted by any organization incorporate some kind of incentive pay, modeled after that applying to Van Tac Vu Teams. The incentive pay system has been a vital element in the success of the Van Tac Vu program.

Provincial-level teams may be composite in nature, i.e., composed of personnel drawing salaries from different organizations. In such cases, personnel whose basic salaries are lower than the standard for culture-drama team members should be brought up to the team level by augmentation of their pay, and all personnel on a team must have equal opportunity to earn incentive pay.

BASIC PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

Experience has revealed certain principles of organization and operation which are fundamental to the success of a culture-drama program. U.S. organizations should support only those programs which meet, or show definite promises of meeting, these basic principles.

It is essential that culture-drama teams live among village/hamlet population . . .

Culture-drama work must be fulltime employment, not an afterhours' activity [of] students. . . .

Appearances of culture-drama teams at social functions of GVN or U.S. organizations should be limited to those necessary for public relations purposes, i.e., to gain support. . . .

Team members must be dedicated, patriotic citizens of the Republic of Vietnam. . . .

Team members must be of high moral character. . . .

Team members should have the ability, or the potential to develop the ability, to establish strong identification with the rural population, to win their favor, and to establish a channel of communication from the Government of Vietnam to these rural audiences.

Teams must earn their pay. . . .

It is not sound to assume that musical or acting ability is the sole requirement for becoming a member of a culture-drama team. . . .

Membership on a culture-drama team must not be permitted to serve the financial interests of the team members or the sponsors.

The basic requirements for employment on a team must be talent and proper attitudes. . . .

It is essential that team members, while operating in the field, function as a family. . . .

Programming, within the general themes and objectives outlined by a supporting organization, should be left largely up to the team members.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Experience has revealed that a culture-drama team should operate within a defined monthly cycle. The cycle established for Van Tac Vu teams is cited here as an example only. These teams generally depart from their headquarters, usually the province capital, for field operations on the fifth day of each month. They spend 20 days in intensive operations in the hamlets. On the 25th day of the month they report back to their headquarters and file their report on operations and the team's diary with the sponsor. Payment of salaries is made at this time, since the amount of incentive pay due cannot be determined until the report is filed. The team leader is reimbursed at this time for costs of transportation and other allowable team operational costs.

After the 25th of the month the team members are allowed five days for recuperation. The first five days of the subsequent month are spent in rehearsal of songs, skits, plays and other program material for use in the upcoming monthly program.

Material used by culture-drama teams must be unsophisticated, i.e., it must be aimed at rural audiences rather than at urban people. The music selected for presentation must be inherently Vietnamese, classic and modern. In the past, some teams have consistently appealed to the tastes of urban audiences influenced by Western culture. This kind of music, particularly including the modern popular music imported from the United States and featured in city night clubs, does not serve the purposes of the culture-drama program.

Operational schedules should be drawn up well in advance of each operational month, in consultation between the supporting organization and the team leader. This schedule should list the hamlets, refugee centers, outposts and other locations to be included in the itinerary. Program content also should be planned in advance, including "themes of the month." In developing monthly plans, it may be helpful to consider the content of the *Van Tac Vu Magazine*, which is a primary source of program material.

The sponsors must provide the maximum attainable security for the team, since it will be a target for the Viet Cong.

Experience has revealed that it is a bad practice to lend money to or provide advance payments to team members. This practice has invariably had an adverse effect on cadre discipline and morale.

NORTH VIETNAMESE AND NFLSV SONGS AS PROPAGANDA*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

Songs are an important medium of communication in many cultures. Singing often accompanies work routine and thus can become a significant medium not only for communicating messages, but also for reinforcing ideas.

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Trends," Issue no. 608, pp. 11-15.

Two song books were issued in 1966 in Hanoi—one is devoted to songs used by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) and the other book contains songs sung in North Vietnam itself.

LIBERATING THE SOUTH

The first songbook is called "Liberating the South." On a green cover the words "Vietnamese Songs" are written in Spanish, French, English, Chinese, and Russian. The majority of the songs used to "liberate the south" are understandably marches.

The first song in this book is dedicated to the NFLSV and called "Liberating the South." It is described as the official song of the "South Vietnam Liberation National Front". The sentiment in this song is perhaps exemplified by a few quotes from the English words that North Vietnam has supplied for its English-language songsters. Among the words of the lyrics are such stout-hearted appeals as "together we advance resolutely. . . to annihilate U.S. imperialism . . . for so many years, our rivers and mountains have been divided." The writer of the lyrics takes pride in the geography of Vietnam and refers to the "majestic Mekong River" and the "glorious Truong Son range."

The song concludes with a refrain which calls upon the "heroic southern people" to rise up because "the sun is rising everywhere and we pledge ourselves to build our country and make it bright and lively forever." As will be noted, this song contains such propaganda themes as anti-imperialism, a call for the unification of Vietnam, and pride in majesty of the nation. This song is a call to people in South Vietnam and makes no reference in the English lyrics to Communism or North Vietnam.

The next song in the book, not a march, is entitled "Uncle Ho's Voice".* The lyrics tell us of the tender voice from "beloved North Vietnam" that reaches South Vietnam, "our native land." Uncle Ho's voice is described as filled with love and bright as the morning sun. As the bringer of tremendous hope, Uncle Ho speaks with a dear voice, the voice of a tender mother. Quite understandably to certain groups of Vietnamese, perhaps, this voice penetrates deeply. Any singer of this song informs Uncle Ho that the South Vietnamese people are rising up against "the wicked enemy and they are marching forward under the "national liberation flag" and that millions of people believe in "Him." Uncle Ho, presumably an atheist, might be surprised to know that Hanoi translators in the English lyrics thought it proper to use the capital letter denoting a Deity for the pronoun "Him" in referring to Uncle Ho.

The next two songs are called "The March of Liberation" and simply "The March." These are what [the NFLSV] probably mean by people's songs, full of such popular gusto as "hatred makes us strong," "we go to kill the last of the Yankee imperialists," "we sing songs of optimism,

*"Uncle Ho" refers to Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnamese leader.

although our people are suffering too much," but nevertheless "hatred is burning in our hearts."

A song called "The Hour of Action" is apparently a battle chant. The lyrics say that the NFLSV cannot soften its hatred, that its soldiers must live and that the enemy must die, and that the "new wind from the five continents is supporting us in our just struggle." It soars in fervor to say, "the revolutionary tide is surging, Rise up!"

"Spring at the Resistance Base" is a pastoral ballad of the guerrilla soldier who contemplates the songs of the birds, the bursting forth of the flowers, and the wind in the forest trees. He admits that he is homesick, but more important, he remains resolute in his determination to wipe out the enemy.

A song called "The Bamboo Spike" is a eulogy on the efficacy of bamboo spikes that draw the enemy's blood. This song is apparently designed for a chorale. There is a solo part, a part for all, a part for the men, and a final section that is described for "two bands." The song seemingly requires one of the chorus to hold up a spike, for it says that "this spike is no doubt a bamboo spike . . . it is the spike which yesterday killed the enemy who came and ransacked our village." One solo part goes, "Brothers! Let's plant the long spike in the deep trap." The chorus cuts in, "Long spike, short spike, everywhere spike, spike bristling upwards or planted in the deep trap." The finale reasserts the theme: "This is the spike to kill the enemy and protect our village, Oh! bamboo spike!"

The girl heroine seems to be popular in Vietnamese song and story, and the NFLSV would not be without a heroine. A tune called "The Everlasting Song" is, according to its lyrics, the song of a girl from Quang Nam, a heroic South Vietnamese girl. The words go on to say, Miss Van! Your song will last forever . . . your heroism will be admired by generations to come . . . the whole South Vietnam is aroused with indignation and sings your everlasting song." The final line gives the heroine's name: "Tran-Thi-Van, your name will live forever."

"Jacket Making Song" is a panegyric to the dedication of the home front. The singer declares that whether it is bitter cold or sweltering heat, those at home will continue to make "jackets" so that their fighters will be resolute and kill the enemy. A third refrain goes: "Speed up your work, oh brothers and sisters." The jackets are said to clothe "the liberation fighters" and the home front wants to express hatred "in silk."

The last song of the NFLSV book is called "Longing for the Liberation Soldier." This is a hymn to the greatness of one NFLSV fighter. It contains such lines as "I love the liberation soldier and miss him when he fleaves . . . a liberation soldier is soon going to annihilate the U.S. imperialist . . . all our people march to annihilate the enemy . . . and make spike traps to defend our villages . . . for the day of reunification of all the people, north and south . . . and all our people will live under the same roof."

The foregoing song collection has been brought out, it is presumed, because the songs are the favorites of the NFLSV.

READY TO STRUGGLE

The second book is devoted to songs sung in the North. It follows the same format, having on the cover the words "Vietnamese Songs" written in Chinese, Russian, French, English, Spanish, and of course, Vietnamese. The title of the book is *Ready to Struggle*, and on the blue cover is a drawing of a U.S. aircraft seen in a gunsight with its wing shot off and falling towards the earth, apparently an exemplification of the dedicated antiaircraft skill of the North Vietnamese antiaircraft unit.

The first song in the book is called "Ready to Struggle." It tells us to music that the people in the north are holding sickles, hammers, or pens in their hands, and they are vying with each other to boost production either in the fields or at construction sites. Like the NFLSV, their hearts are "filled with hatred" and all are anxious to deal deadly blows to the U.S. aggressors. The lyrics call for the transformation of pens into guns since only through struggle can the people grow up quickly. According to the song, the people in the north want to sacrifice their lives for the fatherland; they are unafraid of hardships and difficulties. The singer calls to North Vietnamese youths: "Let's rise up and defend our bright sky."

The second song is pep chant to antiaircraft and other weapons. It is called "Strike Them Accurately." Characteristic of this song is "Our sea is not their pond . . . don't let them soil our air . . . shoot them down . . . annihilate them . . . let us smash their aggressive scheme."

The first two songs are marches, as is the third, in which North Vietnam in song tells the south, "O South, We are Ready." The lyrics point out that "the south is calling upon us, and at this call from you (the south) immediately will start to resist the enemy." The refrain goes: "Just a call from you and we will start to reach our native south."

In a more bellicose vein, is the next aria, "Ready! Fire!" The singer tells how Vietnamese antiaircraft units are smashing "U.S. piratical planes", and how the whole north is "red with flags and soaked in sweat." The singer ends by declaring that the battery in the north is always ready to aim and fire at U.S. imperialists.

Among the North Vietnamese songs is one entitled "Cling to the Sea of Our Homeland." It is devoted not only to the defense of the sea but to the triumphs of the fishing industry. The lyrics begin by describing northern boats going out to sea and when they come back, "our boats will be full of fish." The boats will go "everywhere, pursuing the streams of fish to find things to make our life more joyful." The lyric writer declares that the enemy tries to send over "a lot of spies," but bearing deep in our heart our hatred, "we will force them to pay." In other words, no matter what happens, the message continues "defend our fatherland."

"Quang Binh, O My Homeland" extols an aria. The lyrics laud the good rice plants there, a militia girl who acts as a sentry on the coast, and the songs of fishermen of the cooperatives "who share the sky and the sea and have a rich income." Here also toil young women drying salt along the shore and woodworkers busy in the forests. The English version used the

word "hallelujah" after various lines, but the hallelujah seems to follow no real pattern and is an odd choice for atheistic Communists. The song goes on to tell how mothers and sisters have sacrificed and saved rice to feed the troops. Although Quang Binh is the homeland of the narrator who will defend it because he loves it, he wants to send to the south his true feelings since someday "all will meet again in one home, the day of great victory."

North Vietnam has made a national hero of Nguyen Van Troi, who attempted to assassinate U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara, was caught, and executed in Saigon. A stamp has been issued in North Vietnam honoring Nguyen Van Troi and also a song entitled "Your Words Will Echo Forever." The lyrics say that Nguyen Van Troi, a worker of Saigon City, faced the enemy guns and is now known all over the world through words that echo "until Venezuela." The song tells us that millions will follow the example of Nguyen Van Troi, who has become as "iron and steel" in the effort to kill the U.S. aggressors. The lyrics predict that Nguyen Van Troi's words "Long Live Vietnam" will echo forever.

"Starlights," a love song, talks about the perfume of the night scent, lamps shining, and millions of stars in the sky. The homes in North Vietnam are described as warm with love, where couples may live in love, and where they have pledged to build more and more houses so that they can live in a homeland where one day there will be more songs of love. The singer thinks of home in the south and one day hopes to return there "when millions of stars will shine again to embroider the dark." The lyrics say, "O my sweetheart, we are separated by two zones and partition tears down our hearts," but one day this will all be over.

The song "On Our Way Forward" is dedicated to construction of many kinds. The jungles will be turned into corn and rice fields; new sites will go up everywhere. In the past the singer has fought the enemy; he has fought by the banks of the Mekong River, but today he is standing on the banks of the Red River in North Vietnam, building a new nation that will be filled with joyful songs.

The last song in the book, "Wherever the Difficulties Are, There the Youth Will Be", is a lyric in praise of young fighters. The words say, "We follow the path of revolution and we forget ourselves . . . we are determined to fight, overcoming hardships, we advance to the future towards the bright society . . . when the Party needs us we are ready . . . wherever the difficulties are, there the youth will be."

COMMENT

Not one of these 20 songs is devoted to peace. There are some nostalgic bits about the homeland, but nowhere [in the books] do any . . . lyrics writers hope for peace except on North Vietnamese terms of total victory. The songs are bulging with Communist ideas of self-reliance; dependence on Party leadership; the glorious joys of construction, whether in town or on farm; and the intrepid qualities of Communist guerrillas.

SYMBOLIC ACTS AS PSYOP*

By ROBERT T. HOLT AND ROBERT W. VAN DE VELDE

A simple symbolic act (propaganda of the deed) will often carry a message that will have greater impact in influencing people's thinking and behavior than an elaborately planned propaganda campaign.

Meaning, of course, can be "transferred" through various types of action. Indeed, all foreign policy operations have a symbolic impact over and above their physical impact. But we are not imperialist enough to claim, therefore, that all foreign policy acts belong ultimately in the bag of techniques to be used in psychological operations. There are, however, instances when physical operations are important primarily for the meaning they convey rather than for the change in the material world which they bring about. Some of the Commando raids in France and the Low Countries in 1942 and 1943 were of primary importance not because of the physical damage that was done or because of the information gained about German defenses. But they suggested to the German High Command that an invasion was in the offing and thus tied down troops which could have been effectively used on the eastern or Mediterranean fronts. They also perhaps encouraged the captive populations to resist and harass their German masters. The Doolittle raid on Tokyo in 1942 is another example. The impact on meaning throughout the world was far greater in its implications than was the damage done to Tokyo.

There are also a number of peacetime examples of activities whose symbolic impact is of primary significance. The Moslem festival of *Id al Adha* is the time when thousands of Moslems journey to Mecca. In 1952 *Id al Adha* fell on Friday the twenty-ninth of August, but Mecca's gates were to close on the twenty-seventh. Less than a week before the gates closed, there were more than 4,000 pilgrims stranded in Beirut—800 miles from the holy city. All had air tickets but the local airlines simply could not handle a fraction of that number before the deadline. After some amazingly fast and thoughtful work by the American legation in Beirut and by the departments of Defense and State in Washington, the Air Force rushed fourteen C-54's to Lebanon and began to airlift the pilgrims into a city only 40 miles from Mecca. Flying around the clock, they made it possible for all the pilgrims to get into the holy city before the gates closed. The story of the airlift "magic carpet" was told in the Moslem press throughout the world, and the United States received favorable editorial treatment in a press that had been noted for its hostility.¹

Although military aircraft were used, one could hardly argue that this was a military operation. It was an operation that indicated to Moslems in

*Extracts from *Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy*. University of Chicago Press, 1960, pp. 31-33. © 1960 by the University of Chicago. Published 1960. Second Impression 1964. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, and the courtesy of the author.

Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, and Afghanistan that the United States, a foreign policy giant in the world, would keep an eye out for the "little guy" and was willing to help him if he got in a tight spot. It is difficult to conceive how much propaganda, rumor, and personal contact would have been necessary to get this message across in the absence of the airlift. Its impact was primarily symbolic. On the other hand, although the Berlin airlift had tremendously important symbolic effects throughout the world, one cannot say that its primary purpose was psychological. Once the Allied decision to stay in Berlin was made, the airlift became a necessity for circumventing the Soviet blockade.

In these kinds of physical operations it is extremely difficult to draw a clear line between a psychological operation and a military or economic one. But it is important to recognize that some desired changes in the apparent world can most effectively be provoked by a physical operation and that some of these techniques ought to be at the disposal of those responsible for psychological operation.

NOTES

¹ W.E.D., "Operation 'Magic Carpet'," *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, edited by William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Bethesda, Maryland: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, March 1958), pp. 337-342.

THE OLDER VIETNAMESE AS A COMMUNICANT*

BY THE JUSPAO PLANNING OFFICE

A person with prestige among members of an audience, or one who speaks with recognized authority, has an advantage in persuasion. Age is one relevant factor to prestige in communication; older persons generally tend to be more influential than younger persons advice, with some exceptions, is often sought from older persons.

Age commands great respect in Vietnam. The aged are honored members of the family, the village, and society in general. Traditionally they are entitled to the best food, the best clothing, the best treatment, and deserve honor on all occasions. In old Vietnam elderly men invariably were the heads of their households. This great respect for the aged continues today to a large degree in the rural areas of South Vietnam. In the cities of the South young people are breaking away from family control. In North Vietnam Young people are being taught to turn against the family and parental authority.

* * * * *

Undoubtedly the most important force for harmony in traditional Vietnamese society—one which remains strong today—was family loyalty.

*Excerpts from "The Older Vietnamese as a Communicant," JUSPAO Field Memorandum No. 27, October 4, 1966.

Upon the kinship system rested the entire society, which fostered and cherished it. The basic social unit was the large household of an older man and wife, their married sons, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren. While today this extended social unit is less common, family ties still reach out as they have for thousands of years in Vietnam even beyond the large family to a far wider group of relatives. Traditionally, the family system was strengthened by the pattern of landholding. Most land was owned in small family parcels—only in the last century did large plantations develop. The Vietnamese farmer-family traditionally raised or made nearly everything it used.

To build upon this foundation of family life, the Confucian philosophers found their mortar in *hieu* [or filial piety]. Taking for their premise that feelings of love and respect for parents were innately ingrained in people, they built an entire system of social relations. A proper son, one who cultivated his natural feelings of respect for his father, would as a consequence be a useful member of the community and a dutiful subject of the king. The most important religious ceremonies in Vietnam are rites for family ancestors in which feelings of filial piety are manifested by veneration of departed ancestors. This is the so-called "ancestor worship" which strongly influences Vietnamese thought patterns. The belief is that each person is a link in the endless chain of humanity. One's family therefore includes not only those alive today, but past generations and even the unborn to come. A person's fate upon death—whether he becomes a good spirit or a demon—depends not only on his behavior during life on earth, but also on the solicitude with which his descendants honor him. The highest achievement of *hieu* is to serve the dead as though they were the living. This attitude has the effect of inculcating a strong sense of timelessness which stresses the importance of those who have gone before, of elderly people, alive and even dead.

There are certain countervailing factors with respect to Vietnamese youth. One is the normal "war between generations" in which neither the old nor the new generations knows quite what to make of the other. Another factor, for Vietnam, is a byproduct of the modernization process in which a society finds that its traditional virtues are breaking down because, particularly to the young, they seem no longer adequate guides to behavior. This manifests itself in such phenomena as the "Saigon cowboy," brother to the American [hippie]. A more fundamental countervailing factor is the age median in Vietnam. Vietnam is a young nation in terms of age distribution. Half the people are eighteen years of age or under (as compared with the U.S., itself a relatively youthful nation, where half the population is 25 years of age or under.) And finally there is among Vietnamese city youth a widespread and deeply ingrained suspicion, distrust and cynicism for elders, particularly for elderly politicians. Youth here tend to believe that all Vietnamese who have engaged in political activity during the past twenty years or so, have been tainted and compromised and are unworthy of respect or even attention. This

amounts almost to a prejudice since little effort is made to distinguish one individual from another; the condemnation tends to be a blanket one.

The Communists have asserted that the Vietnamese family system is the source of great social injustice in Vietnam and note the Vietnamese proverb: The son of the emperor is crown prince, and the son of a temple guard spends his life sweeping banyan leaves. The Communists argue that the system causes sons of influential persons to get preferred treatment in business or appointment to high position in government, which discriminates against those whose families are not affluent or politically powerful. While there is something to this assertion—just as it has some validity in the United States—on balance it appears that the Communist attack on the concept of *hieu* has not profited them. As one Vietnamese noted: "*Hieu* is like a gulf stream, on the surface a merely peaceful concept like other traditional streams of thought in Vietnam. In reality however it is strong enough even to resist tyranny." Most Vietnamese were horrified by the Communists' so-called "denunciation movement" in North Vietnam in 1953-54 in which children were encouraged to denounce their parents to the state.

An elderly traditional-minded Vietnamese is impressed most by [individuals] who combined the traits of dignity, humility, wisdom and self-control. Such[individuals] always are calm and unruffled. They never lose their temper. They never shout. They always have a wise and philosophic word to say about events and people. . . . He will impress a Vietnamese as a man of eminent character and honor. . . . It is not that Vietnamese are not materialistic, for they are. But they still do not have the same attitude toward progress as do Americans. This is not because they are against progress, but because they conceive of it—and indeed the whole universe—in different terms and using different concepts.

* * * * *

To the elderly Vietnamese the best and proper behavior consists in knowing and understanding the world, and having understood it, adjusting intelligently to it. To a large degree this means learning how to accept the blows of a capricious fate with decorum. The wise man does not try to change his universe, he adapts to it. Bend as does the bamboo in the wind, say the Vietnamese. . . . What Vietnamese see as suppleness we see as duplicity, what they see as tranquility of spirit we see as lack of concern. And what we see as resolution, the Vietnamese see as intractability; what we see as boldly meeting challenge, they see as disrupting of the harmony of the universe.

* * * * *

If you treat elderly Vietnamese with genuine consideration for their feelings, if you behave toward them at all times as if they were dignified persons worthy of respect, if you simply practice good manners, you cannot go seriously wrong. But this behavior in the final analysis is a

function of your underlying attitude toward the Vietnamese. Vietnamese are unbelievably sensitive to whether or not a foreigner *likes* them as a group. If you do, they will know it, and make all sorts of allowances for your unintentional errors or even your loss of temper. If you don't like them, you will never be able to hide that fact.

AN UNKNOWN WARRIOR*

By EDWARD J. CLARKSON

Rallies of returnees engaged in direct contact with families and friends of known guerrillas have unmatched potential for reaching insurgent ranks with propaganda messages and appeals.

Individuals who have served the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam may join the Government of Vietnam and be welcomed as citizens of the Republic of Vietnam, so states the Chieu Hoi policy of the government of Vietnam.

This policy was adopted by the government early in 1963. Americans, who had gained experience working with and observing defection programs in the Philippines (HUKS) and in Malaya with the British, suggested a similar program and assisted in establishing it.

The rationale is that an enemy force can be weakened by creating opportunities for defection. If the enemy soldier has no alternative to remaining, the enemy force is strengthened. But if an attractive visible alternative exists, the enemy's problems are compounded to a point where almost anyone is suspect. Such a pattern imposes on the enemy a requirement for additional manpower to observe their fellow soldiers.

The Chieu Hoi program aims at projecting the government to the people in a confident and humane light, reversing the process whereby the enemy, having gained a recruit, claims his family's loyalty as well. It provides the family with a means to appeal to him to return home, as the returnee is offered a personal amnesty and a means to return to normal life away from deprivations and hardships of guerrilla existence.

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The task of informing and persuading the Viet Cong and their comrades to rally is called the "inducement phase." Inducement is accomplished primarily by the use of airdropped leaflets; by aerial broadcast from low flying planes, and by appealing to units and individuals, by name, if known.

Possibly an even more effective method of inducement [than airdropped leaflets and aerial broadcasts from low flying planes] is direct personal contact. This is accomplished by armed propaganda teams, composed of former Viet Cong who volunteer to go out into insecure territory and VC-terrorized areas to tell the people of the Chieu Hoi program. Gener-

*Excerpts from "An Unknown Warrior," *Marine Corps Gazette*, LIV (August 1970), pp. 38-43. Reprinted by permission of the copyright holder, the Marine Corps Association, publishers of the *Marine Corps Gazette*, professional journal for Marines. Copyright © August 1970, by the Marine Corps Association.

ally a team is composed of five to eight men, all lightly armed for self-protection. They may spend anywhere from a number of hours to a few weeks living and conversing with the population of a particular village. They may conduct rallies and distribute informative literature about the government. They may distribute food commodities in short supply. These men, organized loosely along military lines, provide visible proof to the population that the government backs up the policy of the Chieu Hoi program. At the same time by just being there they point up the fallacy of VC propaganda, which states defectors are tortured, imprisoned and generally, shot.

Each province and the city of Danang in I Corps has an armed propaganda company composed of Hoi Chanh (returnees) who are trained and equipped to conduct face-to-face propaganda operations. These teams have proved their value by assisting in the control, interrogation and propagandizing of the local populace; by applying their knowledge of VC tactics to locate mines, booby traps and caches; by gathering intelligence from the populace with whom they come in contact; and by spotting VC suspects.

* * * * *

UNORTHODOX TECHNIQUES

Some of the unusual means of communicating messages and appeals include the use of deception, poison pens, mournful sounds over loudspeakers during the night, gossip, superstitions, and rumors. The first two essays recount incidents in which deception was used effectively, and discuss conditions for its use. In "Our Poison Pen War Against the Nazis," a gimmick for unwittingly exposing a target group to PSYOP messages and appeals is described. "Psychological Warfare Unit Sends Out Mournful Sounds" briefly covers unusual themes used over loudspeakers at night in Vietnam. Superstitions are useful to psyoperators because they are closely related to audience predispositions. Also related to audience predispositions, rumors spread because they are congenial to members of the target group and are passed on by them. "Rumors and How to Counter Them" describes how rumors change in the process of being passed on to others and indicates the kinds of defenses that can be used against rumors. In a similar way, "Intra-Group Communication and Induced Change" relates how positive gossip is utilized for spreading ideas and how an established information flow can prevent rumors from spreading.

TACTICS OF DECEPTION IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS*

BY ROBERT I. HOLT AND ROBERT W. VAN DE VELDE

Tactics of deception in psychological operations are often uncertain and become effective in influencing behavior and at the same time maintaining communication credibility only if three general rules are followed.

Tactics of deception attempt to make the audience build up a psychological environment which differs from the material environment. In the terms of perceptual psychology, tactics of deception try to provoke . . . [illusory] percepts. . . .

There are many examples of the use of the tactics of deception. Much of Hitler's success in the late thirties was due to the fact that the official decision-makers in Britain and France defined the situation (particularly in regard to Hitler's goals) in a manner which deviated disastrously from reality.

There were many instances during World War II when deception was used effectively by both sides. Deception is responsible in some degree for the reputation of "evil" which tends to surround the psychological instrument. Indeed, among some people whose understanding of the dynamics of human behavior is meager and whose knowledge of world affairs is parochial, "psychological operations" are understandable only in what they refer to as "the dirty tricks department." All other aspects of the psychological instrument are apt to be scathingly referred to as "globaloney."

One of the most famous and successful uses of deception was the British "Operation Mincemeat"—the case of *The Man Who Never Was*. After the Allies had driven German and Italian military forces from North Africa, the next step in the Allied offensive was obvious to both them and the Germans. Before the Mediterranean could be available for shipping, Sicily had to be taken. The move was so obvious that the Germans could be expected to mass their defensive forces there and make the invasion, even if successful, extremely costly. The value of making the Germans think that the blow would come elsewhere was apparent. Operation Mincemeat was an attempt to do just this.

It involved releasing a corpse, dressed as a major of the Royal Marines, from a submarine off the coast of Spain. A "Most Secret" letter was planted in a dispatch case attached to the body. It appeared to be from General Sir Archibald Nye, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff to General Sir Harold Alexander, who commanded an army in Tunisia. The letter indicated that there would be a major Allied offensive against Greece. Other documents on the body were designed to lead the Germans

*Excerpts from *Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy*. The University of Chicago Press, 1960, pp. 33-35. ©1960 by the University of Chicago. Published 1960. Second Impression 1964. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

to believe that the major was being flown into the Eastern Mediterranean on a plane that crashed off the coast of Spain.

The body was picked up by Spanish officials and the documents handed over temporarily to a German agent who made copies that were sent on to Berlin. After the war, captured documents proved that the German intelligence service believed the documents and convinced the High Command that the Allies would make their major attack in the Eastern Mediterranean. Military and naval forces were sent to Greece and held there even after the invasion of Sicily, because Hitler and the High Command were convinced that the attack on Sicily was diversionary.¹

There were also a number of "black" propaganda operations undertaken by the Allies in World War II which employed the tactic of deception. "Operation Annie" and "Gustav Siegfried Eins" are examples of two radio stations that operated as if they were broadcasting from inside Germany. Their success was predicated on getting the Germans to believe that they were not Allied stations.²

There are three basic rules that must be followed if deception is to be an effective way of influencing behavior. First, the deception must be "reasonable." The success of Operation Mincemeat was due to the fact that it was entirely reasonable that a Royal Marine officer would be flying to North Africa with special messages in a plane that crashed, and that an Allied invasion in the Eastern Mediterranean was a reasonable if not the most likely move from Africa.

A second rule of deception is that there must be no simple way of checking what the facts in the case really are.

A third rule is that the use of deception should not discredit a source which may have valuable future potential. Deception is usually discovered eventually and the more successful the deception the more likely is the source to be discredited. In World War II the "black" Allied station, Operation Annie, was once used to direct a Nazi column into Allied hands. The deception was excellent, but it completely destroyed the future of the station. It is usually unwise to use a newspaper or radio station which built up a large audience for purposes of deception.

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NOTES

¹ E. Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was* (London, 1953).

² Howard Becker, "Nature and the Consequences of Black Propaganda." *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, edited by William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Bethesda, Maryland: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, March 1958), pp. 672-677.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VIETMINH*

BY EDWARD GEARY LANSDALE

Unusual situations and traditions may provide the opportunity for ingenuity in the development of PSYOP initiations. This account describes the exploitation of an historic moment and of local superstition for PSYOP purposes.

. . . Just before the French quit the city of Hanoi and turned over control to the Vietminh, . . . the Communist apparatus inside the city was busy with secret plans to ready the population to welcome the entry of Vietminh troops. I suggested that my nationalist friends issue a fake Communist manifesto, ordering everyone in the city except essential hospital employees to be out on the streets not just for a few hours of welcome but for a week-long celebration. In actuality this would mean a seven-day work stoppage. Transportation, electric power, and communication services would be suspended. This simple enlargement of plans already afoot should give the Communists an unexpectedly vexing problem as they started their rule.

An authentic-looking manifesto was printed and distributed during the hours of darkness on the second night before the scheduled entry of the Vietminh. The nationalists had assured me that they could distribute it safely because the chief of police in Hanoi was a close friend of theirs and would rescue any of them who might be caught and arrested. The next day the inhabitants of Hanoi read the fake manifesto and arranged to be away from homes and jobs for a one-week spree in the streets. The manifesto looked so authentic that the Communist cadre within the city bossily made sure, block by block, that the turnout would be 100 percent. A last-minute radio message from the Communists outside the city, ordering the Communists inside to disregard this manifesto, was taken to be a French attempt at counterpropaganda and was patriotically ignored. When the Vietminh forces finally arrived in Hanoi, their leaders began the touchy business of ordering people back to work. It took them three days to restore public services. A three-day work stoppage was a substantial achievement for a piece of paper.

* * * * *

[A] second idea utilized Vietnamese superstitions in an American form. I had noted that there were many soothsayers in Vietnam doing a thriving business, but I had never seen any of their predictions published. Why not print an almanac for 1955 containing the predictions of the most famous astrologers and other arcane notables, especially those who foresaw a dark future for the Communists? Modestly priced—gratis copies would smack too much of propaganda—it could be sold in the North before the last areas there were evacuated. If it were well done,

*Excerpts from *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1972, pp. 225-227. Reprinted with the permission of the author, copyright owner

copies would probably pass from hand to hand and be spread all over the Communist-controlled regions.

The result was a hastily printed almanac filled with predictions about forthcoming events in 1955, including troubled times for the people in Communist areas and fights among the Communist leadership. To my own amazement, it foretold some things that actually happened (such as the bloody suppression of farmers who opposed the poorly-executed land reforms and the splits in the Politburo). The almanac became a best seller in Haiphong, the major refugee port. Even a large reprint order was sold out as soon as it hit the stands. My nationalist friends told me that it was the first such almanac seen in Vietnam in modern times. They were embarrassed to discover that a handsome profit had been made from what they had intended as a patriotic contribution to the nationalist cause. Unobtrusively, they donated this money to the funds helping the refugees from the North.

OUR POISON PEN WAR AGAINST THE NAZIS*

BY BRIAN MOYNAHAN

Target audiences will unwittingly expose themselves to propaganda messages and appeals not in line with their predispositions if the messages and appeals are subtle and presented in ordinary, normal, or routine fashion.

One of the most ingenious bits of propaganda used by the Allies during World War II was called "Operation Cornflakes." Its details were never released, and it is still on the U.S. secret list. But recently an international stamp actioneer, Mr. Robson Lowe, came across a sheaf of documents and stamps describing it, and next month they will go on show in South Africa.

"Cornflakes" had a beautiful simplicity to it. Dropping leaflets indiscriminately was expensive and largely ineffective. The Germans knew it was Allied propaganda and treated it as such. But if it were to arrive normally, through the German mail, on their breakfast table (hence "Cornflakes"), then most Germans would think that it had come from a resistance group inside the country. This would be a far more shattering blow to their self-confidence.

The idea, conceived by the Americans, was to bomb mail trains northward bound for the Reich with Italian based P-38 fighter bombers. The P-38s would stop the train and damage it heavily with strafing. Then mail bags containing the propaganda letters would be dropped amongst the wreckage. When they found them, the Germans would presume they came from the train and deliver them as normal mail.

*From *The Sunday Times* [London] 2 May 1971, reproduced in *Falling Leaf Magazine*, XII, No. 2 (June 1971), pp. 64-65. Reprinted with the permission of *The Sunday Times* (London), copyright holder.

A vast amount of work went into the scheme. German POWS who had been postal clerks were questioned on regulations, details of postal cancellations, correct methods of packing and labelling mail sacks. Aircraft of the U.S. 14th Fighter Group, assigned to the mission, practised daily.

For every began on a large scale in the summer of 1944. Near-perfect fakes of 12 and 6 pfennig Hitler stamps were run off; a propaganda parody of the stamp showing Hitler as a Death's Head was also made. German envelopes were printed. The material inside looked authentically German; much of it was crudely produced, as one would expect from a clandestine group operating from inside the Reich.

Over two million names and addresses were chosen from the telephone books of Berlin, Dresden, Vienna, Hamburg and Stuttgart. An army of clerks and typists was used to address 15,000 envelopes a week—different typewriters and handwriting had to be used to avoid suspicion.

The first mission was on 5 February, 1945. A mail train on its way to Linz in Austria was attacked, and the engine destroyed. Eight mail bags, each with about 800 letters, were dropped on target. The mail was carefully prepared to coincide with towns on the route of the target train. Envelopes were franked immediately prior to take-off to ensure the correct date appeared.

They were addressed to troops as well as to civilians. A newsletter—Der Jäger der Sudfront, the South Front Hunter—was sent to troops on the Italian front. Forged military envelopes had messages from the "League of German Partisans," suggesting that there was a widespread peace movement in the Army. A special newspaper, Das Neue Deutschland, was printed and dropped. It was effective enough for Himmler's paper, Das Schwarze Korps, to spend two pages denouncing it and its treacherous authors.

The propaganda itself was ingenious and highly varied. "The League of Lonely Women" was invented, which sent combat troops a highly enticing, printed letter. "When are you coming on leave? . . . We are waiting for you in any strange town you may pass through. Cut off the League symbol from the letter. Stick it on your glass when you are in any cafe, in any bar near a station. Soon a member will be with you, and all the traumas of fighting will disappear in the beauty of one night." The kick, of course, came in the tail: Don't be shy, "your wife, sister or loved one is also one of us." Scarcely a thought to keep up the morale of a jealous, worried soldier fighting on the Russian front.

Austrians were urged to master phrases like, "Mej ai slap dse dorti proschn?" (May I slap the dirty Prussian.) But one section shows how serious was the intent behind Operation Cornflakes. "Please Sir, may we hang the Gauleiter ourselves? The executioner lives right around the corner. We will provide the rope. The rope is too thin—too thick—too long—too short. The gallows is not high enough, the Gestapo functionary is too high."

It is almost impossible to tell how effective the scheme was. Only 120

mail bags had been dropped on wrecked trains when the war ended. It is known that copies of Das Neue Deutschland reached troops through the German post in Italy, that it was read by troops as far north as the Baltic, and that 90 percent of prisoners who had read it thought it either genuinely came from Germany or from Switzerland. But the secret has been kept too long to check back on the real impact.

RUMORS AND HOW TO COUNTER THEM*

By WILBUR SCHRAMM

Rumor, limited in its audience, can be a very effective instrument of psychological operations if the communicator has an understanding of how the message is likely to be received by members of the target audience

One of the best illustrations of how perception works, and also one of the aspects of human behavior that the psywar operator needs to understand most thoroughly, is the growth and passage of rumors. The most extensive work on rumor has been done by Allport and Postman,¹ who have studied the problem not only by observing rumors in society but by setting up experimental rumor passages in the laboratory. One of the rumors they studied during the war had to do with a Chinese teacher on vacation who, shortly before Japan's surrender, drove his car into a Maine village and asked his way to a hilltop from which he could see a view that a tourist guide had told him about. "Someone showed him the way," say Allport and Postman, "but within an hour the community was buzzing with the story that a Japanese spy had ascended the hill to take pictures of the region."

What happened? Someone told the story. It was told over and over again. And as it passed from person to person, three things were happening to it. So, at least, Allport and Postman concluded from their analysis of the case.

In the first place, it was being *leveled*. Details were being omitted:

The courteous and timid, but withal honest, approach of the visitor to the native of whom he inquired his way; the fact that although he was certainly Oriental his precise nationality was unknown. Likewise not mentioned was the fact that the visitor had allowed himself to be readily identified by people along the way, and that no one had seen a camera in his possession.

In the second place, the story was being *sharpened*:

Having accepted their special interpretation of the Chinese scholar's visit, the rumor agents accentuated certain features while minimizing others. The sharpening of selected details accounts for the overdrawn dramatic quality of the final story. What in the original situation was Oriental became specified as Japanese; what was merely a "man" became a special kind of man, a "spy." The harmless holiday pursuit of viewing the scenery became the much sharper, sinister purpose of espionage. The truth that the visitor had a picture in his hand became sharpened into the act of "taking pictures." The objective fact that no pictures of any possible value to the enemy could be taken from that particular rural location was overlooked.

*Excerpts from *The Nature of Psychological Warfare*, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Md., 1953, pp. 64-68.

In the third place, the story was *assimilated*:

In the Maine countryside resident natives have had little contact with Orientals. Like most Occidentals they are unable to distinguish a Chinese person from a Japanese. They had only one available rubric for Orientals, firmly implanted in their minds by wartime news and stories: the "Japanese spy." No other category was available for the classification of this unusual visitation.

A Chinese teacher-on-a-holiday was a concept that could not arise in the minds of most farmers, for they did not know that some American universities employ Chinese scholars on their staffs and that these scholars, like other teachers, are entitled to summer holidays. The novel situation was perforce *assimilated*, in terms of the most available frames of reference.

This process—leveling, sharpening, and assimilation—seems to characterize the passage of all rumors. You can test it yourself, as Allport and Postman did, by playing a kind of parlor game: write a brief story; then whisper it word for word to a guest, who will whisper it to the guest on the side of him, and so around the room. When the story comes back to you, compare it with the original. This has been done in the laboratory many times, in the transmission of both pictures and words, and the same general principles of perception seem to apply.

Consider what was happening in the incident of the Chinese teacher. The villagers were trying to give the incident a meaning. They perceived those details that added up to a meaning, selecting some details, rejecting others, distorting some, adding some (for example, the camera). The important question, of course is this: what controlled their selection? They were obviously selecting in terms of the frames of reference available to them (which did not include Chinese teachers on vacation in Maine), and in terms of their needs, moods, and anxieties at that moment. The war was much on their minds. Japanese were objects of fear, distrust, and hate. Protecting their country was a high value of great importance to them. Their suspicion of foreigners was of long standing. They had been exposed to the Government's campaign for security of information, to spy movies, to the knowledge that cameras were prohibited around defense installations. And all this added up to a frame of reference, in terms of which they perceived this new event. As Allport and Postman put it:

A yellow man—a Jap—a spy—photographic espionage. One idea led to the other with almost mechanical inevitability until the final conclusion emerged The three-pronged process of leveling, sharpening, and assimilation reflects the rumor agents' "effort after meaning." The facts of the situation, but dimly understood, did not provide the meaning that the strange visitation required. Hence a single directive idea took hold—the *spy motif*—and in accordance with it, discordant details were leveled out, incidents sharpened to fit the chosen theme, and the episode as a whole assimilated to the pre-existing structure of feeling and thought characteristic of the members of the group among whom the rumor spread.

Rumors are clearly an important weapon of psywar. But let us look at them here only in terms of the perceptual processes they illustrate and of what they mean to the psywar operator who wants to know how a message is likely to be received.

If you want to anticipate how an intelligent enemy will defend himself you can look at some of America's experiences in rumor defense during World War II.

In general, this country used two kinds of defense against rumor. The government agencies preferred the indirect method of smothering rumors with facts, that is, they did not repeat rumors even for the purpose of refuting them. The theory behind this defense is (a) that "rumor flies in the absence of news" and (b) that to repeat a rumor even for refutation may spread it farther. Therefore agencies like OWI, when they learned of a dangerous rumor, would release facts in answer to it without ever mentioning the rumor.

On the other hand, nongovernmental organizations and civilians put their faith in rumor clinics, which chiefly took the form of newspaper columns or radio programs in which rumors were selected for ridicule and refutation. The theory here was to bring rumors out into the open into a climate of fact and understanding, where they could not flourish. Such evaluation and study of these rumor clinics as was made indicates that (a) there was no evidence that newspaper rumor clinics, filled with ridicule and negation as they were, actually served to spread any rumors farther; (b) however, it was regarded as possibly dangerous to print a rumor in bold-face type, or to repeat the rhythms and slogan-like qualities of some of the more effective rumors; (c) it was felt that radio rumor clinics were more likely than printed clinics to spread a rumor, because of the dial-twisting habits of American listeners; and (d) there was some slight evidence that the clinics impeded the spread of rumor, and no doubt whatsoever that they succeeded in making their communities rumor-conscious.

Along with these defenses, of course, there was a poster, newspaper, and radio campaign aimed at security of information. Typical slogans were "Think before you talk," "Enemy ears are listening," "Don't kill her daddy with careless talk." This is standing operating procedure (SOP) for any country at war.

NOTES

- ¹ G. Allport and L. Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York: Holt, 1947).

"PRACTICAL JOKES"*

BY EDWARD GEARY LANSDALE

Some inactive avenues are opened when PSYOP is thought of as an opportunity to play "practical jokes." Results often justify the concept.

Conventional military men think of combat psywar almost exclusively in terms of leaflets or broadcasts appealing to the enemy to surrender. Early on, I realized that psywar had a wider potential than that. A whole

*Excerpts from *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1972, pp. 71-75. Reprinted with the permission of the author, copyright holder.

new approach opens up, for example, when one thinks of psywar in terms of playing a practical joke. We all know that many people risk their lives and safety to paint slogans and appeals on walls in forbidden territory, motivated as much by anticipation of the antics of their outraged enemies as by ideology or patriotism. Low humor seems an appropriate response, somehow, to the glum and deadly practices of Communists and other authoritarians. (I recall a case in Europe once, when militant youths were to partake in a massive street demonstration. The Communist party had followed the book, systematically placing its cadre to incite the demonstrators into acts of violence. Police and military forces were ready to prevent this with tear gas, rifles, and bayonets. But bloodshed was avoided. A ribald benefactor brought out cauldrons of hot chocolate and coffee and invited the would-be demonstrators to share his brews—which he had laced generously with a powerful laxative. The militants found themselves with more urgent business to attend to than street brawls.) When I introduced the practical-joke aspect of psywar to the Philippine Army, it stimulated some imaginative operations that were remarkably effective.

To the superstitious, the Huk battleground was a haunted place filled with ghosts and eerie creatures. Some of its aura of mystery was imparted to me on my own visits there. Goosebumps rose on my arms on moonless nights in Huk territory as I listened to the haunting minor notes of trumpets playing Pampanguena dirges in the barrios or to the mournful singing of men and women known as *nangangaluluwa* as they walked from house to house on All Saints' night telling of lost and hungry souls. Even Magsaysay believed in the apparition called a *kapre*, a huge black man said to walk through tall grass at dusk to make it stir or to sit in a tree or astride a roof smoking a large cigar.

One psywar operation played upon the popular dread of an *asuang*, or vampire, to solve a difficult problem. Local politicians opposed Magsaysay's plan of moving more troops out of defensive garrisons to form further mobile and aggressive BCTs [battalion combat teams], and in one town the local bigwigs pointed out that a Huk squadron was based on a hill near town. If the troops left, they were sure the Huks would swoop down on the town and the bigwigs would be their victims. Only if the Huk squadron left the vicinity would they agree to the removal of the guarding troops. The problem, therefore, was to get the Huks to move. The local troops had not been able to do this.

A combat psywar squad was brought in. It planted stories among town residents of an *asuang* living on the hill where the Huks were based. Two nights later, after giving the stories time to circulate among Huk sympathizers in the town and make their way up to the hill camp, the psywar squad set up an ambush along a trail used by the Huks. When a Huk patrol came along the trail, the ambushers silently snatched the last man of the patrol, their move unseen in the dark night. They punctured his neck with two holes, vampire-fashion, held the body up by the heels,

drained it of blood, and put the corpse back on the trail. When the Huks returned to look for the missing man and found their bloodless comrade, every member of the patrol believed that the *asuang* had got him and that one of them would be next if they remained on that hill. When daylight came, the whole Huk squadron moved out of the vicinity. Another day passed before the local people were convinced that they were really gone. Then Magsaysay moved the troops who were guarding the town into a BCT.

Another combat psywar operation used the "eye of God" technique, which I had heard about when it was used at the siege of Caen, and from its use by spotter aircraft-loudspeaker tank teams in World War II in Europe. The idea was to get exact information about the enemy and then broadcast it through loudspeakers in combat situations, making individual enemy soldiers feel that they couldn't hide from an all-seeing eye and had to follow the directions of the broadcasts. In the siege of Caen, a German officer would be told by name that he was the next to die because he refused to surrender, and moments later an artillery shell would hit his house or headquarters. In the air-tank technique, the loudspeaker tank would call out to German soldiers hidden in defensive positions but visible from the air, claiming to see individual soldiers, describing what they were doing at the moment, announcing that they didn't have a chance, and telling them to come out and surrender. Both examples made effective use of fresh combat intelligence about the enemy.

The only equipment that the Philippine Army had for making broadcasts to Huk guerrillas under combat conditions was a handful of U.S. Navy loud-hailers (bull horns), designed for use by beachmasters in amphibious landings, which I had scrounged in Washington and brought with me. I had planned for them to be used by infantry, but it was found that they could be used from the light liaison aircraft assigned to BCTs, when flying at low altitudes. . . . I had distributed this equipment to each of the first BCTs formed. One day, a Philippine officer made use of the bull horn, the light aircraft, and the "eye of God" technique in an unusual way, thanks to his BCT's collection of detailed information about the enemy.

On this day a Huk squadron was being pursued by an infantry company from a BCT, which had not been able to make contact with the elusive guerrillas. The officer went up in the aircraft to see if he could spot the Huks from the air. He saw them, and he saw also that his troops were helplessly, behind in their pursuit. Frustrated, he looked around in the aircraft for something to throw at the Huks below him—and found a bull horn stowed behind the seat. Inspiration came. Through the bull horn he shouted down at the Huks below, telling them that they were doomed because he and his troops knew all about them and soon would catch them. He cudgled his brains for what the BCT's intelligence officer had told him about this Huk squadron, and he remembered some of the names on its roster. He called down to the Huks by name, pretending to

recognize individuals. As the aircraft made a final circle, the bull horn sent his amplified voice down with these parting words: "Thank you, our friend in your squadron, for all the information." Then he flew away chuckling over his final broadcast. The BCT found out later that the mention of a mysterious "friend" in their ranks had aroused the Huk's darkest suspicions of one another. Three of them were singled out and executed on the spot. The words had inflicted as many casualties on the enemy as troops could have done in a running fight.

The name of this technique, "the eye of God," reminded me of the ancient Egyptian practice of painting watchful guardian eyes over the tombs of the pharaohs. The painting was stylized to give the eye a baleful glare to scare away grave robbers. Recalling its appearance, I made some sketches until I recaptured the essence of its forbidding look, and I handed over the final drawing to the Philippine Army with suggestions for its use. It was mainly useful in towns where some of the inhabitants were known to be helping the Huks secretly. The army would warn these people that they were under suspicion. At night, when the town was asleep, a psywar team would creep into town and paint an eye on a wall facing the house of each suspect. The mysterious presence of these malevolent eyes the next morning had a sharply sobering effect.

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INTRA-GROUP COMMUNICATION AND INDUCED CHANGE*

BY ARTHUR H. NIEHOFF

The establishment of efficient information flow between the communicator and the target audience can assist the communication in two ways. It can be used as a communication feedback mechanism for warding off rumormongering; it can be used as potentially routine gossip for spreading ideas.

The one absolutely essential technique [in helping to produce adoption of new ideas or practices in developing areas] is the establishment of effective communication, for it is the means by which knowledge of the new idea or practice is transferred. . . . We believe there are, basically, three types of relevant communication: input, the movement of information from the change agent to the potential adopters; feedback, the response from the potential adopters back to the change agent; and gossip, or intra-group communication, among the potential adopters regarding the innovation. . . .

Although a change agent may establish channels of communication to transfer his ideas to potential adopters (input), as well as channels for feedback, the interaction process does not stop at this point. When any significant event occurs in a local community, the members of that community invariably begin a process of communication about it among

*Excerpts from "Intra-Group Communication and Induced Change," Professional Paper 25-67, Human Resources Research Office, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C., June 1967, AD 654124, pp. 1-9

themselves. We wish to show that such informal conversation, or gossip, is a powerful force in the process of decision-making in small groups, and thus is significant to induced change projects.

* * * * *

[One] project in which intra-group [or informal] communication was instrumental in helping achieve the goals set by the change agent was an effort to promote modern household practices in Southern Uganda through the establishment of women's clubs.¹ The change agent's first step was to hold a meeting of interested people, including men, in a local house, school, or community hall. She would give a talk on the proposal and answer all questions, after which the women could decide whether they wanted a club. If a club was established, regular teaching sessions, particularly in sewing, were begun. The women had to pay the equivalent of ten cents per week for membership and buy their own cloth. There were perceived practical benefits, both in the clothing the women were able to make for themselves, and in small rewards, such as needles and thread. An additional motivation was the status obtained by being a member and having a club in the community. The local chiefs came to feel "behind the times" if they did not have such a club in their district. This came about primarily as a result of the gossip of the women about their activities, substantiated by showing off their new dresses. Consequently, within a four-year period 40 such clubs were organized with 30-50 members each.

Except for a few projects in which information was given to students with the hope that they would transmit it to their parents, we found only one in which the change agents consciously depended on gossip as a means of spreading an innovation.² This was a pilot project in family planning in Taiwan, and, not surprisingly, the change agents were communication specialists. The change agents used a wide variety of communication techniques at first, but depended on female gossip to carry the knowledge beyond the families contacted directly. An evaluation study later revealed that about 20 % of the women who accepted contraceptives had never been directly contacted by the change agents but had learned about the innovation through gossip.

Most of the projects during which harmful rumors were reported succeeded despite the malicious gossip. However, most of these rumors occurred in the initial stages of the projects' implementation and their effects were neutralized by improved communication. Probably in most instances where rumors were instrumental in halting projects, the change agents never learned of their existence.

Almost all the rumors were a result of communication insufficient for the local people to learn the projects' goals clearly, added to their basic skepticism toward powerful outsiders. It is hypothesized that rumors will rarely occur if there is efficient communication input and feedback. If local people feel confident enough in their relationships with outsiders to express their opinions of proposed changes, they need not depend exclusively on generation of explanations with one another. Unfortunately,

such feedback channels frequently do not exist, and when they do not, rumors can be expected to occur. These will probably tend to be malicious or harmful to the projects' goals in proportion to the perceived threat of the outside influences.

Some harmful rumors that we have found in published case histories sound far-fetched, but they give an indication of what local people think when they are first approached with a novel idea, only partly communicated, that they perceive as potentially dangerous. An illustration of this occurred in an early hookworm treatment campaign in Ceylon.³ Information was initially collected [about] the incidence of the disease, which made the villagers uneasy, as they were afraid it was being collected for tax or military draft purposes. When treatment, which was free, was offered, it was in the form of capsules. The rumor was generated and spread that the capsules contained little bombs which would explode after being swallowed. In spite of this, due principally to the establishment of better communication and the utilization of local leaders to sanction the idea, treatment was later accepted by many. Probably what is most significant in regard to this rumor type is that peasant villagers are usually very suspicious of information collectors unless relatively durable contacts are established.

Another series of harmful rumors emerged in a community development project in Cali, Colombia, again where there was inefficient communication of the project's goals and a perceived threat to the local way of life.⁴ The potential participants were squatters in urban slums who lacked confidence in municipal authorities, since their community had been neglected for years. Because they had no legal title to their land, they were afraid that the suggestions to build a bridge, road, and drainage canals were preparations to convert their neighborhood into a residential zone for the wealthy. In particular, their fears grew when the change agency began conducting a survey of the local environment. However, these fears were allayed by persistent efforts to inform the local people that the real goal was improvement for the squatters themselves and by adroit utilization of local leaders to sanction the project. Ultimately the physical improvements were carried out on a self-help basis through locally organized committees.

Potential loss of land is undoubtedly one of the most vital fears of the poor people in non-industrial countries, whether these are slum squatters, village peasants, or tribal people. Another project where this type of fear occurred was a community development effort in Nigeria.⁵ Although the goal was to build roads, schools, bridges, markets, and other communal structures, some land was usually involved. A number of villagers dropped out in the first stages because of a rumor that the whole project was merely a pretext to take away people's land. Another rumor based on fear of losing land occurred in a land rehabilitation project in Jordan, where the Bedouins thought the construction of dikes and growing of grass was to settle refugees from Palestine.⁶

* * * * *

In all the cases except the land rehabilitation project in Jordan, the goals were in the main achieved, and in all instances the way this was done was by improving communication with the potential adopters and/or by working through local leaders. We wish to reemphasize the significant fact that in these cases the rumors were known, and that similar or more damaging ones usually occurred in projects which failed but were not learned about because communication was not effectively established.

In summary, it is our belief that gossip, or intra-group communication, has two facets of significance to the change process. Positive gossip, favorable to project goals, is an index of the establishment of efficient information flow, both of communication input and feedback, as well as a perception by villagers that the project goals would be beneficial to them. Moreover, such gossip can be deliberately used by change agents as a method of information dissemination.

Negative gossip, or rumormongering, is a product of lack of information flow between the change agent and the potential adopters and/or no perceived advantages from the project goals by the local people.

NOTES

- ¹ P. Hastue, "Women's Clubs in Uganda," *Community Development Bulletin* (London) (December 1950), pp. 4-6.
- ² Bernard Berelson and Ronald Freedman, "A Study in Fertility Control," *Scientific American*, 210, No. 5 (May 1964), pp. 29-37.
- ³ Jane Philips, "The Hookworm Campaign in Ceylon," in *Hands Across Frontiers*, Howard M. Teaf, Jr. (ed.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 267-302.
- ⁴ Centro Interamericana de Vivienda y Planeamiento (O.A.S.). *Siloe: The Process of Community Development Applied to an Urban Renewal Project* (English condensation), Bogota, 1958.
- ⁵ E.R. Chadwick, "Fundamental Education in Udi Division," *Fundamental Education*, UNESCO, Paris (October 1949), pp. 627-644.
- ⁶ Stanley Andrews, *Technical Assistance Case Reports*, International Cooperation Administration, Washington, 1960, pp. 19-22.

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CHAPTER IX PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS

In the evaluation of psychological operations the analyst can now employ tools and methodologies unavailable before the computer age. Moreover, specialists have conceptualized the process of communications in ways more amenable to social science and related research¹—research in sociology and psychology, for example—which has led to new understanding of “hows” and “whys” in the study of persuasive communications.

Perhaps the most common approach to the communications process is the question framed by Harold D. Lasswell:

“Who	[Sources]
“Says What	[Content]
“In Which Channel	[Media]
“To Whom	[Audience]
“With What Effect?	[Effect]” ²

Although weaknesses in the formula have been cited by many scholars, the Lasswell model has not been replaced by one that approaches it in adherents. For that reason, the functional categories of the Lasswell model have been used, in slightly rearranged format, in this chapter: Source, Content, Audience, Media, and Effects—or SCAME.*

Apart from the enthusiasm demonstrated by the proponents of particular theories or procedures, dissatisfaction with the analysis of PSYOP is widespread. Theoretical models and concepts are in dispute, and basic questions of definition are also subject to debate. Even in the face of methodological progress, “there are,” as David Robinson points out, “few, if any, technically acceptable criteria for the evaluation of psychological warfare programs. . . .”³

The dissatisfaction with the state of the analytical art in PSYOP is especially pronounced in evaluation of effectiveness. The many studies of source, message, channel, and receiver factors in attitude change are inconclusive or have led to inconsistent conclusions.

To understand the effects on persuasion of manipulations such as communicator credibility or distraction, a number of stages in the persuasion process must be considered. . . . Needless to say, a large body of conflicting findings must result from . . . accumulation of confounding factors: different types of messages, different dependent variables, different assumptions linking the supportive message to the dependent measure of persuasion, and failure to measure acceptance of supportive beliefs or indirect effects of the message.⁴

These shortcomings must be judged against the methodological and conceptual advances adverted to previously, advances which have enabled analysts to better understand attitude change processes. Further progress in these areas of advance is prerequisite to the development of adequate evaluative programs for PSYOP.

*This approach has also been employed in the Army field manual, FM 33-5, *Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures*, Chapter 9.

The essays in this chapter, organized along the SCAME formula, provide methodological, analytical, and illustrative insights into the evaluation of persuasive communications.

NOTES

¹ See "Social Science Research and PSYOP," in Chapter VII of this casebook.

² Harold D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," in Lyman Bryson, ed., *The Communication of Ideas* (New York: Harper & Row, 1948), p. 37.

³ David D. Robinson, "A Brief Review Study of the Problems of Criteria in Psychological Warfare," in this chapter.

⁴ Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, "Attitudes and Opinions," *Annual Review of Psychology*, vol. XXIII (1972) (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1972), p. 521.

INTRODUCTION

A BRIEF REVIEW STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF CRITERIA IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

BY DAVID D. ROBINSON

There are presently few acceptable criteria for PSYOP evaluation. Various techniques of evaluation have been utilized, but no scientific approach for the evaluation of an entire PSYOP program has been found. Perhaps the most that can be aspired to in the current state of the art is evaluation of individual parts of a total PSYOP program.

FOREWORD

At the present time [1967] there are few, if any, technically acceptable criteria for the evaluation of psychological warfare programs, nor are there adequate techniques available for developing criteria for the evaluation of a *total* psywar program. A number of criteria have been used to evaluate selected aspects of psywar in the past, but most have been unsatisfactory for reasons that will be discussed. In most areas of behavioral science, the problems of criteria remain unsolved, but when situations are highly structured and well defined, and a reasonable degree of experimental control is possible, adequate criteria can be constructed. To the extent that such definition and control are lacking, so are the possibilities for developing adequate criteria. War, by its very nature, prevents the investigator from structuring the situation to any great degree and from being able to control the relevant variables. Mainly for this reason, the state of the art of the development of criteria for the evaluation of psychological warfare is low.

This report will examine some of the problems associated with the evaluation of psychological warfare using examples since World War II. It is necessarily of limited scope, and the review of the open and classified literature has not been exhaustive; nevertheless, it is possible to make

*Prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, by the Remote Area Conflict Information Center, Battelle Memorial Institute, R-896, March 10, 1967.

definite conclusions about the state of the art of criterion development in psywar.

* ~ * * *

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

The proof of the effectiveness of most of the techniques of applied behavioral sciences, including those of psychological warfare, rests on the ability to provide adequate criteria of effectiveness. The criterion is the crucial element in most studies of effectiveness, but it is surprising to note the dearth of adequate research or pertinent articles in the professional literature on this subject. Obviously not all the problems of criterion definition or criterion development are resolved, and yet there has been a diminution of interest in the area. For example, the index for the *Psychological Abstracts* shows the following number of entries under the heading "Criterion" for the following years:

1951	7
1952	0
1953	6
1954	6
1955	11
1956	5
1957	2
1958	1
1959-65	1

This dearth of entries suggests neither attraction nor interest in this vital area. One investigator has remarked that we often act as though criteria are either God given, or just to be found lying around somewhere.¹

This deficient state of our knowledge has been discussed in many quarters, and pleas for attention to research in the area are heard on every hand. It is frequently stated that much more attention is given to the construction of predictor elements, for example, than in the development of criteria. We find ourselves with predictors that have been refined to a psychological hair--reliability coefficients on the order of 0.90, successive attempts to increase reliabilities by a few points, and elaborate attempts to establish norms; but still we are tied to primitive criteria in most cases. In the sphere of psychological warfare, the problem is especially acute. A critical examination of methods used to evaluate psywar programs since World War II follows.

AN EXAMINATION OF METHOD USED TO EVALUATE PSYWAR PROGRAMS SINCE WORLD WAR II

Many psywar programs have developed haphazardly, and evaluation of their success, in cases where evaluation has been attempted, has not been scientifically rigorous. There are cases in which psywar activities have been totally unsuccessful. In one instance, an aircraft was outfitted with a loudspeaker system and used for four months before it was discovered that the broadcasts were totally inaudible to people on the ground.² Other

cases are on record in which techniques produced results directly opposite to those intended. FM 33-5, "Psychological Warfare Operations", presents only a skeleton account of effects analysis.³ Obviously a need for a program of criterion development exists.

Daugherty⁴ has pointed out three major reasons why evaluation efforts of the past have been of limited value. First, those who have been responsible for psychological operations or for post-operation evaluation have not possessed a clear and consistent understanding of the nature and mission of the activity. Second, no clear or acceptable criteria exist for measuring psychological effects except in limited situations. Third, even if the problems of psywar were understood, and even if adequate tools were available for effectiveness measurement, there would be other factors that would greatly limit the success of evaluators, e.g., combat conditions, logistical problems, etc., which would bring about inevitable compromises with scientific rigor.

Assessing the Impact of Psywar Efforts

Among the methods of evaluating the success of psywar efforts have been the following: content analysis of intercepted mail, captured military documents, monitored radio broadcasts, newspapers and magazines printed in the target area; questionnaires and interviews of captured enemy personnel or of enemy civilians in areas recently coming under friendly control; and observation by nonparticipant or participant observers. Most of these methods suffer from two problems: the lack of representative sampling and the lack of an integrated approach to evaluation. Adequate samples can be drawn of enemy civilians living in areas controlled by friendly forces, but several problems are encountered: often they are unwilling to cooperate and in many instances a period of time has intervened between reception of psywar messages and their capture. The fragmented approach to evaluation could be improved if each method could be weighted according to its worth and employed accordingly. These methods are indirect, but are probably as direct as one could hope for since target populations are usually hostile and therefore unapproachable. One segment of the enemy population is approachable, however, and often serves as subject for research: that of prisoners.

Prisoners of War

Prisoners of war have been used in the evaluation of psywar materials, but the tendency has been to give undue weight to this group. The difficulty in generalizing from the prisoner group to the enemy population is that the prisoner group is not a representative sample of the total enemy population. The very fact that a man is captured may reflect an inherent difference between him and his comrade who has managed to evade captivity. Once captured, even the nearly successful evader may change psychologically. For him the war is over. Good food, safety, medical treatment, and so on may change his attitude significantly, espe-

cially after the initial fear of death and torture at the hands of his captors has dissipated.

Shils and Janowitz⁵ developed a taxonomy of social disintegration within the Wehrmacht during the closing days of World War II which could be of value in judging surrender behavior. . . :

1. Desertion
 - a. Individual
 - (1) After discussion with comrades
 - (2) After no discussion
 - b. By groups in concert
2. Active surrender (deliberately signaling, sending emissaries, etc.)
 - a. Individual
 - b. By the group as a unit
 - (1) By mutual agreement
 - (2) By order of, or with approval of, NCO or officer
3. Passive surrender
 - a. By individuals acting alone
 - (1) Non-resistance
 - (2) Token resistance
 - b. By plurality of uncoordinated individuals
4. Routine resistance
5. Last-ditch resistance

This taxonomy could be used as the basis for a scale of "willingness to fight" which could be related to the intensity of their exposure to the psywar campaign.

Efforts to find grist for the psywar mill have sometimes involved interviewing prisoners to find why they surrendered. This technique can be effective, but there are potential problems in using it. It is often impossible to ascribe motives to a surrendering prisoner since he, himself, may be unaware of the reason for his surrender. Was it because of fatigue, hunger, lack of ammunition, or other "objective" factors; or was it because he became "fed up" with the war because of exposure to psywar ploys? It has been pointed out that prisoners will not admit to deserting or allowing themselves to be captured because of guilt feelings over dereliction of duty. They would rather admit to "falling asleep in a cellar and waking up in the midst of enemy troops" or "getting lost and blundering into the enemy" than admitting that they sought out the enemy and surrendered to him. There have been cases of enemy commanders refusing to surrender towns or fortifications until a single shell was fired into it.⁶ Such symbolic resistance is a balm to the conscience of surrendering forces.

"Most Like" and "Qualified Judge" Approaches to Pretesting

The psywar operator is faced with the problem of obtaining accurate information about large populations without systematic use of the populations. There are two possible approaches to solving the problem which

may be called the "most like" approach and the "qualified judge" approach. The most-like approach consists of using respondents who, while not being "the same as" the target population, can be considered most like it. The rationale is that people who are culturally similar will be psychologically similar—a tenuous assumption—but perhaps a necessary one. In order to evaluate the effects of broadcasting to [the People's Republic of] China, for example, the broadcasts could be pretested on refugee groups, citizens of Taiwan, or, if the budget was low, Chinese living in the United States. The second approach, the qualified-judge approach, involves asking a person who knows the group in question to make certain estimates about the inaccessible group. In the example above, a person grounded in Chinese history, language, religion, and other aspects of that culture may serve as the qualified judge.

Sometimes enemy prisoners are used as most-like groups, but there are pitfalls in this approach. Pretesting inevitably involves some question-and-answer procedure, but when the cultures of the interrogator and the subject are different, the reliability and validity of the responses may be compromised. For example, as Daugherty has pointed out:

The average person in Asia, including those who serve in the armed forces of their country, is a simple-minded, semiliterate individual, who is seldom if ever consulted for opinions on any matter.

Thus when someone approaches him concerning his views on the contents of a proposed communication, he understandably may hesitate to go on record as either approving or disapproving a suggested course of action. He surely would hesitate to express an adverse opinion on any action he believed to have originated on a higher level in the social scale from that which he occupies.

Almost universally when such individuals are asked to talk about such matters, there is an apparent eagerness to say that which is designed to please the questioner. As a matter of fact, in all Oriental societies it is considered to be a mark of bad manners for one to appear to be vocally critical of the efforts of another, especially if expressed openly to his face. Among prisoners of war there is likely always to be the further consideration that one should not slap the hand that feeds him.

The people in Asia have been told for centuries what to do, and in many cases what to think. The democratic precepts of the worth of individual opinions are entirely foreign to an Oriental's mental processes. Among the more highly educated classes, basic concepts of politeness prevail to such an extent that they are apt to color any expressions of opinion that are made. Under the very best of conditions it is difficult to get more than a rough approximation of what an Oriental thinks on a controversial item by questioning him about it.

Working through native interpreters further complicates the procedure, for the interpreter, in common with his fellow countryman, will hesitate to be brutally frank at the cost of being seemingly impolite. There is also the further problem of being certain that the ideas are communicated accurately in interpreting what is asked and in reporting the answers given.⁷

The qualified-judge approach suffers from the obvious handicap that the judge may suffer from nearsightedness, bias, or any of a number of ills to which human judgment is subject. Yet, in the absence of a most-like group, or an actual sample of the target audience, the qualified-judge approach may be the only one available.

Examples of Effectiveness Research

There have been no systematic, i.e., controlled, studies of the effec-

tiveness of a total psywar effort, but there are a scattered few that consider a portion of the total. One of the best examples of a controlled study of effectiveness is a study by Andrews, Smith, and Kahn.⁸ These investigators hypothesized that the fundamental effects of psywar can be characterized in psychological form, and that they are predictable in terms of the attitudes, motives, and experiences of the recipients. It was also hypothesized that psywar efforts can affect an individual only in certain optimal conditions. They developed scales that attempted to measure nine factors, including the degree to which the individual, before the Korean War, was in accord with the ideology and war aim of the Peoples Government; the degree to which, and frequency with which, the individual had experienced intensive fear during battle; the degree to which the individual felt he had been poorly treated and physically cared for by his own forces during the war, and so on. Two of the nine scales were criterion scales which measured his willingness to defect or surrender. The scales were intercorrelated (each scale was correlated with every other scale) and subsequent analysis appeared to corroborate the major hypotheses. This study was replicated using another target group, Communist Terrorists in Malaya, with essentially the same results.⁹

A number of studies have investigated the effectiveness of radio broadcasting and films, and their methodologies are similar. In the usual case, groups are assembled and hear tapes of the broadcasts. After hearing the tapes, they either discuss the merits and shortcomings of the broadcast in a panel discussion or in individual interviews, or variations thereof. The lack of precision and control in such procedures is evident, but they could be useful in preliminary work.

Evaluation of psywar efforts has largely been a catch-as-catch-can proposition. Most of the evaluative follow-up work, when there has been evaluation, has come as an afterthought or as a more-or-less unplanned adjunct to psychological and non-psychological military operations. To date, there has not been a concentrated effort to develop criteria of success, and this is one of the reasons why previous efforts have come up with so little.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

At the present time there are few, if any, technically acceptable criteria for the evaluation of psychological warfare programs, nor are there adequate techniques available for developing criteria for the evaluation of a *total* psywar program. Most psywar programs have developed haphazardly, and evaluation, if it has been undertaken, has not been scientifically rigorous. Those who have attempted to research the problem have not had the responsibility for psychological operations and have not possessed a clear and consistent understanding of that activity, and the very nature of war has prevented the precision and control necessary to obtain adequate measures.

Some methods of evaluation have been tried using content analysis,

questionnaire and interviewing techniques, and observation by nonparticipant or participant observers. Prisoners of war have been used as "most like" groups, but they are not always satisfactory because they are not representative of the enemy population as a whole.

It is probably impossible to develop a criterion to evaluate the success of a total psywar effort because of the extreme complexity of the subject. However, selected aspects of the psywar effort can probably be evaluated with techniques we have at hand, if proper consideration is given to the difficulties inherent in the task, and if the shortcomings of past efforts are heeded. However, it is clear at this point that we have many more questions than answers.

NOTES

¹ Jenkins, J.G., "Validity for What?", *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, Vol. 10, 1946, pp 93-98.

² Daugherty, W.E., "Checking Operational Efficiency of Loudspeaker Equipment," *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, W.E. Daugherty and M. Janowitz, Editors, Operations Research Office, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press, 1958.

³ "Psychological Warfare Operations," U. S. Army Field Manual FM 33-5, October 1966.

⁴ Daugherty, "Checking Operational Efficiency."

⁵ Shils, E.A., and Janowitz, M., "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12, 1948, pp 280-315.

⁶ *Ibid*

⁷ Daugherty, "Checking Operational Efficiency."

⁸ Andrews, T. G., Smith, D. D., and Kahn, L. A., "An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare", *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 38, 1954, pp 240-44.

⁹ Kahn, L. A., and Andrews, T. G., "A Further Analysis of the Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare", *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 39, 1955, pp 368-74.

THE PUEBLO FILM*

BY THE 7TH PSYOP GROUP

This analysis of a North Korean film illustrates the integrated use of the SCAME formula for evaluative purposes

SUMMARY

Much propaganda "hay" has been made by North Korea of the capture of the *USS Pueblo*. *Pyongyang* wire service mentions the "intrusion of the U.S. imperialist armed spy ship" almost daily. The domestic daily newspapers, *Nodong Sinmun* and *Minju Chosen*, also give extensive coverage to the circumstances surrounding the *Pueblo*. The two dailies are a Party organ and a Government organ, and, therefore, propaganda oriented. North Korea also sends propaganda abroad, especially when, in the NK view, such a U.S. vulnerability as the *Pueblo* can be exploited.

*Excerpts from "The Pueblo Film," 7th PSYOP Group, 15th PSYOP Detachment, "Communist Propaganda Trends," SD 69-13, 22 August 1968.

The magazine, *Korean Youth and Students*, No. 92, 1968, gave the crew's confessions and carried pictures of the captured crew members. *Pyongyang Times* gave extensive coverage to the capture and subsequent happenings. However, North Korean propaganda aimed at foreign targets reached its zenith in a film produced by "2.8 Studio" of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) entitled "*Pueblo*, Armed Spy Ship of the U.S. Imperialist Aggressors."

This film is probably one of the most traveled films in the world. It has been shown in Communist and non-Communist countries throughout the world.

* * * * *

Recently, the film found its way, or rather, it was directed on its way by North Korean Communists, to the Japan-North Korea Association in Japan. Here, the Nihon Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) televised the hour long film in an abbreviated twenty minute capsule. This was the first known public showing of the film outside North Korea. The NHK narrator introduced the film in the Japanese language; however, the actual North Korean film was in English. This included the narration by the North Koreans and the voices of various officers and crewmen.

Since video-taping procedures are rather simple, it was possible for non-official Americans, for the first time, to view this piece of North Korean propaganda. North Koreans, as is well known, say the *Pueblo* was in territorial waters, and claim that the crew admits this. This analysis does not delve into the pros and cons of this claim. Nor will any effort be made about the possibilities of "brainwashing" or coercion to get the crew's confession and appeal to President Johnson.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the film as propaganda, to describe, in empirical terms, the appearance of the crew and their environment, and in conclusion, compare the film with other North Korean propaganda methods and themes.

The analysis of the propaganda film will follow the "SCAME" formula. That is, the analysis will be made in regard to Source, Content, Audience, Media, and Effects.

[SOURCE ANALYSIS]

The source of this propaganda is identified by the narrator as the 2.8 (founding day of KPA) Studio of the North Korean People's Army. This, it would seem, gives credibility to the film since the KPA is the source. The KPA, which includes all North Korea's military services, captured the *Pueblo*. KPA identify closely with the North Korean Labor Party (KLP), which is, in turn, easily identified with Kim Il-song, who is said to have founded KPA and KLP. Therefore, the credibility of this film is enhanced since the source captured the *Pueblo*, and who else could better film the story? KPA is closely identified with the North Korean leader, Kim Il-song. In summary, the source, KPA, is an indication that the film

originated from an official voice. This gives the film a more potent effect than might be the case of a supposed commercial film.

[CONTENT ANALYSIS]

Content analysis of the film's script is based on a direct translation of the Japanese language narration of the film. The subject matter of this film can be divided into four categories:

1. The *Pueblo*, acting under orders from the U.S. Government, intruded into North Korean territorial waters.
2. The *Pueblo* was engaged in espionage activities against North Korea.
3. The United States Government must apologize for this activity.
4. The crewmen are being treated well by the North Korean Government.

The North Korean method of describing these four categories is the next step in a content analysis. The first category, the *Pueblo* intruded into North Korean territorial waters, is "proven" by several methods. The captain of the *Pueblo*, Commander Lloyd Bucher, admits that he "intruded deep into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea . . ." He also states that the *Pueblo* sailed within 7.6 miles of Ryodo Island. Then the navigator, Navy Lt. Murphy, describes both verbally and visually, by tracing on a wall map, the course of the *Pueblo* and its intrusions into North Korean territorial waters. From the script, one can distinguish at least six intrusions as described by Murphy.

The final bit of North Korean evidence of a territorial-water intrusion was in the letter signed by the crew and addressed to the President. The letter states that the U.S. must admit "the *Pueblo's* infiltration into the North Korean territorial waters." The film shows the officers and crew filing by to sign this appeal to the President.

The fact that the *Pueblo* was acting on orders from Rear Admiral Johnson, U.S. Navy, is attested by Captain Bucher. He said that he was to collect various oceanographic information in the "the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with radars and various kinds of observatory instruments in a clandestine manner at Chongjin, Wonson, and several other points." And in the letter to the President, it is stated again that the assignment of the *Pueblo* was given by the U.S. Government.

The second content category is that the *Pueblo* was engaging in espionage activities. One North Korean propaganda technique is to compare a slogan and use it over and over. In the case of the *Pueblo* this has been done again and again. "The armed intelligence ship of the U.S. imperialist aggressor" has become almost a proverb in North Korea. Captain Bucher, in his confession which he reads aloud in the film, says that "we spied on various military installations and the distribution of industries, and the deployment of armed forces . . ." The contents of the letter to the

President, which Bucher also reads aloud, reiterates the espionage mission of the *Pueblo*.

The North Korean insistence that the U.S. apologize for the intrusion and activities is manifested primarily in the open letter to President Johnson. Bucher reads, "Our repatriation will be realized only in the case that the Government of the United States admits, not only the *Pueblo*'s infiltration . . . , but hostile acts, and sincerely apologizes for these acts and gives assurance that they will not be repeated . . ." The letter then gives an emotional call for the crew's quick repatriation.

The fourth content category is that North Korea is treating the crewmen humanely, in spite of the crew's admitted criminal acts. The crew is seen eating breakfast while sitting at Western-style tables and chairs. The crew is shown reading North Korean books printed in English. Recreation is provided for all crew members and officers in the form of cards and physical conditioning exercises. One sequence of pictures illustrates the medical care being afforded the men by their North Korean captor.

The crewmen had rooms which appeared to be individual type rooms. They were furnished with Western-style furniture and beds. It was noted that the rooms appeared ready for a "White-glove" inspection.

[AUDIENCE ANALYSIS]

In audience analysis of the "SCAME" formula, it is found that this film has been shown in a myriad of countries. It must be assumed that the term *audience* takes on a very broad connotation. However, there are at least several common characteristics that can be found in all of the diverse audiences. For one thing, the film is, say the North Koreans, shown at embassies or official functions. The other is that all of the countries have some level of relations with North Korea. This might well predispose viewers to be more receptive to anti-U.S. propaganda.

There is also the possibility that there is more than one intended audience. It is obvious that the countries where this film is shown are the apparent audience group. However, it would appear that North Korea hopes to influence other world people who are either neutral or even pro-U.S. at this time. Japan, for instance, has no official relations with North Korea. Such areas may, in fact, be North Korea's ultimate audience. One thing not yet mentioned is the possibility that this film may be targeted for the U.S. The effect may be fairly great even though the U.S. does not see the film. This may seem incongruous at first glance, but this still may be the case. If North Korea could add to internal dissension in the U.S. by sowing doubts as to whether the *Pueblo* was in international waters, there is little doubt that North Korea would do so. Yet, how could this benefit North Korea? Two ways, one direct, one indirect. First, if doubts were implanted in the minds of Americans concerning U.S. military involvement in Korea, there might be a "pull-out of South Korea movement" similar to the case with Vietnam now.

The indirect motive might be concerned with North Korea's helping its friend, North Vietnam. By causing more dissension in the U.S., the North Koreans would indirectly be assisting North Vietnam in two ways. One, this might be an assist to the so-called U.S. doves to sue for peace in Vietnam. Also, by keeping the Korean situation in the forefront, North Koreans may be hoping to tie down U.S. troops in Korea, thereby precluding their deployment to South Vietnam. In either contingency, the North Korean Government helps its friend, North Vietnam.

[MEDIA ANALYSIS]

An analysis of the media used by the North Korean propagandists is essential in a discussion of the *Pueblo* film. It is believed that the movie, as the medium, is well suited to the North Korean propaganda pitch. For one thing, the movie is repeatable. This is, of course, one of North Korea's propaganda principles: repeat the same message over and over, and sooner or later it will be believed, or at least heard. This has been done in various countries.

The use of the film also gives credibility to North Korean claims. After all, the Captain of the *Pueblo*, Commander Bucher, can be seen by all. He is reading his confession, appealing to President Johnson, but living a relatively "good life" under the auspices of the benevolent North Koreans.

Other benefits from using a movie as a medium are: easily presented, inexpensive, yet effective and the North Koreans can present what facts they want by editing.

[EFFECTS ANALYSIS]

Finally, in an effects analysis, no audience survey can be made or has been made, as far as is known. However, a few assumptions can be made. One effect this movie has had is to keep the *Pueblo* incident in the limelight in certain areas. The North Korean Government can, therefore, continue to stress its themes of U.S. imperialism, aggression, and consequent war provocations.

Another effect the North Koreans might hope for can be assumed—some U.S. allies could start doubting the U.S. intentions in Korea. If this did, in fact, occur, the North Koreans could rejoice in their efforts.

[OTHER COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION]

Having completed the "SCAME" formula analysis, a few other observations can be made after having seen this film.

The first thing noticed when viewing this film was that Bucher looks extremely tired, possibly even verging on exhaustion. He is unkempt and unshaven. Whether this has any bearing on pressures that could have been placed on him is unknown.

The North Koreans obviously did give some coaxing to Bucher and the other writers of the confession and appeal. Some wording in these docu-

ments is very seldom used in the Western world. For instance, the North Korean Government insists on being called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and, as can be seen in the movie script, this phrase is used at least seven times by Bucher and Murphy, the ship's navigator. It is obvious that some North Korean "guidance" had to be given to these two men, since the North Korean Government will not allow itself to be referred to as anything but the DPRK. Western nations do not usually use DPRK.

A final incongruity involves the crew's living quarters. The quarters were unquestionably adequate, almost plush. However, one might question the fact that the rooms appeared "white-glove" inspection-ready. It is to be expected that the men would have to keep their rooms straight, for morale purposes, if nothing else. However, the fact that nothing was out of place makes one wonder if these quarters are really used by the crew.

In conclusion, it is obvious that the North Koreans have used the *Pueblo* incident to great benefit. The film "*Pueblo*, Armed Spy Ship of the U.S. Imperialist Aggressors," is "good" propaganda, at least as far as North Koreans are concerned.

[The analysis is followed by a translated script of the film.]

* * * * *

SOURCE ANALYSIS

Analysis of the source of a communication focuses on the relationship of the source and the audience and often involves the question of "credibility." In other words, although source prestige and other variables may be relevant considerations in the analysis, they are insufficient without data on the audience attitudes by which those variables may be affected or which they may affect. Most of the conclusions regarding attributes of the source that may be important in determining his credibility are tentative: research findings of scientists in the communications field seem to conflict. Richard H. Orth, in the first of two essays in this section that deal with source attributes and audience credibility, discusses some of the more important conclusions research has indicated. A contribution by R. Barry Fulton describes one method used to measure credibility. Radio Free Europe's (RFE's) sampling techniques also illustrate a means to measure the relationship of the audience to persuasive appeals from various countries.

Source analysis need not focus solely on the audience-source relationship, although this is usually the subject on which it seeks to shed light. Study of the role of the communicator may also involve its relationship to a political hierarchy or its philosophies, attitudes, or operational methods. Valyuzenich's polemical description of the American organization for, and approach to, international political communications is an example of such analysis.

The concluding essay in this section provides an additional example of

how the evaluation of the communicator's objectives and technique can contribute to nonhostile source analysis.

SOURCE FACTORS IN PERSUASION*

BY RICHARD H. ORTH

In developing a persuasive appeal, PSYOP planners must carefully consider the attributes of the source as a significant desideratum is receptivity to the message.

In their classic summary of source effect, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley suggest that the term "source" can subsume under it more specific elements of the communications process such as the originator and channel.¹ They further state that most probably the same basic factors that apply to persons will apply to other elements such as the medium used. For the purposes of this essay, the distinction among the various types of sources has little importance. The main principle is that the nature of the source ought to be considered before a campaign is initiated.

Hovland, Janis, and Kelley mention only some basic considerations:² Communicator credibility and trustworthiness and the duration of the effects brought about by the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the communicator. Most of the results of their work have become a standard caveat among individuals involved in both the basic and applied fields of attitude change. However, further inroads have been made by looking into the concept of credibility in more detail.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOURCE: SIMILARITY

There should be some basis for similarity of interest between the source of the message and the target. Moreover, the similarity should occur in an area relevant to the issue. One issue that has come to the fore concerns the similarity of the source and the receiver. It appears that when the two enjoy some area of shared characteristics, the source has more success in persuading the target. Before accepting such a statement, one must examine more closely how similarity affects persuasiveness. For example, Mills and Jellison found that if the sender has an occupation similar to that of the target, he is more persuasive.³ Interestingly enough, the similarity in occupation did not increase persuasiveness by making the source seem more credible. Rather, the increased persuasiveness derived from the medium of shared experiences. A study by Berscheid found that a similarity in values helped boost the effectiveness of the source.⁴ Moreover, Berscheid showed that similarity of values is more important if that similarity occurs in an area relevant to the issue on which the persuasion is being attempted.⁵

In a further investigation of the similarity issue, Brock showed that fine discriminations were made by the receiver,⁶ thus suggesting that the

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.

closer the source and the receiver are, the better the chance of influencing the receiver.

It should be noted for practical application of such research that the similarity that is being discussed is specifically concerned with the values held by the source and the receiver. Thus, the psyoperator must be very careful if he chooses to base a campaign on the similarity between a source and a target. For example, it may seem intuitively correct to use a defector as the source of a message urging surrender. However, a question that must be asked is: "Do this source and the proposed target hold similar values regarding surrender?" The evidence, by the fact that the source defected while the target did not, suggests that they have different values about surrendering to an enemy force. As shown below, this fact need not, by itself, rule defectors out as sources in PSYOP campaigns. However, their use must be carefully weighed in terms of the potential benefit and potential harm to the campaign from the receiver's evaluations.

INTENT

The source's intentions are important to the success of a persuasion campaign. If the intent to persuade is obvious, the PSYOP communicator can circumvent the suspicion of an audience by presenting the message in a particular framework that can override the obvious intent. Another characteristic of the source that has received some attention since the original concerns expressed by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley is the intent of the communicator.⁷ The question here is whether a communication that is an avowed attempt to persuade is more successful than one in which the objective (persuasion) is hidden. Intent could be examined in more general terms, but most frequently it concerns an individual's assessment of what the source is attempting to accomplish by engaging in the communication process. One need only consider his own behavior when reading or watching television. An advertisement or political statement is interpreted by the audience as an attempt to persuade. Of course, if the receiver's attitude is already in line with the message, the judgment may be (and usually is) different. There is little chance that the receiver will assess the source as one who is trying to convince him to change his attitude. However, if the source advocates a position different from that of the receiver, the latter will accuse the source of trying to sway his feelings. Usually when this occurs, very little opinion change takes place. There is evidence for this phenomenon. For example, it has been shown that a communicator is more effective when he is overheard than when he confronts the receiver.⁸ Another study showed that taking a receiver's mind off the fact that a persuasion attempt is being made resulted in greater attitude change than allowing him to concentrate on the persuasion.⁹ Interestingly enough, this was found to be true only when there was strong reason to feel that the receivers were involved in the issue over which the change was advocated. This latter point further

supports the contention that intent becomes a factor only when there is a change advocated by the source.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the intent issue for the psyoperator is that the receiver will surely attribute intent to persuade to any effort directed at him from an enemy force. Thus, the psyoperator must keep in mind that his efforts to persuade the enemy soldiers begin with a major handicap.

One effective technique to overcome this handicap is to convince the receiver that the intent to convince him is undertaken because the source actually likes the receiver.¹⁰ In other words, a receiver who thinks that the source likes him even though he is trying to persuade him to alter his opinion will be more likely to change. Intuitively, this makes sense. The receiver would have to ask why someone who likes him would want him to change his opinion. There are only two responses to the question. On one hand, the source might not know what he is talking about. On the other hand, if the source does know what he is talking about, he must be thinking about the best interests of the receiver. This thought process demonstrates that one must be wary of simply using a source who is known to be friendly to the target; he must also be considered to have some expertise on the issue of the attempted persuasion.

DISCREPANCY

The discrepancy between the source and the receiver should be at a level where there can be some basis for mutuality. The primary question concerning discrepancy involves the relationship of the amount of difference between the source and the receiver to the degree of receiver attitude change. Generally, the greatest amount of change will take place at the intermediate level of discrepancy. Figure 1 demonstrates this relationship graphically. It should be obvious that if there is no discrepancy, there can be no change. Moreover, as the amount of discrepancy increases, so does the amount of change. This is true only up to a point: Thereafter, the amount of change begins to decrease as the discrepancy becomes even larger.




Figure 1

This is a very familiar process, exemplified in bargaining situations. In such a case, the buyer meets the price asked up to a point. Past that point, he begins to bargain with the seller to see if they can reach a mutually satisfactory price. In this context, the more the seller sees that his price is beyond the buyer's reach, the more he will tend to lower his price. In essence, the roles of source and receiver keep reversing until agreement is reached. However, if the price that the two parties have in mind is the same, there will be no bargaining. Similarly, if the prices are too far apart there is little chance that bargaining will occur. If either the buyer or seller perceives that the latter is true, there will be little hope of reaching agreement.

Thus, it behooves the psyoperator to insure that the source he uses is seen as being within the scope (usually referred to as the "latitude of acceptance") of the receiver. Unlike the bargaining situation, there is little chance that the source can move toward the receiver in his attitude. In other words, change on the part of the receiver will usually be a major change.

Yet, it might be worthwhile for a PSYOP campaign to try the bargaining approach. However, it has been shown that when there is a great deal of difference between the source and the receiver, the receiver will attempt to derogate the source. That is, rather than trying to think up counterarguments, the receiver will reject the source as being either noncredible or unknowledgeable. If this is true, then a change in the extremity of the source's position may give credence to the receiver's earlier judgment. This would then make the receiver even more likely to reject the qualification of the source.

CREDIBILITY

The source must be credible to the receiver. Credibility has traditionally been discussed in terms of trustworthiness and expertise. For example, a source that is shown to be trustworthy is more credible than one that is shown to be untrustworthy. However, trustworthiness is an attribute of the source that is attributed by the receiver. Thus, a Communist newspaper may be seen as untrustworthy by non-Communists but as trustworthy by Communists; the obverse might be true of a non-Communist newspaper. The psyoperator must be aware of this phenomenon. It may operate even more subtly: A source considered trustworthy by a particular receiver in one situation may not be considered so in another situation. For example, an enemy officer may be a highly trusted source for his men about the course of a war when he is their commander. However, should this same officer defect, his comments on the course of the war may easily be dismissed because of his defection. Thus, it is not only necessary for the psyoperator to keep in mind the problem of how trustworthy the source is, but he also must be aware of the limitations of trustworthiness. Moreover, he must analyze the trustworthiness of a source—not from his own perspective, but from the view of the receiver

of the message. Trustworthiness is attributed to the source by the receiver based on his analysis of a multitude of characteristics either actually possessed or assumed to be possessed by the source.

EXPERTISE

The source must exhibit some expertise in the field he is discussing. Another area of credibility that we have ignored thus far is that of expertise. It is common sense that one is much more likely to follow the advice of an expert than that of a novice. The expertise requirement has received ample treatment elsewhere, and there is little need to dwell on it. The psyoperator must utilize a source that is knowledgeable on the issue on which persuasion is attempted. Although demonstrated expertise in a related area may enhance the source somewhat, it is preferable that his expertise be precisely in the issue being discussed.

THE SOURCE AND THE MESSAGE

Especially in PSYWAR situations, it is from the message that the receiver infers the credibility of the source. We have thus far concerned ourselves primarily with characteristics of the source. These characteristics are either possessed by him or they are attributed to him by the receiver. In this context, the question arises: "How does the receiver attribute the characteristics to the source?" Oftentimes, the attribution originates simply in observation. For example, racial or ethnic similarity is often visible to the receiver. Other characteristics can be attributed to the source by knowledge of the position he holds. For example, expertise can be attributed to a college instructor because he is a teacher and, therefore, different from someone who speaks in a social situation.

In a practical sense, however, such clear-cut situations are not often available to the psyoperator. Messages are conveyed in such a manner that the source is usually not clearly identified. This does not mean that the receiver will not attend to the source of the message but rather that he determines on a subjective basis who the source is. One device that is available to the receiver is the message. He may reasonably ask "Who would want to say this to me?" or "Who would want me to perform the acts suggested in the message?" For example, a leaflet suggesting surrender to soldiers of the enemy forces will obviously be attributed to the forces suggesting the surrender. He will then compare the reasons given for the need to surrender with what he knows to exist. On the basis of this comparison, he will make a judgment about the credibility of the source (It must be noted that the credibility attributed to the source from this single comparison is likely to persist for some time, especially if it is negative. This should not be confused with the dissociation of source from content which also operates over time).

Earlier in this discussion the effect of the similarity between the source and the receiver was discussed, and the discrepancy between the stand of the source and the stand of the receiver was examined. The similarity can

be attributed by a variety of means, including observation. The discrepancy, on the other hand, is attributed usually on the basis of the message from the source to the receiver. What happens when the receiver sees the source as being similar to himself, and then when the message is received, he sees a large discrepancy between himself and the source? He has two alternatives available. First, he could determine that the source has more knowledge than he does and will thus change his attitudes. The latter could be done with the least psychological cost. The receiver could think that the source was forced into saying something he did not really believe because he was forced to do so by someone with control over the fate of the source. In a situation where the source is being held by the enemy forces, this has a great deal of credence, as in the case of a captured comrade. The psyoperator must be aware of the latter possibility even when the campaign is aimed at friendly or neutral people. However, in this situation he can increase the psychological cost of the second alternative by loading the source with credibility that would be difficult to discredit.

Another area where the message can affect the rating of the source is in the nature of the language used. If the message is difficult to understand (too complex) or is stylistically incongruent with the source, the receiver is likely to question the quality of the source. For example, if the source is presented as being similar to the receiver and uses a language style that is very dissimilar from that used by the receiver, the intended similarity will quite likely be ineffective, the whole result being a futile PSYOP appeal.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is clear that the characteristics of the source are important to the potential effectiveness of a PSYOP appeal. We discussed some characteristics other than the usual trustworthiness and expertise factors. We do not minimize the importance of these two characteristics, but we must recognize that the source characteristics important to successful PSYOP appeals are many and that all are important. Moreover the psyoperator must be careful not to isolate source characteristics as being the only relevant factors. Quite often all the care taken to insure a good source can be lost by selecting a message that results in the receiver's derogating the source. The qualities of the source and the content of the message must be congruent if any attitude change is to result.

NOTES

¹ C. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953.

² Ibid.

³ J. Mills, and J. Jellison, "Effect on Opinion Change of How Desirable the Communication is to the Audience the Communicator Addressed," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (1967), pp. 98-101.

⁴ Ellen Berscheid, "Opinion Change and Communicator/Communicatee Similarity and Dissimilarity," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, IV (1966) pp. 670-680

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ T. C. Brook, "Communicator-Recipient Similarity and Decision Change," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1 (1965) pp. 650-654.

⁷ Hovland, et al., *Communication*

⁸ Elaine Walster and L. Festinger "The Effectiveness of 'Overhead' Persuasive Communications," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 65 (1962) pp. 395-402.

⁹ L. Festinger and N. Maccoby, "On Resistance to Persuasive Communication," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 68 (1964) pp. 359-366.

¹⁰ J. Mills, "Opinion Change as a Function of the Communicator's Desire to Influence and Liking for the Audience," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 11, (1966) pp. 152-159.

THE LIKABILITY AND SELF-INTEREST OF THE SOURCE IN ATTITUDE CHANGE*

BY VERNON A. STONE

AND

HARROGADDE S. ESWARA

Evidence provided reveals that it is not always safe to assume that a likable source will be more effective than an unlikable source, and that self-interest (as reflected by occupation) interacts with other source variables rather than manifesting itself as a main effect.

Recent studies have shown that the most favorable source is not always the most effective agent of persuasion. Bauer has found that enduring attitude change in the face of counterpropaganda may be better wrought in some cases by a source of questionable trustworthiness than by a high-trust source.¹ Also in contradiction to common sense notions, Walster, Aronson and Abrahams have found that in some cases a low prestige source may be more persuasive than a high prestige communicator.²

The latter finding came in a test of the hypothesis that "regardless of his prestige, a communicator will gain in effectiveness when he advocates a position opposed to his own best interests and will lose effectiveness when he advocates a selfish position."³ To test this hypothesis, the Walster group used a prosecutor as the high prestige source and a criminal as the low prestige source. The topic was court power—whether there should be more of it, which would presumably be in the best interest of the prosecutor, or less court power, in the best interest of the criminal. There were four conditions, each source taking each side of the argument. As predicted, the criminal was more effective in changing attitudes when he argued against his best interest. But contrary to expectations, the prosecutor was almost equally effective whichever way he argued. This indicated an interaction between prestige and self-interest whereby the

* From "The Likability and Self-Interest of the Source in Attitude Change," *Journalism Quarterly*, XLVI, No. 1 (Spring 1969), pp. 61-68. Reprinted with the permission of *Journalism Quarterly*, copyright holder.

low prestige source gained in effectiveness by arguing against his own best interests, but made no difference for the high prestige source.

Walster and her associates did not accept the interaction interpretation, however. They held the results might have been in part an artifact of the high school student subjects' being more familiar with arguments for strong courts than with arguments against them. They conducted a second experiment in which the sources were a prosecutor and a criminal from the supposedly less familiar Portuguese court system. In this experiment, as predicted, each source was more effective when he argued against his self-interest. Support was claimed for the hypothesis that such will be the case regardless of prestige.

A test of that hypothesis would demand that there indeed be differences in the perceived prestige of the sources. In the first experiment by the Walster group, the prosecutor was clearly rated higher than the criminal on prestige. But in the second experiment, with the setting shifted to Portugal, the criminal was rated almost as high as the prosecutor. It appeared possible that prestige differences might have interacted with self-interest in the first experiment but were too small to do so in the second.

The present study was addressed to the conflicting questions posed by the two earlier experiments: Does arguing against his best interest enhance the persuasiveness of a communicator, regardless of his prestige? Or does such enhancement come only for low prestige sources?

The approach taken here differed from that of Walster and her associates in three basic ways. First, to rule out the possibility of differential effectiveness of messages arguing for and against an issue, the same message was used in all conditions. Second, occupation was used for the manipulation of self-interest rather than of prestige; the manipulation of positive and negative source characteristics was undertaken independently of occupation. Third, in ascribing the source characteristics constituting global prestige, credibility and personal likability were manipulated separately.

The latter strategy was intended to provide a test of the relative effects of credibility and likability on attitude change. The source characteristics of expertness, honesty and influence which constituted the prestige index used by the Walster group may be seen as essentially components of credibility in that they deal with the credentials of the source in relation to the message. But Aronson and Golden have demonstrated that opinion change may be influenced by characteristics of the source which are more or less irrelevant to his credentials.⁴ Moreover, Rarick has separated "cognitive" and "affective" components of source prestige and found both to be positively related to attitude change.⁵

Credibility, in turn, may be considered in terms of such components as expertness and trustworthiness. Although probably closely related in most cases, they do not necessarily have to be. One can conceive of a source which is considered highly expert but untrustworthy and another

which is trustworthy but inept. The credibility component chosen for manipulation in the present investigation was professional expertness.

Likability was treated as including only those characteristics which generally are considered to make a person personally likable but are not necessarily related to his expertness in a profession or an area of knowledge.

Predictions were made for expertness rather than likability because expertness was considered closer to the global prestige variable used in the study suggesting the present one. The main objective was a test of the opposing predictions suggested by data from the study by Walster and associates. The prediction derived from their hypothesis was for a main effect of self-interest whereby a source arguing for such self-interest would be more persuasive than a source arguing for such self-interest, regardless of expertness. The opposing prediction, suggested by the first experiment by the Walster group, was for an interaction whereby an inept source would be more effective when arguing against than when arguing for his best interests, but an expert source would be equally effective whichever way he argued.

METHOD

Subjects were 95 male and 73 female students enrolled in an undergraduate radio-television course at the University of Wisconsin. The experiment was conducted by the senior author during a regular class period.

Subjects were randomly assigned to the eight experimental conditions in a 2x2x2 factorial design. The manipulated variables were (1) the self-interest (occupation), (2) the expertness and (3) the likability of the source. The main dependent variable in the before-after design was attitude change on the issue of courtroom television.

All materials were contained in a single mimeographed booklet titled "Free Press-Fair Trial Study."⁶ Booklets for the eight conditions were identical except for the page describing the source.

The attitude change message was represented to the subjects as one of the responses in a nationwide survey requesting opinions on the issue of television in the courtroom from a random sample of lawyers and newsmen. The message, a 36-line argument against courtroom television, was constructed largely of excerpts from the United States Supreme Court decision of 1965 in the Billie Sol Estes case.

To point up the self-interest differences of the occupational variable, the booklet's introduction explicitly noted that television journalists generally consider it against their best interest to have their cameras banned from courtrooms and that criminal lawyers generally favor such a ban on grounds that the presence of television cameras may interfere with a fair trial for their clients. It was also noted that the news media and the bar have collided on the issue many times in recent years.

The source was introduced as JRB, a respondent in the nationwide

survey. At the start of a two-paragraph description, he was further introduced as either (1) a television journalist or (2) a lawyer specializing in criminal cases.

Expertness was manipulated in the first paragraph by describing the source as either (1) a successful practitioner in his profession who had received high recognition from his colleagues or (2) an unsuccessful practitioner who had been described by colleagues as "lacking in sound judgement and professional competence." Thus professional prestige was used as an indicator of expertness.

Likability was manipulated in the second paragraph of the source description by noting that "people who know JRB on a day-to-day basis" describe him as either (1) pleasant, unpretentious, sensitive to the feelings of others, etc., or (2) unpleasant, pretentious, insensitive, etc., characteristics which would tend to make a person unlikable though he might be a highly respected expert in his profession.

No explicit information was provided regarding the source's trustworthiness. Any perceptions of trustworthiness were left to be inferred from the descriptions of the professional expertness and personal likability of the communicator.

All attitudes were assessed on bipolar 7-point scales before and after the attitude change message was read. Attitude toward the issue was assessed by four agree-disagree items expressing the issue of television and free press-fair trial in slightly different ways. The source was evaluated on six dimensions: (1) his reliability as a source of information on the issue at hand, (2) expertness on the issue, (3) bias, (4) trustworthiness, (5) likability as a person and (6) general attractiveness. The message was evaluated by (1) how well made and (2) how sincere were the arguments.⁷

RESULTS

Source Evaluation Factors. A factor analysis of correlations between source evaluation items yielded two factors (Table 1). Reliability and expertness loaded high on the first factor; scores on those two items were summed for the expertness used in the study. Likability and attractiveness evaluations loaded high on the second factor and were summed for likability scores. Because the loadings for trustworthiness and bias were distributed equally between the two factors at the start of the experiment, those characteristics were treated separately.

Manipulation Checks. The pre-message ratings in Table 2 show that the source manipulations yielded the intended high-low distinctions both in the expertness and likability conditions. The midpoint of each evaluation continuum was 8. The mean initial expertness rating given sources in high expert conditions was 9.48 and in low expert conditions 5.79. The difference between likability ratings in the likability conditions was even greater—a mean of 10.21 for subjects who read the high likability source description as against 4.74 for those reading the low likability description.

TABLE 1
Factor Analyses ^A of Perceived Source Characteristics

Traits	Pre-Message Factors		Post-Message Factors	
	I	II	I	II
Reliability	.88	.26	.87	.16
Expertness	.89	.08	.85	.16
Likability	.04	.93	.09	.94
Attractiveness	.35	.85	.17	.93
Trustworthiness	.61	.62	.69	.36
Unbiased	.38	.35	.66	-.05
% of total variance	36.8	36.3	40.6	32.5
% of common variance	50.4	49.6	55.7	44.3

^A A principal components solution with varimax rotation was used

TABLE 2
Mean Pre- and Post-Message Evaluation of Sources

Traits and Occupations ^A	By Expertness Conditions				By Likability Conditions			
	Pre		Post		Pre		Post	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Expertness								
Journalist	9.43	4.79	10.60	8.86	7.69	6.52	9.55	9.90
Lawyer	9.52	6.79	10.76	9.67	8.88	7.43	10.14	10.29
Likability								
Journalist	7.95	5.98	9.19	8.67	9.74	4.19	10.26	7.59
Lawyer	8.93	7.05	9.81	8.50	10.69	5.25	10.69	7.62
Trustworthiness								
Journalist	4.43	2.95	5.00	4.05	4.38	3.00	4.64	4.40
Lawyer	4.50	3.36	5.24	4.14	4.79	3.07	4.86	4.52
Unbiased								
Journalist	3.19	2.83	4.07	3.98	3.31	2.71	3.88	4.17
Lawyer	3.50	2.71	4.02	3.29	3.55	2.67	3.38	3.93

^A Expertness scores represent the sum of two 7-point scales (expertness and reliability). Likability scores represent the sum of separate 7-point scales for likability and attractiveness. Trustworthiness and Unbiased scores are by single 7-point scales. N = 42 per mean.

TABLE 3
Mean Message Evaluations

Criteria and Source Occupations	By Expertness Conditions		By Likability Conditions	
	High	Low	High	Low
Arguments well made ^A				
Journalist	6.17	6.14	5.93	6.38
Lawyer	6.21	5.83	6.02	6.02
Arguments sincere ^A				
Journalist	5.93	5.88	5.83	5.64
Lawyer	6.00	5.87	5.81	5.26

^A Scores are by 7-point scales. N = 42 per mean.

There was a fairly high correlation (.41) between the effects of the separate expertness and likability manipulations. Table 2 shows that likability as well as expertness was higher in the high than in the low expert conditions. Similarly, perceived expertness was higher in the high likability conditions. Ratings on trustworthiness and lack of bias were also higher when the source had been described as either expert or likable.

An unexpected result was some initial confounding of occupation with the other source variables. The lawyer was initially rated higher than the journalist on both expertness ($F = 7.68$, $df = 1/160$, $p < .01$) and likability ($F = 9.51$, $df = 1/60$, $p < .01$). Occupational differences in ratings on trustworthiness and lack of bias, while not significant, were also initially in the direction favoring the lawyer. One possible explanation is that the issue involved was essentially a legal one and thus a lawyer might be expected to be better qualified on it. An alternative explanation is that the subjects may have perceived criminal law as a more prestigious profession than television journalism.

Message Evaluation. Table 3 shows that, regardless of what the subjects thought of the source initially, they perceived his message as highly expert. The mean rating given the arguments of the attitude change message on the "how well made" criterion was 6.09 on a 7-point scale. The sincerity of the arguments was also rated highly, the over-all mean being 5.65. Although there were some variations by conditions, the mean message ratings were all high.

Source Evaluation Change. A comparison of pre- and post-message evaluations in Table 2 shows that the message, which was the only variable intervening between the two ratings of the source, substantially changed perceptions of the communicator. Ratings of his expertness and, to a lesser extent, his likability went up in almost every cell following the highly rated message. Both for expertness and likability, evaluations of initially low-rated sources changed more than those for sources rated high initially.⁸

One effect of these changes was the elimination of any significant over-all differences between the journalist and the lawyer on expertness ($F = 1.95$, $df = 1/160$, n.s.) and likability ($F < 1$) ratings. Occupation was intended to serve only as the manipulation of self-interest and not to be confounded with the other source variables. The data indicate that no such confounding existed at the time attitude change was recorded.

However, another effect of the source evaluation changes proved adverse from the standpoint of testing the main prediction. The highly rated message also eliminated the high-low expertness distinction initially achieved by the source descriptions. When his message had been read, the source was perceived on the expert (> 8) side of the continuum both by subjects in the expert condition ($M = 10.68$) and by those in the intended inexpert condition ($M = 9.26$). Thus, as in the second experi-

ment by Walster and his associates, differences in perceived professional expertness or prestige of the source were quite small.

Table 2 shows that the source likability distinction remained following the message, though the high-low gap was reduced considerably. The intended unlikable source remained slightly on the unlikable side ($M = 7.61$) and the intended likable source was clearly on the likable side ($M = 10.48$) of the continuum.

The message, then, can be seen as having a more pronounced effect on the content-directed (cognitive) source variable of expertness than on the purely source-directed (affective) variable of likability. The message also appears to have reduced the overlap between the cognitive and affective evaluations. The correlation between likability and expertness dropped from an initial .41 to a post-message .28. Furthermore, as Table 1 shows, the message changed the source evaluation factor structure. The content-related traits of trustworthiness and bias, which had loaded equally on both factors initially, moved clearly to the credibility factor following the message.

Attitude Change. The existing beliefs of the majority of the subjects were congruent with the position taken in the attitude change. Seventy percent were on the low (anti-television) side of the midpoint of 16 on the against-for continuum. The mean initial attitude level was 13.06 and the median was 12.54.

The four items assessing attitude toward the issue of courtroom television were summed, and attitude change was calculated by subtracting total attitude following the message from total initial attitude.

An analysis of variance (Table 4) failed to yield the main effect of self-interest which the Walster group's hypothesis would have predicted.⁹ The analysis also failed to yield the interaction between self-interest and expertness predicted under the alternative hypothesis that arguing against his best interest will enhance persuasiveness for an inexperienced source but not for an expert source. The fact that sources in both expertness conditions were rated expert at the time attitude change was recorded can be seen as militating against differences due to expertness.

Self-interest interacted with likability, and the direction of the interaction was the one predicted for expertness. The means in Table 4 show that the low likable source arguing against his self-interest was more effective than the low likable source arguing for his self-interest. In the high likability condition, on the other hand, the communicator arguing for his self-interest (the lawyer) was as effective as the one arguing against his self-interest (the journalist). Furthermore, using identical arguments, the low likable journalist was more effective than the high likable journalist.

DISCUSSION

The evidence indicates that self-interest—at least the kind reflected by occupation—interacts with other source variables rather than manifest-

TABLE 4
Summary of Analysis of Variance of Attitude Change and Means
of Interaction between Self-Interest and Likability

Source of Variance	df	MS	F
Self-interest (A)	1	10.01	1.07
Expertness (B)	1	22.15	2.37
Likability (C)	1	22.15	2.37
A x B	1	1.72	1
A x C	1	41.01	4.38*
B x C	1	18.01	1.92
A x B x C	1	.29	1
Error	160	9.36	
<i>Means</i>			
<i>How Message Relates to Source Self-Interest</i>		<i>Source Likability ^A</i>	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
Against (journalist)		1.45 _A	3.26 _B
For (lawyer)		2.29 _{A B}	1.69 _A

* $p < .05$

^A Means bearing the same subscript do not differ at the .05 level by Duncan multiple-range test. N = 42 per cell

ing itself as a main effect. Although the interaction between self-interest and likability was not the one for which predictions were made, the pattern was the same as had been predicted between self-interest and expertness. The unlikable source enhanced his effectiveness by arguing against his best interests, but such was not the case for the likable source. As for the predicted interaction involving expertness, it probably was not given an adequate test in this experiment because the expert-inexpert distinction initially achieved was not retained through the crucial period of a attitude change.

How far this evidence can be generalized depends upon the extent to which the intended variables were indeed manipulated. Checks of the expertness and likability manipulations showed that they produced the desired perceptions of those variables. But were the differences produced by occupations primarily due to perceptions of self-interest? Or did other variables associated with the occupations contribute substantially to the interaction with likability? Had the sources been union and industry officials and the issue open-shop legislation, for example, would the results have been the same? In view of the explicit information given in the test booklets and the fact that the subjects were students midway through a radio-television course, it appears most unlikely that they could have failed to associate the appropriate professional self-interest in the issue of courtroom television with the occupations of lawyer and TV journalist. Whether other occupational connotations acted as variables confounded with professional self-interest is unknown. This is a hazard of using occupations as indicators of self-interest.

Be that as it may, the attitude change interaction is clear evidence that it is not always safe to make the common sense assumption that a likable

source will be more effective than an unlikable source. If the choice is between personally likable and unlikable sources who are willing to argue against their professional self-interest, the evidence here recommends the unlikable one. This further bolsters the notion forwarded by Walster and her associates that in some cases a low prestige source may be even more effective than a high prestige communicator.¹⁰

Why should this be the case? Why should the unlikable journalist, rated lowest of all sources initially, tend to be more effective than any other source in the experiment? A search for correlates revealed that, although the attitude change message was the same for all sources, the arguments tended to be rated best made (Table 3) when they came from the unlikable journalist. The 6.38 rating given his arguments is significantly different ($p < .05$ by 2-tailed t test) from the 5.93 rating given the same arguments from the likable journalist. The correlation between attitude change and argument effectiveness ratings was .22 ($p < .05$). Should this appear to belabor the obvious, it is noted that other variables which might have been expected to correlate with attitude change did not. Evaluations of expertness, bias and trustworthiness of the sources, changes in these evaluations and ratings of argument sincerity yielded no correlations with attitude change. The only other measured source or message variable correlating with attitude change was change in likability ($r = .21$, $p < .05$). Here again, the greatest change was toward the unlikable journalist, initially rated least likable of all sources.

The fact that the message was congruent with existing attitudes of the majority of the subjects was considered as a possible partial explanation of the results. However, this was discounted when an analysis of covariance adjusting for initial attitude levels yielded the same interaction pattern, as did a separate check of the 41 subjects for whom the message was incongruent with initial beliefs, i.e., they favored courtroom television.

Relationships between the various components of source and message evaluation are of interest in their own right. The evidence suggests that it is well to consider the message-related (credibility) and purely source-related (likability) components of source evaluation separately. Although there may be some overlap between credibility and likability, they appear to operate independently enough to warrant separate consideration.

Perhaps the evidence pointing most strongly to a specific area of further research is that which showed the message to have such pronounced effects on source perception. Although such a change in source evaluation is not surprising in view of congruity theory,¹¹ most investigators have studied only the effects of initial credibility and other source variables upon message acceptance and attitude change and have ignored the effects these processes may have upon how the source is perceived. The present study demonstrates that the communicator may be seen quite differently before and after his message is received. Such evidence

argues against the procedure of assessing only initial attitudes toward sources.

Finally, the pre- and post-message factor analyses of source evaluations indicate that when explicit information regarding expertness and likability but not trustworthiness is available, people tend to draw equally upon cues from the other characteristics in estimating trustworthiness. However, a message judged highly expert and sincere can move trustworthiness clearly into the credibility factor. The question of how trustworthiness is related to other variables also warrants further study.

NOTES

¹ Raymond A. Bauer, "Personality, Perception of Source, and Persuasibility," in Joseph W. Newman, ed., *On Knowing the Consumer* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 83-89.

² Elaine Walster, Elliott Aronson and Darcy Abrahams, "On Increasing the Persuasiveness of a Low Prestige Communicator," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 2:325-42 (1966).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

⁴ Elliott Aronson and Burton W. Golden, "The Effect of Relevant and Irrelevant Aspects of Communicator Credibility on Opinion Change," *Journal of Personality*, 30:135-46 (1962).

⁵ Galen R. Rarick, "Effects of Two Components of Communicator Prestige," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1963.

⁶ Copies of materials are available from the senior author at the School of Journalism, University of Wisconsin, Madison 53706.

⁷ Examples of attitude assessment items.

In general, courtroom coverage by television cameras should be permitted.

strongly disagree ----- strongly agree

How likable do you think you would find JRB as a person?

very very
unlikable ----- likable

⁸ An analysis of variance of expertness change scores yielded an F ratio of 13.61 (df=1/160, $p < .01$) for the differences by expertness conditions and a F of 30.18 (df=1/160, $p < .01$) for the difference by likability conditions. An analysis of variance of likability change scores yielded an F of 46.53 (df=1/160, $p < .01$) for likability conditions and an F of 1.31 (n.s.) for expertness conditions.

⁹ Walster, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Charles E. Osgood and Percy H. Tannenbaum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," *Psychological Review*, 62:42-55 (1955).

THE HUNGARIAN SELF-IMAGE AND THE HUNGARIAN IMAGE OF AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS*

BY RADIO FREE EUROPE

Findings, in part, indicate, but do not prove conclusively, that stereotypes cannot be changed by a radio station's efforts alone, however, at least to some extent, the young and the better-educated are less given to extreme national stereotyping

INTRODUCTION

This report investigates the Hungarians' image of themselves and of two other nationalities: the Americans and Russians.

It is part of a research series examining national Auto- and Hetero-Stereotypes in Eastern Europe and follows the study "The Polish Self-Image and the Polish Image of Americans, Russians, Chinese, Germans, and Czechs," published in January 1969.

Like the previous study, this one is based on the Buchanan-Cantril "Adjective Check List."¹ The respondents are handed a list of adjectives and asked to select those that in their opinion apply to their own countrymen. They are then asked to do the same for each of the foreign nationalities.

The Buchanan-Cantril "Adjective Check List" consists of twelve adjectives:

Hard-working	Self-controlled
Intelligent	Peace-loving
Practical	Conceded
Generous	Cruel
Brave	Domineering
Progressive	Backward

For this study the list had to be slightly adjusted: "Self-controlled" was eliminated because pre-test results showed that the interviewees were not sure just what it denotes. "Progressive" was replaced by "Advanced" because of the tendentious connotations of "Progressive" in Communist countries.

The idea underlying the employment of the "Adjective Check List" is based on the observation that people tend to ascribe to their own social or national group a set of characteristics generally different from the character traits they ascribe to other groups or nations. The resulting self-image ("Auto-Stereotype") is predominantly flattering, while their picture of "others" ("Hetero-Stereotype") is strongly influenced by how much they imagine those others to be like themselves.

*Excerpts from "The Hungarian Self-Image and the Hungarian Image of Americans, Russians, Germans, Rumanians, and Chinese." Radio Free Europe, Audience and Public Opinion Research Department, February 1970.

Thus the relative "similarity" or "dissimilarity" between group stereotypes is a useful indicator of the degree of friendliness or dislike between groups or nations.

Extensive research in this field has led to three conclusions:

- (a) Hetero-Stereotypes are seldom based on objective assessments; as a result the tendency to extreme stereotyping reveals the existence of strong emotions between social or national groups.
- (b) Established *social* Hetero-Stereotypes resist change. Even the recognition of individual differences among members of the "other" group rarely affects the Hetero-Stereotypes of the group as a whole ("Some of my best friends are, but").
- (c) *National* Hetero-Stereotypes are sometimes less rigid, especially when formed as the result of specific and extraordinary situations and if they are of recent origin. As Cantril and associates noted, the temporarily positive American Hetero-Stereotype of the Russians deteriorated significantly between the joint-war-effort year of 1942 and the cold-war year of 1948. This sharp change occurred because the Russian actions during the cold-war period were contrary to U.S. policy *and* the American self-image.²

However, long established national Hetero-Stereotypes are as difficult to change as social ones. They are almost immune to change when this is attempted by a government which does not have the support of its nation. It is known that the policy of the Hungarian regime toward most Western nations conflicts with popular sentiment.

The survey findings will be analyzed in two ways:

- (a) All eleven adjectives will be treated as an entity and the *overall* findings for one nation or social subgroup will be compared with the overall findings for another.
- (b) The adjectives will be grouped into and analyzed in the following four categories:
 - (1) Hard-working
Intelligent *Positive Unemotional*
Practical
 - (2) Brave
Peace-loving *Positive Emotional*
Generous
 - (3) Advanced *Level of Development*
Backward
 - (4) Conceited
Domineering *Negative Emotional*
Cruel

The first section of the report compares the Hungarian self-image with the Hungarian image of the other nations in toto. [Other] sections will

treat each nationality in greater detail with special emphasis on how age and educational background affect the attitudes.

SAMPLE AND METHOD

This report is based on a survey of 1,055 Hungarian nationals interviewed . . . by independent opinion research institutes in seven West European countries. The interviewers were not identified with Radio Free Europe.

Most of the respondents were visiting the West as tourists (41%) or as guests of families living in the West (36%). Regime officials and members of regime-sponsored groups accounted for 8%. Fifteen percent were refugees or legal emigrants.

Certain population groups (people with lower educational and occupational attainments and rural residents) were underrepresented in the sample. Other groups (urbanites and the educational and occupational elites) were overrepresented. To bring the sample results into line with the population at large, these disproportions were corrected *ex post facto*; the weights of the underrepresented groups were appropriately increased and those of the overrepresented groups decreased to conform with their distribution in the entire population.

The COMPARATIVE AND CONTINUAL SAMPLING method was applied. This method stipulates that analysis can be undertaken only if *all* findings based on the different and independent samples obtained in the various interviewing areas agree to a significant extent.

* * * * *

I. How the Hungarians Compare Themselves to the Americans and Russians

The respondents were handed the list of eleven adjectives and told:

Here is a list of words by which one can describe people. Please go through this list carefully and select all the words from it which apply to your countrymen

The process was then repeated *separately* for . . . Americans, Russians, Germans, Rumanians, and Chinese.

Table 1 lists the findings for all six nations:

Table 1

	Hungarian Hetero-Stereotypes of					
	Hungarian Self-Image	Americans	Germans	Russians	Rumanians	Chinese
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Hard-working	69	53	82	23	8	45
Intelligent	74	51	71	13	11	13
Practical	43	71	67	26	24	20
Brave	79	29	57	27	4	17
Peace-loving	67	41	20	28	15	3
Generous	68	63	13	8	4	1
Advanced	49	52	32	17	14	5
Backward	8	1	1	49	61	59
Conceited	23	32	57	44	37	28
Domineering	4	11	30	58	40	44
Cruel	3	6	35	49	46	64

As Table 1 shows, there were side differences in how the Hungarians looked at the five foreign nations.

To assess relative degrees of sympathy or antipathy, the Hungarian Auto-Stereotype was correlated with each of the five Hetero-Stereotypes. The correlation coefficients had a potential range from +1.00 (total identity) to -1.00 (total contrast).

The resultant correlation can be interpreted in terms of the basic theory outlined in the introduction, namely that the degree of similarity or dissimilarity between a national Auto-Stereotype and a national Hetero-Stereotype is indicative of the character of feelings between nations.

Table 2

Hungarian Auto-Stereotype	American Hetero-Stereotype	= +0.71
Hungarian Auto-Stereotype	: German Hetero-Stereotype	= +0.40
Hungarian Auto-Stereotype	: Russian Hetero-Stereotype	= -0.67
Hungarian Auto-Stereotype	: Chinese Hetero-Stereotype	= -0.76
Hungarian Auto-Stereotype	: Rumanian Hetero-Stereotype	= -0.92

The Hungarian Auto-Stereotype correlates positively only with the American Hetero-Stereotype (+0.71) and, to a lesser degree, with the German (+0.40). In other words, the Hungarians ascribe to the Americans many and to the Germans some, of the characteristics they ascribe to themselves.

The three other correlation coefficients were negative: the Russians (-0.67), the Chinese (-0.76), and the Rumanians (-0.92); they showed a marked contrast to the Hungarian self-image and thus antipathetic sentiments.


However, a more qualitative analysis of the assessments reveals that the correlation coefficients fail to tell the whole story. Because emotionality is probably the major determinant of stereotyping, an attempt was made to isolate the emotionally charged adjectives in the "Adjective Check List" and consider them separately—i.e., to compare their prevalence in the Hungarian self-image with their prevalence in the five Hetero-Stereotypes. An average score was computed for the three positive emotional adjectives in the list ("brave," "peace-loving," and "generous"), and the three negative emotional adjectives ("conceited," "domineering," and "cruel").

Graph 1 shows the following results:

The high "positive emotional" score for the Hungarian Auto-Stereotype indicates that the traditional national virtues of bravery and generosity and also love of peace continue to stir the Hungarians.

Scrutiny of the various Hungarian Hetero-Stereotypes gives the following picture:

- (1) The Hungarians' emotional attitude toward the Americans was the only positive one, the ratio between "positive emotional" evaluation and negative being 2.75:1. In all other Hetero-Stereotypes the



Graph 1.

*Degree of Emotionality in the Hungarian Self-Image
and in the Hungarian Hetero-Stereotype of Five Other Nations.*

negative emotionality exceeded the positive, with variations from nationality to nationality.

- (2) Hungarian sentiments toward the Germans were ambivalent (ratio of positive: negative = 1:1.4), but the degree of emotional involvement was considerable: 71% (positive score = 30; negative score = 41).
- (3) The Hungarian attitude toward the Russians was predominantly negative (ratio positive: negative = 1:2.4), but it was marked by the same high degree of emotional involvement as the German Hetero-Stereotype was, 71% (positive score = 21; negative score = 50).

- (4) The "emotional" Hetero-Stereotypes of both the Rumanians and the Chinese were almost exclusively negative (the ratio positive: negative for the Rumanians being 1:5, for the Chinese 1:6.4). Half the sample revealed emotional involvement in their attitude toward these two nationalities. For the Rumanians 49% (positive score = 8; negative score = 41), for the Chinese 52% (positive score = 7; negative score = 45).

The findings may be interpreted as follows:

The *Americans*, in the eyes of the majority of Hungarians, possess to a relatively high degree two of the character traits that Hungarians consider themselves to possess—"generosity" and "love of peace," but this "positive emotional" image was incomplete: only a minority of Hungarians (29%) attributed to the Americans the most highly regarded virtue in the Hungarian self-image, "bravery." The low "bravery" evaluation is no doubt a heritage from the 1956 Hungarian revolution: many Hungarians still seem to blame the West, especially the U.S., for withholding aid against the Soviets during that crisis. Nevertheless, few Hungarians attributed to the Americans such "negative emotional" characteristics as "conceited" (32%), "domineering" (11%) and "cruel" (6%). In fact, they saw these character traits almost as frequently in themselves.

The Hungarians' emotional attitude toward the *Germans* was ambivalent. On the one hand, the Germans drew the highest rating for "bravery," the most valued trait in the Hungarian self-image; on the other hand, the Germans ranked very low in other assumed positive Hungarian characteristics: "generosity" (13%) and "love of peace" (20%). The high rating for "bravery" must be partially traceable to the Hungarian-German military cooperation in World Wars I and II. Nevertheless, the Germans' relatively high showing for "negative emotional" characteristics—"conceited" (57%), "cruel" (35%) and "domineering" (30%)—indicates an emotionally unfriendly attitude. As will appear later, the relatively positive image that, overall, the Hungarians hold of the Germans is due to "positive unemotional" traits of character.

There is nothing surprising in the Hungarians' strong emotional involvement with the *Russians*, or in the fact that those emotions are predominantly negative. One has only to recall the Soviet occupation of their country during World War II, the establishment of a Soviet-sponsored political system, and the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. "Domineering" (58%), "cruel" (49%) and "conceited" (44%) were the Russians' most frequently mentioned "emotional" attitudes.

The Hungarian Hetero-Stereotype of the *Rumanians* reflects the long-standing territorial dispute between the two countries and the problem of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. The Rumanians were seen as lacking all the traditional character strengths of the Hungarians ("bravery," 17%; "generosity," 1%; "love of peace," 3%), and as possessing such "negative emotional" characteristics as "cruelty" (46%), "domineeringness" (40%) and "conceit" (37%).

Although the *Chinese* are far away and the Hungarians' personal experience with them is nil, this Hetero-Stereotype is predominantly negative. "Cruelty" was the most frequently mentioned character trait—a reflection no doubt of a traditional fear of the "Yellow Peril"—as well as of a repugnance for the political dogmatism and intransigence of the Chinese leadership, evocative as they are of the worst periods of the Stalinist era.

Graph 2 shows how the Hungarians assessed themselves and the five other nationalities with regard to their "level of development"—i.e., how often they used "advanced" and "backward" to describe their own nation and the others.

The Hungarians' image of their own level of national development, as depicted in Graph 2, reflects the tendency of all social or national groups to flatter themselves. The positive/negative ratio of 6:1 (49% to 8%) is very favorable.

The assessments of the five foreign nations show a clear-cut split: everything west of Hungary was considered highly advanced, everything east backward. The Americans led all other nations, including Hungary, in their assumed level of development. The Germans approximated the Hungarian self-image. The Russians, in spite of their considerable technological achievements, were regarded as being rather backward. Traditional superiority feelings toward the Rumanians colored that image. The Chinese—as the most "Eastern" of the five nationalities—were considered the most backward.

Net scores for the level of advancement for the six nationalities—arrived at by deducting the "backward" scores from the "advanced"—clearly show this split:

Americans	+ 51
Hungarians	+ 41
Germans	+ 37
Russians	- 32
Rumanians	- 47
Chinese	- 54


II. The Hungarian Self-Image

Now we shall submit the Hungarian self-image to closer scrutiny, paying particular attention to differences related to such factors as age and education.

Both the "positive emotional" and the "positive unemotional" groups of adjectives dominated the Hungarian Auto-Stereotype (Graph 3). The attributes that the Hungarians most frequently ascribed to themselves were: "brave" (79%), "intelligent" (74%), "hard-working" (69%), "generous" (68%) and "peace-loving" (67%).

Among the "negative emotional" characteristics, "conceited" was mentioned by 23% of the respondents. This and the fact that less than half the interviewees considered the Hungarians to be "advanced" (49%) and

Graph 2.




"practical" (43%) shows that the Hungarian self-image was not completely uncritical.

Graph 4 shows a remarkable similarity between young and old, in other words a strong consistency in the Hungarian national self-image. In spite of this general consistency, the young Hungarians considered their compatriots less "hard-working," less "generous" and less "brave" than the older generation did—the skepticism of the youth of today.

Graph 5 compares the Auto-Stereotype of the well-educated Hungarians with that of the less well-educated.

Graph 3.



While age did not significantly affect the Hungarian self-image, education did:


Graph 5 shows that the members of the educational elite viewed their countrymen much more critically than the non-elite did—most significantly in respect to the following attributes: “hard-working” (educational elite = 48%, non-elite = 82%), “brave” (64% to 90%), “practical” (36% to 51%), “advanced” (42% to 54%), “peace-loving” (63% to 72%) and “conceited” (36% to 19%).

Graph 6 shows that in the breakdown by education the *young* Hungarians followed the pattern of the overall sample: The more educated were more self-critical.

III. The Hungarian Image of the Americans

Graph 7 depicts the favorable Hungarian hetero-stereotype of the American

Graph 4.
The Hungarian Self-Image
(According to Age)




cans which evidently exists in both the emotional and unemotional perceptual areas.

Graph 7 shows that the Hungarians viewed the Americans as "practical" (71%), "generous" (63%), "hard-working" (53%), "advanced" (52%), and "intelligent" (51%)—mostly "positive unemotional" characteristics. However, the high "level of development" assigned to the Americans and the important "positive emotional" attribute "generous," one of the most treasured traits in the Hungarian self image, contributed to the favorable overall image.

Moreover, the Americans' positive image was untarnished by strong "negative emotional" sentiments. Only 32% regarded the Americans as


Graph 5.
The Hungarian Self-Image
(According to Education).



"conceited," 11% as "domineering," and 6% as "cruel." "Conceited" and "domineering" are attributes very likely to be attached to a world power, but they were mentioned by surprisingly few respondents—not so very many more than ascribed them to their own countrymen ("conceited," 23% "domineering," 4%). It is noteworthy that in spite of the incessant regime propaganda about American "war crimes" in Vietnam, only six out of one hundred Hungarians considered cruelty part of the American national character.

Graph 8 compares how Hungarians with only a basic education differed from the better-educated in their view of the Americans. Hungarians with a university education considered the Americans significantly more "practical," "brave," and "generous" but also more "conceited" than the


Graph 6
The Hungarian Self-Image
 (According to Education—
 of Those up to 25 Years of Age Only).



non-elite did. Concerning the two "positive emotional" characteristics—"brave" and "generous"—the attitudes toward the West developed during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 may very well be mainly responsible for the differences: Hungarians with only a basic education probably regard the U.S. inaction during that crisis as having been motivated by cowardice and selfishness, whereas their better-educated compatriots see a less simplified picture.

Graph 9 shows that the young educated showed the same pattern as the older educated. By the same token, young people with lower education held nevertheless the same attitudes as the old lower educated respondents.

Graph 7.




Graph 9 shows that the young educated showed the same pattern as the older educated. By the same token, young people with lower education held nevertheless the same attitudes as the old lower educated respondents.

As Graph 10 shows, the Hungarian Hetero-Stereotype of the Russians is dominated by "negative emotional" sentiments. The Russians were described as "domineering" (58%), "cruel" (49%), "backward" (49%), and "conceited" (44%). Only a tenth to a quarter of the respondents saw "positive emotional" traits in them, suggesting that the majority of Hungarians feel toward the Russians a mixture of cultural superiority and a strong antipathy.

As Graph 11 shows, the older respondents were more negative about the Russians than the younger generation was. The two age groups differed most on emotional characteristics: more young respondents described the Russians as "brave" and "peace-loving." Conversely, the over-40 group tended to regard the Russians as more "cruel" and "domineering."

Graph 8.
The Hungarian Image of the Americans
(According to Education)




No significant differences in feeling toward the Russians could be elicited from Hungarians of different educational backgrounds.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The Auto-Stereotype and the various Hetero-Stereotypes of RFE listeners and of non-listeners differed only slightly. Where statistically significant differences could be established, it was not the factor of listening or non-listening which produced them but other factors unrelated to Radio Free Europe's impact. The data indicate but do not conclusively prove that stereotypes cannot be changed by a radio station's efforts alone.

Graph 9.
The Hungarian Image of the Americans
(According to Education—
of Those up to 25 Years of Age only).




IV. THE HUNGARIAN IMAGE OF THE RUSSIANS

Graph 10 suggests that most Hungarians have strong negative emotions toward the Russians and feel culturally superior to them.

These findings, like those in the first major APOR study of national stereotypes—"The Polish Self-Image and the Polish Image of Americans, Russians, Chinese, Germans and Czechs," January 1969—reaffirm the basic theory put forth in the Introduction: Established Hetero-Stereotypes resist change, and even the recognition of individual differences among members of the "other" group rarely affects the Hetero-Stereotype as a whole. This report showed, too, that a negative national

Graph 10.




Hetero-Stereotype is especially firmly entrenched when it has been formed by a historical enmity and feeling of cultural superiority, as the Hungarian attitude toward the Rumanians has been.

However, the findings also reveal that, at least to some extent, the young and the better educated are less given to extreme national stereotyping, although the two concurred in the negative appraisal of the Rumanians.

In this context it was of particular significance to note that no amount of regime indoctrination of the older or the young succeeded in establishing "Socialist Solidarity" or erasing national prejudices. As was stated before, this state of affairs will have to be taken into account in the decision-making processes of leaders East and West.

Graph 11
The Hungarian Image of the Russians
(According to Age)



NOTES

¹ Buchanan, W., Cantril, H.: "How Nations See Each Other," University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1953

² Cantril, H. and Strunk, M. "Public Opinion 1935-1946," Princeton University Press, 1951.

WAYS AND MEANS OF U.S. IDEOLOGICAL EXPANSION*

By A. VALYUZHENICH

A current Soviet analysis of the philosophy and organization of U.S. international political communications.

* * * * *

U.S. ideological expansion based on anti-Communism is apparent in new components in foreign policy machinery, as well as in intensification of the propaganda functions of U.S. government bodies. An important role is also assigned to various private and semi-official organisations, charity funds, educational and cultural institutions. The ways and means of U.S. ideological expansion are most clearly manifest in the activities of the three main centres of American foreign propaganda—the United States Information Agency (USIA), the Pentagon and the State Department.

The president of the U.S. has charged the USIA with the mission of elaborating and implementing foreign policy propaganda programmes and actions; it coordinates the propaganda of all other U.S. government bodies with the exception of the Pentagon and CIA and works closely with the propaganda services of other imperialist states, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. The basic documents of the USIA, founded in 1953, naturally contain no references to "psychological warfare" or propaganda in general. These words are replaced by the more neutral and flexible word "information." Thus, U.S. legislators sought, as much as possible, to dissociate themselves from the "psychological warfare" methods which had been compromised back in the Truman presidency. They also tried to gloss over the class meaning of their propaganda and persuade other nations that the United States furnishes unbiased information, particularly emphasising the USIA's chief aim of telling "the American story to the World".

According to Perusse, a former long-standing USIA propagandist, "the entire task of dealing with foreign people will be made easier" if the corresponding services of the United States will "go along with a tide of public opinion at home and abroad and drop the word [propaganda] completely. . . ." Perusse made it clear that from a strictly professional viewpoint, "this is 'psychological warfare', pure and simple, as everyone who has engaged in any aspect of such activity will recognise".¹

That USIA propaganda has long been called "overseas information", "international communication" and "international information" demonstrates that such recommendations of the "psychological operations" experts have won approval. Only under the Kennedy Administration was USIA activity overtly called propaganda. The USIA participation in the

*Excerpts from "Ways and Means of U.S. Ideological Expansion," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 2, February 1971, pp. 63-68.

"psychological operations" carried out by the U.S. military in Vietnam has generally revealed the shameful role of the USIA in fabricating and putting about all kinds of slander to whitewash the criminal U.S. aggression in Indochina.

In preparing news and comment for the Voice of America radio station, TV broadcasts, films, displays, magazines, booklets and other publications, the USIA propagandists pursue the same objectives that are dictated by U.S. military-political strategy aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Lecturers, teachers and tourists going abroad receive similar instructions in propaganda.

Blatant propaganda moves which may clearly compromise the U.S. Administration in the eyes of the world are frequently carried on not by USIA but by organisations and centres with private signboards such as "Radio Liberty" or "Radio Free Europe". The CIA, which maintains close contacts with the USIA, is charged with carrying out the most important ideological subversion.

* * * * *

Everday news released by the USIA and other American propaganda services is called "managed news". Miles Johnson, a journalist writing on international affairs and familiar with "the management of news," wrote that it implied "all of the means, direct and indirect, the government employs to manufacture, control, manipulate, and shape the news relating to its activities so as to affect opinion, either at home or abroad, in a manner advantageous to itself".²

Two Washington journalists exposed the alleged objectivity of the U.S. ruling circles' "information policy," when they wrote of U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s: "Repeatedly the government of the United States has been caught in the act of telling lies to its citizens and to the world. Not euphemisms or exaggerations, not the deft distortions and slick simplifications that constitute the fine art of propaganda, but deliberate and flagrant lies. Three successive national administrations have made the device of outright deception their method of choice in dealing with foreign affairs crises."³

U.S. propaganda today frequently employs the "soft sell" method. U.S. ideologists had used "hard sell" at the height of the cold war when the overtly aggressive strategies of "containment", "rolling back", and "liberating" were proclaimed.

The "soft sell" has many versions, but all of them have been most often used in ideological subversion against the socialist community gradually to erode and undermine the foundations of socialism. In other words, they are part of the notorious "bridge-building" strategy.

The manner of U.S. propaganda against socialist countries has changed correspondingly. In the past, it was primarily meant for socialism's opponents, the remnants of the exploiting classes and people who felt "socially depressed"; these sections of the population were supposed to undermine

the system from within. U.S. propaganda is now, however, making a play for other sections of the population brought up under socialism; it is counting on a long-term process of "transformation" of socialism. The propagandists have particularly been keen to extol the scientific and technological achievement of capitalist countries expecting them to cause disillusion with socialism thereby impelling the sections towards "integration" with Western countries, and breaking up the socialist community.

To make their material and broadcasts convincing, U.S. propagandists assume an attitude of defending "true socialist ideals" by condemning all adherents of "conservatism", "sectarianism," "dogmatism" and other "isms" they themselves have invented. Imperialist propaganda has always attached major importance to whipping up nationalism and chauvinism, counterposing them to socialist proletarian internationalism.

USIA activity is based on the strategy and tactics of U.S. foreign policy propaganda. Strategic propaganda is meant to create a situation conducive to the attainment of U.S. foreign policy goals in a given period, while tactical propaganda is concentrated on solving current political problems. U.S. strategic propaganda is addressed to comparatively small groups of people capable of influencing public opinion or the government of the particular country. It is for them that the bulk of books, learned journals and other academic publications are as a rule intended. Cultural and educational exchanges serve the same purpose. The main function of U.S. tactical propaganda is interference in specific current events, their comment and appeals to the broadest possible audience through newspapers, radio and television.

U.S. propaganda services devote special attention to determining the appropriate object for propaganda and the most feasible means of carrying it out. For instance, printed matter is preferred if a country is highly literate; radio, television and propaganda films are preferred if literacy is low.

Since the launching of the Echo-I satellite in the 1960s, the U.S. press has debated opportunities for using outer space for broadcasting propaganda round the world by furnishing the communication satellites with up-to-date electronic equipment capable of generating powerful signals and thus making it possible to receive directly from the comsats without any relay stations. General Electric has estimated that in the early 1970s the USIA will have a system of communication satellites capable of broadcasting radio and TV programmes at frequencies and with scanning typical of the receivers in America and Europe.⁴

* * * * *

In 1968 . . . [in] a learned survey—*United States Foreign Policy* . . . [the author] wrote:

. . . The immediate aims of United States propaganda programmes might range from building support for an existing government to promoting its overthrow or urging its citizens to defect; from encouraging a climate of opinion which will enable a friendly government to contribute military forces to the war in Vietnam to encouraging an Eastern European Communist Country to assert increasing independence from the Soviet Union; from promoting attitudes conducive to economic development in a new African State to minimising support for Castroism in parts of Latin America.⁵

The propaganda services of the [current] Administration are sparing no efforts to implement these subversive aims of U.S. foreign policy propaganda. The . . . U.S. "information facilities" continue to serve the global aspirations of U.S. imperialism. They still seek importunately, though vainly, to create in people's minds an embellished image of the U.S. as the "world leader". But all "psychological efforts" of U.S. imperialism's ideologists are futile.

In the spring of 1969, the U.S. Congress published a collection of documents, a sequel to the studies conducted by leading American experts on the U.S. "image" abroad. The collection also included recommendations aimed at improving the "Image." A very important goal of U.S. propaganda has always been to create an embellished U.S. "image" and a distorted "image" of its ideological adversary, corresponding to the general political lines and interests of the U.S. ruling circles.

The above-mentioned collection, entitled *The Future of the United States Public Diplomacy*,⁶ contains numerous facts attesting to the sharp deterioration of U.S. "image" in recent years and failures of U.S. foreign policy propaganda; the U.S. "image" abroad has considerably deteriorated owing to such events as U.S. aggression in Indochina, racial unrest and the increasing crime rate. The aforesaid experts conclude: "The mental picture that many foreigners have of our nation is increasingly that of a violent, lawless, overbearing, even a sick society."

They blame this unsatisfactory state of affairs partly on "modern communications" which tend to "stagger negativism". However, the conclusions also contain some rational ideas, such as, that foreign policy "begins at home", that foreigners judge the U.S. on its record not on its words, and that "propaganda of action is far more powerful, expressive, and persuasive than words." At the same time, these experts propose that the government should intensify efforts to prepare and implement all aspects of foreign policy propaganda, which, as they hold, ought to improve the U.S. "image" abroad and, as far as possible, denigrate socialism and the socialist community.

The Pentagon and all the forces that make up the U.S. military-industrial complex are playing a leading role in the ideological expansion of U.S. imperialism. Pentagon propaganda is not only militaristic; it also fully reflects the viewpoint of the forces which comprise this complex and provide it with ideas.

* * * * *

Pentagon foreign propaganda aims to uphold the morale of U.S. servicemen as well as to "manage" public opinion in the countries where U.S. troops are stationed. According to the information released by the Pen-

tagon, the radio and television services of the U.S. armed forces, numbering more than 350 radio and 90 TV stations, work for U.S. troops abroad.⁷ This vast radio and TV network is intended both to brainwash U.S. Defence Department personnel and to maintain the cold war and war hysteria atmosphere abroad.

Special groups of war correspondents are busy producing anti-communist films which also praise militarism and other "blessings" of the American way of life. For instance, Pentagon film-shooting groups brought 118 films from Vietnam in 1968 alone. Not one film, however, attempted to give an objective notion of the Vietnamese war . . . An international affairs expert at the University of Maryland observes that all films are nothing but dirty propaganda about the U.S. servicemen's "noble mission" in Indochina.

The Pentagon also puts out films which, at first glance, are unconnected with military affairs, yet incite blind hatred for Communism. They include *Free People* (the script written in the spirit of rabid anti-Communism cynically slanders life in socialist countries), *The Line is Drawn*, *The Road to the Well*, and other similarly stereotyped productions.

Pentagon military-propaganda services produce their own films and help private companies whose films are of interest to the Defence Department. Thus, in the spring of 1969, [a] congressman . . . openly condemned the backing lent by the Pentagon to actor John Wayne and his company in the filming of the ultra-militaristic film *The Green Berets* glorifying the "feats" of the U.S. Task Force in Vietnam. [The author] stressed that "the glorified portrayal of the Vietnam War, which is the heart of this film, raises serious questions about the Defence Department's role in using tax funds for direct propaganda purposes. . . . This alliance of Hollywood and the Pentagon seems to have brought out the worst in both institutions."

CBS, NBC, ABC and U.S. private corporations supply their productions to Pentagon radio and television services free of charge. The Pentagon also uses The Voice of America, operated by the USIA. The magazines' and books' divisions of the Pentagon Office of Public Affairs puts out special military and military-propagandist publications. The Defence Information Office holds press-conferences and publishes and distributes pamphlets, books, magazines and newspapers under more than 125 titles with a total circulation of close to ten million copies.

The reporters of U.S. newspapers and magazines who write "favourably" about Pentagon activities are asked to write for military magazines which pay them substantial fees. At the same time, the journalists who cover events objectively, the war in Vietnam in particular, find themselves under the surveillance of the Pentagon security service. Such measures by the Pentagon special services make the civilian mass media distribute the information which comes directly from the Department of Defence or the newspapermen who are very close to it and have won a reputation as ultra-patriots.

The Pentagon special services try hard to influence the younger generation outside the U.S. ideologically and psychologically, achieving this through the Defence Information School of the Defence Department. It was set up soon after the Second World War and now covers 28 countries on three continents where 8,000 Pentagon-appointed instructors teach over a million U.S. servicemen's and local children.

... The dangerous influence of this "state within a state," is increasingly more openly discussed in U.S. sociopolitical and academic circles. A conference on U.S. national goals and war budget was held in Washington in March 1969. The 45 Congressmen and 19 academics and experts who took part in the conference severely criticised Pentagon activities. Pentagon leaders, however, ignore U.S. public criticism. Speculating on the "Communist menace" and fanning chauvinism and obscurantism, Pentagon top-brass and the military-industrial complex seek to fashion the American way of life after a pattern of a "garrison state."

The ramified apparatus of the U.S. State Department, which of late has been more widely used for foreign policy propaganda, is one of the most important channels of U.S. ideological expansion.

The speeches and statements of the Secretary of State and other U.S. foreign policy leaders, as well as the messages sent to heads of state, are invariably meant to influence public opinion in those countries. At press-conferences regularly held by the State Department, its high-ranking officials brief reporters on various aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Even in the U.S. the substance and quality of information given to the reporters at those press-conferences are often severely criticised. ... Washington correspondents often feel that the State Department "is seeking to use them as instruments of psychological warfare." *

The ideological and "psychological" action of the State Department is not confined to press-conferences and briefings. It is also evident in the practical measures carried out in cultural and educational exchange arranged, as a rule, jointly with the USIA. As an important form of foreign policy propaganda, such exchanges have served and continue to serve the global aims of U.S. foreign policy. A report of the Bureau of the Budget of the House of Representatives in charge of the State Department's budget recently stated: "Culture for culture's sake has no place in the United States Information and Educational Exchange Program. ... cultural activities are indispensable to all propaganda. ...".*

... [A] former U.S. Ambassador to the UN ... has said that contacts with East European states are not "awards" conferred on communist governments but a means of getting Western ideas through to Eastern Europe and diminishing dependence on the Soviet Union. It was hardly surprising therefore that ... [the] former head of Radio Free Europe, one of the main centres of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda, was appointed Assistant-Secretary of State for cultural and Educational exchange.

The notorious American aid to foreign countries administered through the Agency for International Development (AID), a special body of the

State Department, is but a poorly camouflaged political diversion by U.S. imperialism against peaceloving peoples. A professor who served for many years in the State Department, the AID, Department of Trade and the CIA, disclosed the ideological and political meaning of the aid when he said that its most important function was "to counter the spread of Communism," and emphasised that it was just these considerations that are "preponderant in decisions to provide aid" ¹⁰ to a particular country.

Specialists from developing countries who come to the U.S. under the AID exchange programme are taught not so much technical subjects as unquestioning admiration for the virtues of the American way of life. On the other hand, U.S. specialists sent abroad take special courses of training in accordance with the ideological and political policies of the U.S. State Department.

The Peace Corps comes under the State Department and is an instrument of ideological expansion in developing countries. Its volunteers are often regarded by the governments of the recipient countries as subversive and, consequently, as having nothing in common with "strengthening mutual understanding" avowed by the Corps Charter.

The most important objective of U.S. ideological expansion carried out by the strategists and tacticians of American foreign policy propaganda is to split the ranks of imperialism's opponents and to sow discord between the socialist countries, to poison the minds of workers, and to denigrate socialism. Bourgeois propaganda seeks to break up the common front of struggle for peace and socialism by appealing to nationalistic and chauvinistic feelings, juggling with all manner of anti-socialist ideas and trends and speculating on the slightest errors of its ideological adversaries.

* * * * *

The world balance of forces is continuing to change in socialism's favor. Despite all their variegated attempts, the capitalist ideologists are incapable of turning the clock back. The influence of the noble and lofty Communist ideas on world sociopolitical development is irreversible.

NOTES

¹ R. Perusse, "Psychological Warfare Reappraised" in W. Daugherty, M. Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, Baltimore, 1958, pp. 34-35.

² M. Johnson, *The Government Secrecy Controversy*, New York, 1967, p. 20.

³ W. McGaffin and E. Knoll, *Nothing but the Truth*, New York, 1968, p. 64.

⁴ See *Washington Evening Star*, July 2, 1964.

⁵ S. Appleton, *United States Foreign Policy*, Boston, 1968, p. 570.

⁶ *The Future of the United States Public Diplomacy*, Report No. 6. Together with Part XI of the *Hearings on Winning the Cold War: the U.S. Ideological Offensive*, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, pp. 1R, 3R, 4R.

⁷ See *Department of Defence Appropriations for 1971*, Part 3, p. 751.

⁸ See J. Reston, *The Artillery of the Press*, New York, 1967, p. 38.

⁹ See C. Thomson, W. Laves, *Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Bloomington, 1963, p. 86.

¹⁰ Cyril E. Black, *The Strategy of Foreign Aid*, Princeton, 1968, pp. 16-19.

INFLUENCING POLITICAL CHANGE BY BROADCASTING TO THE SOVIET UNION*

BY ROBERT L. TUCK**

There is competition for the ear of the Soviet listener in international broadcasts. Listeners are becoming more discriminating and expect to hear more interesting programs than before. The role of international radio is that of a source of information and ideas, rather than an instrument of mass persuasion.

ABSTRACT

External communications are an increasingly important factor for influencing political change in the USSR. The number of citizens who can hear radio broadcasts from abroad has increased fifteen times since Sta-

*Prepared for delivery at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Statler Hilton Hotel, New York City, September 6-10. Reprinted with the permission of the American Political Science Association and the author.

**Author's Note:

When this paper was written in 1966, there was only scattered evidence of efforts by individual Soviet citizens to challenge the regime by insisting on their legal rights to justice and freedom, that is, to work for political change in their own interests. The paper was, therefore, an outline of assumptions and suggested methods and techniques for communicating with the Soviet listener to overcome his isolation and to broadcast relevant information and ideas which would help him in his own efforts toward political reform.

During the intervening six years it has become possible to test these assumptions and the broadcasting methods and techniques to an increasing amount of concrete documentation—that is, to *samizdat*, the “self-published” and distributed materials of dissent and protest which describe the thinking and actions of individuals who contribute to a small but vital democratic movement within the USSR.

Samizdat is a communication among the democrats; they take considerable risks to get documents to the West to inform and win support of world opinion; they depend on radio from abroad for further dissemination back within their own country. (As author Alexander Solzhenitsyn stated in his interview in *The New York Times* of April 3, 1972, “If we ever hear anything about events in this country, it’s through them,” referring to Radio Liberty.)

As *samizdat* documents arrive in the West they provide the broadcaster with program content to inform Soviet listeners about the efforts of the democrats and to win support for their often heroic insistence that legal guarantees of individual rights be implemented for all Soviet citizens.

This mutual interplay and interaction of supporting information and ideas between external broadcasters and their Soviet listeners has become a unique form of communication. By studying and broadcasting *samizdat* documents along with other relevant information and ideas denied the audience by a regime which insists there can be no “peaceful coexistence” in ideology, today’s international broadcaster has an unprecedented opportunity to help his Soviet listeners in their own quest for justice and freedom—and therefore to hasten political change. [April 1972]

lin's death. The Soviet regime has been slowly yielding to the demands of modern industrial society for a freer interplay of economic forces and individual initiative; these pressures for economic reform point toward corresponding relaxation in the political sphere.

A radio broadcaster therefore can play a role in influencing political change (1) by regarding international radio as a source for stimulating information and ideas rather than an instrument of mass persuasion or manipulation; (2) by continual analysis and reassessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system and regime policy; (3) by continual study of the attitudes and aspirations of the vast complex of Soviet listeners (the younger generation, rank-and-file Party members, the technical and creative intelligentsia, et al); (4) by formulating broadcasting objectives which conform to the aspirations of the audience for faster political, economic, and social reform, and (5) by presenting his material in an effective manner which appeals to the basic patriotism of his listeners and their own best human instincts and self-interest.

* * * * *

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL RADIO

International radio is a source of information and ideas, rather than an instrument of mass persuasion. There are some 26 million radio sets in the USSR capable of receiving short-wave broadcasts. [In 1971 the estimate was 30 million.] They are in the hands of individuals who exercise some freedom of choice in what programs they listen to and who are not captive to the local networks of loudspeakers which the regime saturates with its official line. The omissions, distortions, and dreary political fare of Radio Moscow very often encourage Soviet listeners to seek foreign stations in preference, but listeners will not continue to search for other stations which do not satisfy their wish for stimulating information and ideas.

Radio broadcasts in themselves are unlikely to result in overt political action by Soviet citizens against a regime which has kept itself in power by a tightly controlled party and police apparatus for almost 50 years—nor should this be intended. Appeals for direct action would, in all probability, disappoint the broadcaster by their lack of success. Whether supporters of the regime or its committed opponents, Soviet listeners would resent calls from abroad [that would] expose them to regime retaliation or punishment, and [furthermore they would] tend to discount all other ideas and information broadcast by the same station as, in their minds, similarly irresponsible.

Thus, any suspicion in a listener's mind that a station is trying to manipulate him for its own purposes would be ruinous to the station's credibility, and credibility is the *sine qua non* of audience impact.

The broadcaster must therefore accept the more modest—and more challenging—role of trying to stimulate independent thinking on the part of the individual members of his audience. Listening to broadcasts from abroad is now easier and no longer as dangerous to Soviet listeners as it

was in the past. There is more competition for the listener's ear from both other international broadcasters and from Soviet media which offer television and entertainment. The broadcaster must therefore assume that listeners are becoming more discriminating and expect to hear more interesting programs than ever before.

* * * * *

SOVIET LISTENERS.

In addressing the Soviet audience as a whole, one must bear in mind that it is basically patriotic, young, and therefore future-oriented, and made up of varying interest groups. Broadcasts can be directed at; but cannot be limited to, specific categories of listeners; anyone with a receiver might hear them, and thus nobody should be unnecessarily or carelessly excluded and thereby, perhaps, offended.

At the same time, a broadcaster who wishes to influence political change in the USSR must select program material on the basis of its appeal, either directly or indirectly, to those groups of listeners who have political potential: the younger generation, rank-and-file members of the Communist Party; certain occupational groups, some of primary, some of secondary potential; and the various nationality groups of the USSR.

Appealing to politically influential listeners is a challenge, because many of them have a vested interest, active or latent, in the present system; they may simply not be interested in fundamental change, they may fear it. The basically patriotic majority frequently identify their own interests with those of the regime and tend to react defensively to criticism of that regime. Therefore they must be appealed to on the basis of their own patriotism and self-interest and be persuaded that many of the regime's policies are not in the best interests of either their country or themselves. Many, if not most, of them are already well aware of the shortcomings of Soviet society and are trying to improve their situation. The broadcaster's greatest challenge today is to follow these trends in listener attitudes, understand them, and then help his Soviet listeners by supplying them with new and pertinent information and ideas with which to work for faster and more lasting improvement.

* * * * *

BROADCASTING OBJECTIVES

In formulating and implementing his objectives, the broadcaster will necessarily exercise some value judgments of his own. His program must be directed toward a definite goal and it must indicate some sense of mission, if there is to be a direction and purpose about his work. But the broadcaster cannot impose his own values on his listeners; his values must coincide with those of his listeners, if he is to influence political change inside the target area.

The aspirations of Soviet citizens are in the direction of freedom and democratic political institutions which represent the best interests of the majority of citizens and peoples of the USSR; therefore, this should be the goal of the broadcaster. It follows that his mission should be to

encourage and help his listeners to work toward replacing the present oligarchical political system with one which is representative of and responsive to the will and aspirations of the entire population of the USSR; [and] to provide his listeners with information and ideas which will enable them to work more effectively for change in their own interest.

Broadcasting objectives which would fulfill this mission would encourage (1) practical, democratic political alternatives to present Soviet practice; (2) social and economic reform in the interests of the population of the USSR; and (3) cultural diversity and freedom of exchange of information and travel for Soviet citizens. Another objective would be to correct omissions and distortions of official Soviet media and try to undermine Communist ideology, not by arguing with it in its own terms but from the point of view of showing that it is irrelevant and a bar to serving the real needs of the people.

In the writing of scripts it is necessary to concentrate on specific themes which encourage political, economic, and social reform and freedom of information and travel. On the eve of a CPSU Congress or Central Committee plenum the broadcaster should show the need for true inner-party democracy instead of "democratic centralism," [and] for hastening the course of de-Stalinization by opening party and state archives to facilitate writing the full history of the 1930s, etc. When it became apparent that the writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel, were to be tried, broadcasters used this occasion to carry foreign press reaction and comment in defense of the two as artists and patriots. . . . It is not often that individual broadcasts themselves can be measured for their direct audience impact; occasionally, however, as with the coverage of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, the heated rebuttals by official Soviet media indicate their effectiveness.

PRESENTATION OF BROADCAST MATERIAL

The soundest objectives based on the best possible analysis of the Soviet internal situation become academic if the presentation of individual scripts is not effective. If the attitudes of listeners toward their own situation and toward the broadcaster are disregarded, if scripts are not tailored directly to the attitudes and aspirations of a particular audience, there is little hope of any effect, to say nothing of influencing political change.

In addition to sound radio production and journalistic techniques to capture the listener's attention, to entertain and stimulate by effective argumentation, and to present a convincing case; a special dimension is required for the Soviet listener. Despite widespread discontent and the numerous tensions in Soviet society, the bulk of the evidence indicates that typical Soviet listeners are deeply, if not fiercely, patriotic. Indeed, the sacrifices and repressions of recent decades followed now by the realization that the USSR lags far behind other industrialized countries in

its standard of living seems to spur Soviet citizens to greater efforts. While often very critical of the Communist regime and its policies, they are also quick to defend the USSR against foreign critics.

The question of the tone of broadcasts thus becomes of paramount importance for anyone trying to influence political change inside the USSR. All criticism of Soviet reality must be clearly in the interests of Soviet citizens. It must encourage constructive change and not simply denounce the negative aspects of Soviet life. The temptation to quote internal criticism in the official Soviet press at length to the Soviet audience should be resisted—because the listener has already read it or heard it and because the regime uses this criticism as a device to build up support for its own purposes. Instead the broadcaster should help the Soviet citizen to read his own press critically and in his own interest, asking whether official explanations are the correct ones, suggesting other more basic reasons, and supporting trends toward specific reforms which are being discussed inside the USSR and abroad. When warranted and the facts are convincingly presented, he can also suggest that limited, piece-meal reforms have only a limited effect and that more basic changes in the system are necessary to achieve lasting results.

At the same time the broadcaster must refrain from appearing to exploit positive internal developments for what may appear to be his own "anti-Soviet propaganda" purposes. Such treatment could be dangerous to those Soviet citizens who are working for constructive change and could hinder their efforts. Thus, when a Soviet writer produces a new work which challenges some aspects of the system, when an economist advocates decentralization of planning and controls, when a party member calls for more inner-party democracy, etc.; the radio commentator should not suggest that such developments are anti-regime acts, but rather treat them as attempts to help Soviet society, and as being motivated by more patriotism than is shown by the party bureaucrats who oppose such innovations.

By consistently taking this approach, the broadcaster avoids giving his internal Soviet critics grounds for accusations that he engages in "anti-Soviet propaganda," and perhaps hindering the forces of constructive change already at work inside the USSR.

[CONCLUSION]

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the individual broadcaster himself is the most important, and yet most intangible, element working to influence political change in the USSR by external communications. He must be an effective communicator possessing the technical skills of writing and speaking, but most important is his attitude toward his audience. He must be motivated not so much by hatred of Communism and the Soviet regime as by dedication to the cause of freedom for people who want it badly enough to work continually toward it. He must be committed to the possibility of fundamental change on a long term basis in

Soviet society. He must be patient and not discouraged at the lack of visible progress; when setbacks occur he must not let himself or his listener become frustrated and apathetic but should encourage the search for yet new approaches. And he must develop the knack of vicariously sensing the opportunities which his listener can use, suggesting them to the listener without overtly telling him what to do or how to do it, and thereby helping the listener to help himself in his own interest.

The increasing opportunities for political change which have emerged in Soviet society in recent years offer encouraging prospects for the future.

By continually studying and refining his own assumptions about the role of radio communication per se, the actual political situation in the target area, and the complex of varied attitudes of his many listeners toward that situation and their own aspirations; by formulating objectives which coincide with the basic human instincts and self-interest of his Soviet listeners; and by presenting his material to the audience in a corresponding manner, the broadcaster can effectively hasten political change in the USSR by external communication.

CONTENT ANALYSIS

Analysis of content, unlike source analysis, focuses upon the message. Beyond that generalization, however, content analysis is characterized by diversity in objective, method, and results.

Although content analysis is one of the oldest forms of propaganda evaluation, the advent of the computer to assist the human mind has made the use of previously impractical methodologies now eminently feasible. This is largely the result of the machine's ability to process, store, and retrieve massive amounts of information with great speed.

The lead-off article in this section discusses the use of computers in the coding and analysis of materials on the People's Republic of China. Both of the first two papers utilize quantitative content analysis. Although quantification has undeniable advantages for certain objectives,¹ the use of qualitative techniques is equally important and may be preferable in individual cases. The last three selections illustrate the varied uses of qualitative analysis of propaganda content.

NOTES

¹ See Harold D. Lasswell, "Why Be Quantitative?" in Lasswell et al., *Language of Politics* (George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1949), pp. 40-52.

CODING AND ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS FROM COMMUNIST CHINA*

BY PAUL WONG

The methods of survey analysis are adapted to an analysis of documentary materials. The author contends that the two major types of content analysis—qualitative and quantitative—are indispensable. Both should be used in conjunction with each other.

In this paper the argument is made that the utilization of a qualitative-quantitative mode of analysis may yield valuable insights on the social, economic and political developments in Communist China. The method of coding involved in the qualitative-quantitative mode of analysis is discussed. Concrete examples are drawn from a content analysis project currently in progress at the University of California at Berkeley.¹ Finally, several specific hypotheses encountered in the content analysis project are presented to demonstrate the utility of the qualitative-quantitative mode of analysis.

DISPARITIES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF DATA

The most important source of empirical data on Communist China comes from documentary materials such as the *People's Daily* (Jih-min Jih-pao). Researchers spend long periods scanning through Chinese Communist documents and other potential sources of data. The difference between "Datum" and "material" must be maintained and clarified. By material is meant a document in its original form such as an editorial in the *People's Daily*. Materials are transformed into data by some scheme of categorization. Materials are, therefore, the sources of data. Data are generally at a higher level of abstraction than materials, and are, in general, more applicable for scientific investigation. Indeed, one of the shortcomings of research on Communist China has been the failure to transform materials into data before using them for scientific investigations.

There are disparities in the degree of availability of data for the three different but highly correlated dimensions of the Chinese Communist social system—that is, the political, social and economic dimensions.² It is proposed here that an effort should be made to collect systematic data on economic, social and political structure and dynamics on Communist China on both regional and national levels. In so doing, the gaps or disparities in the availability of data would diminish. Furthermore, a general analysis of some problems employing data from all three dimensions would become possible.

*Excerpts from "Coding and Analysis of Documentary Materials from Communist China," *Asian Survey*, VII, No. 3 (March 1967), pp. 198-211. Reprinted with the permission of *Asian Survey*.

A SYNTHESIS OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES

Experienced researchers have the capacity to "read the lines" to analyze overt meanings as well as "between the lines" to ascertain less obvious implications and inferences. At the same time, it is essential to raise the question of objectivity. Qualitative treatment of documentary materials is indispensable, but it is argued here that the reliability and validity of qualitative analysis can be increased and its importance and value enhanced by means of a quantitative analysis of the same materials and then synthesizing the results achieved through both approaches.

It is particularly in the coding and classification of documentary materials from totalitarian or closed societies that quantitative content analysis can make a lasting contribution. To some extent, this is a consequence of the fact that many methods of social science research are not applicable to closed societies. Quantitative content analysis was used extensively during W.W. II to study Nazi propaganda, but there was a period of about ten to fifteen years thereafter during which there was a decrease in the number of projects using content analysis methods. The reasons for this decrease were: (1) manual coding and analysis placed a serious limitation on the amount of materials which could be treated in any single project; (2) traditional content analysis involved essentially the inspection of univariate distributions (technically called "marginals"), or, at most, bivariate distributions (technically called "zero-order" relationships). Many researchers felt that the analysis of marginals and zero-order relationships did not provide an adequate explanation of the empirical phenomena in which they were interested; and (3) the lack of foundation support on content analysis projects.

In the past five years, there has been a reemergence of interest in content analysis, facilitated by the rapid development in data processing facilities and computer applications in the social sciences. In the area of content analysis, the development of social-psycholinguistic dictionaries has made possible the machine coding of original materials—especially in English but even in some foreign languages. Due to the extraordinarily complicated structure of the Chinese language, machine coding of original documents is not yet feasible. But recent development in optical scanning devices indicates that it is likely that machine coding of original Chinese documents will be possible before too much longer.

The present project may be regarded as an intermediate stage between traditional content analysis and machine content analysis in that the coding is done manually but the analysis is done entirely by high-speed electronic computers. Already in the pilot study, 2,316 articles or cases have been coded. In the larger study, more than 35,000 cases will be coded, making it the most extensive systematic content analysis ever attempted on a single polity.

The inclusion of diverse but systematic queries in the coding schemes

means that an analysis of a total society will be possible. Although a manual coding system is used, this also has some advantages in that it facilitates the inclusion of both rigidly structured and open-ended items in the coding schemes. In this manner, some significant but unforeseen information will not be lost. One major methodological assumption in this study is that an article or speech in a newspaper is similar in many ways to a human respondent. The researcher can literally "ask" the article both structured and open-ended questions; the answers to these questions may be coded in the same way as a respondent's answers to interview questions in survey research. A major difference between a survey interview and coding of content materials is that whereas in the former the human respondent is asked to answer questions about social background and attitudes toward various subjects for most of which he has answers, in the latter the coding scheme tends to include a great number of items which only inquire about their presence or absence.

Methods of survey analysis are to some extent applicable to content analysis. I have in mind especially the method of "elaboration" developed at Columbia University.³ Essentially, the method of elaboration attempts to ascertain the validity of a relationship between two variables by controlling other variables. The relationship between two variables is called a bivariate or zero-order relationship. In controlling each additional variable in the same table, the order is raised by one. If used carefully, the method of elaboration may be of immense value in content analysis; it may also make possible the application of content analysis for explanatory purposes.

The crucial point raised in this paper is not that qualitative methods should be rejected. On the contrary, qualitative considerations, in principle, should temporally precede quantitative considerations, although not infrequently *ex post facto* hypotheses are discovered after the analysis of quantitative data. In effect, a synthesis of the two methods should be attempted, particularly in the area of research on Communist China. This synthesis may perform one or more of the following functions:

1. Compare and contrast the results obtained from the two analyses, and thus facilitate the validation of research findings.
2. To provide fresh insights and hypotheses for the quantitative analysis, and vice versa.
3. To synthesize hypotheses suggested by current research literature and hypotheses suggested by quantitative analysis. In this respect, quantitative analysis performs an explanatory function—that is, it helps in providing a systematic framework upon which a logical explanation of some aspects of the total social system can be based.
4. From this synthesis of ideas and the systematic framework resulting from it, new hypotheses may be derived for further research.
5. Through quantification, an immense amount of documentary materials can be transformed into data, which may be used for secondary analyses.

6. Criteria for distinguishing the difference between "manifest content" and "latent meanings" can be provided.

METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The content analysis project on Communist China covers a number of time periods. A great deal of attention is naturally given to the *People's Daily*, the official organ of the Communist regime. In addition, a number of other newspapers have been selected to study internal variations, including geographical and ideological variations. The examples presented in a later section of this paper relied only upon data collected for May, August, and December in 1957. The data consist of headlines of the *People's Daily* appearing in the *People's Daily Monthly Index*. In sum, 2,316 headlines of articles were coded, and constitute the "cases" for this paper. The sample consists of all headlines appearing in every fourth daily edition of the *People's Daily*. For this content analysis study, two general coding schemes were devised. In this paper, only a minute portion of the results obtained by means of the first coding scheme are presented for the purpose of illustration.

The coding schemes were developed on the assumption that newspapers, or any medium of mass communication, are subject to internal and external influence and are sensitive to such influence. In Communist China in 1957, newspapers were, on the whole, effectively controlled by the regime. The *People's Daily* as the official party and governmental organ, functioned in propagating the official policies of the regime, in eliciting mass participation, and as an agent of social control. One can, therefore, classify the news items appearing in the newspaper and on the basis of this information make inferences concerning the conditions of the system. In this respect, one assumes that the newspaper, as a product of the system, at the same time plays a role in shaping the system. What appears in the newspaper is of tremendous value in studying conditions of society, especially in Communist China—a relatively "closed" society from which interview data cannot easily be obtained.

An important aspect of the coding schemes is the classification of subject matter categories appearing in the *People's Daily*. After experimenting with different methods of classification, we decided to use, by and large, the same categories as those appearing in the *People's Daily Monthly Index*. This classification may be regarded as the Chinese Communist elite's "perception of the situation." The number of items devoted to specific subject matters may be regarded as an index of the amount of attention focused on these subjects by the leadership. Aside from the subject matter categories, we have also included geographical, individual, organizational institutional, and other social economic and political categories.

Our data were coded in such a manner that the same data may be analyzed in several different ways by using a different "unit of analysis":

1. The headline or article as the unit of analysis.

2. The person as the unit of analysis. For every case we include all the information about the person together with the information about the headline or article in which the person's name appeared. Note that since a person's name may be mentioned in different articles (contexts), the data offer an opportunity to study specific persons under varying contexts. In this manner, we may be able to examine how, for example, a Central Committee member is related to different policies.
3. The organization as the unit of analysis. This is similar to the explanation given for the person as the unit of analysis.

In addition, we may use groups of persons as the unit of analysis—for example, Central Committee members in comparison with non-members. Also, we may use type of organizations as the unit of analysis—for example, political in comparison with non-political organizations.

ARTICLE AS THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

In this section, we will report on some empirical findings using the headline as the unit of analysis. We have a total of 2,316 cases. The headline as the unit of analysis is not to be confused with individuals mentioned in the headline as the unit of analysis. In the former case, our interest lies in characterizing the content of the headline; in the latter case we want to characterize the individuals in terms of two sets of data. The first set of data refers to the socio-political-economic background of the individuals, which are more or less constant in a given period. The second set of data relates the individual back to the content of the headlines to ask questions such as in what type of news content is the individual most likely to be mentioned. Analysis using the individual as the unit may be considered as a study of leadership structure and decision processes. Analysis using the article as the unit may be regarded as a study of the Chinese Communist's "definition of the situation." In this respect, the two analyses supplement one another in facilitating an interpretation of the Chinese Communist world view and domestic outlook. The analysis on organizational structure and processes adds a third dimension to the interpretation.

INDICES OF IDEOLOGY

Definitions. Schurmann's definition of ideology as the manner of thinking characteristic of an organization has been followed.⁴ The pervasiveness of ideology in Communist China cannot be denied. Although ideological discussion and education permeate every level and aspect of life, the number of references to ideology in the 1957 issues of the *People's Daily* used for this study was not great. This was not surprising, given the fact that every reference to ideology in the *People's Daily* had to be considered authoritative.⁵ To an experienced Western observer or a Chinese "sensitized" to the Chinese Communist documents, the appearance of even a single term such as *lilun* (roughly translated as theory) is of

paramount importance in explaining or predicting changes in ideology. To some extent, the small number of references is also a consequence of the fact that a rigid definition of ideology is used here. Ideology, in this context, refers to any of the various "isms" and "thought." Types of ideology are classified according to the charismatic leader who is associated with the particular "ism" or "thought." For example, Maoist thought is classified as Chinese, while Leninism is classified as Russian. General ideology does not refer to any specific individual. While it is plausible that an ideology may, at some point in its development, transcend the confines of national boundary and become universal, it is maintained that, at least in Communist China, the nationalistic element in different ideologies can still be distinguished from their universal meaning. For example, Marxism-Leninism is still foreign and Russian, while Maoist thought is Chinese, in spite of their presumed universal applicability.

Analysis: Of the eighteen references to ideology in the May, August and December 1957 issues of the *People's Daily*, eleven referred to Chinese ideology, three to foreign ideology, and four to general ideology. The fact that Chinese ideology predominated supports Schurmann's hypothesis concerning decentralization policies in the latter part of 1957 as well as the fact that these policies coincided with a conscious attempt to develop an economic model which was not merely a mirror image of the Soviet economic model.⁶ Change in emphasis on different types of ideology was but one of the many changes which occurred in 1957. Schurmann pointed out that during the first fourteen years of the Chinese People's Republic, the leadership applied two distinct developmental strategies, one for each of the two five-year plan periods.⁷ The terminal year of the First Five-Year Plan, 1957, was crucial not only for economists, but also for sociologists and political scientists since many social and political changes occurred. In the present discussion, we are only interested in the ideological dimension. A detailed examination of the hypotheses raised by Schurmann will be treated elsewhere.

In a strict sense, our data on Chinese versus foreign ideology do not enable us to test the hypothesis that there was a shift in ideology accompanying the transition from the First to the Second Five-Year Plan period. Schurmann postulated that China had gone through two radical phases, one during the First Five-Year Plan period when the Chinese Communists tried to repeat the Soviet experience of industrialization, and the second during the Great Leap Forward when they used their own mobilizational techniques to try to achieve an economic breakthrough.⁸ Our corollary to this general postulate is that the transition from the First to the Second Five-Year Plan period was also accompanied by a change in ideology. To test this corollary, data from the First Five-Year Plan period are needed. But until data for 1952 are available and analyzed, such a comparison is not possible.

Since the Foreign Ideology Index is not made up exclusively of

categories on Soviet Ideology, it would be interesting to look at the statistical variation of Soviet ideology categories in comparison with those for Chinese ideology (see Table I).

This table reveals several striking facts. First, there was only one reference to Soviet ideology in the entire sample. This discovery seems to be relevant in the interpretation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Although a general break in Sino-Soviet relations did not occur until years later, it has been suggested that changes in Sino-Soviet relations began as early as 1956 in connection with the problems of de-Stalinization and with crises in Poland and Hungary. In the early period, according to one authority, it was very much a conflict over the question of the "correct" ideology, although the fact that economic problems were involved—including the stopping of Soviet loans and the disillusionment with the Soviet economic model—cannot be denied.⁹ Another striking fact in Table I is the variation in references to ideology by month; this variation seems to be related to the timing of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign and the anti-rightist campaign which followed. MacFarquhar stated that anything printed before June 8 in the *People's Daily* can be taken to have been straight reporting, June 8 being the day on which the *People's Daily* initiated the counter-attack. Our data show that in May there were nine references to ideology, for August there was none, and for December there were 3. To interpret this variation, let us divide the general event period covering the "Flowers" campaign into four sub-periods:

1. February to April—period of anxiety following Mao's speech on contradictions in February 1957.
2. May and part of June—blooming and contending period during which there was a liberalized policy on ideological debates.
3. Part of June, July and August—period of the anti-rightist campaign.
4. September to December—aftermath.

Our data cover sub-periods 2, 3, and 4. During the period of liberalization on communication, the number of references to ideology was largest.

TABLE I
REFERENCES TO CHINESE VERSUS SOVIET IDEOLOGIES, BY MONTH*

Type of Ideology	May	August	December	Total	Test of Significance** (row difference)
Chinese	9 (11.7)	0 (0)	2 (2)	11 (13.7)	p > .01
Soviet	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	1 (1)	not significant
Total	9 (11.7)	0 (0)	3 (3)	12 (14.7)	p > .01
Test of significance** (column difference)	p > .01	----	not significant	p > .01	

* Figures in parentheses represent number of references after adjustment for variation in sample size (adjustment ratios for May, August, December, equal to 1.30, 1.07, 1.00 respectively). Tests of significance are based on adjusted figures.

** Kolmogorov-Smirnov 1-sample test for row or column difference.

During the most intensive period, the anti-rightist campaign, there was no reference to ideology at all. Finally, there was a limited reemergence of ideological discussion in December. In May, many individuals openly attacked the regime and its ideology; study groups (*Hsiao-tsu*) were formed and mass meetings were held to discuss alternative ideologies and practices. But after June 8, intellectuals, with the exception of the students, became more apprehensive and reserved. After July 20, when a government resolution was passed whereby in future every student has to produce proof of ideological reliability before he can obtain a job, the students also became more quiescent. It was only toward the end of the year that the situation began to calm down, and even some of those who had been singled out for special reprimand turned up again in public life, although shorn of all influence.¹⁰

Thus there tends to be a minimization of communication about the source and focal point of failure during a crisis situation, especially the role which the elite played in contributing to this failure. However, while there is a *minimization* of communication about the elite's role in policy failure, there is also a *maximization* of statements blaming "others" for this failure. "Others," in this sense, may refer to individuals groups, nations or even abstract ideas.¹¹ There was a tremendous increase in references to the campaigns against counter-revolutionaries (*sufan*) and references to antirightist campaigns in August 1957.

The findings on minimization and maximization of communication, in terms of the number of references in the *People's Daily*, may be expressed in the form of a general hypothesis:

If a policy fails, the system tends to *minimize* communication about the source and focal point of this failure, *minimize* communication about the role the elite played in contributing to the failure, but *maximize* communication in blaming "others" for the failure.

In the case of ideology, the "Flowers" campaign was formally endorsed by Mao; moreover, the effects of the campaign were viewed as extremely unfavorable for the entire system; consequently the restriction on discussion about ideology was so great that there was no reference to ideology at all in the entire sample for August. In December, the threat of the consequences of general discontent became less pronounced, as evidenced by the reappearance of a limited number of references to ideology.

It is by no means assumed that the data on ideology conclusively confirmed the minimization hypothesis mentioned previously; a confirmation of this hypothesis requires testing against a variety of different situations, different types of policies, and different time periods. A comparison of the references to the ideology of Mao, Engels, Stalin, and Lenin reveals three important facts. First, nine of the ten references to ideology of individuals concerned Maoist ideology. Second, there was no reference to ideology of any individual either in August or December. The last fact, when combined with our finding that there was a limited reappearance of references to ideology in December, means that this reap-

pearance was limited to general ideology; apparently ideology of specific individuals was still too sensitive an issue to be discussed in the press.

THE POLITICAL PARTY INDEX

The political Party Index consists of three categories: The CCP (Chinese Communist Party), Communist parties of other countries, and workers' parties of other countries (see Table II). First of all, looking at the total column for all months, we find that of the 209 references to parties, 186 referred to the CCP. On the basis of our limited data, we must accept the validity of the postulate that the Chinese Communist spokesmen consider the Chinese Communist movement as part of the world Communist movement. On a *long-term* basis, this postulate is probably true. It was certainly not accidental that Teng Hsiao-Ping, in an article written for the *Pravda* in celebration of the 10th anniversary of the People's Republic of China in 1957, stated that:

We stand for proletarian internationalism as opposed to all kinds of bourgeois reactionary ideologies of big-nation chauvinism and narrow nationalism. The modern revisionists, as represented by the Yugoslav ruling clique, use bourgeois nationalism to oppose proletarian internationalism, use the nation as cover to oppose international solidarity and have fully become an echo of imperialism. . . .¹²

In fact, Teng's article is a reflection of a more general ideological stand which emphasizes the interdependence of the Chinese Communist and world Communist movements on a long-term basis.

While, on the one hand, we can speak of a *long-term* ideological stand, at the same time, *short-run* fluctuations may occur due to practical considerations made necessary by such problems as domestic crises. In our sample for the latter part of 1957, for example, there was a preponderant number of references to the CCP as opposed to references to foreign Communist and workers' parties. The nature of such short-run

TABLE II
REFERENCES TO POLITICAL PARTIES, BY MONTH*

Party	May	August	December	Total	Test of Significance** (row difference)
C.C.P.	112 (145.6)	4 (4.1)	70 (79)	186 (219.9)	p> .01
Foreign C.P.'s	2 (2.6)	4 (4.5)	9 (9)	15 (15.9)	not significant
Foreign worker's Parties	8 (10.4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	8 (10.4)	p> .01
All Parties	122 (158.6)	8 (8.6)	79 (79)	209 (246.2)	p> .01
Test of significance** (Column difference)	p> .01	not significant	p> .01	p> .01	

* Figures in parentheses represent number of references after adjustment for variation in sample size (adjustment ratios for May, August, December, equal to 1.50, 1.07, 1.00 respectively). Tests of significance are based on adjusted figures.

** Kolmogorov-Smirnov 1-sample test for row or column difference.

fluctuations is worth exploring in future research, although it will be, undoubtedly, a tedious and costly job. In order to distinguish between short-run fluctuations and sudden changes, one must also have detailed knowledge of the long-term developmental patterns. Methodologically, one should study long-term patterns in detail qualitatively and, at the same time, select a large sample of documentary materials covering a number of years for quantitative analyses. What we have said for time-variation holds, of course, also for regional variation.

Looking at the total number of references to all parties, we found that, in comparing the distribution for the three months, our hypothesis on minimization in communication in periods of stress is again confirmed. There were 122 references in May, but the number was reduced to 8 for August, and finally there was a reemergence of references to political parties in December, the number being 79. Looking at the distribution by month for each party, we found that for the CCP the restriction in communication hypothesis is also confirmed; with 112 references for May, 4 for August, and 70 for December. The number of references to foreign Communist parties or foreign workers' parties during the three months were too few in number to warrant speculation.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION IN 1957

If the proposition that decentralization occurred late in 1957 is valid, then a comparison of the three time periods in our sample with regard to a series of indicators about decentralization in its various manifestations should provide evidence that in the later months of 1957, decentralization was much more widespread than the earlier months of the year. Since our sample consists of three months in 1957—namely, May, August, and December—we will be satisfied if, in fact, there were more indicators of decentralization such as a decrease in emphasis on cen-

TABLE III

REFERENCES TO LOCAL AND NATIONAL AUTHORITATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS, BY MONTH*

Type of Organization	May	August	December	Total	Test of Significance** (row difference)
National	5 (6.5)	3 (3.2)	8 (8)	16 (17.7)	not significant
Local	1 (1.3)	8 (8.6)	14 (14)	23 (23.9)	$p > .05$
Total	6 (7.8)	11 (11.8)	22 (22)	39 (41.6)	$.10 < p < .05$
Test of significance** (column difference)	not significant	not significant	not significant	not significant	

*Figures in parentheses represent number of references after adjustment for variation in sample size (adjustment ratios for May, August, December, equal to 1.30, 1.07, 1.00 respectively). Tests of significance are based on adjusted figures.

**Kolmogorov-Smirnov 1-sample test for row or column difference

tralized administration and an increase in emphasis on downward transfer of authority, in the later months. Our data on administrative organization show quite clearly that there was a tremendous increase in the references to local authoritative and administrative organization in the later months when compared with May. In May, only one out of six references are on local organization; but in August eight out of 11, and in December, 14 out of 22 references are on local organization. The number of references to national organization in August was the smallest of the three months; this was likely to be related to the minimization of communication in the rectification campaign. Since central or national authority and administration were challenged in the "Powers" campaign, there was consequently a greater restriction on the discussion of national organization in the rectification period. This restriction in communication on topics related to the sources of strain in the system again confirms the minimization of communication hypothesis formulated earlier.

REFERENCES TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

On the basis of favorable, neutral and unfavorable references to foreign countries in the *People's Daily*, an index of evaluation of foreign countries was computed using the following formula: (favorable references multiplied by 1) plus (unfavorable references multiplied by -1) divided by all references.

The range of the index is from 1.000 to -1.000 (i.e., from completely favorable to completely unfavorable). Using this index, we found in Table IV that in comparing the countries which recognized Communist China in 1957, Asian countries received the most positive evaluation, African countries second, and European countries the least. It is suggested that the "Bandung spirit," together with the historically-rooted suspicion of European nations may be the cause of the variation in evaluation.¹³ With regard to the countries which recognized neither Communist China nor

TABLE IV
REFERENCES TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN THE PEOPLE'S DAILY
BY EVALUATION, BY CONTINENT, AND BY RECOGNITION
IN MAY, AUGUST, AND DECEMBER, 1957

Continent	Score on Evaluation Index		
	Communist China	Countries which recognized Neither	Taiwan
North America	-----*	-----	-0.5091
Central America	-----	-----	-0.4000
South America	-----	-----	0.0000
Europe	+0.067	-0.1833	-0.0767
Asia	+0.2306	+0.1500	+0.1041
Africa	+0.1714	+0.1667	-----
Oceania	-----	-----	-----

*denotes not enough cases

Taiwan, a similar pattern prevails, but evaluation of European countries had become definitely negative. Looking at countries which recognized Taiwan, we find again a similar pattern for Europe and Asia. For countries in the Americas, an additional factor of geo-politics seems to be operating: Central America, being closer to the United States, was given a highly positive evaluation while South America was given a neutral evaluation. The highly positive evaluation seems to be related to an effort to persuade the countries of "Central America"¹⁴ to join the world Communist movement, thus isolating the United States from her neighbors.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, an effort has been made to adopt the methods of survey analysis to the analysis of documentary materials from Communist China. Combining the traditional qualitative method with a quantitative treatment of the same materials, we have shown that, with proper treatment, documents provide not only "impressionistic evidence" but may be used as a tool to give a meaningful and logical "explanation" of empirical phenomena occurring in Communist China.

One critic of quantitative analysis has maintained that this mode of analysis tends to preclude a judicious appraisal of the role which qualitative consideration might play. At the same time, however, he admits that:

quantitative analysis includes qualitative aspects, for it both originates and culminates in qualitative considerations. On the other hand, qualitative analysis proper often requires quantification in the interest of exhaustive treatment. Far from being alternatives the two approaches actually overlap. . . .¹⁵

Therefore, the problem is not to make a choice between qualitative and quantitative analyses—since both are obviously indispensable—but to use both in conjunction with each other. In this respect, quantitative treatment of documentary materials is similar to analysis of standardized questionnaires, while qualitative treatment of documentary materials is similar to the analysis of depth interviews in survey research.

NOTES

¹ The project is being conducted in collaboration with Charles Y. Glock and Franz Schurmann, directors of the the University of California's Survey Research Center and the Center for Chinese Studies, respectively. Their advice in reading an earlier draft of this paper is gratefully acknowledged. I also wish to thank my wife for valuable comments. This is publication A-69 of the Survey Research Center.

² See *The Chinese Communist Social System: A Content Analysis Study* forthcoming, December 1967. Chapter I, "Maturation of a Special Area Study. The Presentation of Evidence."

³ See, for example, Herbert Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955).

⁴ H.F. Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 18.

⁵ Until attacked by the regime in 1966, the *People's Daily* had enjoyed a privileged position in its relation with the party.

⁶ See Franz Schurmann, "Economic Policy and Political Power in Communist China," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 349 (September, 1963), pp. 49-69.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ See Franz Schurmann, "China's New Economic Policy—Transition or Beginning," in *The China Quarterly* (January-March 1964), p. 65.

⁹ See A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China In Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 82.

¹⁰ Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow* (New York: Mentor, 1964), p. 211.

¹¹ In a personal communication, Professor Robert Scalapino informed me that in his study of North Korea, he found a similar pattern in that, during an economic crisis, statements blaming the government were minimized while those persuading the people to work harder were maximized.

¹² Quoted in Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China," in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds.), *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 555-6.

¹³ Methodologically, we controlled for the variable of political recognition, and looked at the remaining variation.

¹⁴ Central America, in Chinese Communist political geography, includes Mexico, Cuba and other Caribbean countries as well as the Central American States.

¹⁵ See Siegfried Kracauer, "The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis," in Leo Lowenthal (guest editor), *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Special Issue on International Communications Research (Winter 1962-63), p. 634.

POLITE PROPAGANDA: "USSR" AND "AMERICA ILLUSTRATED"*

BY RICHARD A. GARVER

Content analysis showed that the picture magazine produced for U.S. readers by the Soviet Union emphasized such "American" values as industrial growth and a high standard of living. In contrast, the U.S. periodical distributed in Russia portrayed Americans as cultured and imbued with esthetic interests. Unanswered are the questions: Do reader interest and copy sales imply propaganda success? Does a gentlemanly, "non-propagandistic" approach sway readers?

In October 1956 there was distributed in 84 cities of the Soviet Union the first issue of a new publication, *America Illustrated*. A slick, pictorial magazine created by the United States Information Agency, it was reported sold out within a few hours.¹ At the same time, a Soviet publication, *USSR*, was made available at most metropolitan newsstands throughout the United States. The two magazines were highly similar: a *Life* magazine format minus the advertising, wide use of color throughout the issue and a gentlemanly reticence in purveying their respective country's wares; i.e., the propaganda was polite.²

This was not the first experience for the U.S. in printing a Russian language magazine for mass distribution in the Soviet Union. From 1945 to 1952 this country had circulated the publication, *Amerika*, in quan-

*Excerpts from "Polite Propaganda: 'USSR' and 'America Illustrated'," *Journalism Quarterly* XXXVIII, pp. 446-484. Reprinted with the permission of *Journalism Quarterly*, copyright holder.

titles ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 copies per issue. Censorship problems and distribution difficulties created by the Russians had stopped the magazine after 53 issues. During this same period the Russians had circulated from their embassy in Washington the *USSR Information Bulletin*. Circulation of the *Bulletin* was stopped in this country when *Amerika* was cut off in Russia.³

After a three-year lapse, an agreement by Washington and Moscow late in 1955 laid the groundwork for a renewal of the publication exchange. This time the publications were to be concerned exclusively with the life and culture (not politics) of the two peoples.

Here, then, was an opportunity to observe a reciprocal propaganda operation in action, an interesting arrangement in which the two opposing political powers agreed to allow the enemy in the "home camp" as long as he employed what might be called in political double-talk, non-propagandistic propaganda. The situation for comparing the two publications was ideal because of the similarity in their formats.

A content analysis was undertaken concerned with a comparison of topics and themes in the two magazines. Although similar in format, were the publications different in content? If so, how?

PROCEDURE

The first 12 issues of each monthly publication were analyzed.⁴ All editorial material was coded for subject and theme content. The basis for theme categorization was Berelson's definition, "... a summary or abstracted sentence, under which a wide range of specific formulations can be subsumed."⁵

Pictures were not coded individually but were used as an aid in coding the textual material. Two *a priori* codes for subject and theme content were developed and added to, as needed, while the coding was in progress. The subject code ultimately consisted of 20 major headings with 102 subcategories and the theme code consisted of 45 themes covering 9 areas of human activity. The coding was accomplished in a graduate seminar in communications.

Each story or article was tabulated on an individual card with the coder noting topic, theme, story length, number and size of accompanying pictures and page location. Coders were instructed to code only what they thought was the major topic of the article and the single, overriding theme. While there obviously was a multiplicity of themes presented in some single articles, the fairly high coder agreement obtained indicates this stricture on coding does not make impossible the handling of multi-subject and multi-theme materials.⁶

RESULTS

Content of Magazines

Content of the two magazines can best be described in terms of

similarities and differences. Topical composition of the two magazines is summarized in table 1.

Similarities

There was agreement between the two magazines as to the subjects which hold greatest interest for the readers. In both magazines the subjects with highest rate of incidence were Economics (35 articles), Culture (68) and Human Interest (66).

In Economics, both magazines stressed industrial development. Although there were 17 subcategories under Economics, 12 of the 48 *USSR* articles and 13 of *America Illustrated* articles concerned growing industry ("Harnessing the Volga's Power" versus "St. Lawrence Seaway"!). While other articles in the Economics category ranged from automation to labor organizations, the predominant image in both magazines of such material was of a vital, growing industrial society.

In the other two categories played heavily by the magazines, there were some differences as to what material was stressed. In Culture, for example, the *USSR* concentrated on literature ("Novelist Mikhail Sholokhov"), while the American publication stressed music ("Jazz in Color").

Other classifications in the culture category were art, classical dance, drama and folklore. And in the third popular category, Human Interest,

TABLE 1
Topical Content in "America Illustrated" and "USSR"

Topic of Article	America Illustr. (N = 218)	USSR (N = 282)
Agriculture	10%	6%
Architecture	*	1
Culture	15	12
Communication	2	3
Economics	22	17
Education	4	3
Geography	3	9
Government	3	4
History	*	*
Human Interest	12	14
Living Standards	4	2
Military	*	1
Religion	*	*
Science	8	7
Social Life	1	1
Sports, Recreation	9	15
Weather	*	1
Fiction	2	1
Humor	4	2
Miscellaneous	1	1
	100%	100%

*Less than 5%

an interesting difference was observed. The *USSR* emphasized Babies and Children ("Children Get Special Vacation Care") while *America Illustrated* stressed Adults ("Everybody Bowls"). Perhaps the Russians are well aware of the dominant place children in America occupy.

Differences

The differences in subject content were, however, more striking than similarities. The Russians made great use of material in categories of Sports and Geography, which, in comparison, the American publication did not. It was apparent from magazine content that the Russians believe Americans have slight knowledge of the Soviet Union. *USSR* set out to educate the reader on this subject. It also was evident that American interest in sports is not wasted on the Russians. There were 43 sports items in the first 12 issues of *USSR*. In contrast, the American publication used 17 such items.

The Americans, in their publication, placed greater emphasis on Agriculture and Living Standards than did the Russians. Particular stress was placed on Agriculture: "Farm Wife of Today"; "Life on the Farm"; "Young Cattleman"; "Farm Girls' Fashions," to cite a few. Living Standards also was a more frequent subject in *America Illustrated*. But in this category the American publication attempted to make its point gently and without angering the Russian reader or making him incredulous.

Theme Content

Aside from a single category—Social Relations—there were distinct differences in theme content of the two magazines. (See table 2). The Russian publication emphasized increasing prosperity ("Amateur Movie Makers"), extensive social care ("All Kinds of Summer Vacations") and the longing for peace ("An Arms Plant Converts for Peace"). This was done with a dominance of themes in the categories of Economic Development, Government and International Relations.

Thirty-six of the 45 mentions of economic themes concerned progress in elevating living standards and expanding industrial output: new apartment developments and low cost housing are being made available; the country's industrial might is burgeoning; the stores are well-stocked; it's a busy but happy life. *USSR* seemed to have borrowed a somewhat reconstituted but easily recognized image of the United States.

In theme material concerning government, the picture of good care for the old and sick, payment of child-rearing costs and the development of a wide variety of other social welfare programs was heavily drawn: "School for Millions"; "The Right to Security"; "In Life's Sunset—an Old People's Home."

A secondary but prominent theme concerning government involved the democratic nature of Russian government: "American Judge Visits a Moscow Court—I Would Have Passed the Same Sentence," Says Judge

TABLE 2
Theme Content in "America Illustrated" and "USSR"

Theme of Article*	America Illustrated (N = 218)	USSR (N = 282)
Social Relations		
(Old people are respected)	21%	22%
Human Resources		
(Nation's youth has great promise)	35	21
Economic Development		
(Economic planning is yielding results)	10	16
Government		
(Legal justice is available to all)	6	15
International Relations		
(Nation's armed force is being reduced)	3	9
Patriotism		
(Nation has a proud history)	3	4
Culture		
(Citizens have interest in art)	11	5
Miscellaneous	5	3
No theme	6	5
	100%	100%

*Themes were consolidated into general areas of subject matter, such as Social Relations, and the theme appearing here under each subject heading is merely a representative specimen of each category. There were 45 individual themes.

William Clark of Princeton"; "The Soviet Parliament"; "How I Became a Legislator." Here the reader found that Russian government, particularly at the local level, is run most democratically—and many times by women.

The Russian people were not pictured, however, as totally occupied by narrow national interests. There is a great popular longing for friendlier relations with other nations and a particular desire to increase contacts between the U.S.S.R. and the United States: "Foreign Visitors Are Welcome"; "We Are Willing to Trade with All Countries"; "The International Geophysical Year"; "Atoms for Peace."

In summation, the reader of *USSR* found the Russian people increasingly prosperous, well cared for, democratic and friendly to foreigners.

America Illustrated took quite a different tack, centering on two areas not so heavily emphasized by the Russians: Human Resources and Culture. Great pride was exhibited in the large number of highly creative persons in this country who are allowed to pursue their own interests and thus achieve the highest development of their talents: "They Tread New Paths in Music—Contemporary American Composers Enjoy Great Popularity"; "Jan Peerce"; "Carl Sandburg"; "He's Changing the Face of the Earth—Robert G. Le Tourneau"; "Korczak Ziolkowski: Mountain Carver." This natural talent, coupled with an innate desire for adventure and challenge, was pictured as responsible for turning many Americans into world figures in science, industry and the arts.

Related to this picture of talent, enthusiasm and individual freedom was a strong emphasis on the cultural life of Americans. Twenty of the 23 items in the theme category, Culture, contained the dominant thought that American music and art are developed to a high level, enjoyed by many of our citizens and much liked by citizens of other countries, namely Russians.

CONCLUSIONS

A content analysis of the first year's issues of the two propaganda magazines, *USSR* and *America Illustrated*, indicated a considerable difference in emphasis. A study of theme and topic content of articles showed that the general impact one receives in reading *USSR* is of a nation concerned with materialistic things: progress, consumer goods, job benefits, vacations. It does not seem an overstatement to say that one can see an obvious reflection of the United States in *USSR* content. It is a calculated effort to show that things Russian are much like things American.

The over-all tone of *America Illustrated*, however, is not of materialism but of *Kultur*. Content reminds one of a symphony: *allegro* (we're talented); *adagio* (we're cultured); *scherzo* (we're free); *allegro presto* (we're enthusiastic). While the American magazine may discreetly advertise our high living standards, the major effort being made is to convince the Russian reader that we are a diverse people with many interests, including a keen taste for life's esthetic adventures.

Both magazines do a creditable job. Forgetting reality for a moment, the Soviet Union appears to be a jolly fine place in which to live—things are progressing so—and the United States shines as an oasis of artistic sensibilities.

One can scarcely guess at the effectiveness of the two magazines. Do reader interest and copy sales imply propaganda success? Does a gentlemanly, "non-propagandistic" approach sway readers? These remain most difficult, unanswered questions.

* * * * *

NOTES

¹ Floyd G. Arpan, "American Tells Its Story Behind Iron Curtain in New 'Slick' Magazine," *Quill*, January 1957, pp. 9 ff.

² Arpan in his article indicates a type of doublethink used by the *America Illustrated* staff when he writes "*America Illustrated* was to be nonpropagandistic . . . The staff was told to make the magazine 'the next best thing to a visit to the United States' and yet to avoid propaganda." *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³ "The Russian-Language Magazine 'Amerika,'" in *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 589-97.

⁴ The author wishes to express his appreciation for the cooperation of the United States Information Agency in providing him with translations of the Russian text of *America Illustrated*.

⁵ Bernard Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), p. 138.

⁶ A check on coder reliability was made by having all persons code a particular issue in

addition to other issues coded. Initial agreement on theme coding was approximately 85%; i.e., there were two or more coders in disagreement on 15% of the items. Discussion of disagreements reduced this to less than 1%. Initial agreement on subject coding, a simpler matter, was 95%.

PUPPET REGIME CLINGS TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

By the 7th PSYOP GROUP

Auditing adversary broadcasts can indicate the strengths and weaknesses of friendly PSYOP.

REPORT

The Cambodian Information Agency (AIC) (clandestine) in French to Southeast Asia and the Far East, on 2 May said that the traitorous clique of Lon Nol, in its last gasp of agony, is desperately clinging to its only remaining arm psychological warfare.

AIC stated that the Phnom Penh regime hoped to reverse its desperate situation by pouring out a flood of slander and lies every day by trying to distort the truth by transforming political isolation into popularity, famine into abundance, corruption into honesty, fascism into nationalism, dictatorship into liberty, defeat into victory, and treason into patriotism. AIC compared this to a boomerang and to an imbecile who spat toward the sky, because in both cases that which is tossed out will return to the individual. AIC promised that the lies of the Phnom Penh clique would also return to it.

AIC stated that the propaganda uttered by the Republic of Khmer has become so voluminous and boisterous that the few remaining people outside the liberated areas no longer believe such lies.

Cut off and completely isolated from the masses, Cambodia's traitors do not know who they can trust, even among their associates. Specializing in treason themselves, they smell treason everywhere around them. AIC said high-ranking officials had been tried and shot, but these were the lucky ones because they received some publicity. Others had simply disappeared, not on the battlefield, but in broad daylight on the streets of the capital, never to be seen again. AIC insisted that an atmosphere of mistrust and terror existed in Phnom Penh and that many intellectuals had been arrested and shot for not aligning themselves with the puppet regime.

It is this lamentable situation that the political propaganda apparatus of the traitors tries to camouflage to the eyes of the public. AIC said the clique had built a shaky cardboard castle that masses will destroy. Defeated militarily, isolated politically, suffocated economically, and de-

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Highlights and Trends Analyses," Issue No. 18-71, 7 May 1971, pp. 18-30—18-31.

pressed psychologically, this regime of traitors sold itself to the U.S. imperialists and lives on borrowed time—this explains the confusion and discord in its ranks. No political propaganda, no matter how clever it may be, can deny this old proverb: "When the ship is wrecked, the rats jump into the sea."

COMMENT

Communist propagandists, such as the Chicom-controlled *AIC*, usually do not specifically mention what is considered by them to be enemy PSYOP. This indicates that *AIC* not only listens to what the Khmer Republic says but is concerned enough to call Khmer programs a pack of lies, conscious deceit, and other derogatory terms. Communist propaganda spends most of its time on Communist successes and is positive to the point of insanity—not realizing in Communist fervor that nothing ever has or ever will be as perfect as the Communists say Communism is. Evidently the Communists have been quite concerned about the effect these Khmer PSYOP programs are having on the people. The Communists must know that Khmer people are listening. Virulent counter-propaganda is usually a sort of "dying gasp," to use a Communist term. After all, the Communists say that success is everywhere, all is well, and getting better. But is it? *AIC* said there were only a few people remaining outside the "liberated areas" which is untrue in itself, but an effort to disguise the fact that in the "liberated areas," thousands upon thousands are dissatisfied. They are probably trying to listen to republic of Khmer PSYOP. They know that what the Communists say is not true where they live. These Cambodians also know that they, like other Cambodians, do not find North Vietnamese to be Cambodian liberators.

U.S. VULNERABILITIES AS PORTRAYED IN THE EAST GERMAN TELEVISION FILM, "PILOTS IN PAJAMAS"*

BY HARLEY O. PRESTON, JAMES L. MONROE, and ALDO L. RAFFA

Valuable information can be obtained from the careful analysis of the contents of the propaganda of rival communication activities. For example, while this report yielded only a few tentative conclusions, it did provide many inferences for U.S. policy and actions

* * * * *

Pilots in Pajamas . . . , filmed in a North Vietnamese prison by producers from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and recently broadcasted over GDR television, . . . is a sophisticated propaganda production that undoubtedly will be effective with many audiences. It follows the convincing format of a documentary film in which captured U.S. pilots are individually interviewed by an unseen but

*Excerpts from "U.S. Vulnerabilities As Portrayed in the East German Television Film, 'Pilots in Pajamas'," Preston and Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C.: A Technical Report to the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, 1968, AOSR 68-1623. Reprinted with the approval of the Air Force Office of Scientific Research.

obviously a European interrogator. The questions are carefully phrased to sound reasonable and the answers are generally relevant. To provide background and credibility, the interviews are interspersed with scenes of bomb damage, captures of downed pilots, and excerpts from U.S. news films of U.S. pilots at bases in South Vietnam. These scenes and those of the interviews are artfully edited and spliced together into logical sequences and episodes that should prove plausible and convincing to the unwary. Technically, the film is an excellent production.

* * * * *

The present report is limited to the identification of individual propaganda themes in the film that appear to be components of current and anticipated Communist political strategy and tactics not only for the Vietnam conflict but perhaps globally. This report is divided into three sections: Propaganda Themes—their objectives and development in the film; Evaluative Comments—rationale and estimates of impact; and Implications and Tentative Conclusions.

PROPAGANDA THEMES

Captured U.S. Pilots in Vietnam are not prisoners of war. They are war criminals within the meaning of the London Agreement, the basis for Control Council Law No. 10, which was the authority for the International Court at Nuremberg ("War Crimes Court"). The findings of this Court were unanimously adopted by the United Nations upon a motion by the United States.

Under the "norm of international law" at Nuremberg, the individual was not excused for committing crimes against humanity because he acted in accordance with orders from his superior. Both the individual and the Nazi government were guilty. This theme is repeated throughout the film with appropriate variations. The captured pilots are air pirates, mercenaries, and outlaws. They and other U.S. military personnel in Vietnam are committing acts of criminal aggression. Thus, they have no status as prisoners of war, as defined by the Geneva Convention of 1949 to which both the United States and the North Vietnamese governments presumably adhere.

Throughout the questioning and commentary by the East German producers of the film, there is a studied attempt to compare U.S. policy and actions in Vietnam with those of the Nazis in Europe during World War II. Each pilot was asked specifically if he knew of any declaration of war by his government against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As Nazis were convicted of crimes against humanity and their convictions were supported by world opinion, so U.S. military personnel are also criminals and not deserving of the status of prisoners of war.

The criminal intent of the individual pilot is established by juxtaposing scenes from his sober interview with scenes of conviviality among U.S. pilots at their air bases and on Navy carriers and scenes of alleged "terror bombing" of civilians in North Vietnam. Complimentary mention is also made in the commentary to the "Russell Court" in Copenhagen as a judgment of world public opinion on the U.S. role in Vietnam.

U.S. pilots are poor officers because they are callous about human life, cowardly when their own lives are at stake, and violate their own Military Code of Conduct when captured.

This theme is closely related to the one alleging criminality and is developed similarly in the film. Again, scenes of bomb damage and wounded women and children are followed by scenes from U.S. television films showing pilots being interviewed after returning to their bases from successful missions over North Vietnam. The pilots in these U.S.-made interviews are posed against a background of highly technical equipment and speak with fitting modesty about their recent success over specific targets. These scenes contrast vividly with those of North Vietnamese women and farmers capturing downed pilots with only pitchforks.

In the prison interviews, the fact is established that these downed pilots had their service revolvers with them at the time of their captures but, contrary to the Military Code of Conduct, had not used them to resist capture. Though brave when dropping bombs and napalm on civilians and heroic when interviewed by the U.S. press, these same pilots are cowardly when face-to-face with their victims and behave contrary to their own regulations when facing capture.

Further elaboration of the theme about the poor quality of U.S. officers is given by the East German commentator who, at the end of each extended interview with a captured pilot, reminds the audience that the Code of Conduct specifies that captured U.S. military personnel are bound to give their captors only their names, ranks, serial numbers, and dates of birth.

U.S. officers are ideologically naive and politically they are dolts.

The role of the pilots in the development of this theme is relatively passive. Each, following the U.S. tradition of political neutrality of members of the Armed Forces, makes a statement disavowing any active interest in politics, domestic or international. From these simple disclaimers, the East German commentator then attempts to reinforce the popular notion among many Europeans, Communists or not, that Americans generally are politically immature. Americans are obviously technologically advanced, but equally obviously they are retarded in their understanding of the real social forces and class struggle throughout the world. To quote from the commentary:

The clumsy and by this time immature impression which captive Americans made with regard to politics may in our opinion hardly be blamed on the individual. It is much more the faithful reflection of the inner political situation in the U.S. of which Professor Robert Paul Wolff says in his essay, "The gap between the ruling and the ruled is so deep that the active participation of the citizen in the affairs of the government disappears into it. Even the periodic election becomes a ritual where the voters choose a president whom they have not appointed so that he decides on facts which were never discussed, on the basis of facts that cannot be published."

This theme is probably the most undisguised propagandistic one of all in the film. It lacks any subtle development that involves U.S. activities in Vietnam. It is exhortative and suggests that the U.S. is unfit to cope

with the governments and peoples in countries that are the beneficiaries of "scientific socialism." The U.S. pilots' disavowals of partisan politics only provide the springboard for a monologue on the political unawareness of American world leadership.

The North Vietnamese exhibit Western (Christian) virtues that the United States only professed

This is an all-pervasive theme. The people of North Vietnam are long-suffering. Their tribulations are American-made and not of their own making. They bear these tribulations with great fortitude and unswerving loyalty to their government that is also blameless since it is not attacking civilians in the United States. Yet when these simple people confront their tormentors—downed U.S. pilots—they act with great restraint and kindness. They see to their enemies' physical needs, offer what medical aid they possess, and steadfastly refrain from taking any personal vengeance against the pilots. This portrayal of the North Vietnamese people as the forgiving victims of an impersonal "American Colossus" is supportive of the contention of the peace movement in the United States and elsewhere. As such, the pictorial elaboration of this theme will be taken as "proof" by groups in this peace movement.

The use of camera close-ups and their editing into what appears to be uninterrupted sequences of this "good guys versus bad guys" theme is quite convincing. The faces of the pilots seem to reflect some inner feelings of guilt, sadness and remorse when they are questioned about their treatment by civilians at the time of their captures. Whether these camera shots were taken at the time the pilots were actually being queried about their captures cannot be determined. Only one pilot voiced some personal remorse at his violation of his religious tenets against killing. But even his response could have been made to a different question than the one that was heard on the sound track of the film.

The United States has broken with its own traditions in fighting a war in Vietnam.

The objective of this theme is to convince the captured pilots and more significantly those in the wider television audience that the Vietnam war is "Johnson's war." Such a war is contrary to America's great traditions. The questions and comments on the response from pilots mention the great historical role of the United States and reverently quote excerpts from the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. It is doubtful that this "Devil quoting Scripture" technique has any effect on the captured pilots, but this cannot be asserted with the same confidence about viewers who have taken a peace-at-any-price position and who might be expected to be receptive to appeals to restore "historical America."

The Soviet Union is providing the tangible means for the people of a small "fraternal socialist" country to defend itself against attack from a mighty imperialistic country.

The purpose of this theme seems to be twofold. First, to demonstrate

that the U.S.S.R., as a nation-state, can compete successfully with the U.S.A. not only politically and economically, but also militarily and technologically. Secondly, to show developing nations in Asia and particularly those with Communist-influenced regimes that the Soviet Union is ready, willing, and able to come to their aid with modern and effective weapons.

This theme, unlike the one on the political and ideological shortcomings of Americans, is promulgated by testimony from the U.S. pilots rather than by direct statements of the unseen commentator. Each is asked if he knows how his plane was brought down, and each showed his technical knowledge of weapons by naming a specific type of enemy aircraft or type of rocket that he believed was involved. This U.S. expertise was further exploited by other questions that emphasized that the pilots knew the equipment involved was Soviet-made. In the battle, it was Soviet equipment in the hands of simple Vietnamese that triumphs over U.S. equipment and personnel.

EVALUATIVE COMMENTS

The six major propaganda themes just discussed were abstracted from a film where they are intertwined and submerged under the realism of a documentary-type production. Knowledge and forewarning about these themes can tend to destroy the seeming objectivity of the "documentary approach" of *Pilots in Pajamas* and can alert viewers to see the contrived nature of this television presentation. Many of these viewers and others who may read about the film, however, will still be perplexed at the seeming cooperation of U.S. pilots in such a propaganda effort that not only defames them personally but also the country they are sworn to defend.

Because this perplexity may lead some individuals to form hasty and derogatory conclusions about these pilots and U.S. servicemen in general, certain evaluative observations by the analytic team are in order. Some of these observations are admittedly speculative and must remain so until more information is available about the making of *Pilots in Pajamas*. Yet such observations may serve to bring about a suspension of judgment on the part of otherwise well-intentioned individuals who will inadvertently become victims of the propaganda effort if they form conclusions solely on the basis of what seems to be true at this time.

No hint is given by the producers about the selection of the particular pilots who were interviewed. Although they appear to be voluntary cooperators whose consciences, sense of guilt, or repentance caused them to consent to be interviewed, there is ample experience from similar prisoner interrogation in the past to support the suspicion that none had much, if any, choice in the matter. The producers attempt to avoid any impression of "brainwashing." This, in itself, suggests that less crass forms of psychological pressure may have been involved. One such pressure would be to dangle in front of isolated men the opportunity to

communicate with their families via a television interview to be conducted by an obviously non-North Vietnamese, Western interviewer.

While the eyes and ears of a TV viewer may verify that U.S. pilots submitted to interviews, they can only attest to what was an edited film and sound track. They cannot attest to what may have been said or done in the actual interviews but deleted by expert editing. For example, it was observed that some of the phrases were not in the idiom normally spoken by Americans when responding to the types of questions asked. The technique of substituting answers to questions other than those ostensibly asked is frequently used in film-making for both artistic and humorous effects. To believe one's eyes and ears in the case of a film that was edited by competent technicians of suspect political credentials, is a degree of credulity that is unwarranted in any educated person.

Answers by the pilots to questions about military equipment sound much more important and revealing than they actually are. The admissions about the MIGs, rockets, or AA fire that downed their planes is all ordinary, ex post facto information which the enemy already knew. Whatever intelligence interrogation these pilots may have had took place previously and was separate from any questioning shown in the film. The information of seeming military intelligence that was elicited in the film was for propaganda purposes and not intelligence. No assumption on whether these pilots gave intelligence information to the enemy is justified on the basis of this film.

The pilots are in situations for which they have not been adequately trained except for physical survival. Except for some oral instruction on the Code of Conduct, their training and practice have been in electromechanical systems, not social systems. They have been schooled to be operators of highly complex machines and to be leaders of men who have cultural values and ideals similar to their own. They have had little or no training in coping with the stratagems of a skilled dialectician who uses logic based upon assumptions with which they are unfamiliar, and in stressful situations where they are relatively powerless, and leadership rests with someone of a different political orientation. No Air Surgeon would authorize these pilots in their present debilitated physical condition to operate aircraft on which they have been highly trained. This same condition makes them even more incapable to perform mental skills for which they have had neither practical experience nor training.

Lastly, these pilots are not in a "Stalag 17" situation. They are not being detained in any organized prisoner of war camp where they might be able to draw some psychological support from being with other Americans and being permitted occasionally to exercise and communicate with other prisoners. Contrary to the few scenes of several Americans being together while reading, relaxing, and celebrating Christmas together, these pilots and other captive Americans are individually incarcerated, physically dispersed and isolated from each other, and kept incommunicado. Judgments about their behavior, therefore, cannot be based

upon the behavior of other Americans who have been captured in other wars where POWs may have been treated as harshly but differently. In this respect, the actual situation corresponds to the propaganda theme--captured U.S. military personnel are treated as criminals not as prisoners of war.

IMPLICATIONS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

The quick analysis that was possible of the film, *Pilots in Pajamas*, yields only a few tentative conclusions but many inferences for possible U.S. policy and actions.

Five conclusions were reached. All conclusions but the first one listed below should be regarded as tentative and subject to verification.

1. The film, as a vehicle of psychological warfare, is admirable. It is a carefully prepared and sophisticated propaganda production. It sets forth a pro-Soviet position without alienating viewers who may be generally sympathetic toward the United States.

2. The film's greatest propaganda impact probably will be upon groups affiliated with peace movements in the United States and Western countries and upon individuals who tend to believe that there is a "credibility gap" in the reporting of news about the war in Vietnam. Its impact probably will be somewhat less upon individuals in Eastern Europe because of their over-exposure and saturation by State-sponsored, political education through public communication media. How effective the film will be with viewers in non-Communist Asian and "neutral" countries, cannot be determined without additional analyses. There is some reason to believe that audiences in Asian countries would find some of the behavior of the Vietnamese "unbelievable."

3. U.S. military personnel in Vietnam, if they view the film, will be relatively unaffected except for anger at the treatment of their comrades and amusement at the portrayal of the North Vietnamese as humane and forgiving. The film probably will have an irritating effect on many present and former officers of the U.S. Armed Forces.

4. The weakest point in the film to Western audiences will be the emphasis placed on the fact that U.S. pilots violated their Code of Conduct by not using their revolvers against civilians to resist capture.

5. The strongest point to Western audiences probably will be the "documentation" that was edited into the film from U.S. news and television sources.

The film, its making and distribution by the German Democratic Republic, has a number of implications for the United States. Some of these implications are set forth below.

1. The film is evidence that "software" as well as "hardware" is being accepted by the Hanoi government from Soviet Bloc nations. The absence of any references to military assistance from Communist China should be noted.

2. None of the identified propaganda themes is entirely new. Their combination in the scenario for this major production, however, strongly suggests a formal coalescing of these themes into a "line" that may be expected to be repeated again and again by front-organizations and hence in the public communication media of both the United States and countries abroad.

3. Any negotiations for a political settlement in Vietnam, including the preliminary talks currently being held in Paris between representatives of the United States and the Hanoi governments, will involve the propaganda themes imbedded in *Pilots in Pajamas*. U.S. representatives should be prepared to cope with these themes.

4. It is possible that the film, in whole or in edited parts, will be offered to U.S. networks and individual television stations in what may appear to be as a straightforward commercial transaction. Similar offers may be expected to be made to TV outlets in Mexico and Cuba. The title of the film may be changed and the entrepreneurship may not be directly identified with East Germany.

5. The portrayal and inferred treatment of captured U.S. military personnel indicate that the Geneva Convention of 1949 is not considered germane by the Hanoi government which subscribed to this Convention in 1957. That there may be even a remote basis for this position, suggests that the United States should examine this Convention for ambiguities and, at the appropriate time, press for clarifying amendments.

6. The Code of Conduct is being used as a psychological weapon against the United States and its military personnel and is not the defensive weapon it was intended to be. Those provisions of this Code that define and limit the behavior of military personnel at times of capture and detention should be reexamined in light of the changing nature of warfare and recent medical and psychological research.

7. The legal justification for the treatment being given captured U.S. military personnel is attributed to actions by the United Nations. For purposes of the record, this attribution should be questioned appropriately by the United States in the United Nations and in other international organizations.

AUDIENCE ANALYSIS

Audience analysis also may be classified as quantitative or qualitative. Much of the output of standard intelligence analysis¹ can be used in the evaluation of audience attitudes, opinions, emotions, and behavior. For a thorough analysis of the audience of a PSYOP appeal, survey techniques may be highly appropriate. However, in dealing with international political communications, such techniques are frequently infeasible for political reasons.

The first two articles of this section describe the means utilized by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to assess the attitudes and perceptions of their audiences. Quantitative and qualitative techniques are employed.

Both types of analysis require certain capabilities on the part of the analyst. In this connection, the results of a study delineating some of the factors influencing the ability to estimate foreign populations' attitudes are described in an article by Alexander R. Askenasy.

The final selection of this part of Chapter IX is an example of the methodology employed to test hypotheses regarding the audience in communication theories applied to foreign audiences.

NOTES

¹ See Chapter VII of this casebook

AUDIENCE ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH— RADIO FREE EUROPE*

BY LORAND B. SZALAY

Effective international communication requires more than accurate translation. People and nations have their own language, interests, concerns, concepts, priorities, and values—their cultural frame of reference. This frame of reference is the critical factor in determining whether a communicator is listened to and accepted. RFE audience analysis attempts to derive information from large samples representing wide cross-sections of the population.

BACKGROUND

Radio Free Europe's audience research has developed as a direct

*Excerpts from "Annex to Audience Analysis and Public Opinion Research—Radio Free Europe," by Lorand B. Szalay, annex to "Radio Free Europe—A Survey and Analysis," by James R. Price, the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 22, 1972.

response to conditions and situational characteristics which are fairly exceptional in broadcasting. Three of these conditions appear to be especially significant.

a. The broadcasting is directed toward the people of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. These distant audiences are not readily accessible because of the strong social and political controls that block most of the common means of feedback: free reporting, public opinion surveys, free political elections. The people of these Central and Eastern European countries live under political systems which maintain a fairly close monopoly over all channels of mass and public communications operated on the basis of Communist ideology.

b. The people of these countries generally feel poorly informed; they express a deep interest in receiving information that is timely and unbiased. Thus, there are large, highly receptive audiences in Eastern Europe, and they are distinguished by certain characteristics which deserve interest.

c. In respect to their frames of reference, beliefs, and opinions, these audiences cannot simply be identified with the ideological blueprints of the governments or official media. Nor can they be treated as if the experiences of the last three decades did not have any influence. Although in many aspirations the people of Eastern Europe are similar to people in the free neighboring countries, they cannot simply be equated. For example, they cannot be compared with Austria, on which public opinion survey data and free election results are readily available.

Thus, Radio Free Europe has as its major audiences people that have specific information needs and whose audience reactions are not directly available to the radio station operating from abroad. This uncommon relationship between the station and its audience presents a situation which is delicate politically, complex and demanding from the angle of the communication task. This situation accounts for certain distinctive characteristics of Radio Free Europe in general and for the role assigned to the audience and public opinion research in particular.

Audience analysis at RFE passed through various stages during the past until recently it reached its present scope and orientation. In its present form the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department (APOR) produces extensive and timely information by interviews. These interviews are conducted on large samples of visitors ($N \geq 1,000$) representing Czech-Slovak, Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian audiences and also on sizable samples ($N \geq 800$) of Bulgarian audiences. The survey data contain generally three major categories of information: Listenership data, program evaluation, and attitude studies.

Comparable information is generally available to Western broadcasting from a variety of different sources. However, the RFE audience research performs an important pioneering service as the scope of the audience and public opinion research in these five Eastern European countries is modest and the publication of opinion results is selective. In the social and

political field, the validity of the officially released data is frequently questionable.

This explains why the relevance of the RFE research is substantive not only in connection with the immediate use of these data in program planning and evaluation but also in the broader context of introducing and applying social science research to this area. RFE research traces and evaluates social and political trends in the five Communist-controlled Eastern European countries in which objective public opinion research efforts are seriously hampered by political conditions. The resulting information gap on Eastern Europe is accentuated by a similar but still wider information gap—a nearly complete lack of solid social science research data on the Soviet society, on the Soviet citizen—his attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and world outlook.¹

Against this background RFE audience analysis attempts to derive solid, objective information from large audience samples, which represent wide cross-sections of the populations. Based on information and observations personally accumulated in Munich and in Vienna, a few general conclusions may be formulated. To keep the report short, the actual procedures, designs, the technical and professional details, situational problems, and limitations are elaborated in separate appendices.

THE INTERVIEW

In its present form audience analysis conducted by RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research Division is a most significant undertaking. It represents a large-scale research effort to apply public opinion survey methods in real life situations, which requires a careful adjustment of technical-scientific criteria to given social, political, and psychological conditions. After decades of nearly complete information blackout of valid empirical survey data, at the present level of operation nearly 7,000 Eastern European nationals are interviewed every year. Each national sample (with the exception of Bulgaria) includes over 1,000 cases. The interviews are conducted in various large European cities—Vienna, London, Paris—where Eastern Europeans travel as tourists, visitors, businessmen, or sportsmen.

The fieldwork of interviewing is contracted out by Radio Free Europe to independent national public opinion and market research organizations, which employ interviewers who speak the respective languages. The rules and quotas, as well as the guidelines for the interviewers, are specified by RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research Department. Radio Free Europe also provides the questionnaire used by the interviewer in the process of the interview. The use of independent local organizations is an especially sound decision on more than one account. First, it makes the outcome of interviews and the research results independent of RFE, which is especially desirable because the results tell a great deal about RFE, its popularity, its impact, and its effectiveness.

Assigning this task to local public opinion research organizations is also

important in that it makes it clear that the research involves open public opinion surveys of the type widely used in all democratic, open societies and therefore has nothing to do with clandestine intelligence work—an accusation frequently voiced by the Communist authorities.

Finally, working independently in different locations and using more than one interviewing organization give ample opportunities for internal control, for testing the internal consistency of the results.

The actual interviewing procedure is described in Appendix 1. This description elaborates on a few technical questions such as the procedure for contacting visitors, their cooperativeness, the frequency with which interviews are refused, and other details which were considered important from the viewpoint of effectiveness of the method and the quality of the results.

REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE SAMPLES

The quality and information value of public opinion surveys are inseparable from the question of how generalizable are the results and how representative are the samples interviewed. This question of generalizability and representativeness acquires special importance in a situation where the parent population—the audiences at home—cannot be directly surveyed and inferences must be based on subpopulations such as the samples of travelers.

As elaborated in Appendix 2 in more detail, RFE's use of large samples, numerous independent subsamples, and its attempts to reach visitors randomly to reduce the biases of selectivity are all sound measures which help to fight the odds of a complex research task.

The designers of the survey work are unquestionably correct in asserting that developments in Eastern Europe during the last decade have produced certain welcome changes, such as extensive travel to the West and reduced anxiety about expressing personal opinions. The RFE Audience and Public Opinion Research Department is prompt and effective in the use of these changes for better obtaining research of higher quality and generalizable results. Although the optimism and confidence in the representativeness of the samples may not be readily proven merely by the adapted design or research method and some of the statistical assumptions may be questioned, a considerable body of empirical evidence suggests that this confidence in the samples is not unfounded. The research findings show that the samples include not only people from all walks of life but also from a broad and varied spectrum of political opinions (Appendix 2).

SCOPE AND UTILIZATION OF AUDIENCE INFORMATION OBTAINED

The information obtained by the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department covers a wide variety of topics and may be conveniently subdivided into three major problem areas:

1. *Listenership data.* This covers such technical information as listening habits, preferred listening times, wave length, receptivity, and jamming. The data are collected with regard to the technical planning and scheduling of broadcastings.

2. *Program evaluation.* This portion of the survey aims to determine the popularity and use of existing programs. It involves assessing what is liked, what is not liked, why, and what people would like to have more of. These and similar questions produce feedback necessary for timely, audience-oriented programming, which is the aim of every broadcast.

3. *Attitude research and special studies.* These studies deal with diverse socially and politically relevant attitudes, opinions, and images. They constitute fairly extensive survey work focusing on important parameters of public opinions relevant to programming and broadcasting.

The main process of data collection involves the administration of the basic questionnaire which includes questions related to all three problem areas. Each year it is administered to new samples. The questionnaire is also updated yearly: some questions are kept to allow for comparability over time and others are replaced by new ones to reflect more timely concerns.

In addition to these basic questionnaires, some special questionnaires are used to cover unanticipated timely events such as Prague in the spring of 1968 and the Polish uprisings in 1970. Some additional "special studies" are occasionally conducted in order to provide timely audience information: for example, the Eastern European interpretation of some key concepts (socialism, capitalism) using new research techniques such as the Semantic Differential.

The use of audience analysis data within Radio Free Europe is institutionally organized. The various country desks show a general and fairly uniform appreciation of the value of the listenership data. The program evaluation results are received occasionally with mixed feelings. This can be explained by the fact that when evaluation indicates a decline in program popularity, the feedback, while useful and necessary, is not flattering. The attitude data and special studies information is of more recent origin and up to now has been used on a more sporadic basis. I feel this area deserves more special attention (Appendix 3).

Generally, the relationship of the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department and the Country Broadcasting Departments cannot be entirely free from the common problems which naturally arise in those instances when people with different professional frames of reference must work out common solutions. The quantitatively oriented social scientist and the talented country expert charged with heavy responsibilities of daily output of high quality are naturally predisposed to look at the same problem from different angles. In the case of Radio Free Europe, however, there are clear signs of mutual appreciation and recognition of the complementary nature and shared interests of these two roles (Appendix 3).

The scope and results of audience research with its nearly 400 publications are broad and varied, and their discussion would go beyond the scope of the present report. However, some data on the role and image of Radio Free Europe may be of interest at this time of conflicting opinions, when the reactions of Eastern Europeans deserve special attention.

AUDIENCE DATA ON THE ROLE AND IMAGE OF RADIO FREE EUROPE

There are numerous categories of audience data which are informative on the role of Radio Free Europe. Perhaps the most significant are those data which estimate the size of its [listenership]. According to earlier (1967) and more recent findings (1971), about 50% of the populations listen to Radio Free Europe. The figures are somewhat higher for Poles and Rumanians and lower for Hungarians and more recently, for Czechs. In all the Eastern European countries Radio Free Europe was found to be the most listened-to foreign station, preceded only by the local national station. Although these local stations—Radio Budapest for Hungarians, Radio Prague for Czechs—generally show the highest number of listeners, the importance of Radio Free Europe is frequently rated higher than the domestic station in particular contexts, especially on foreign news (Poland, 1971; CSR, 1971).

A trend analysis (#221, #304)* has found a slowly but generally increasing listenership for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. This trend is occasionally interrupted, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, by strict measures of control and heavy jamming in the post-invasion period (#304), but in the long range they usually prevail. While the figures on listening are high, the additional percentage of those who receive RFE news indirectly by word of mouth is hard to estimate. The censorship of news media and the desire to receive reliable information produce a favorable climate for spreading information by word of mouth. The importance of these private channels in controlled societies has been emphasized by numerous accounts.²

Although Radio Free Europe is right below the domestic station on the level of listening, in respect to such characteristics as reliability, truth value, and timeliness of information, Radio Free Europe is consistently in first place (#292, #292a, #182, #168, #177).

In contrast to the image of domestic broadcasting, which is generally criticized for suppression and distortion of information and described as "biased," "cold," and "obscure," Radio Free Europe is described primarily as "interesting," "skillful," "pleasant," "wide," and "quick" (#283, #284, #287, #288).

This emphasis on reliability and information value is consistent with the main task or function that Eastern European audiences assign to Radio Free Europe. To the question, "What do you consider the most

*See Appendix 5, for listing of RFE publications used.

important tasks of Radio Free Europe?" the most frequently chosen functions were "to inform about events," "to explain. . .," and "to entertain." The ambiguous function of "encouragement," which could simply mean to have faith that the situation will improve, or with more forcefulness might be interpreted to mean encouragement to revolt, figures only as a low choice of 10%. The most frequently given reasons for liking Radio Free Europe by Czech, Hungarian, and Polish listeners were that the programs were "interesting" and "informative" and that it provided information otherwise not available.

* * * * *

APPENDIX 1. THE INTERVIEW

The experience of being questioned by an independent research organization as a part of a public opinion survey is generally an uncommon, novel experience for Eastern Europeans. Questioning about attitudes and opinions related to official, governmental interests, which might have undesirable personal consequences, may be a more commonly shared expectation. Furthermore, Communist authorities are heavily engaged in campaigns to discredit Western public opinion research in general and the polls conducted by Radio Free Europe in particular.

There are numerous indications that during recent years the adverse effects of this preconditioning have considerably decreased, that Eastern Europeans are less hampered by fear, and that they talk more freely. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to entirely dismiss the potential impact of unfamiliarity, anxiety, and various misconceptions of the interview, which could produce biased results.

In respect to the objectivity and information value of the results of RFE audience research interviews, the following steps appeared to be especially critical:

- a. Selection of the interviewee
- b. Contacting the interviewee; his cooperativeness
- c. Interview procedure

To examine the procedure, I questioned about a dozen INTORA (Vienna) interviewers about their work and experiences. I also had the opportunity to observe interviews in progress and to talk with the people interviewed. Based on these various impressions, I have come to the following general conclusions:

a. Selection of the Interviewee

Ideally, the interviewer would interview every traveller he happens to meet on an entirely random basis. These people, by their characteristics as a subsample, would approximate the parent populations (nontravellers in the country). There is naturally a discrepancy between the composition of the samples and the parent populations. In actuality, we know that the samples are not entirely representative, that the more educated strata are over-represented, that peasants are generally underrepresented, and so on.

To help correct his discrepancy, quotas are calculated. The director of INTORA explained that two complementary measures have been developed. One is based on previous experiences with the interviewers, which give an idea about their characteristic preferences, what type of people they are predisposed to contact. Taking these predispositions into consideration, INTORA selects interviewers whose predispositions largely balance each other.

As a second measure INTORA issues guidelines on which category of traveller to focus on—young, less educated, etc. The combination of these two measures was described as generally effective in obtaining sizable, fairly proportionate representation for the expected quotas. As a means of reducing the discrepancy between the composition of the samples interviewed and the parent population, weighting scores are calculated, based on the relationship of the actual proportions of people interviewed and the desirable quota calculated on the basis of the national sample.

A second source of discrepancy may be the result of a more or less conscientious avoidance of the unpleasant experiences of rejection. Especially the more experienced interviewers may be suspected of having developed a certain sense for detecting those who may be cooperative and those who may not. For instance, they may have learned to avoid hardcore party members, secret police, and the like. There are no safe controls against this type of bias. Nonetheless, the breakdown of the samples by occupation and party affiliation suggest that the effects of this selectivity are probably not too serious or that they may be partially cancelled out by conflicting trends (for example, the above average participation of party favorites in foreign travel).

b. Contact and Rejection Rate

Contacting the prospective interviewee is naturally an important and delicate step since Eastern Europeans are not used to polls and have developed considerable suspicions. The adverse effects of these understandable reservations are apparently reduced by the fact that the interviewers are compatriots of the travellers who speak the same language. The interviewers also understand that they must first establish a rapport on the basis of neutral topics (finding places, articles, shopping). Next the interviewer explains his survey and asks for cooperation.

As was stated by both the interviewers and INTORA, the average rate of refusal is about 20%. This rate differs from nation to nation as well as over time. Presently, the rate of refusal is the highest from Czechs and Slovaks (about 35%) while Rumanians were characterized as the most readily communicative (15%). The 20–25% refusal rate is surprisingly low and requires repeated verification.

To maintain control over the work of the interviewers, the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department has set the condition that the interviewers are obliged to call in by phone in 80% of the time. They must state that they have an interview in progress and give the location and a

brief description of the interviewee. These calls are then used for local spot checks.

c. The Interview Procedure

Once he has received an affirmative answer in respect to the interviewee's readiness to cooperate, the interviewer takes the questionnaire and poses one question after another. The interviewer reads from the questionnaire and notes the answers or places the checkmarks in the case of multiple choice items. The interviewee is fully aware that his responses are being registered. Although this procedure could arouse some fears, the fear may be counteracted by certain other factors. Namely, the interviewee recognizes that the nature of this inquiry is schematic and mechanical, and the questions do not convey the idea of searching for personal or confidential information. Furthermore, he has been previously assured that his identity will not be retained and that the evaluation of the information will be group-oriented and statistical.

The questions belong to three major categories: (a) attitudes and opinions on timely social, and political topics, (b) information on listening and program preferences, and (c) data on the respondent's sociodemographic background. Part b, is administered only to respondents who have stated previously that they regularly listen to Radio Free Europe. The administration of the questionnaire requires on the average 40-60 minutes.

The interviewers have stated the interviewees generally have no problem in understanding or answering the questions. Occasionally, they ask for clarification on the use of certain terms such as "socialist party" and express the desire to offer more qualified answers than the forced choice alternatives provide for. There is a general tendency to tell more and elaborate on details beyond the scope of the questionnaire.

The interviewees are not paid for the interview but it is a common practice for the interviewer to offer coffee or beer to the interviewee if the questionnaire is administered in a coffeehouse or restaurant. The interviewers state that the interviewees generally desire to talk and like to have their opinions asked.

The interviewers I met were mostly men; there were only two women in a group of twelve. Both male and female interviewers appeared well qualified and interested in the work. They usually have other full-time occupations and do the interviewing only on part-time basis. They receive about a \$5.00 equivalent in Austrian schillings (135) for each questionnaire.

Since a large portion of the questionnaire deals with RFE performance, the claim that neither the interviewers nor the interviewee know about the source of interest is somewhat doubtful. It is true only in the sense that they are not told this explicitly. The official explanation states that radio stations involved in broadcasting toward their country are being evaluated.

APPENDIX 2. THE SAMPLES

To derive up-to-date information on audience characteristics such as listening habits, program preferences, and attitudes of the people in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, travelers (visitors, tourists) arriving in Western European capitals are interviewed.

The institutes listed below are being used to conduct the field work. Not all of them will always work with all five national samples as there may be only a few travelers of a certain nationality in a certain area.

INTORA Opinion Research Institute	Vienna, Austria
A.I.M. Market Research Institute	Copenhagen, Denmark
A.I.M. Market Research Institute	Stockholm, Sweden
William Schlackman Psychological Research	London, England
Sales Research Services	London, England
SOFRES Opinion Research Institute	Paris, France
COFREMCA Opinion Research Institute	Paris, France
Vandoros	Athens, Greece

Since the native populations of these countries cannot be reached by Western surveys, the interviewing of visitors to the West from these otherwise inaccessible populations appears to be the best alternative for obtaining useful, generalizable information. Since the early 1960s travel restrictions have been considerably reduced and now several hundred thousand Eastern Europeans travel to the West every year. While the size of the travelling groups is unquestionably large enough to warrant sampling on a sufficiently broad foundation, the composition of the samples presents a more complex problem.

The ideal objective would be to use samples that precisely match the composition of home audiences in the respective Eastern European countries. However, a more realistic expectation is to approximate the composition of parent populations within acceptable limits, and there are indications that a fairly good approximation is reached. Before elaborating on these data, we should discuss the extent to which we can expect the samples of visitors to be representative of the parent population. Even if they closely approximate each other in the distribution of certain demographic variables (age, sex), this is not necessarily an indication that the visitor sample does not deviate from the parent population on some other parameters—political beliefs, level of politicization, conformity, extroversion. If it does deviate, then this deviation in turn may show significant correlation with attitudes and opinions expressed in the interview. To mention only a single example, let us take mobility. Mobility, the motivation and interest in travel, is not the same for those who travel and those who do not. To what extent mobility, on which travelers and non-travelers differ, actually interferes with the distribution of responses

is in no way clear. If we assume that this mobility correlates with the level of interest in the external world, in international affairs, then it could produce biased results as a factor of selectivity. If this selectivity is assumed to be more political in nature, then its effects on politically oriented questions are likely to be negligible.

Since we cannot clearly identify those factors which actually differentiate those who travel from those who do not, demographic quotas (educational, occupational) provided for sampling may not solve the problem.

Nor is this problem resolved by the method of "independent sampling." The rationale of interviewing independent samples of travelers in various European capitals is undoubtedly sound, and it provides a solid basis for testing the internal consistency of the results. Nonetheless, if there is a selectivity factor which differentiates travelers from non-travelers, the effects of this factor cannot be eliminated by this sampling procedure because in this sense the samples are not independent.

Nonetheless, there are research findings which suggest that the samples have a broad and varied composition which includes not only sizable groups of the main social and educational strata but also sizable percentages of people with diverse political orientations. Table 1 shows the composition of samples on the basis of occupation.

TABLE 1
THE COMPOSITION OF THE 1970 SAMPLE BY OCCUPATION

	Czechoslovakia RFE Sample q	Population q	Hungary RFE Sample q	Population q	Poland RFE Sample q	Population q
White Collar Workers	23	29.8	23	27.8	26	27.0
Technocrats	16		12		10	
Professionals	6		6		6	
Artists, Writers	4		4		1	
Students	7		4		12	
Workers	31	59.7	27	46.1	26	42.0
Full-time Housewives	6		9		10	
Shopkeepers	-		4		3	
Others	2		2		2	
Farmers	5	10.5	9	26.1	4	31.0
	N=1499		N=1525		N=1316	

The disparity in categorization complicates direct comparisons. As an RFE publication on the "Occupational Background of the East European Populations" observes:

The statistical yearbooks, published under strictest regime supervision, tend to cover this area in summary fashion and, often, even this summary information is incomplete, or contradictory. Furthermore, employment figures are frequently presented for entire sectors of production (e.g., "transport" or "wood processing

industry") but these figures include everybody from the enterprise managers and chief engineers to unskilled messengers inside the plant and cleaning personnel.

Another problem relates to the semantic ambiguity of certain categories, a confusion probably resulting from both practical and ideological differences. In a Socialist country everybody is a worker by definition. Nonetheless, as a second meaning, worker is frequently used in reference to "manual worker" as in the dichotomy of "workers" and "intelligentsia." In the summary statistics shown above, worker is used apparently in this second sense and the white collar category is largely coterminous with intelligentsia. Where the division line is drawn is impossible to tell.

The demarcation between workers and farmers is perhaps even more ambiguous. Agricultural workers—for example, peasants working on state farms—are frequently categorized as "workers" while peasants doing practically the same work on private or partially collectivized land are identified as farmers.

The "Population" columns of the above table rely on official statistics. The data on CSR came from the statistical yearbook (1970), which contained a table on "the Social Structure of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." The Hungarian data are based on a publication of the Bureau of Statistics in a volume entitled "Employment and Income Ratios" (1969 data), which shows the breakdown of the "vocationally active population" (4.46 million).

On Poland RFE has used the information provided by the State Telegraphic Agency (PAP) dated September 29, 1969—as the Statistical Yearbook did not provide this information. Discounting the apparent disparities between the social-occupational categories, the white collar stratum is somewhat overrepresented and the agricultural population underrepresented in the RFE sample.

The comparison between the RFE sample and the parent population is easier in terms of such demographic variables as sex, age, and education, as shown in Table 2. Again, as a general trend, males, middle-aged people, and the more educated strata are somewhat overrepresented in the RFE sample.

TABLE 2
COMPOSITION OF THE 1970 SAMPLE BY SEX, AGE, AND EDUCATION

	Czechoslovakia RFE Sample %	Population %	Hungary RFE Sample %	Population %	Poland RFE Sample %	Population %
Sex						
Male	59	49	50	42	57.5	50
Female	41	51	50	52	42.5	50
Age						
Up to 25 years	21	22	18	20	27.0	25
26-35 years	28	16	22	18	29.9	19
36-50 years	31	25	29	25	26.3	27
over 50 years	20	37	31	37	16.8	29

TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

	Czechoslovakia RFE Sample %	Popula- tion %	Hungary RFE Sample %	Popula- tion %	Poland RFE Sample %	Popula- tion %
<i>Education</i>						
Elementary	37	66.5	42	70	31.7	70
Secondary	47	27.0	43	25	46.3	25
University	16	6.5	15	5	22.0	5

Finally, the following Table 3 shows the political orientation of the interviewed samples by expressed political party preference.

TABLE 3
PARTY PREFERENCES IN A HYPOTHETICAL ELECTION-PARTY ALLEGIANCE
BY PERCENTAGES (1970)

	CSR	Hungary	Poland	Romania
Communist Party	3	5	3	11
Democratic Socialist Party	41	40	35	37
Christian Democratic Party	26	27	36	23
Peasant Party	6	13	6	8
National Conservative Party	7	2	5	13
Other and no answer	17	13	15	8

APPENDIX 3. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT GEARED TO THE AUDIENCE'S FRAME OF REFERENCE

The modern discipline of intercultural communication is based on the realization that effective communication between various people and nations requires more than accurate translation. People and nations not only speak their own language but they have also their own characteristic concerns, priorities, concepts, and values—their cultural frames of reference. This frame of reference is really the critical factor determining whether a communication is listened to, whether it is accepted or rejected, much more so than the language that is the pronunciation of a name or the grammaticalness of a sentence.

As Edward Hall elaborated on this topic at a recent hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee,* effective communication requires more than learning the foreign language; it requires knowledge of the foreign culture. This observation has far-reaching implications for broadcasting to foreign nations. It is obviously not enough to translate programs originally designed for U.S. audiences into the language of a particular foreign audience. Such a translation may be understood word

*Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy (U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1969).

by word and sentence by sentence, but this does not mean that it will be grasped in its full meaning or that it will relate to the experiences and interests of the local audiences.

Adjusting programs to the interests of a particular foreign audience constitutes an especially demanding task for which Radio Free Europe, with its national desks, programs, and first class staff recruited from the literary and intellectual elites of the respective countries, has developed outstanding potential.

The institutional policy of Radio Free Europe not only allows for individual country-oriented, independent program development but actually demands it. This unique feature, which is supported by a corresponding organizational structure, differentiates Radio Free Europe from all other known broadcasting stations aiming at foreign audiences. It is probably the main factor responsible for the strong identification Eastern Europeans—Czechs, Hungarians, Poles—develop with the station and is also primarily responsible for its wide popularity.

The audience research has an important role in this performance, even if this role may presently be more potential than actual. In this role the following contributions require special recognition.

First of all, the audience research provides the only empirical evidence which is broadly based and convincing enough to demonstrate that Eastern European audiences do have highly specific audience characteristics—concerns, interests, concepts, images—which differentiate them from other audiences and thus require full recognition and selective communications. For any interested citizen these findings should speak clearly enough to show the necessity of differentiated treatment of selective, audience-adjusted broadcasting.

Secondly, the audience research of Radio Free Europe is an important instrument, which enables the members of the national broadcasting staffs to keep up to date, to preserve the impression of timeliness, and to keep apace with the changes. Whether the staff members are new or old emigrants, they are in danger of getting more and more detached and losing contact with recent changes in the home audiences. Concerns and priorities change, new slogans and concepts develop (e.g., new economic mechanisms), and new social phenomena emerge (hippies). To keep apace with the changes and to update their approach, the broadcasters, script writers, and commentators can safely rely on the findings of audience analysis. To take full advantage of its potential, it is important that audience analysis be treated not as a threatening authority exerting criticism but as an important source of authentic information which can help to adjust to the latest changes and provide a basis for timely decisions not by speculations and arbitrariness but by empirical evidence.

Finally and most importantly, RFE audience analysis has the organizational, material, and personnel resources to provide up-to-date audience information and feedback on approximately 120 million Eastern Europeans—a knowledge presently not available from any other source.

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APPENDIX 5. RADIO FREE EUROPE PUBLICATIONS USED

318	The Major Information Sources of Polish Respondents on Important Foreign and Domestic Issues	October 1971
315	The Major Information Sources of Hungarian Respondents on Important Foreign and Domestic Issues	September 1971
314	An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Czechoslovak Programs	September 1971
313	An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Rumanian Program	September 1971
312	An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Polish Programs	August 1971
311	An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Hungarian Programs	August 1971
309	Party Preference Trends in Hypothetical Free Elections in East Europe	July 1971
305	Listening to Western Radio in Bulgaria Before and after the "Polish Events" (April 1970-March 1971)	May 1971
304	Audience Trends in Czechoslovakia (1967-1970)	May 1971
303	Rumanian Listening Patterns Before and After the "Polish Events" (April 1970-March 1971)	May 1971
301	Listening to Western Radio in <i>Hungary</i> Before and After the "Polish Events" (May 1970-March 1971)	April 1971
300	Listening to Western Radio in <i>Poland</i> Before and After the "December Events" (May 1970-March 1971)	April 1971
292	The Reliability of Radio Free Europe	December 1970
288	The Images of Radio Free Europe and Radio Bucharest Among Rumanian Respondents	November 1970
287	The Images of Radio Free Europe and Radio Budapest Among Hungarians	November 1970
284	The Image of Radio Free Europe and of the Domestic Station Among Poles	October 1970
283	The Image Among Czechs and Slovaks of Radio Free Europe and the Domestic Radio Stations	October 1970
280	Identifying with Radio Free Europe	August 1970
270	Rumanian Listening Patterns May 1969-March 1970	May 1970
269	Listening to Western Radio in Poland-1969	May 1970

263	Listening to Western Radio Stations in Hungary in 1969	February 1970
259	Listening to RFE in Czechoslovakia in 1969 (A Preliminary Report)	December 1969
256	Attitudes Toward Key Political Concepts in East Europe (An Exercise in the Measurement of Meaning) BOUND STUDY	December 1969
245	Listening to Western Radio in East Europe (Joint s.) BOUND STUDY	July 1969
239	Listening to RFE Programs in Czechoslovakia Before and After August 21st	April 1969
238	Listening to Western Radio in Hungary in 1968	April 1969
237	Listening to Western Radio in Poland-1968	April 1969
235	Audience Mail in 1968	March 1969
234	Rumanian Listening Patterns 1968/69	March 1969
230	Listening to Western Broadcasts in Czechoslovakia Before and After the Invasion	January 1969
223	The Program Preferences of RFE's Hungarian Listeners (A Technical Report)	December 1968
222	Listening to Western Radio in Hungary 1967/1968	November 1968
221	Radio Free Europe's Listenership Trends 1962-1968	October 1968
219	Listening to Western Radio in Poland	October 1968
218	RFE's Audience in Czechoslovakia After the Invasion (A Preliminary Report) (Strictly Confidential)	October 1968
206	RFE's Audience in Czechoslovakia (1963-1968)	April 1968
204	Rumanian Listening Patterns 1967	March 1968
186	Listening to Western Radio in Bulgaria	September 1967
185	The Image of RFE in Bulgaria	September 1967
181	The Image of RFE in Poland	August 1967
177	The Image of RFE in Hungary	July 1967
175	Listening to Western Radio in Hungary, 1966/1967	July 1967
174	Listening to Western Radio in Poland	July 1967
168	The Image of RFE in Czechoslovakia	February 1967
164	Listening to Western Radio Stations in Czechoslovakia	February 1967
157	Hungarian Listening Patterns, 1965/1966	August 1966
156	Bulgarian Listening Patterns, 1964/1966	August 1966
151	Listening to Western Stations in Czechoslovakia III	June 1966
133	Listening to Western Radio in Poland	December 1965

132	Rumanian Listening Patterns III	December 1965
122	Hungarian Listening Patterns 1964-1965	August 1965
118	The Audience of Western Broadcasters to Czechoslovakia-II	March 1965
116	Radio Listening Patterns and Program Preferences of Polish Listeners to RFE (With Special Reference to Certain Age and Occupation Factors)	January 1965
115	Hungarian Attitudes Toward Other Nations	December 1964
107	Radio Listening Patterns and Program Preferences of Polish Listeners to RFE	August 1964
104	Hungarian Listening Patterns Prior to the Cessation of Jamming	April 1964
92	Agitation or Information? East Europeans Mistrust Their Mass Media (An Illustrative Report)	August 1963

NOTES

¹ Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

² Inkeles and Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*; Klaus Mehnert, *Der Sowjetmensch* (Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1958), pp. 13-14.

AUDIENCE ANALYSIS AT RADIO LIBERTY*

BY LORAND B. SZALAY

Despite similarities between RL and RFE audiences, there are differences. The Soviet audiences pose special requirements which RL must meet to provide effective audience-adjusted broadcasting. Audience analysis, in such a situation, becomes a most elementary and vital requirement.

* * * * *

SITUATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, INSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHIES

In its background and objectives, Radio Liberty shows some distinct similarities with Radio Free Europe. The similarities are especially important in respect to audience analysis.

First of all, there is no direct physical access to the audiences toward which the station is primarily oriented, and there is little public opinion and feedback information on these main audiences. Moreover, the stations operate in a highly sensitive psychological and political atmosphere. Although little is actually known about the opinions and attitudes¹ of these distant audiences, there are indications that during the last decades

*Excerpts from "Audience Analysis at Radio Liberty," *Congressional Record*—Senate, Vol. 118, No. 33, Washington D C., Government Printing Office (March 6, 1972), pp. S 3426-S 3428.

they have developed some characteristics which distinguish them from comparable Western audiences.

Despite the similarities between RL and RFE audiences, there are also some characteristic differences. The differences may have emerged as a function of the longer history of the Soviet Communism and the inbred nature of the Soviet system as compared to the largely imported nature of Eastern European Communist systems. The differences may also have resulted from the greater isolation of the Soviet population compared to the physically, geographically, and psychologically more exposed populations of the Eastern European border states.

For the Soviet audiences there also appears to be a stronger association between nationalism and loyalty to the political system. There are indications that external criticism of the system may be more readily resented on primarily nationalistic grounds. There is a type of national pride in the Soviet world power status, space achievements, and sport successes which is effectively exploited by the political system for denouncing criticism and political opposition as "unpatriotic." The Eastern Europeans, however, do not take pride in Communism as a type of national achievement; rather it is generally viewed as a foreign imposition of Russian colonialism.

It is not only the combination of strong national feelings with ideological elements which complicates the situation; a combination of nationalism and white Russian centralism also produces a hard-to-predict attitudinal mixture, which challenges minority nationalisms that work toward independence and separatism.

All these factors and more contribute to making an especially complex communication task involving audiences with uncommon, occasionally highly ambivalent, feelings and philosophies. Thus, the Soviet audiences pose special requirements which Radio Liberty must meet in order to provide effective, audience-adjusted broadcasting. In such a situation audience analysis becomes a most elementary and vital requirement.

At the same time, as a competent RL representative has expressed, no one in the West seems to have a very clear idea about the actual attitudes and beliefs of the broad Soviet citizenry.² Under these conditions the proper selection and planning of broadcasting, which is large in volume and can rely on little first-hand audience feedback, becomes an immense task.

The situational factors hampering audience analysis are overwhelming. Compared to the Eastern European development, they show only slow and minor improvements. The Soviet attitude of hostility has not mellowed, jamming is in full effect, and the number of travelers (RFE's major information source) has not shown a dramatic increase. Moreover, the campaign of denouncing Radio Liberty and discouraging cooperation with Radio Liberty has recently been further intensified.

Listenership data are naturally very difficult to obtain in a closed society. In view of the Soviet system and the lack of surveys conducted on

samples which would allow broad generalizations, it is impossible to give an empirically founded estimate on the actual proportions of the listenership. Nor is it possible to plot trends in the level of listening over time as Radio Free Europe has been doing for the last decade. Only a few general statements can be made which suggest that Radio Liberty is widely known and listened to.

In a closed society where listening to a foreign station is an officially proscribed activity, statements on listening or nonlistening cannot be accepted without reservation. The impact of the station, however, goes beyond the direct listeners; it also involves those who receive the information by word of mouth. These percentages may run high but are especially hard to estimate. In an open society the proportions of listenership may directly express the popularity of particular stations. In a society of controlled public media, however, where there is an intensive awareness of news censorship, the numerical data on the direct listeners is not sufficient to give a realistic idea of the importance of a station.

Under these conditions Radio Liberty does not feel that the situation is "thawed" to the point that they can provide public opinion research comparable to Radio Free Europe's. At the present time it is considered impossible to conduct open interviews on large visitor samples which could approximate in composition the home audiences. Whether this position is a legitimate one or merely an attitude based on past experiences is a debatable question which will be discussed later.

Nonetheless, Radio Liberty now holds the position that audience analysis, at least for the time being, cannot be conducted on the principles of open public opinion research. It cannot use open, large-scale surveys, first of all, because by doing this Radio Liberty would expose its sources, who as Soviet citizens would be subject to political persecution. Furthermore, Radio Liberty feels that a detailed elaboration of the present procedures is undesirable at least in terms of specifics, which could be exploited and frustrate future efforts of data collection.

Discussed in more general terms, Radio Liberty's audience analysis consists of three types of activities:

- a. Documentation of mail and press reactions.
- b. Panel evaluation of programs.
- c. Reports on interviews with Soviet travelers.

DOCUMENTATION OF MAIL AND PRESS REACTIONS

Especially in the past this category of audience reactions to RL broadcasts has represented a major information source. While the content of the audience mail reveals public sentiments, the flow of this information depends a great deal on the fluctuating level of censorship and suppression of private mail traffic.

The content of this mail is conveyed by RL excerpts. This method is simple and commonsensical but provides little basis for broader generalizations and is not very convincing to the more skeptical. The central

themes of these letters are: complaints about the suppression and distortion of news by the Soviet media, manifestations of desires to be adequately informed about the world, and compliments to Radio Liberty for its interesting and informative broadcasting.

While this content shows little change over time, the flow of these letters has shown a decrease in volume during recent months. Although it might merely be taken as a sign of loss of interest, this simple interpretation would ignore certain facts. Recently the foreign mail has undergone stricter censorship and strong anti-Radio Liberty campaigns have been launched. That the Soviet government has taken an increased interest in Radio Liberty is shown by the . . . yearly breakdown of the volume of media used in attacking Radio Liberty.

PANEL EVALUATION OF RL PROGRAMS

As a partial substitute for first-hand audience feedback, Radio Liberty has developed a panel approach for program evaluation. A fairly sizable panel is formed of recent emigrants, travelers, and Soviet experts. The members of these panels receive samples of the new program items, and they are asked to evaluate them in terms of the effects they might have on Soviet audiences. To facilitate and systematize this evaluation, a variety of specific questions are asked: How interesting is its content? How effective will it be? How is the form of presentation, language, style? Is the program sufficiently supported by facts and data? Should the program be repeatedly used? Does the program appeal to the whole listenership? to the creative intelligentsia? to the scientific-technical intelligentsia? to journalists? to party and ideological leadership? to military, youth, workers, rural populations? The members of the panel evaluate each submitted program element in the above terms. Then the evaluations produced by individual members are summarized and the conclusions are formulated.

Considering the situational constraints, the above panel procedure appears to provide an economical solution. The panel's effectiveness, of course, depends a great deal on the authenticity of its members in their representation of the contemporary Soviet audiences—their concerns, attitudes, language, style, taste, etc.

REPORTS ON INTERVIEWS

To differentiate this method from the RFE's public opinion questions, which are contained in a questionnaire administered in a uniform, schematic procedure called an "interview," Radio Liberty refers to its approach as "conversations." These are also fundamentally interviews, but they differ from RFE's surveys in that they are not organized on the same lines as Western surveys. They try to adapt to each individual informant and tap his personal knowledge and opinions in the framework of one or more conversations. The interviewer is not bound by prepared questions but has a checklist of possible topics. These involve general

listening, foreign radio listening, general accounts of audience reactions, attitudes, opinions, etc. The conversation can be of any length, extend over numerous meetings, and can discuss audience characteristics at any depth. This procedure does not follow the rationale of Western opinion surveys, which attempt to work with representative samples by using a standard, pretested set of uniform questions. Accordingly, RL's evaluation is fundamentally descriptive.

The number of persons interviewed reaches several hundred yearly. Thus, the size of the group is large enough to warrant broader generalizations. The specific composition of these samples, however, represents the more thorny problem.

Radio Liberty's position, as it stands now, is that in order to protect informants, it would be "irresponsible" to place the interview in the public spotlight. As a "Note" by Radio Liberty on this subject states:

The difficulties encountered in conducting survey research work among Soviet citizens are all those obstacles which a totalitarian regime can systematically impose, the most important of which is the denial of free and ready access to interviewees, both within and without the territorial confines of the USSR. Internally, the Soviet Union is a closed society and systematic interviewing of a representative sample of the population is impossible for obvious reasons. This limits Audience Research essentially to interviewing Soviet travelers abroad. Here also free access is denied, however. Travelers abroad are generally briefed to be wary of foreigners or Soviet emigres who attempt to engage them in conversation on substantive issues. Surveillance of Soviet travelers, while not total, is also a common practice. Additionally, fear plays an important role. Radio Liberty and other foreign radios are regularly and systematically attacked by Soviet media in the most inflammatory terms. The virulent hostility of the Soviet regime to foreign radios in general and Radio Liberty in particular is consequently no secret to Soviet citizens and they are often hesitant to discuss listening (which can be interpreted as a political act) with a stranger until good rapport and some degree of confidence can be established, often a time-consuming process. In light of these impediments to normal social research, usual scientific sampling methods are precluded. An adjunct to the above is that the recruitment and training of qualified people to work as field interviewers is no easy task.

As an additional reason for keeping these interviews confidential, Radio Liberty refers to the need to protect the RL interviewer. This attitude of cautious secrecy prevails in the entire procedure from the moment of contact to the use of the results.

In respect to the contact, no claim is made for random choice. To the contrary, those travelers are interviewed who in a careful process of establishing rapport present themselves as cooperative. Areas of conversation or themes about which the interviewee appears hesitant to speak are avoided. The broadcasting divisions receive the report of the conversations in an anonymous form.

The main products that the broadcasting divisions receive are in the form of single listener reports. They describe the interviewee in terms of occupation, nationality, and language. The reports also include such details as place, listening times, language of broadcast, audibility, jamming, and specific programs listened to. In addition to these general, largely technical details, there is a summary of the conversation, which may include statements about public reactions, comments on recent events, and expectations about future developments. In the few reports I have read, there was a recurring complaint about the system's control of news and the general lack of reliable, objective information.

NOTES

¹ Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

² This opinion is generally supported by the literature. As Inkeles and Bauer point out in their Harvard study on Soviet refugees, "there are many excellent books describing the history of the Soviet Union and the formal structure and functioning of its institutions, but we know almost nothing about the attitudes, values, and experiences of its citizens." *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 3.

IDENTIFICATION WITH NORTH OR SOUTH VIETNAM IN EASTERN EUROPE*

BY RADIO FREE EUROPE

An example of the use of comparative and continual sampling techniques by RFE to assess east European dispositions toward North and South Vietnam

Interviewing on which this report is based was completed in 1967. Six hundred and seven (607) Polish, 622 Hungarian and 279 Czech and Slovak respondents were polled. Urban residents and those in the higher occupational and educational brackets were overrepresented. The method of COMPARATIVE AND CONTINUAL SAMPLING was employed, and the final analysis was based on those findings which were to a large extent common to the independent samples obtained in seven interviewing areas over a period of 11 months. The interviews were carried out by local opinion research institutes whose interviewers were not identified with Radio Free Europe.

I. WHICH SIDE SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY YOUR COUNTRY?

Table 1. shows the amount of support North Vietnam and South Vietnam received from the Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak samples. The question was formulated so as to neutralize, as much as possible, the fact that the citizens of none of the three countries have, at present, any choice about supporting North Vietnam:

*Excerpts from "Identification With North or South Vietnam in Eastern Europe," Audience and Public Opinion Research Department, Radio Free Europe, April 1968.

Table 1

"Assuming that it had a free hand in the matter, should your country support North Vietnam, South Vietnam or neither?"

	Poles %	Hungarians %	Czechs/Slovaks %
North Vietnam	16	10	5
South Vietnam	18	12	14
Neither	64	74	77
Other answer, no answer	2	4	4
	100%	100%	100%

In spite of strenuous propaganda efforts, the Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak governments have not succeeded in evoking a groundswell of sympathy for the North Vietnamese "victims of imperialist aggression." Fully 82% of the Poles, 86% of the Hungarians and 91% of the Czechs/Slovaks polled did not want their country to support North Vietnam.

Support for South Vietnam was slightly stronger. The pro-South Vietnamese minorities in the Polish and Hungarian samples were only marginally larger than the pro-North Vietnamese minorities. However, among the Czechs and Slovaks, South Vietnam was clearly favored over the Communist North: even so, only one in seven respondents from Czechoslovakia wished to see his country become involved on the side of Saigon.

Not to take sides at all was the reaction of two out of three Poles and three out of four Hungarians and Czechs/Slovaks interviewed. To all indications, most Poles, Hungarians and Czechs/Slovaks interviewed are not ready to take sides in the Vietnamese war and desire that their countries should be equally uncommitted in this distant conflict.

II. WHAT KIND OF HELP SHOULD BE GIVEN TO NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM?

Humanitarian and material aid were suggested most frequently, while military support was mentioned by only about a quarter of the pro-North Vietnamese minorities. Moral and diplomatic support, which calls for little sacrifice on the giver's part, was suggested mainly by Hungarians:

Table 2

	Poles %	Hungarians %	Czechs/Slovaks %
Medical aid	17	28	50
Food and clothing	19	29	21
Economic, industrial, technical aid	24	18	14
Moral and diplomatic support	11	43	14
Military aid	23	20	29
Other answers	25	17	-
Don't know, no answer	3	5	14
	132%*	160%*	142%*

*Multiple answers

* * * * *

Despite the vast deployment of American aid in South Vietnam, a very large proportion of Czechs and Slovaks, a majority of Poles and nearly half the Hungarians wanted their country to give humanitarian and economic aid to South Vietnam. In this respect, East European respondents appear to see both Vietnams in the same light: distant and non-white North and South seem to be associated with disease, poverty and backwardness. In the Hungarian and Polish subsamples, military support was specified by only one respondent in six; the Czechs and Slovaks not only identified more with South Vietnam than with North Vietnam (see Table 1), but they also wanted to help them militarily twice as often as did the Poles and Hungarians.

III. REASONS FOR NOT TAKING SIDES

In Table 1 it was shown that large majorities from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia wanted their country to stay clear of the Vietnam conflict; this desire for non-involvement was based on the following reasons:

Table 3

"Why should your country support neither North Vietnam nor South Vietnam?"			
	Poles	Hungarians	Czechs/Slovaks
We are too poor, too small, have our own worries	38	46	34
They are too far away, none of our business	17	27	15
Nobody should interfere, they should solve their own problems	14	13	34
Would be dangerous, nobody should extend a war	20	3	13
Other answers	15	16	14
No answer	—	3	—
	104%*	108%*	110%*
Number of cases	388	458	215

*Multiple answers

As Table 3 shows, the plurality of Poles and Hungarians—and a large minority of the Czechs and Slovaks—felt that their country lacked the means to influence events in Vietnam. Conceptually related is the view that Vietnam is far away and (hence) of no concern to the respondent's country.

REFERENCE GROUPS, CONGRUITY THEORY AND CROSS/CULTURAL PERSUASION*

By E.S. LORIMOR and S. WATSON DUNN

The findings of this study in the measurement of selected middle-class attitudes in France and Egypt suggest that persuasion messages (such as advertisements) can be transferred across cultures to a greater extent than is generally supposed. It also seems probable that the transferability of messages differs from nation to nation rather than conforming to an exact formula.

* * * * *

One of the many puzzling questions facing international communicators and marketers today is the extent to which they can transfer a successful domestic persuasive or promotional campaign to a different culture. Opinions on the subject range from those which support almost complete transferability [2] to those which maintain that every market is so distinct that marketers will face a host of problems if they attempt to use the same approach abroad as they have in their domestic advertisements [7, 12]. Yet there is little evidence reported to support either argument, nor have the factors which affect international communication ever been clearly identified.

The study that follows provided a test in the field of some hypotheses developed from reference group theory and a consistency model of attitude change.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Among the many variables influencing the effectiveness of most persuasive communications is the source of the message. This point has been well documented by Hovland, Weiss and many others and need not be discussed here. One of the standards by which the audience appraises the source is the reference group to which that source belongs.

Implicit in the concept of reference group is the notion of an individual deriving values and goals as well as frame of reference from the perspective of the group [4, 17, 19]. Consequently, many kinds of units with great variations in size, composition, and structure may become reference group. [9]. A person's reference group may well contain persons whom he has never seen [18], but it is important that the individuals composing a group bear a psychological relationship to each other [3]. We may therefore think of a given nationality as constituting a group. Such phenomena as jingoism, chauvinism, and wartime solidarity suggest that the citizens of a nation have a psychological relationship to each other. We speak of a nation as sharing a common culture, a concept used by Redfield (cited in 19) to refer to a perspective shared by those in a particular group. On this basis it is proposed that one's nationality group serves as a

*Excerpts from "Reference Groups, Congruity Theory and Cross-Cultural Persuasion," *The Journal of Communication*, XVIII (December 1968), pp. 354-368. Reprinted with the permission of the *Journal of Communication*, copyright holder and the courtesy of the author.

reference group for both self-evaluation and attitude formation, other things being equal. The qualifying phrase recognizes such exceptions as the individual who has learned to loathe himself and his membership group so that it may become a negative reference group (cf. 11) and such facts as that the individual has many reference groups, one of which may have more effect than another in a given situation (17).

One popular approach to the study of attitude change is Congruity Theory [13] where two objects of judgment—*source* and *concept*—and an *assertion* are linked. The assertion (communication) originates with the source and concerns the concept. Both source and concept may be positive, negative, or neutral, and the assertion may be positive (associative) or negative (dissociative). The basic congruity principle holds that changes in evaluation always occur in the direction of increased congruity with the prevailing frame of reference. For example, if a negative source (an habitual Drunk) says something favorable about a positive concept (Fine Wines), the attitude toward fine wines would become less favorable while the drunk would rise in the individual's estimation.

HYPOTHESES

On the basis of reference group and congruity theory, and the findings of the case history research, certain hypotheses were formulated:

1. A persuasive message is more effective when its source is viewed as a member of the recipient's nationality group than when the source is seen as a non-member, other things being equal (nationality of source).

Since the foreign model in one country was the native model in the other, and vice versa, it was predicted that:

2. A persuasive message from a source in a country to which he is native has a reverse effectiveness from one in a country to which he is foreign (between country).

It is a well-known fact that the language of a group reflects its values and interests. Obviously an outsider will not be so aware of these as a member of the group who is thoroughly at home in the language. Therefore, a third predictive hypothesis was:

3. A message composed originally in the language in which it is read is more effective than a message translated idiomatically from another language (translation).

A weakness of Congruity Theory is the failure to allow for the consequence of the intensity of the bond between source and concept (originator and object of the message, respectively). It seems reasonable that the strength of the bond is partially determined by the distance between source and concept.

In the study under discussion, it was assumed that a message directly attributed to a source would be seen as more closely linked to that source than one which merely associated the source with the message without making an explicit attribution. For example, if Carl Sandburg is quoted

about a pen, the message is seen more as *his* than when his face simply appears without comment in a pen advertisement. Closer association of the source with the message should lead to closer association of the source with the object of the message. We would expect that Carl Sandburg would have a stronger association with the pen in the first instance. On the ground that a closer association between source and concept results in a stronger link, it was predicted that:

4. A message which is directly attributed to a *positive* source is more effective than one which is his merely by implication (attribution).

Various studies of communication effects have found that, in general, picture and verbal messages together are more effective than words alone in changing evaluative judgments (e.g., 8). A possible reason is that the pictured source reinforces or creates favorable feeling toward the source by appearing to be a member of the recipient's reference group. On the basis of an extension of congruity theory, combined with reference group theory, it was predicted that:

5. The effect of a persuasive communication is greater when a favorable source is actually portrayed with the message than when no source is portrayed regardless of whether or not the message is verbally attributed to the source (illustration).

To test the hypotheses, designs were formulated with two countries, France and Egypt; three levels of identified sources, one native and two foreign; two levels of attribution, attributed and not attributed; two levels of translation, idiomatic translation and a message composed originally in the language in which it was read; and five products.

SAMPLE

The subjects selected for study were middle- and upper-class, urban French and Egyptians. The two countries differ markedly in their degree of economic development, standard of living, and literacy level, and hence permit a test of the hypotheses under very different conditions. The sample in France was chosen by selecting one section at random from middle- and upper-class sections of Paris. After the blocks were numbered, 20 were selected randomly and 10 interviews done in each for a sample of 200. The interviewers were given no choice in the selection of respondents; however, the sample was stratified for sex and employment. In Egypt, a sample of 200 was selected randomly from a larger sample used in a refrigerator study. The original sample was obtained by listing all households in Cairo and its environs which had a special meter, indicating that they used electricity for purposes other than lighting. This original sample was judged by Egyptian authorities to contain almost all of the middle- and upper-class inhabitants of metropolitan Cairo. The respondents were approximately half male and half female. In both countries, subjects were limited to individuals 18 years of age or older. The income, education, occupation, and possessions of the sample were congruent with a middle- and upper-class population.

TEST MATERIALS

The persuasive messages used in this experiment were five print advertisements which had been run quite successfully in mass-circulated magazines in the United States. All had received high Starch recognition scores and most had produced evidence of high recall and/or sales response. All were full-page advertisements which would be effective in black-and-white, were of conventional advertising format, and depended for their impact on a combination of illustration, headline, and body text.

Headlines and copy were translated by bi-lingual nationals. The second version of each headline and copy was written by professional copywriters from each country who had a copy of the original copy platform (including advertising objective), certain background information on prospective consumers, copies of the illustrations to be used, and instructions to write appropriate heads and copy of a given length for the advertisement.

The original photographs were replicated, using French and Egyptian nationals. Great attention was devoted to making details correct, and each illustration carried as a caption a typically national name plus the nationality. Copy and headlines were attributed through the addition of quotation marks and the selected name plus a few words describing the pictured source. The finished persuasive messages consisted of 20 advertisements about each product for each country. The experimental ads were produced by an electrostatic process which provided a clear black-and-white reproduction.

Care was taken to select five products which were neither culture-bound nor too drastically different from products normally used in the selected countries. None of the products violated obvious taboos in any of the countries, and an attempt was made to avoid using a product which was associated with a particular country. For example, France is known for its perfume, on which grounds a French national might be expected to be a better perfume salesman than, say, a Turk, even to other Turks. Neutral fictitious brand names were assigned to the products in order to avoid ceiling effects and any pre-communication judgment. The judgments as to whether or not the products met the selection criteria were made by consulting communication and advertising experts in the nations to be studied.

Ten subjects in each of twenty conditions were shown one message promoting each brand for a total of 200 in each country. These conditions permitted a test of each of the hypotheses. Various measures of effectiveness were administered individually by trained native interviewers in each country. Special care was taken to avoid interviewer or order bias.

MEASURING INSTRUMENTS

Four measures of advertising effectiveness were used. As a measure of attitude toward the products, seven-step semantic differential scales [14]

were used. There is evidence for both reliability and validity of the evaluative scales used in this way [13], and variations of the method have received increasing use in testing advertising effectiveness (e.g., 10). Care was taken to select panculturally stable scales. Subjects rated each advertised product against 12 scales and against a *would buy-would not buy* continuum. In addition, each subject was asked to describe his corresponding ideal product on the same scales. The semantic differential scales were coded from 1 to 7 with 7 being the most favorable.

After factor analysis, four scales which loaded high and purely on the evaluative factor were selected. For both countries, the scales were good-bad, dirty-clean, effective-ineffective, and agreeable-disagreeable. The scores for these four scales were summed for each individual to give his evaluation factor score; this permitted a range of scores from 4 to 28.

Table 1
Product Means and F-ratios for French Study

Product	Evaluation	Eval diff	Comprehension	Willingness to Buy
Soft Drink	21.43 _i	1.98 _{ij}	1.14 _i	4.66 _g
Toilet Soap	22.02 _a	3.66 _i	.84 _i	4.52 _g
Cigarettes	19.52 _b	1.88 _d	.78 _i	3.80 _h
Men's Toiletries	21.91 _a	2.95 _{cd}	.80 _i	4.32 _g
Washing Machine	21.93 _i	3.35 _{cd}	1.06 _i	4.24 _g
Source of Variance	df	F	F	F
A Nationality of Source	2		1.11	
B Attribution	1		2.17	
C Translation	1	5.18**		
AB	2			
AC	2		2.95	
BC	1			
ABC	2		2.01	
Error (between)	108			
D Product	4	8.06*	3.73*	5.47*
AD	8	1.35	1.32	
HD	4	1.22		1.68
CD	4		1.55	5.05*
ABD	8		1.03	
ACD	8		1.69	1.82
BCD	4		2.04	1.11
ABCD	8			1.45
Error (within)	432			

*p < .05

**p < .01

Note: Means with the same alphabetical subscript are not significantly different from each other at the .05 level; Newman-Keuls test.

As a second measure of attitude toward the products, evaluation factor scores of the advertised brands, were subtracted from the evaluation factor scores of the corresponding ideal products, theoretically permitting a range of individual scores from -24 to +24. These scores are

hereafter referred to as evaluation-difference scores. The rationale for this measure is that the most effective advertisements would tend to move the individual's product rating closer to his ideal product score than would the less effective messages. Thus, the smaller the score, the more favorable the evaluation.

Table 2
Product Means and F-ratios for Egyptian Data

Product	Evaluation	Head-shift	Comprehension	Willingness to Buy	
Soft Drink	22.52 _b	3.02 _d	1.34 _f	5.29 _h	
Toilet Soap	23.62 _b	2.94 _d	1.20 _{fg}	5.70 _b	
Cigarettes	18.55 _c	1.92 _{de}	1.29 _f	3.43 _j	
Men's Toiletries	23.04 _b	1.42 _e	1.23 _f	4.55	
Washing Machines	25.05 _a	1.75 _{de}	1.06 _g	5.40 _h	
Source of Variance	df	F	F	F	F
A Nationality of Source	2			1.13	3.08
B Attribution	1	3.83	6.93**		
C Translation	1	1.53		5.81	
AB	2		5.15***		
AC	2		1.49		
BC	1				1.03
ABC	2	1.07**	2.13		4.31**
Error (between subjects)	108				
D Product	4	17.44*	3.83***	2.66	32.28*
AD	8	1.04	1.93	1.30	1.21
BD	4			1.26	1.08
CD	4		2.14	3.51***	1.05
ABD	8	1.36	1.48		1.78
ACD	8		3.97		
BCD	4			1.12	1.02
ABCD	8	1.91		1.16	1.45
Error (within subjects)	432				

*p < .005

**p < .025

***p < .01

Note: Means with the same alphabetical subscript are not significantly different from each other at the .05 level in Newman-Keuls test.

The willingness-to-buy measure was simply the rating made by the individual on the single *would buy-would not buy* scale. This again ranged from 1 to 7, with 7 being the extreme of *would buy*.

For the comprehension measure, the two most important ideas from each advertisement were selected, as rated by six judges. Each was presented in a multiple-choice situation with two other plausible statements about the product, again as suggested by the judges. Thus, there were ten multiple-choice questions with three parts to each. The subject was given zero for an incorrect choice, and one for a correct choice. The answers to the two questions for each product were combined, permitting a possible score of zero, one, or two for each individual for each product.

Table 3
Source-by-Attribution-by Translation Means of Egyptian Evaluation Scores

Model	Attribution Translation	Attributed		Not Attributed	
		Idiomatic	Original	Idiomatic	Original
American		22.30 _{ab}	23.20 _a	23.23 _a	23.84 _a
Arabic		19.52 _b	22.98 _a	24.50 _a	21.84 _{ab}
French		21.98 _{ab}	21.74 _{ab}	21.60 _{ab}	24.60 _a

RESULTS

The data were analyzed using analysis of variance and appropriate subsequent tests [20]. Generally little support was found for the nationality-of-source hypothesis. There were no significant source main effects on the basis of any measure. In the case of French data, there were no interaction effects involving the source.

In the collected data in Egypt, significant interactions of source with other variables occurred in the case of all measures except comprehension. (See Table 2.)

Although there was no easy explanation for the significant differences among means in the case of Egyptian data there seemed to be a tendency for the version featuring Americans in illustrations to be more effective (at least in absolute numbers).

Support for the translation hypothesis was found in the evaluation-difference data in the case of French subjects (Table 1). The mean for idiomatic translation was 3.46 and the mean for original composition 2.12. (The lower the mean, the closer the evaluation is to the "ideal product.") In the case of Egyptian data, there was a translation main effect for the comprehension measure (Table 2) with the original advertisement being more effective than the translated message.

Table 4
Source-by-Translation-by-Product Means of Egyptian Evaluation-Difference Scores

Model	Translation	Product				
		Soft Drink	Toilet Soap	Cigarette	Men's Toiletries	Washing Machine
American	Idiomatic	2.00	3.10	3.70	2.20	2.55
	Original	.95	2.85	1.15	1.85	.85
Arabic	Idiomatic	3.85	4.05	1.25	3.35	1.95
	Original	3.70	1.20	4.05	.60	2.60
French	Idiomatic	5.05	3.55	-1.05	.10	.55
	Original	2.55	2.90	2.45	1.65	2.00

For the French subjects, a significant interaction of translation with products occurred when comprehension was used as a dependent variable. The original was more effective than translation (in absolute numbers) for four of the five advertisements. There were no other interactions involving the translation variable in the French data.

In the Egyptian data, there were translation interactions for all measures. (See Tables 2 and 6.) There was a tendency for the absolute numbers to suggest more effectiveness for the original composition than for the translated message in the corresponding condition, but the differences were not usually significant.

Hypothesis 4 (attribution) received no support from the French data. For the Egyptian data subjects; there was an attribution main effect only in the evaluation-difference data (Table 2).

Table 5
Translation-by-Product Means for French Comprehension Scores

	Soft Drink	Toilet Soap	Cigarette	Men's Toiletries	Washing Machine
Idiomatic	1.08 _{ac}	.78 _{bcd}	1.00 _{acd}	.67 _{bd}	1.00 _{acd}
Original	1.20 _a	.90 _{acd}	.57 _b	.93 _{acd}	1.12 _a

Note: Means with the same alphabetical subscript are not significantly different from each other at the .05 level by Newman-Keuls test.

Here, the attributed message was less effective than the nonattributed message (means of 2.81 and 1.61 respectively). Attribution interaction effects appeared in all Egyptian data except comprehension (Tables 2, 3, 4). In the evaluation-difference analysis, the attribution condition with the American model and the attribution condition with the Arabic model were each less effective than the corresponding non-attribution condition. However, for the willingness-to-buy and evaluation data, there seemed to be no meaningful pattern involving the two conditions.

For the illustration hypothesis, there were no significant effects in any of the French data nor in the Egyptian data.

The hypothesis regarding reverse effectiveness of native and foreign sources received no definitive support from either the intra-country or between-country comparisons. The interaction effects in the between-country analyses again seemed to lack a meaningful pattern. However, the evaluation data appear to indicate that Egyptian subjects were more influenced by all persuasive messages than were the French, regardless of source.

DISCUSSION

The findings suggest that persuasive messages can be transferred across cultures to a greater extent than is generally supposed. With the middle-class audience tested, it seemed to make little difference in effectiveness whether the source was native or foreign, whether the message was attributed or not, or even whether it was illustrated. There may well be a cosmopolitan audience in many countries for whom the nationality of the source is relatively unimportant. Although the data provided some evidence in support of the hypothesis that composition of a message in the language of the expected audience is more effective than translation from a foreign language, tests involving levels of skill are needed to determine the limits of this variable.

A number of possibilities suggest themselves as explanations for the lack of difference among the versions tested. (That it was not due to general lack of response to the messages is apparent from examination of the ratings, most of which are well above neutral.) For example, the predictions from reference group theory would not be applicable if one's nationality group were not really a reference group. However, three different measures suggested that the nationality group did indeed serve as a reference group although not necessarily the most important one in buying.

Another possibility is that reference groups are more likely to influence consumers in choosing among *brands* than classes of products [21]. One study [16] indicates also that national reference groups have more effect in association with some products than with others.

Also, expertise may have influenced the application of reference groups to buying decisions and attitudes toward products. It seems probable that a disliked outsider might, in some cases, be more influential than a liked member of one's reference group in cases where the former was seen as an expert and the latter was not. A foreigner might at times be considered more knowledgeable regarding a foreign product than a native, and hence serve to change the subject's attitude.

Table 6
Product Means and F Scores of French and Egyptian Data

Product	Evaluation	Eval Diff
Soft Drink	21.97 _c	2.50 _{ef}
Toilet Soap	22.82 _{ab}	3.30 _c
Cigarettes	19.18 _d	1.90 _i
Men's Toiletries	22.54 _{bc}	2.26 _i
Washing Machines	23.49 _a	2.55 _{ef}

Source of Variance	df	F	F'
A Country	1	6.63**	2.43
B Nationality of Source	2		
C Attribution	1	3.11	5.19***
D Translation	1	2.18	5.48***
AB	2	1.47	
AC	1	1.02	
AD	1		1.57
BC	2		1.20
BD	2		
CD	1		
ABC	2		2.88
ABD	2		1.62
ACD	1		
BCD	2	2.59	
ABCD	2	2.07	2.10
Error (between subjects)	115		
E Product	1	45.76*	3.36**
AE	4	7.58*	4.18**
BE	1		1.56

TABLE 6 Cont'd
Product Means and F Scores of French and Egyptian Data

Source of Variance	df	F	F
CE	4	2.10	
DE	1		1.98
ABE	8	1.41	1.14
ACE	4		
ADE	4		1.63
BCE	8		1.33
BDE	8		
CDE	4		
ABCE	8	1.28	
ABDE	8		3.01
ABCE	4		
BCDE	8	1.28	
ABCDE	8		
Error (within subjects)	864		

*p < .005

**p < .01

Note: Means with the same alphabetical subscript are not significantly different from each other at the .05 level by Newman-Keuls test.

Another factor which may have influenced the results is the multiplicity of sources involved in an advertisement—the manufacturer, or agency, and medium in which it appears as well as the pictured or named individual. However, the obviously foreign names of the products featured may have suggested a foreign source, an idea which may have outweighed any effect as a result of the combined effect of various sources. Such an effect could occur in the case of any advertisement, but might have been intensified by the fact that the products in this case were foreign.

Still another possible influence is the level of sophistication of the audience. Keigrotski and Anderson [15], in a study of several European countries, including France, found support for the notion that increasing foreign contact tends to increase favorable opinion about other people and cause one to be more critical of his own people. A study of the lower classes might reveal a different picture from that indicated by this sample.

In agreement with earlier studies [9], the finding that Egyptians were more influenced by persuasive messages than the French subjects supports the idea of national differences in reaction to persuasive messages. The study mentioned actually provided evidence for the independence of the French. This suggests that a knowledge of national characteristics would be of great value to an individual in deciding on message strategy. Further, it seems probable that transferability of messages differs from one nation to another rather than being subject to a hard-and-fast rule.

A possible reason for the general lack of difference between illustration and no-illustration conditions is that most illustrations are designed to attract attention to the message. In cases where the subject is forced to

read, as in this study, the message alone may be equally as effective as the combination.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Despite the obvious need for further research, this study suggests that advertisements may often be successfully adapted from one culture to another. It further suggests that the models used in successful advertisements need not always belong to the recipient's cultural group. Thus, one of the first research tasks that confronts the aspiring international researcher is to determine the positive and negative national reference groups for the countries that he plans to enter and their relevance to the produce service or idea he is promoting.

This study also suggests that general theories such as reference group and consistency theories, may need refinement and possible modification when applied to cultures other than the one in which they were developed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This study was supported by the Group Psychology Branch, Office of Naval Research, under Contract Nonr 1202 (24), "Study of the Influence of Certain Cultural and Content Variables on the Effectiveness of Persuasive Communications in the International Field."

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MEDIA ANALYSIS¹

The basic question for the communications specialist in the process of media analysis is "why?" Why was this channel (medium) of communication used rather than another? Or, why should this channel be used instead of another, and why does one particular medium contribute to the effectiveness of the message more than others? In order to answer the question, "why," it is first necessary to determine what contribution to effect is made by each channel.

The use of quantitative techniques to arrive at conclusions of comparative media effectiveness is demonstrated in the first essay of the section. Survey research methods have also been employed by RFE to measure the effectiveness of radio in communications about Vietnam to East European audiences.² "Effectiveness" in the context of media analysis, however, is really a measure of the range of the medium rather than its inherent advantages in persuasion.

The other essays in the media analysis section are not quantitative in approach. Each evaluates use of a particular channel of communication to various audiences from a qualitative frame of reference.

NOTES

- ¹ See also "Exploitation of Channels of Communications" in Chapter VIII of this casebook.
- ² The viability of the technique as it is used by RFE may be assailed by some for using samples that are not "representative" of the audiences as a whole. Clearly, the difficulty of obtaining representativeness is the major impediment in any survey technique. Nevertheless, the methodology itself is particularly valuable in some circumstances. In this connection see the contributions by Lorand B. Szalay in this section and Joseph G. Whelan, "Radio Liberty's Audience Impact and Effectiveness" in the Effectiveness Analysis section of this chapter.

EFFECTIVENESS OF PSYOP MESSAGES:

A FOUNDATION STUDY*

BY ERNEST F. AND EDITH M. BAIRDAIN

The findings of a quantitative research effort to establish the comparative efficacy of various PSYOP media in Vietnam indicate that leaflets and airborne loudspeaker messages were found to be clearly effective. Under conditions prevailing at the time in Vietnam, however, radio was not an effective medium.

Psyop comes in many shapes and sizes—ranging from mini-scale person-to-person up to maxi-scale nation-to-nation. But ultimately, even the most grandly conceived psyop reduces to a communication reaching a target—no communication, no psyop. . .

REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE PSYOP MESSAGES

. . . Leaflets and airborne loudspeaker broadcasts are the media that reach the largest number of enemy troops most often. Supplementary data shows that appeals to rally or surrender are the most frequently used themes in the messages carried by these media. Research under wartime conditions prohibits experimental manipulation and it is necessary to find and work with existing real situations rather than creating them for the researcher's purposes. Therefore, the effectiveness of psyop messages making rally and surrender appeals using leaflets and airborne loudspeakers will be the focus of concern in this section.

SELECTION OF CRITERIA

The first issue in consideration of effectiveness is "what is effectiveness?" A search for answers to this question requires selection of criteria appropriate to the subject being studied (i.e., the phenomenon selected for measurement). In evaluating the effectiveness of rally or surrender appeals, the most demanding criterion is that rally or surrender occurs immediately in response to such an appeal; a less restrictive criterion is that the desired response occurs ultimately rather than immediately. A still less strict criterion is consideration of rallying or surrendering whether or not the action takes place. If any of this family of criteria is met, the message has been effective in some degree.

Being overly strict in specification of criteria also would mean being somewhat unrealistic or impractical in evaluating psyop; there must be some acceptable relationship between effort expended to transmit the messages and the amount of return for the effort. The second issue to be considered in effectiveness, then, is the question of "yield" or productiv-

*Excerpted and adapted with the cooperation of the authors from *Final Technical Report Psychological Operations Studies—Vietnam*, Human Sciences Research, Inc., May 25, 1971. Reprinted with the permission of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, project sponsor.

ity; the basis for selecting criteria for evaluation of this issue appears to be purely a matter of subjective opinion in most cases unless someone can be persuaded to make arbitrary decisions that trade off danger to life against expense in dollars and effort.

For clarity of analysis, interpretation and discussion of the issues of "whether effective" and "how effective" cannot be treated simultaneously.

Unfortunately, separate treatment of the two issues results in tedious, lengthy, and monotonous restatements of the same issues. In what follows the question of "whether effective?" will be treated in detail; the issue of "how effective?" will be treated in more global fashion.

REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVENESS

In order to focus analysis tightly and sharply on the issue of effectiveness, a sequential set of requirements that must be met for psyop messages to be effective has been postulated and a question which tests whether psyop messages meet each requirement has been formulated. These "requirements," in relation to the section titled "Development of a Science" may be regarded as first attempts at formulating and providing support for "theoretical constructs." The requirements are based on the experience . . . gained from studies in Vietnam during 1966-71 and consultation to psyop-related programs at Fort Bragg, logical analysis of the experiential history of military psyoperations embedded in the psyop manuals, and conclusions from interviews and discussions with more than sixty psyop officers. . . . These requirements for psyop effectiveness and the associated test questions, ordered here in logical sequence are:

Requirement 1 Means of transmission of a psyop message must exist within the span of perception of target audience members.

Question: What media enable communication to enemy personnel?

Requirement 2. The message carried by the proximate media must come to the attention of members of the target audience, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or by relay.

Question: Are messages actually received by enemy personnel?

Requirement 3. The words and phrasing—the language of the message—must be understandable to the target audience.

Question: Are the words and phrasing of the psyop messages understandable with normal ease?

Requirement 4. The theme or content of the message (with some specific exceptions) must be judged by members of the target audience to be comprehensible.

Question: Is the content of the message—the theme—comprehensible to the enemy?

Requirement 5. The content must be sufficiently believable for the target audience to ascribe some degree of credibility to the message.

Question: Are the messages judged by the enemy to be credible?

Requirement 6. The persuasive power of the message in the context of the situation in which it is received by the target audience must not be disproportionate to the danger and potential consequences involved in taking the action recommended in the message. To be effective the recommended action or an equivalent action must be taken or receive some degree of consideration.

- a. Were the psyop messages the dominant factor or a major contributing factor in evocation of the desired action (or an equivalent action)?*
- b. Were the psyop messages a facilitating factor in the decision to take the recommended action (or an equivalent action)?
- c. Did the psyop messages receive serious consideration (whether or not the action or an equivalent action is ever taken)?
- d. Did the psyop messages receive brief consideration even though it may have been quickly rejected?

SOURCE OF RESEARCH DATA/PROCEDURE

The data treated in this section includes the responses of 100 VC PW's and 200 NVA PW's interviewed in all four military regions in Vietnam in 1970. Specially-designed questionnaires were developed for each type of prisoner.

Also included are the responses of 100 NVA ralliers and 100 VC ralliers who were interviewed at the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon and other Chieu Hoi Centers in MR2 and MR3 between July and November 1970. . . . Interviews averaged approximately three and one-half hours for PW's and slightly over two and one-half hours for ralliers. . . .

TEST OF RESEARCH RESULTS AGAINST REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVENESS

The test question for each requirement for media effectiveness is applied in sequence to the research data obtained on VC and NVA ralliers and PW's.

Requirement 1: What Media Enable Communication to Enemy Personnel?

Even a perfectly conceived psyop could not possibly have any effect upon the members of a target audience unless the media is effective in terms of reaching the target audience.

Table 1 shows the extent to which the physical means of emitting a psyop message were within the span of perception of members of the target audience. The proximity of nine types of media—leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, radio sets, newspapers, magazines, ground loudspeakers, posters, television sets, and psyop novelty items was surveyed for four classes of enemy: NVA Hoi Chanh, VC Hoi Chanh, NVA PW's and VC PW's.

*A requirement that psyop be judged the 'sole factor' would be extremely unrealistic and incorrect; a basic tenet of clinical psychology is "multiple causation": paraphrased, the rule says; "Every bit of behavior has many causes "

TABLE 1
ENEMY PROXIMITY TO MEANS FOR TRANSMITTING PSYOP MESSAGES

Media	Ralliers		Prisoners	
	VC (100)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
Saw Leaflets	99%	96%	87%	89%
Heard Airborne Loudspeakers	100%	88%	81%	70%
Saw Radio Sets	98%	69%	98%	68%
Saw Newspapers	34%	16%	20%	11%
Saw Magazines	13%	06%	10%	05%
Heard Ground Loudspeakers	09%	05%	04%	01%
Read Poster	07%	02%	03%	—
Saw Television Sets	04%	02%	07%	02%
Saw Psych Novelty Items	01%	02%	—	—

Comment. The results shown in Table 1 demonstrate conclusively that leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, and radio are the mechanical means for transmission of psyop messages which are seen or heard by a large majority of VC and NVA personnel. Accordingly, these three media will be the focus of further attention. Statistics for other media will be shown where available but without comment.

Three media are effective means for attempts to reach enemy personnel with psyop messages (under current practices in Vietnam).

Requirement 2: Are Messages Actually Received by Enemy Personnel?

Physical proximity—i.e., being within sight or hearing—of means of transmission of psyop messages does not necessarily mean that messages reach the enemy. Leaflets can be left untouched, the sound of airborne loudspeakers can be audible but unintelligible, and radios may not be in

TABLE 2
MESSAGES THAT REACH LARGE NUMBERS OF VC AND NVA PERSONNEL

Media	Ralliers		Prisoners	
	VC (100)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
<i>Leaflets</i>				
% in Sample Saw Leaflets	99%	96%	87%	89%
% in Sample Read Leaflets	86%	93%	27%	39%
% of "Saw Leaflet" who "Read Leaflet"	86%	97%	31%	44%
<i>Airborne Loudspeakers (ALS)</i>				
% in Sample Heard Sound of ALS	100%	88%	81%	70%
% in Sample Heard Words Clearly	89%	86%	63%	57%
% of "Heard Sound" who "Heard Clearly"	89%	98%	78%	81%
<i>Radio</i>				
% in Sample Saw Radio Sets	98%	69%	98%	68%
% in Sample Heard Broadcasts	69%	43%	21%	17%
% of "Saw Radio" who "Heard Radio"	70%	62%	21%	25%

operation or may be tuned to non-psyop channels. To have the chance to be effective, it is necessary that the target audience attend, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the psyop message.

Table 2 shows the extent to which messages carried by the three effective media register upon the four categories of enemy being treated.

Comment. The results shown in Table 2 make it clear that a very large majority of ralliers—both VC and NVA—did read leaflets before they rallied.

Although all of the samples of NVA and VC ralliers and prisoners had similar exposure to leaflets, there is a large difference in the number of ralliers that read leaflets and the number of prisoners that did so. The number of VC ralliers who read leaflets (86%) is three times as large as the number of VC PW's who read them (27%); similarly, the number of NVA ralliers who had read leaflets (93%) is two and one-third times the number of NVA PW's who had read them (39%).

The differences in leaflet-reading behavior between ralliers and prisoners were investigated by analysis of narrative responses. Those in the PW samples mention their cadres' insistence that it is strictly forbidden to read leaflets and the existence of strict surveillance and controls as reasons for not picking up and reading leaflets. Other reasons mentioned consistently explain that such an act would be disloyal or unthinkable. In contrast, the ralliers do also mention surveillance but a much larger percentage indicate that it is possible to escape such controls if it is so desired; many have some type of grievance. The contrast in attitudes between the ralliers and PW's suggests the existence of personality, ideological, and motivational differences between the two groups. This notion is furthered by the fact that the pattern of the responses of both ralliers and PW's is much more alike than is the pattern of VC ralliers compared to VC PW's or NVA ralliers, compared to NVA PW's.

A large majority of ralliers and prisoners heard the sound of airborne loudspeakers. For the ralliers, to hear the sound was essentially equivalent to hearing the message clearly although not necessarily on all occasions. Among the prisoners, a somewhat smaller percentage heard and a smaller percentage heard clearly on fewer occasions. The option to ignore a leaflet is easily exercised but the same option does not exist in the case of airborne loudspeaker broadcasts; because there is little or no choice about hearing or not hearing such messages, the findings must be interpreted with caution.

About half of the rallier samples—somewhat more VC than NVA—heard radio broadcasts and slightly less than one-fifth of the PW samples heard radio broadcasts. The questions used as internal checks on the consistency of individual responses disclose that in each sample a large majority of those who do listen to radio broadcasts listen solely or mainly to music, opera, or "news", all of which apparently have little relevance to psyop appeals. The relationship of "news" to psyop could not be determined within the limits of this study.

In summary, of the three media that reach the enemy in sufficiently large numbers to enable execution of studies, leaflets were clearly effective in getting messages to virtually all enemy personnel who become ralliers but were read by only about one-third of the prisoner samples.

Airborne loudspeakers did not reach enemy personnel with the same completeness of coverage as did leaflets although they do reach a larger percentage than any other media.

Radio broadcasts could reach useful segments of the enemy audience but, because the content of what is heard is ambiguous, radio is not identified here as an effective medium for psyop under current conditions in Vietnam.

Requirement 3: Are the Words and Phrasing of the PSYOP Messages Understandable with Normal Ease?

Once the psyop message has reached its target, as a minimum requirement the words, phrases, and style of composition must be characterized by normal intelligibility for communication to occur. Table 3 shows the pattern of reactions to the language used in leaflet messages.

The issue of "hearing words clearly" is so intricately involved with the issue of "understanding words" in a verbal message that the distinction could not be maintained satisfactorily; in effect, the terms appear to be interchangeable. Therefore, airborne loudspeaker messages were not included in this series of questions because of their known brevity and simplistic construction in order to conserve time and expand coverage of indeterminate issues.

Comment. Table 3 shows clearly that the language element of the message is almost completely effective in that no problems are indicated in understanding the individual words.

Requirement 4: Is the Intent of the Message—The Theme—Comprehensible?

It is quite possible to understand all of the words that make up a message without gaining any understanding of the intended content or theme of a message.

For the psyop message to have the chance to be effective, the target audience must feel that they understand the message. Despite this fact the psyoperator's actual intention, which may be quite different from the "intent" perceived by the target audience—and which is presumably

TABLE 3
INTELLIGIBILITY OF LANGUAGE USED IN LEAFLET MESSAGES

Media	Ralliers		Prisoners	
	VC (100)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
<i>Leaflets</i>				
% in Sample Read Leaflets	86%	93%	27%	39%
% in Sample Understand Words	79%	93%	26%	35%
% who "Read Leaflets" who "Understand Words"	92%	100%	96%	90%

embedded in the content of the message—does not have to be recognized consciously or understood by the target audience for the message to have a chance to be effective. It can be said with confidence that conscious understanding is not necessary for effectiveness because what is known of dynamic psychology makes it clear that one does not necessarily know whether, when, how, or by what, one's thinking and emotions may be affected. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that artfully contrived messages with hidden meanings could influence the readers' attitudes and emotions in some significant way that the reader does not consciously recognize. However, the nature of current operating practices in the field that govern the composition of psyop messages does not encourage the notion that sophisticated messages with hidden intent and impact are the rule—or that they occur at all by deliberate intent.

Instances where the psyoperator's intent is to cause confusion or perplex others may seem to be an exception to the need for an assumption of understanding on the part of the target audience but it is not actually so. The psyoperator's intent is for the reader to become confused about the issue treated in the message; except in unusual circumstances, it is not intended that the reader be confused about the meaning of the message.

Table 4 shows the extent to which target audiences report they have understood the intent or themes of psyop messages.

Comment. The category "Understand Some" is interpretable in two ways: analysis of narrative elaboration of the respondent's initial answers disclosed that the "Understand Some" response may be interpreted correctly as, "understood some part or all of all messages received" or "understood some part of some of the messages received".

It is obvious by inspection of Table 4 that when messages were read or heard, the recipients felt they understood part or all of some or all of the messages received.

TABLE 4
UNDERSTANDING OF THEME—INTENT OF MESSAGES
THAT REACH ENEMY PERSONNEL

Media	Raiders		Prisoners	
	VC (100)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
<i>Leaflet</i>				
% in Sample Understand Words	79%	93%	26%	35%
% in Sample Understand Some/All Content	79%	93%	26%	35%
% of "Understand Words" who "Understand Content"	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Airborne Loudspeaker</i>				
% in Sample Heard Words Clearly	89%	86%	63%	57%
% in Sample Understand Some/All Content	87%	84%	56%	52%
% of Heard Clearly who "Understand Content"	98%	98%	89%	91%

In summary, leaflet messages and airborne loudspeaker broadcasts were effective in the sense that those who read or heard the messages judged that they understood the theme or content of the message.

Requirement 5: Are the Messages Judged by the Enemy to be Credible?

Having reached a target audience—to have an opportunity to be effective, i.e., evoke a desired reaction—the content or theme of the message must be judged to be believable. The credibility of a message does not have to bear any relationship to its “truth” or degree of “untruth” as judged by some set of arbitrary standards. “Believability,” or the willingness to ascribe credibility, exists in the mind of each individual recipient of a message.

Table 5 shows the judgments of believability of messages made by the four types of enemy samples.

Comment. As is the case for the data shown in Table 4, the category “Believed Some” is interpretable in two ways: qualitative elaboration of the respondent’s initial answers disclosed that the “Believed Some” response may be interpreted correctly as “believed some part or all of all messages received” or “believed some part of some of the messages received”.

It can be seen by inspection of Table 5 that more than three-quarters of all the rallier samples ascribe some degree of credibility to some or all of the messages received through either media. When only those who read or heard and understood the messages are considered, about nine out of ten ralliers—whether VC or NVA—ascribed some degree of credibility to the messages. Remembering that the average number of leaflets read by the rallier samples is about twenty, it can be said that “the rallier who reads leaflets came to believe them.” About one-fifth of the prisoner samples found some of the messages credible in some degree. Airborne loudspeaker messages were heard and believed in some degree by a large percentage of the ralliers sampled and by about one-fifth of the PW samples.

TABLE 5
CREDIBILITY ASCRIBED TO MESSAGES THAT REACH ENEMY PERSONNEL

Media	Ralliers		Prisoners	
	VC (130)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
<i>Leaflet</i>				
% in Sample Understand Content	79%	93%	26%	35%
% in Sample Believed Some/All	79%	83%	14%	25%
% of “Understand Content” who “believed Message”	100%	89%	54%	71%
<i>Airborne Loudspeaker (ALS)</i>				
% in Sample Understand Content	87%	84%	56%	52%
% in Sample Believed Some/All	86%	76%	22%	23%
% of “Understand Content” who “believed Message”	99%	90%	39%	54%

In summary, leaflets were effective in the sense that almost all in the VC and NVA samples who did rally, and had read or heard and understood messages, believed some or all of what was said in one or all of the messages. About one-fifth of the PW samples ascribed some degree of credibility to messages read or heard.

Requirement 6a: Were the PSYOP Messages a Dominant Factor or a Major Contributing Factor in Evaluation of the Desired Action (or an Equivalent Action)?

Requirement 6b: Were the PSYOP Messages a Facilitating Factor in the Decision to Take the Recommended Action (or an Equivalent Action)?

Requirement 6c: Did the PSYOP Messages Receive Serious Consideration (whether or Not the Action or an Equivalent Action is Ever Taken)?

Requirement 6d: Did the PSYOP Messages Receive Brief Consideration Even Though it May Have Been Quickly Rejected?

Messages may be believed—may be ascribed any degree of credibility—without being “effective” in the sense that “belief” in the message results in any behavior that the message is intended to evoke. A recognized problem that has hindered attempts to “measure PSYOP effectiveness” in the past has been the pervasive tendency to either omit definition of objectives for messages or to cast objectives in terms of what the sender wants to do instead of specifying what the sender wants the recipient of the message to do. Although the distinction may not seem obvious, it is of extreme importance.

Effectiveness, in the context of this study, can be defined only in terms of the objective(s) that the message is intended to serve. A hierarchy of progressively more demanding objectives can be conjectured to exist for most rally messages whether or not they are defined by the originators; stated in terms of effectiveness, these objectives are:

- Cause no negative/counterproductive reaction
- Cause awareness of the possibility of rallying
- Cause consideration of whether or not to rally
- Cause a desire to rally (whether or not acted upon)
- Cause a rally

Whether or not a message can cause any of these behaviors is dependent upon the persuasive power of the message and the individual's total life history up to the point of reading the message and for some period of time afterward.

The total patterns of responses of the VC and NVA ralliers demonstrated that leaflets, far more than airborne loudspeaker messages, were effective in that they had contributed to the decisions and acts of ralliers. Unfortunately, the length of the interviews—which were designed to serve several different objectives and which were held to a maximum of four hours because of limitations imposed by POW Camp and Chieu Hoi Center regulations and schedules—did not permit intensive inquiry into the reasoning processes and emotional reactions associated with rallying.

The total patterns of responses of the VC and NVA prisoners indicated that a considerable number of prisoners, influenced to some extent by leaflet messages, may have surrendered or engineered their own capture deliberately as a way of surrendering that had less potential for future reprisal by their own side.

Once it was established that PSYOP messages were affecting decisions to rally or surrender, the reasoning processes and emotions that were experienced prior to rallying or to giving some degree of "cooperation" when becoming a prisoner—in other words, the "how" and "why" of deciding to rally or facilitate capture—increased greatly in importance. Despite the significance of this issue, contractual limitations on time and effort made it impossible to conduct a further study of both ralliers and prisoners; accordingly, NVA and VC ralliers were selected for a more intensive examination of motivation to rally.

An additional questionnaire and interviewing procedures were designed specifically for more penetrating investigation of the amount and nature of the influence actually exerted by the leaflet messages upon VC and NVA ralliers. One portion of the comprehensive interviewing procedure used with these samples was designed to identify the extent to which the PSYOP messages affected the enemy soldier's thinking and behavior, specifically in relation to defection. Another portion is designed to identify the ways in which the action of rallying first enters an individual's thoughts, the reasoning processes and emotional linkages involved in coming to accept rallying as a possible action, and the reasons for making and acting on a decision to rally. Narrative elaboration of responses was obtained to provide a check on the validity and reliability of initial brief answers. These responses provide useful descriptive detail and, if necessary, can be subjected to latent structure analysis to resolve inconsistencies.*

Arrangements were made for interviews to be conducted at the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon, at the Chieu Hoi Center in Bien Hoa, and at several other province centers by a trained anti-Vietnamese team of interviewers under the supervision of a Vietnamese Research Supervisor and an American Research Supervisor. Individuals were selected at random from administrative records and assigned to the appropriate category until samples of 100 VC and 100 NVA ralliers had been obtained with the combat: support ratio matched to that of the earlier groups of ralliers. Interviews required from one and one-quarter to one and one-half hours; each was conducted under adequate conditions for privacy and freedom of response.

Table 6 shows the percentages of the two samples of VC and NVA ralliers who had read leaflets, claimed to remember particular types of

*Latent structure analysis is a method used in the social sciences for scaling replies to questionnaires based on the assumption that contradictory or partially inconsistent replies can be explained in terms of the "latent class" or "latent distance" found in deeper underlying attitudes. The logic of the analysis resembles that of factor analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1954).

TABLE 6
ATTENTION TO PSYOP LEAFLETS

Question	First Sample		Second Sample	
	NVA	VC	NVA	VC
Read leaflets before rallying	93%	86%	89%	87%
Remember particular types of messages	87%	85%	89%	87%
Describe message content	87%	85%	89%	87%

leaflets, and could validate this report to a considerable extent by accurate recollection of themes or wording.

Comment. It is obvious by inspection that the statistics approach being identical. [sic]

Table 7 shows four different attitudes toward rallying that existed prior to the reading of PSYOP messages and the effects associated with having read the leaflets. An average of approximately twenty leaflets had been read before rallying; a large majority of the leaflets concerned rallying.

TABLE 7
EFFECT OF PSYOP MESSAGES ON DECISIONS ABOUT RALLYING

Attitude toward defection before reading leaflets	NVA (100)		VC (100)	
	Leaflets played part in decision to rally (Col. 1)*	Would not have rallied if had not read leaflets (Col. 2)*	Leaflets played part in decision to rally (Col. 1)*	Would not have rallied if had not read leaflets (Col. 2)*
"No Prior Consideration"				
Did not consider defection before reading leaflets	37%**	(32%)*	26%	(21%)
"Considering Other Method"				
Considering another means of defection before reading leaflets	66%	(63%)	19%	(63%)
"Undecided Re Method"				
Undecided about how to defect before reading leaflets	18%	(67%)	15%	(32%)
"Already Considering Rally"				
Wanted to rally even before reading leaflets	11%	(65%)	20%	(63%)
All Others	28%		27%	
	100%	47%	100%	(30%)

* Col. 2 is included in Col. 1

**For example: Among the 37 rallyers who did not consider defection before reading leaflets, 32% would not have rallied if they had not read the leaflets

Comment. The results in Table 7 show that 37 individuals in the NVA sample had not considered defection before reading GVN leaflets: among these 37, 32 would not have rallied if they had not read the leaflets. For the VC, the equivalent figures are 26% and 21%.

Of 6 NVA who were already considering some other form of defection prior to reading GVN leaflets, 3 would not have rallied if they had not read the leaflets. For the VC, the equivalent figures are 19% and 3%.

Among the 18 NVA who were undecided about a way in which to defect before reading GVN leaflets, 7 would not have rallied if they had not read leaflets. For the VC, the corresponding figures are 15% and 3%.

For the 11 NVA who already wanted to rally before having read GVN rally leaflets, 5 would not actually have rallied if they had not read leaflets. For the VC, the corresponding figures are 20% and 3%.

In summary, 47% of the NVA and 30% of the VC ralliers would not have rallied if they had not read GVN rally leaflets.

Table 8 shows the four gross groups treated in Table 7 (defined by attitude towards rallying before they read rally leaflets), broken down further into seven sub-groups and rearranged to show their relationship to the graded criteria for effectiveness described in Requirements 6a, 6b, 6c, and 6d.

Comment. The results in Table 8 show that the "No Prior Consideration/Would Not Have Defected" group—32% of the NVA ralliers and 21% of the VC ralliers—had not considered any form of defection prior to receiving PSYOP messages and judged that they would not have rallied if the messages had not been received. This pattern of reaction to the PSYOP message indicates the leaflets to have been a dominant factor in the act of rallying. This group, then, meets the requirements for PSYOP message effectiveness described in 6a.

Fifteen percent of NVA soldiers and 9% of VC soldiers (the total of those in the "Considered Other Method/Would Not Have Defected", "Undecided About Method/Would Not Have Defected", and "Already Considering Rally/Would Not Have Defected" sub-groups) had already been considering either a specific method of defection (not rally) or several alternative methods of defection (one of which might be rallying) or were already considering rallying before they read rally leaflets; these individuals reported that they would not have rallied if they had not read rally leaflets. This pattern of reaction to PSYOP messages indicates the leaflets to have been a major contributing factor in the decision to defect by means of rallying. This group, then, also meets the requirements for effectiveness described in 6a.

Nineteen percent of the NVA and 33% of the VC (the total of those in the "Considering Other Method/Would Have Defected in Some Way", "Undecided About Method/Would Have Defected in Some Way", and "No Prior Thought/Would Have Defected in Some Way" sub-groups) would have defected in some manner but had not decided upon rallying. For the 5 NVA and 5 VC in the "No Prior Thought/Would Have De-

TABLE 8
EFFECTS OF HAVING READ RALLY LEAFLETS EFFECTIVENESS (NOTE 1A)

Effectiveness Requirement	Before Reading Leaflets	Attitude toward Defection	After Reading Leaflets	NVA (200)	VC (189)
Dominant Factor (6a)	No prior thought of defection	Would not have defected	Rallied	32%	21%
Major Factor (6a)	Considering other method to defect	Would not have defected	Chose to Rally	43%	43%
Major Factor (6a)	Undecided about method to defect	Would not have defected	Chose to Rally	47%	43%
Major Factor (6a)	Already considering rally	Would not have rallied	Did Rally	45%	43%
Facilitating Factor (6b)	Considering other method to defect	Would have defected in some way	Chose to Rally	43%	16%
Facilitating Factor (6b)	Undecided about method to defect	Would have defected in some way	Chose to Rally	11%	12%
Facilitating Factor (6b)	No prior thought of defection	Would have defected in some way	Chose to Rally	45%	45%
6a, 6b	Total	Leaflets Contributed to Decision to Rally		66%	63%
6c, 6d	Total	Would Have Rallied Even if Had Not Read Leaflets		46%	17%
6d	Total	Rally Decision Not Affected by Leaflets		15%	49%
--	Total	Did Not Read Leaflets		13%	11%
				100%	100%

defected" sub-group, reading rally leaflets was a facilitating factor in their choice of rallying as a means of defection. For the 11 NVA and 12 VC in the "Undecided About Method/Would Have Defected" sub-group, reading rally leaflets tipped the scales toward rallying. This pattern of reaction to PSYOP messages indicates that the leaflets had a facilitating role in the final decisive act of rallying in that the leaflets caused rallying to be chosen rather than some other form of defection. These three sub-groups, then, meet the requirements for effectiveness described in 6b.

Below the double lines in Table 8 are shown the totals for the seven sub-groups of the NVA and VC samples that have been discussed so far; the totals are 66% and 63% respectively.

Immediately below the totals, the number appears of those in the "Already Considering Rally/Would Have Rallied Without Reading Leaflets" who would have rallied even if they had not read rally leaflets—6 NVA and 17 VC. Analysis of their narrative responses, which provides qualitative elaboration in the form of reasons for most answers, indicates that a majority of both groups had prior information about the Chieu Hoi Program from relatives, friends, or other sources; the sources may or may not have been motivated by PSYOP programs given such names as "Induce VC Kin to Rally". In overall context it appears certain that the leaflets, though not a determining factor, were read with some

TABLE 9
THEMES OF INFLUENTIAL LEAFLET MESSAGES

Leaflet Theme	VC (100)	NVA (100)
Family Sentiment	17%	10%
Death	15%	16%
GVN Welcome	08%	12%
Hardship	06%	---
Chance for New Life	04%	---
Useless Sacrifice in NLF	04%	---
Other	02%	12%
TOTAL	56%	50%

degree of serious attention. This group meets the requirements for effectiveness described in 6c and 6d.

A total of 15 NVA and 9 VC read rally leaflets but do not consider that the leaflets contributed to their rallying. While the simple act of reading a leaflet can be ascribed with equal justification to curiosity or boredom, as well as interest in gaining information, these individuals had read the leaflets thoroughly enough and often enough to remember specific kinds of leaflets and to recall message content. The responses of this sub-group clearly meet the requirements for effectiveness described in Requirement 6d.

In summary, PSYOP leaflet messages are effective in that approximately two-thirds of large samples of NVA and VC ralliers believe that the leaflet messages played a part in their decision to rally.

Effective Themes in Influential Messages.

Although those who read leaflets had read an average of about twenty and could recall a variety of themes, 56% of the VC soldiers and 50% of the NVA soldiers, or 53% of the total sample, said that a specific leaflet message had contributed to their decision to rally. The themes most frequently cited as specifically influential are shown in Table 9.

Nearly one-third had a leaflet with them when they rallied, 19% of the VC and 37% of the NVA. The primary reason given for not rallying sooner was the constant surveillance; the next most frequently cited reason was the fact that they had not yet come to believe what the leaflets said.

The Rally Decision Process

The process of reaching and acting on a decision to rally was probed with a structured series of questions about attitudes that existed when the term "Chieu Hoi" was first heard, at the time of actual rally, and at various times after rally.

Knowledge of the Chieu Hoi Program and arrival at some degree of confidence that the GVN will act in accordance with the policies it proclaims emerge as the primary factors in the constellation of developing

attitudes that eventually lead to rally. Motivation is two-factored: there can be motivation to leave the NLF and there can be motivation to join the GVN; the two motivations are separate and do not necessarily appear together. The two factors work together to move the individual in one direction; while the factor impelling the individual away from the Front ranks is fear and distrust, the factor impelling him to rally is some measure of hope and trust. In 200 responses, 200 different situations may be described at a "total detail" level of analysis. But overall there is a clearly discernible consistent general pattern that starts with initial disbelief, perhaps even intense dislike for the term "Chieu Hoi". This is followed by growing recognition of evidence of the truth of the messages, and a slow transition to acceptance of the belief that the GVN descriptions of the Chieu Hoi Policy are made in good faith. Once arrived at this opinion, if some factors motivate the individual to leave the Front and at the same time others motivate him to move toward the GVN, the decision to rally and the actual rally becomes only a matter of finding or making an opportunity.

Almost all of the ralliers placed their first consideration of the possibility of rallying at a point in time between one and two years before actually rallying. The most frequently cited reason was the fact that they did not yet believe fully in what the leaflets said. Investigation of the time lag between consideration of rallying and actually doing so, in cases where there was a considerable time gap between having made a decision to rally and the actual rally, indicate the primary reason was constant surveillance—the validity and generality of this reason is supported by the results of several more lengthy related studies not reported here.

Thus knowing about the Chieu Hoi Program, knowing how it works, knowing how to rally, knowing what to expect, believing that good treatment will be received, and staying alive long enough for accretion of credibility is essential in inducing rally. Family urging of the prospective rallier is particularly effective for VC, and for NVA where relatives or friends exist; the family can explain the program, can cite the well-being of other ralliers, and assist by escorting him to the rally point or by making prior arrangement for a safe reception when rallying.

In summary, the thinking and feeling processes that lead to a decision to rally operate over a one to two year time period if unusual situations do not occur.

SUMMARY

As one part of a total systems approach to the complex manifold problems involved in attempting to measure the effectiveness of PSYOP as a military function in a field operational setting (Vietnam), the basic ingredient of all PSYOP—messages—was selected for a total detail-level examination. For this task a total of 706 NVA and VC ralliers and prisoners was interviewed (200 NVA ralliers, 200 VC ralliers, 100 VC prisoners, and 200 NVA prisoners). The issue of effectiveness of PSYOP

messages was fractionated into six aspects or dimensions: proximity of media, clarity of reception, language appropriateness, thematic comprehensibility, credibility, and evocation of behavioral response. Questions applicable to each aspect were formulated and used to query the data resulting from the rallier and prisoner interviews.

Step-by-step analysis of the data in relation to the first five of the six criteria demonstrated the pre-eminence of leaflets and airborne loudspeakers as effective media in the sense that they do reach the enemy, are understood, and have some credibility. An even more searching test of the sixth question or criteria showed that leaflets, to a much greater extent than loudspeaker messages, were effective in that they contributed to the defection of two-thirds of the VC soldiers and two-thirds of the NVA soldiers sampled. Almost one-third of the VC and one-half of the NVA ralliers maintain they would not have defected if they had not read leaflet messages.

The authors advise that the results of this study and their implications be considered with caution. It is clear that the much-maligned leaflet has received unmerited disparagement from enthusiasts for other media but it must be remembered that leaflets represented about 95% of the planned PSYOP effort in Vietnam. It is not possible to say whether the same amount of expense and effort devoted to another media would produce equivalent returns and the problem cannot easily be subjected to cost-yield analysis.

EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO THE VIETNAM CONFLICT*

By RADIO FREE EUROPE

The results presented in this preliminary account of the effectiveness of Western international broadcasting efforts in the formation of East European opinions toward the U. S. involvement in Vietnam show RFE's audience covered a broad range of the attitudinal spectrum. The listeners were far from unanimous in approving U. S. policy.

INTRODUCTION: SAMPLE AND METHOD

This is a preliminary report, based on interviews with 583 Hungarians, 569 Poles, and 261 Czechs and Slovaks—1,413 respondents in all. Interviewed in four West European countries, they were in nine cases out of ten on temporary visits to the West and have since returned home; only 10% of the sample comprised defectors, refugees, and emigrants.

* * * * *

Among the 1,413 respondents, there was a predominance of males, urbanites, and the better-educated, with a disproportionate number fit-

*Excerpts from "East European Attitudes to the Vietnam Conflict: A Study in Radio Effectiveness," Radio Free Europe, Audience and Public Opinion Research Department, July 1967.

ting into the higher occupational categories. Overall, the general run of the interviewees consisted of "opinion leaders."

The interviews were done by independent research institutes in various West European countries, the interviewers being in no way identified with Radio Free Europe.

I. Attitudes To The United States Course in Vietnam

Respondents were asked whether they considered the U.S. course in Vietnam to be "right," "wrong," or "right in some respects and wrong in others." In Table 1, half the Hungarian and Polish samples and nearly half the Czechoslovak were critical of American policy in Vietnam.

II. The Most Important Factors in Attitude-Formation Toward The U.S. Course in Vietnam

Once his attitude toward the U.S. course in Vietnam had been ascertained, each respondent was asked to select from a list the influences he thought had contributed to his opinion. The list included the three major mass-communication media (press, radio, television) as well as informal channels ("discussion with friends and relatives"); he could also indicate that, mistrusting contradictory influences, he had used his own resources ("thinking the matter over by yourself"). Lastly, each respondent was encouraged to volunteer unlisted influences (few did volunteer any).

Table 2, shows the five items in the order in which they were submitted to the respondents. Radio, standing fifth in the order of submission, was the most frequently cited influence in two samples and the second most frequently cited one in the third, a result that argues against any link between responses and placement in the list.

Radio was the strongest influence among the Hungarians and the Poles, and the second strongest among the Czechs and Slovaks. The frequency of the "discussions" and "thinking it over" responses in all three samples is typical for the attitude formation process as seen by the respondents involved.

Television in all three samples turned out to be less important not only than radio and newspapers but than the two other options as well. Only in the Polish sample did television emerge as an important attitude-forming factor. As for newspapers, their showing was significant. Radio, it must

Table 1

	"What do you think of the U. S. course in Vietnam?"		
	Hungarians	Poles	Czechoslovaks
	%	%	%
Right	19	31	38
Right in some respects and wrong in others	26	20	17
Wrong	50	49	44
No answer	5	*	1
	100%	100%	100%

*Less than 0.5%

be remembered, refers to both regime-controlled broadcasts and the uncensored ones from abroad; newspapers on the other hand refer, in practical terms, to the communist press alone.

	Hungarians	Poles	Czechs/Slovaks
Listening to the radio	57%	71%	53%
Reading the newspapers	47%	60%	53%

The above figures suggest that radio listeners (including listeners to Western radio) may not be impervious to the tendentious "interpretation" of the U.S. course in Vietnam carried by the Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak press.

III. Reference to RFE, VOA, BBC, And The Domestic Radios As "Important" in Forming Opinions About Vietnam

Those who regarded "listening to the Radio" as an important influence on their Vietnam opinions were asked to specify stations. For the purposes of this preliminary report, minor Western stations were disregarded. [The results are in Table 3.]

Of the three major Western stations, the only one with an impact approaching that of the domestic radios on attitudes to Vietnam was RFE. Among Poles, Radio Warsaw and RFE were specified about equally, another indication of RFE's authority in Poland.

The Hungarian interviewees cited Radio Budapest somewhat more often than the Poles cited Radio Warsaw, and they mentioned RFE somewhat less often than the Poles did. This result is hardly surprising. Table 4 shows that Hungarian respondents hostile to the U.S. course in Vietnam outnumber its supporters even among the regular RFE listeners.

In the Czechoslovak sample, references to radio—both the domestic broadcasts and RFE's—occurred less frequently than in the other two samples. The importance Czechs and Slovaks accorded to "thinking the

Table 2

"Which of the following were important to you in helping you to form this opinion (on the U.S. course in Vietnam)?"			
	Hungarians %	Poles %	Czechs/Slovaks %
"Discussion with friends and relatives"	52	57	48
"Thinking the matter over by yourself"	49	69	75
"Reading the newspapers"	45	69	53
"Watching television"	20	53	27
"Listening to the radio"	57	71	53
Other answers	3	1	—
	228%*	311%*	251%*

*More than 100% because of multiple answers.

Table 3

"Which stations were important to you in helping you to form this opinion [on the U.S. course in Vietnam]?"			
	Hungarians	Poles	Czechs/Slovaks
Domestic radio	43	40	30
RFE	23	39	26
BBC	13	12	7
VOA	6	10	6

matter over by themselves" (see Table 2) suggested a measure of distrust for all communications media.

The differences among the Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak results should not obscure the fact that a quarter of the Czechoslovak, a third of the Hungarian, and two-fifths of the Polish respondents ascribed to RFE a decisive influence on their Vietnam attitudes. Combining the three national samples produces the following results:

Domestic radio	40%
RFE	34%
BBC	11%
VOA	8%

For every respondent whose attitudes to Vietnam were influenced by BBC, nearly four were influenced by the regime station. The comparable ratio for VOA was 1:5. Of the three major Western stations, obviously only RFE is at present capable of effectively challenging the domestic radio on issues like Vietnam.

IV. Attitudes To The U.S. Course In Vietnam By Regular RFE Listeners

Table 4, below, compares the attitudes of regular RFE listeners (defined as people who tune in more than once a week) with those of the others in the three samples. Irregular listening (less than once a week) was reported by under 10% of the interviewees. The "others" therefore consist mainly of non-listeners.

Table 4

Attitudes of Regular RFE Listeners and "Others" to the U S Course in Vietnam						
	HUNGARIANS		POLES		CZECHS/SLOVAKS	
	Regular RFE listeners %	Others %	Regular RFE listeners %	Others %	Regular RFE listeners %	Others %
U S course is right	26	11	43	20	46	32
partly right, partly wrong	36	17	25	16	18	15
wrong	37	63	30	64	35	52
No answer	1	9	2	-	1	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Interestingly, the degree of approval by regular RFE listeners was lowest among the Hungarians, higher among the Poles, and highest (although by a very narrow margin) among the Czechs and Slovaks, while the same ranking, at a considerably lower quantitative level, prevailed among the "others." It is equally significant that the only sample in which regular RFE listeners opposing the U.S. course in Vietnam (37%) outnumbered those favoring it (26%) was the Hungarian, in which the "others" rejected the U.S. course by a six to one ratio.

The Polish results deserve scrutiny. They indicate an especially close rapport between RFE and its Polish regular listeners, as shown by the very sharp split between the attitude patterns of the regular listeners and the others. Polish approval of the U.S. course in Vietnam was twice as frequent—and disapproval half as frequent—among regular RFE listeners as among the "others." In regard to regular RFE listeners, the proposition of unqualified opponents of the U.S. course in Vietnam was smaller for the Poles than for the Hungarians or even the Czechs and Slovaks.

A quantitative expression of the differences between the attitudes of RFE's regular listeners and the others can be given by a *net approval index* of both groups in the three national samples. The index is computed by subtracting negative attitudes ("U.S. course is wrong") from positive attitudes ("U.S. course is right")—disregarding indecisive answers and refusals.

	NET APPROVAL INDEX	
	Regular RFE Listeners	Others
Poles	+18%	-52%
Czechs/Slovaks	+14%	-24%
Hungarians	-18%	-70%

The degree of attitudinal difference between the regular RFE listeners and the others is, for each of the three countries, expressed by the "distance" between the two figures. That distance is the largest in the case of the Polish sample—"70". The Hungarian sample ("52") follows, and then the Czechoslovak sample ("38"). Looked at in this way, the impact of RFE upon its Polish regular listeners appears extremely impressive. They provided the highest net approval index for the U.S. course in Vietnam in spite of a powerful hostility on this score among the remainder of the Polish sample. By the same token, RFE's impact on its regular listeners in Czechoslovakia seems to be less decisive—with regard to Vietnam—than in either Poland or Hungary, since Czechoslovak public opinion, as reflected by the preliminary findings under discussion, is generally less hostile to the U.S. course in Vietnam. It has already been shown (Section III) that Table 4's evidence of RFE's variant impact among regular listeners in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland has the support of other data.

V. Evidence Of Direct Effect Of RFE On Attitudes to Vietnam

The 476 Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak interviewees who regarded RFE as an important influence on their attitude toward Vietnam were asked to specify *how* RFE broadcasts affected their opinions. [See Table 5]

Nearly half of the Hungarians, nearly two-fifths of the Czechoslovaks, and nearly a third of the Poles who listed RFE as an important influence on their attitude to Vietnam (see Table 2) revealed that RFE was *the* decisive influence. It was RFE which "made them think the way they do" or which, less frequently, dissipated an earlier attitude and thus "changed their opinion."

Table 5

"Did listening to RFE	Hungarians %	Poles %	Czechoslovaks %
confirm the opinion you already had"	31	41	52
make you think the way you do"	44 } 46	22 } 31	31 } 36
change your opinion"	2 }	9 }	5 }
leave your opinion unchanged"	26	26	6
No answer	2	2	6
	108%	100%	100%

*More than 100% because of some multiple answers.

Significantly, RFE's attitude-forming role was most pronounced in the case of the Hungarians, who represent a public opinion predominantly hostile to the U.S. course in Vietnam (see Table 1). In this generally critical climate, tendentious regime propaganda about the war itself, emphasizing its "David and Goliath" aspect, exerts a heavier impact. And, more important, "discussions with others" tend to reinforce negative rather than positive attitudes toward the U.S. line in Vietnam. Under such circumstances, positive attitudes to the U.S. course in Vietnam are more strongly in need of RFE's support in Hungary than, for instance, in Czechoslovakia.

GENERALLY, A MASS MEDIUM IS ALREADY CONSIDERED VERY EFFECTIVE WHEN IT SUCCEEDS IN REINFORCING EXISTING ATTITUDES. TABLE 5 CLEARLY SHOWS THAT, AS FAR AS THE VIETNAM ISSUE IS CONCERNED, RFE'S IMPACT WENT BEYOND REINFORCEMENT: IN A LARGE NUMBER OF CASES ATTITUDES WERE ACTUALLY FORMED AND CHANGED!

CONCLUSIONS

Attitudes to the U.S. course in Vietnam may be regarded as a sound test of RFE's impact and effectiveness as a communicator in East Central

Europe. The Vietnam issue is salient enough to provoke opinions (only 5% or less failed to answer the first question) but still stands apart from the respondents' most immediate personal concerns.

Two findings desire particular emphasis:

1) Many interviewees indicated that their attitudes to the U.S. course in Vietnam were formed under the direct influence of RFE. The implication is that any full or partial endorsement of American policy was due not to a general predisposition in favor of "U.S. courses" but to the specific content of RFE communications on the subject of Vietnam.

2) RFE listeners were far from unanimous in approving the U.S. policy in Vietnam.

This is an important finding. It indirectly reasserts that RFE listeners are an integral part of the active public opinion by which they are influenced and which they in turn can influence. Had the results shown the attitudinal patterns of RFE listeners on this issue to be the exact opposite of the remainders of the three samples, there would have been a question of whether or not RFE's Vietnam broadcasts "preach only to the converted." By extension, RFE could have been suspected of talking to the completely disaffected and them alone. Whatever the actual numbers of the disaffected, their role in any gradual and patient transformation of economic, political, and "power" relationships from within can be only limited. The results presented in this preliminary report show that RFE's audience covers a broad range of the attitudinal spectrum. There seems to be no danger that the station's message might fail to reach those people, both inside the "Communist Establishment" and outside it, through whom progressive changes in East Central Europe must come.

USING MOTION PICTURES TO AID INTER-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION*

BY NEIL P. HURLEY, S. J.

The author, who has experimented with screen education, believes there are three types of film. He outlines six rules which explain why motion pictures are capable of creating intercultural bonds among peoples of the world. Twelve films are evaluated in terms of their contribution to intercultural communication

From their very inception, motion pictures enjoyed a world-wide appeal. Without the barrier of language and all the accompanying cultural and psychological associations, films crossed political boundaries with the ease of the weather. Charlie Chaplin, of all the performers on the silent screen, became known rapidly by such endearing names as Charlot (France), Carlos (Spain), Carlito (Latin America), and Karlchen (Germany, Austria and Switzerland). Vision became language as the silent

*From *The Journal of Communication*, XVIII (June 1968), pp. 97-108. Reprinted with the permission of the *Journal of Communication*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

film learned to touch that universal cord latent in mankind. True, there were still cultural factors which influenced popularity in varying degrees. For example, Griffith's "The Birth of a Nation" was a distinct product of American culture just as Eisenstein's "Potemkin" was unmistakably a Soviet statement. Nevertheless, in both instances, the audiences overlooked the conditioning factors of time and space as the magic of the camera depicted mutiny, slavery, rebellion, death, and sacrifice in an historical reconstruction hitherto unknown to mankind. In the pre-talkie era, motion pictures served as channels of inter-cultural communication.

Yes, motion pictures ushered twentieth-century man into the "imaging revolution" where psychology was as important as logic, where social context ranked with the traditional moral evaluation of the individual, where mood rivalled categorical statements, and emotion was as weighty as reason. Perhaps the end of "typographic man," to use Marshall McLuhan's phrase, came between the two great wars when a global audience made up of all classes, races, creeds, ages, and sexes could, for a modest admission fee, see the implications and consequences of human involvement in every conceivable circumstance of life. Women vibrated in empathy with Greta Garbo in her tragic portrayals of Anna Karenina, Queen Christina, and Mata Hari, and were attracted by Douglas Fairbanks and Ramon Novarro. Men learned about *femmes fatales* such as Pola Negri and Marlene Dietrich and identified with heroes such as William S. Hart, Clark Gable, and Leslie Howard. Children learned about the Wild West, gangsterism, war, and the adult world through a Tom Mix, a James Cagney, a Jean Gabin, a Humphrey Bogart, a Frederic March, or a Charles Laughton.

Unfortunately, because motion pictures have been seen largely as a profit-seeking venture; educators, parents, and the cultural guardians of society have been late in recognizing its potential as a formative and informative instrument for creating the bases of community: shared experiences at the affective and cognitive levels. One reason is that the image is so close to us that we take it for granted. Curiously children understand pictures more readily than adults as Antoine de Saint-Exupery indicated in *The Little Prince*. Whenever he drew a boa constrictor which has swallowed an elephant, adults thought it was a hat until he drew the elephant inside the swollen body of the boa constrictor. Something very similar takes place in the cinema. We see the thematic expression but not the non-thematic reality with which the film artists have to work. The hidden elephant in every media experience is the set of rules of the particular communications game. For instance, there are six such rules which explain why motion pictures are capable of creating intercultural bonds among peoples of the world.

1. A physical law—that a transparent plastic material sufficiently flexible to unwind from a reel could produce a number of swiftly moving still images.

2. A physiological law—that an image on the retina of the eye persists long enough to give the illusion of continuity when successive still pictures are passed rapidly before a spectator.

3. A psychological law—that through skillful editing and montage, induced associations from memory, mind, and imagination suggest the inner life of persons photographed in illusory motion.

4. A sociological law—that any group of individuals emerges more cohesive in sentiment and purpose after a common communications experience.

5. An anthropological law—that people have curiosity about other peoples and want to learn *how* they meet the four essential *whats* of life: (a) survival and development; (b) love and hate; (c) authority and disobedience; (d) belief systems—integration in the present social order or protest against it.

6. An ethico-religious principle—based on identification: (a) negatively with villainy; and (b) positively with self-sacrifice and vicarious suffering.

It is interesting that these six rules of cinematic experience seem to be bound up inextricably with certain constants of reality. In summary, we are saying that man has discovered a way of recording both visually and aurally experiences of nature, life, and human activity so that a mirror-image of reality permits man to discover himself and the world about him in greater depth. Let us now show more concretely how film can enable the human process of personal and social existence to be better understood, thus furthering inter-cultural understanding.

The author has experimented with screen education in both Chile and the United States for more than two years, at both the high school and university level in social science and religion courses. Films proved an especially valuable ally in such courses, especially for beginners. The author discovered that there are three types of film:

1. films peculiarly apt for members of a given society;
2. films which reveal important differences between cultures in a way which is fresh and non-polemic;
3. films which are transcendental and incorporate members of all cultures indiscriminately into a state of mind characterized by solidarity and allegiance to the human race.

The twelve films which the author has found particularly illuminating in teaching certain traditional disciplines are:

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1. The Leopard | 7. Children Adrift |
| 2. Zorba the Greek | 8. Mint Tea |
| 3. Hombre | 9. Phoebe |
| 4. The Lilies of the Field | 10. Le Boulevard de Saint Laurent |
| 5. West Side Story | 11. The World of Marshall McLuhan |
| 6. The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner | 12. The Parable |

The first six films are full length commercial movies, while the last six are short subjects ranging from twenty minutes to an hour in length. The film, *The World of Marshall McLuhan*, was a television program now available from the National Broadcasting Company in color.

1. *The Leopard*, a film directed by Visconti from the novel by Giuseppe di Lampedusa, had an extraordinary impact on Chileans when it was shown in Santiago in 1964, because the presidential election later that year heralded radical changes in the social structure of Chile. A country with great concentration of wealth, especially land, Chile found itself facing the same social upheaval so dramatically described by di Lampedusa in his novel on the passing of the *ancien régime* in Sicily.

The graphic representation of drastic social reform by Garibaldi's "red shirts" on the island of Sicily in 1884 produced historical echoes in those fearing a Communist victory at the polls. The important points which emerged as focal issues for Chilean viewers of *The Leopard* were:

a. Economics—the importance of relating concrete commercial transactions and circumstances of economic power to a cultural framework.

b. Psychology—the difficulty of regressing from a higher standard of living to a lower standard of living and the opportunistic psychology of the *nouveaux riches* who emerge to fill the social vacuum left by the displacement of the feudal nobility.

c. Sociology—the implications of abrupt social change and the passing of one social code where honor and status predominate to one where wealth and influence matter.

d. Religion—the ties between religious conviction and social stability, showing that the environment is a conditioning factor in religious observance.

2. *Zorba the Greek*. A rendition by Jules Dassin of Nicolai Kazantzakis' novel by the same name, this film is an admirable example of the thesis of Marshall McLuhan that "the medium is the message" and that oral cultures produce "cool types" such as Zorba and print cultures "hot types" such as Zorba's English employer. According to McLuhan, a "cool type" is mysterious, uninhibited, with little sense of time, while a "hot type" reveals a clearly defined, time-conscious, orderly, and efficient personality structure.

It is interesting that Latin audiences see in Zorba a resourceful, fun-loving person with dignity and freedom, not a parasitic, amoral, indolent character such as an Anglo/Saxon audience sees. On the other hand, Latins tend to interpret pejoratively the narrator who is Zorba's boss. For them he is a slave of the clock, overly serious, and a captive of an arbitrary and unreal set of convictions about honesty, fidelity, and industriousness.

The film is far from being a great film, one of the chief weaknesses being the lack of psychological preparation the audience receives for the narrator's sudden conversion to the belief system of Zorba. Despite its defects, the film is admirable as a basis for intercultural understanding,

especially in terms of how characterology is intimately related to a specific communications matrix.

3. *Hombre*. A picture directed by Martin Ritt is excellent for giving expression to minority views. In one of Hollywood's rare exceptions to the classic cowboy film, the Mexican and Indian characters are shown in a favorable light with the "white man" portrayed in a villainous light. The long-standing paternalism of both the Anglo and the male is subtly examined in a suspense-ridden movie in which the dialogue moves even swifter than the action.

The heroism which the picture portrays rests on the notion of vicarious suffering. For this reason it has appeal to youth especially in an age of iconoclasm and skepticism. The film is saved from pathos by an excellent portrayal of the Indian hero by Paul Newman. It is never clear why he goes on the stage-coach trip with the others, but plot lapses such as these are forgivable when compensated for by sustained creative achievement elsewhere in the film. As an obvious intercultural bridge, *Hombre* shares with *Zorba* the advantage of immense appeal to peoples in the underdeveloped world where the ethos of thrift, hard work, and wealth have not taken hold. These same audiences invariably like films such as the *Apu* trilogy of Satyajit Ray, De Sica's *Shoeshine* and *Bicycle Thief*, and John Ford's *The Grapes of Wrath* and *How Green was my Valley*. It is interesting that some pictures find greater popularity abroad than at home (*The Blackboard Jungle*, *Rebel Without a Cause*, *David and Lisa*).

4. *Lilies of the Field*—Another excellent example of how film can portray national types. The plot centers on an urban Protestant Negro, self-sufficient but not self-conscious, and a strict German Catholic nun, domineering by instinct. The contrast between the two is well-drawn, especially in the scene when Sidney Poitier, as the Negro, defends his pluralistic belief system to the unyielding Mother Superior. This confrontation is the beginning of mutual respect and even fondness.

Other touches which many audiences miss and which only a second viewing can disclose is the mediating role which Sidney Poitier plays between the Mexican-Americans and the nuns. He is a blend of "hot" and "cool," to use McLuhan's categories. He stands up to the White Southern Protestant and his prejudices; he makes friends with the Mexican cafe owner, caught between the culture he came from and the one in which he finds himself; and he appeals to the Irish-American Catholic priest who serves the region with his mobile church van.

Curiously, Poitier is the stranger, the wanderer, the pilgrim. But this marginal man proves to be all things to all men. He wins the affections of all the different racial, religious and class groups; he is at home with the vortex of social change; he knows that to be is to be different; he needs no privileged cultural cocoon or environmental prop. He is the only character of the film who is living in the present; all the others are tilted toward the past.

5. *West Side Story*. This stunning film blends music, choreography, and color in a patent inter-cultural example. Borrowing from the feud of the Capulets and the Montagues in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, the picture transplants the scene from Verona to upper west side Manhattan. The white gang and the Puerto Rican "pandilla" provide the backdrop of racial tension for the poignant love affair between the Puerto Rican girl and the Anglo-Saxon youth.

Latin American audiences react fearfully, as a rule, to this film. For example, Chilean audiences saw the threat of American imperialism as an imminent one. They miss the references in the film which portray the Latin reaction to the shadowy side of life in America as well as the voluntary nature of the Puerto Rican migration to New York. Nevertheless, Latins sympathize with the film, finding in it a vehicle of authentic expression of some of their most basic values and emotional responses.

The film offers perhaps greater rewards to Anglo-Saxon audiences, particularly those people who are inadequately informed concerning Latin America. Some still believe that it is a giant seedbed of caudillos, revolutions and anti-Americanism, characterized mainly by the bossa nova, the rhumba, bootblacking, begging, and banana crops. A film such as *West Side Story*, if discussed in a mixed group of Anglos and Latins, can do much to bring into sharper focus the mutual image each group has of the other and the underlying value-system which supports it.

6. *The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner*. Directed by Tony Richardson, this film cuts across many boundaries of class, culture, and creed to touch a universal chord in man. The film has a peculiar appeal to adolescents because it sensitively portrays how the "establishment world" of authority and adults is seen subjectively by a youth from Nottingham who has been sentenced to Borstal Reform School for theft. *The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner* offers the adult world a reflection of themselves in the mirror of youth.

The inter-cultural value of this existential motion picture is that it unites the rebellious and the protesting elements against those who hold the reins of power and sanction. Highly credible, this picture appeals to all cultures where the adolescent revolt has taken root. Since the death of James Dean, the phenomenon of Colin Smith is world-wide: the *blousons noirs* of France, the *Teddy Boys* of Holland, the *Halbstarken* of Germany, and the *Stilyagi* of Russia. In the television scene, we see Colin and his friend turn off the sound and ridicule the adult world with its empty rhetoric and moralizing postures. The communication's "short-circuit" between generations has never been shown more forcefully.

SELECTED SHORT FEATURES

7. *Children Adrift*. This French filmette is ideal for inter-cultural exchanges. The author has found that this tender film about the life of children in a metropolitan banlieu gives a convincing portrayal of the joys and the sorrows of vagrant children. In the Inter-American conference

held at the University of Notre Dame last May, this film welded together the sentiments of both Latin Americans and North Americans. The culture of poverty is as real as the culture of youth and, we might add, for many just as unknown.

Children Adrift is a highly visual film, almost worthy to be called silent. As such, it does not jar any national sensibility or trigger any defensive mechanism. Since the world of slum-dwelling children is, essentially, a nonthreatening experience, a multi-national audience will usually let down the psychological barriers and become united in the deeper community of the family of man.

8. *Mint Tea*—Another French film which appealed to the Notre Dame Inter-American Conference, mainly because it portrayed loneliness within the soul of a homosexual. Centered on persons whom we meet in a Parisian sidewalk cafe, the picture shows the inability of a young, effeminate-looking man to relate to those around him. The close-ups (the sideward glances, the immobile face, the empty gaze) serve to heighten the young man's state of incommunicability.

Unfortunately we know deviant behavior only through statistics, sensational newspaper accounts, and documentaries, but rarely through the eyes of the artist. Not since Fritz Lang's *M* gave us a compassionate account of a child-murderer, have we seen such serious treatment of what society calls abnormal. One of the fine touches of *Mint Tea* is the final scene of an elderly gentleman seated alone with his tea.

9. *Phoebe* is a product of the Film Board of Canada. It is remarkable from several points of view. Its psychological power lies in the ability of the teen-age Phoebe, pregnant and unwed, to communicate with her boyfriend, her parents, and the school authorities. Furthermore, it shows the social context of her home, suggesting why she might have sought affection in the way she did. Artistically, *Phoebe* is a celluloid cameo with superb angle shots and mood scenes. Its handling of what Henri Bergson called "inner time" is splendid. By drawing out Phoebe's imagined confession to her mother, we are reminded of Eisenstein's classic bridge scene in the *Forty Days That Shook the World*. Another fine artistic touch is the baroque trio on the beach who imbue the film with a Fellini-like quality.

The intercultural contribution of *Phoebe* as cinema is its transcendental theme. Avoiding the moralist's temptation to portray as sordid an immature romance, *Phoebe* spells out delicately the ramifications of young love consummated. We do not know what Paul will do when Phoebe calls him to tell him about their future child. We have seen her previously imagine the worst (his running away) and the best (his taking her into his arms and promising to get a job). The workings of the adolescent female imagination is brilliantly achieved with rapid shuttle-like scenes between extreme optimism and extreme pessimism.

Again we have a subtle indictment of the adult world, but one so masterfully achieved that national and cultural considerations create no obstacle to appreciation. The author has found that in Chile teen-agers of

the middle and upper class accepted Phoebe's plight as an accurate representation.

10. *Le Boulevard de Saint Laurent*—Another film of the Film Board of Canada. The depressing scenes of the Bowery section of Montreal create a striking visual impact which surmounts the barrier of the difficult French soundtrack.

The film portrays several forms of asocial behavior but in suchwise that we see human beings and not merely agents of socially repugnant conduct. The viewer is more inclined to compassion than condemnation. Starting with a nightclub "strip-tease," we are taken on a camera tour of *Le Boulevard de Saint Laurent*. It is mostly "night people" who fill the screen with only occasional shots of dishevelled women and dirty men sitting on park benches or shuffling along in the daytime.

In showing the film to young college girls from the upper class of Santiago, the author insisted that we were not looking at a certain section of Montreal but that every large city has its equivalent of *Le Boulevard de Saint Laurent*. The students applauded and expressed their sincere thanks, demonstrating that social evil can be portrayed in a way which serves humanistic, supra-national purposes. The reaction of students from different nations is unvariably one which recalls Terence's dictum: "*Nil humanum puto a me alienum.*"

11. *The World of Marshall McLuhan*—A film copy of a one-hour television show based on the book which McLuhan published with Quentin Fiore: *The Medium is the Message*. We earlier made reference to McLuhan's thesis that "the medium is the message" in commenting on *Zorba the Greek*. McLuhan's latest elaboration of this thesis in the form of a pun states that most people live not in the present but in the previous environment. Apart from the avant-garde artists and astute students of social change and cultural flux, the great majority look through a historical rear-view mirror (recall *The Lilies of the Field*). To borrow computer terminology, only a few live in "real time," where knowledge can be used to shape the present.

This film documents McLuhan's observations with brilliant sequences of overlapped images, out-of-sight voices, out-of-focus shots, and feverish intercutting of scenes *à la Eisenstein*. The younger generation find McLuhan refreshing and provocative. The film as a rule, irritates older people. How such films divide audiences is a significant cross-cultural phenomenon. The younger generation, products of the "electronic age," basically sympathize with McLuhan. This has been the author's experience in his teaching experiences in both North and Latin America. *The World of Marshall McLuhan*, captures viewers in diverse cultures, compelling them to co-create the experience. Disconnected, suggestive, a Joycean "stream-of-consciousness" experience, this film can help bring prepared viewers to understand the bias in media and, consequently, the perceptual prejudices which are unconsciously smuggled into every culture.

12. *The Parable*—A film made by the Protestant Council of New York for presentation at the 1964 New York World's Fair. It is a remarkable attempt to use the medium of cinema to convey to 20th century mankind the significance of Christ's life and message. In a sense, both can easily become historical relics, recalling the McLuhan insight that we live life backward and not forward. In order to bring freshness to the gospel story, the makers of *The Parable* resort to a circus background. It is ironic that the spirit of Christ must be clothed in the character of a clown. What he does, however, is ridiculous: exposing himself to the anger of the powerful by helping the underprivileged (the worker, the unemancipated woman, the victim of racial injustices). Finally comes the scene of the clown's voluntary death: an agonizing death scene in the harness of one of the live marionettes, aloft in the high rotunda of the circus tent.

The author led eight film discussions on *The Parable* in Chile with laity and clergy, atheists and Marxists, youth and adults. The diversity of interpretations clearly indicate that the film is a true parable. That is to say, just as in Christ's parables, so too in this film, there are many levels of meaning, some more overt than others. Three points in particular are interesting:

a. Marxists, atheists, and not a few Christians perceive a subtle criticism of organized religion. Thus the tent top in the parallel-crucifixion scene, some claim, looks like a church cupola; the youthful spectators wear cowl-like hoods; the harness-wires are jerked to the sounds of something close to church chimes. The impression is one of prophetic judgment on all institutions as accomplices in the death of the Christ-figure.

b. There is a strong insinuation that the followers of the Christ-figure have not caught His message. They seem to be aloof from the march of history, colorfully portrayed by a succession of decorative floats bearing the names of nations. Just as the picture ends, the man on the donkey seems to veer off onto a side path, no longer part of the parade. Although the evidence is scanty, it is not demonstrably clear that the master of the marionettes undergoes a conversion. Some viewers maintain that he puts on the clown's grease paint to dissimulate the Christ in order to sow discord. These would also hold that the figure on the donkey in the final scene is not the same as at the beginning, but rather the disguised master of the marionettes.

c. It is not certain that there is a resurrection of Christ for we only see a springtime scene of peace and harmony but no physical person resembling the clown. The last scene is reminiscent of the first and cannot be thought to be a clear sign of a physical resurrection.

The intercultural power of this film needs no special argument. The figure of Christ is of transcendental interest and the multiple interpretations carefully folded into the picture, either deliberately or inadvertently, give free play for the imaginations and minds of viewers with divergent backgrounds. The film succeeds in teaching many things ac-

according to the capacity of those learning. As such it is well-named *The Parable* and revitalizes contemporary mankind's jaded perception of the Christ who taught in parables.

In a world growing smaller and smaller due to satellites, TV, computers, and lasers, it is imperative that attention be given to programming which transcends provincial interests. The author is convinced that underlying the undeniable differences of men and nations, there is a sameness, not a monochromatic sameness, but an inexhaustible wealth of sensibility, spirit, and emotional resonance. We are at an evolutionary juncture where we are seeing civilization in the singular. Our education must recognize that the "image" is the worldwide language which can unite men in the depths of their being across all known barriers of sex, race, class, nation, politics, and religion.

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING* **

By FRANCIS S. RONALDS, JR.

International broadcasting is defined as broadcasts prepared in one country but intended for other countries. The discussion of its trends and implications suggests a growing importance.

The world may become a global village some day, and home receivers may be picking up audio and video signals via satellite from all over the world. But that "some day" will not be soon, certainly not in this decade and probably not in the next.

On the other hand, if we judge by the investments going into transmitters for use in external propaganda efforts via short- and medium-wave radio, and if we accept estimates that the number of short-wave radios will nearly double during the seventies, then there is no doubt that international broadcasting is alive and well, enjoying healthy middle age.

DEFINITIONS

Before examining the above claims, let us define terms. Just what is international broadcasting?

... I exclude domestic broadcasting in foreign countries and speak solely of broadcasts prepared in one country but intended for other countries. Such "external" broadcasts may be mounted by governments, either officially as external services or unofficially as clandestine stations, by "public/private corporations," by religious groups, and by commercial

*Special thanks for help in preparing this paper go to Mrs. Barbara Schiele, VOA's inexhaustible fount of facts and figures on the subject.

**Excerpts from "The Future of International Broadcasting," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 398 (November 1971), pp. 71-80. Reprinted with the permission of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the courtesy of the author.

operations. Most of the major international broadcasters, including Moscow, Radio Peking, Radio Cairo, the Voice of America (VOA), and the Deutsche Welle (the external radio of the West German government) belong to the first category. At the moment of writing, there are seventeen Communist and fourteen non-Communist clandestine radio stations. The British Broadcasting Corporation and certain Commonwealth stations patterned after it, including the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, are granted appropriations by Parliament but are not directly controlled by the government currently in power. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty . . . [may] be converted into similar "public/private" corporations. . . . Radio Peace and Progress, although housed in the same building as Radio Moscow, purports to be supported by Soviet public organizations. . . .

Major religious broadcasters. . . may carry news but . . . concentrate on bringing the word of God to people who might otherwise be deprived of it.

* * * * *

One service of Radio Cairo beams out recitations from the Koran for 98 hours a week. Of the commercial broadcasters carrying international services, the largest are Radio Luxembourg and Europe Number One--the latter located in the Saar. Their audiences are estimated in the tens of millions. The Commercial Service of the Ceylonese Broadcasting Corporation, although not described as an external service, would not be so lucrative if it were not for its millions of listeners in India.

I am aware of only one television station with an "external" service: Tallin TV is beamed across the Baltic in Swedish and Finnish. There are, however, important "spillover" audiences for a few TV and many national radio stations. Of political significance is the considerable if unmeasurable viewership for Austrian TV across the borders in Hungary and Czechoslovakia; there is a lot of cross-watching between East and West Germany, particularly in the Berlin area; and Estonians can pick up and understand Finnish TV programs.

Listening to a foreign country's domestic radio broadcasts is traditional in Europe, where some powerful medium- and long-wave signals virtually blanket the continent. Accra is heard throughout Anglophone West Africa, Radio Conakry in the French-speaking countries, and Nairobi is popular throughout East Africa. Refugees from China report listening to Cantonese programs from Hong Kong. The U.S. Armed Forces Radio-Television System, broadcasting only in English for troops stationed abroad, is believed to have a very large audience, particularly in Germany, Japan, and Southeast Asia. However, even though spillover listening to such programs may have international political consequences, they cannot rightly be labeled "international broadcasts." With the United Arab Republic, on the other hand, it is difficult to distinguish domestic from external broadcasts. Radio Cairo's three 500-kilowatt medium-wave transmitters can be heard throughout the Near East and North Africa, as

well as in the UAR itself. Its Arabic programing is generally aimed at Arabs everywhere.

In the case of certain international broadcasters, direct listening is supplemented by relays and by "placement." A great many Commonwealth nations continue to relay BBC newscasts and other programs on domestic facilities. Hundreds of stations south of the Rio Grande regularly relay portions of VOA programs in Spanish and Portuguese; two-thirds of Latin America's 3,600 medium-wave stations carried VOA coverage of the flight of Apollo 11. Communist stations do not fare so well. Somewhat to the surprise of experts, Havana so far has not seen fit to relay Radio Moscow, which receives such brotherly support only from Ulan Bator. Little Albania, one of the largest international broadcasters, has only recently begun to relay selected programs of Radio Peking. Largely as a by-product of direct broadcasts, BBC and VOA also ship out vast quantities of taped programs for replay by government and commercial stations all over the world. The Office de Co-operation Radiophonique (OCORA), now absorbed into the foreign service of the French Radio, supplies much of the programing carried over many French speaking nations in Africa, the Caribbean, and elsewhere. Relay and placement is also common within the East European Communist bloc.

Since this whole range of activity is too broad for coverage in one short article, I will discuss only the politically significant broadcasts of official government and "public/private" stations.

SATELLITES

What about the future? Will satellites make it possible for Moscow, the Voice of America, and other broadcasters to dispense with short-wave and to beam TV as well as radio programs directly into the homes of people practically everywhere?

The United Nations Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites says no—not for a long time to come. In a report of February 26, 1969, it concluded:

While it is considered that satellite technology has reached the stage at which it is possible to contemplate the future development of satellites capable of direct broadcasting to the public at large, direct broadcasting of television signals into existing, *unaugmented* home receivers on an operational basis is not foreseen for the period 1970-1985.

In a July, 1970, report to the White House, a panel of U.S. government experts under the chairmanship of W. E. Plummer of the Office of Telecommunications Management came to the conclusion that direct radio broadcasts by satellite, while technologically feasible, are economically out of sight:

Such a satellite could provide a single voice channel to an area the size of Brazil, for up to twenty-four hours a day, with poor to good quality reception by typical FM receivers employing simple outdoor antennas. However, the estimated annual cost would be between \$40 and \$50 million. By comparison, the VOA is presently

reaching the entire Western Hemisphere with a consistently good signal many hours a day for approximately \$1.5 million a year using terrestrial high frequency transmitters for as many as three different programs simultaneously

The total annual budget of the VOA comes to slightly over \$40 million a year—the price of that one satellite circuit.

The cost of satellite circuits will drop, but other obstacles will remain. Many countries fear a possible loss of control over their own mass media and wish to write into international law a provision preventing broadcasting via satellite into any area where the local government does not desire to have it. Copyright restrictions likewise present nightmarish complications. And last but by no means least, the broadcast spectrum is so crowded in the high and ultra-high frequency ranges that the world Administrative Radio Conference of the International Telecommunications Union held in Geneva in June/July of this year determined that a portion of the spectrum in the newly developed superhigh frequency range would be set aside for use in direct broadcasting by satellite, and for the first time allocated frequencies for direct broadcasting via satellites to home receivers. This means that when and if direct broadcasting by satellite becomes technologically, economically, legally, and politically feasible, new TV sets must be devised capable of receiving signals at frequencies up to 12 *gigahertz*, or 12 billion cycles per second.

So-called educational satellites, capable of relaying a signal into relatively low-cost "community" receiving stations, are a different matter. The United States is due to loft one such "Edsat" in 1974 over the Indian Ocean for use by India. Brazil hopes to get one a year or two later, and the Andean nations are talking about sharing one. However, due to the fears of "cultural imperialism" and the need to tailor educational programs to specific national conditions, as well as to the fact that Edsats will be controlled by the governments of the countries using them, these second-generation satellites are not expected to provide any significant outlets for international broadcasters.

Existing point-to-point satellite stations—expensive installations which send, receive, and amplify extremely faint signals from space—have so far been used sparingly by international broadcasters. The only organization of any kind to purchase dedicated 24-hour voice circuits for extended periods is the Voice of America, which has used them on an experimental basis to feed its relay stations in the Far East. The satellite circuits proved to be more reliable than short wave, but more expensive. As prices fall, satellite circuits may be ordered for regular feeding of far-off relay stations. In the meantime, they will be used occasionally as back-up for high frequency circuits during periods of poor propagation.

GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

With TV out of the picture, the term "international broadcasting" will remain synonymous with international radio for a long time to come. But is international radio becoming more, or less, important? Are the signals

fading away or getting more numerous and more powerful? Are more countries getting in on the act, or are they opting out? Is the number of languages that are broadcast going up, or down? the total time on the air increasing, or falling?

In 1966 there were 52 broadcasting transmitters of 200 kilowatt or greater strength. By 1969 there were 131, 180 in 1970, and in 1971, 185. In Europe, East Asia, the Near East, and Africa alone, there were 47 such transmitters in 1968; now there are 93.

Construction of short-wave superpower transmitters (200 kilowatts and above) moves ahead at a furious pace, increasing by 255 percent over the past five years. Leading the pack is the Deutsche Welle, which is building twelve 500-kilowatt transmitters inside Germany. All twelve are scheduled to go into operation before the Munich Olympics in 1972, and there are plans for new relay stations in Rwanda, Malta, and the Caribbean.

International broadcasts are not limited to short wave, as many people seem to think. Although extra-continental broadcasters reach Africa and the Americas only via short wave, medium wave is very important in Europe and Asia. In the Far East alone, the VOA has three megawatt (one-million watt) medium-wave transmitters—each with a strength twenty times as great as the most powerful United States domestic station. It has others in Europe, the Near East and, for Cuba, in Florida. The BBC pours 600 kilowatts into Europe and has a 1½ megawatt medium-wave transmitter outside the Persian Gulf. The USSR uses medium wave for Europe and the Near East, whereas China covers much of South and East Asia with several powerful medium-wave stations, one believed to have a power of two megawatts. Many of these boom louder than domestic stations in the intended target areas. And the trend is still up. In the period 1968 to 1971, the number of superpower medium-wave transmitters used in international broadcasting jumped by 97 percent and large numbers are reported under construction.¹

Many smaller nations have come into the field. Saudi Arabia, for example, recently inaugurated a megawatt medium-wave station and Congo-Kinshasa [Zaire] has a 600-kilowatt medium-wave transmitter that reaches as far as Abidjan. The greater power does not, however, necessarily mean that the signals will be heard better than before. Spectra for both the short and medium wave-lengths are now so crowded that co-frequency interference limits the effective coverage area. You have to shout louder to be heard at all.

According to the last totting up by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (the U.S. government radio monitoring organization), in May of 1969 international broadcasts had reached the incredible total of sixteen thousand hours weekly, and were still on the way up. The USSR is way ahead with 1,921 hours. However, if Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and RIAS (Radio In the American Sector of Berlin) are added to the VOA, the U.S. total rises to 2,155. Outside Eastern Europe the United

States is again far behind Communist countries, which carry a whopping 6,478 hours weekly.

The number of professionals employed in the business of international broadcasting is considerable. Of the Western stations, the BBC External Services have the largest staff: thirty-six hundred people. A Royal Commission headed by Valentine Duncan in 1968/69 proposed drastic cuts in British government overseas operations but praised the BBC and even recommended a technological build-up. VOA has a staff of twenty-two hundred, more than half of them technical personnel. Staff sizes of Communist stations are not known, but in view of the number of languages broadcast out of Russia—eighty-two, compared with thirty-eighty for the BBC and thirty-five for the VOA—the USSR's External Services must be huge.

Over the past four years, the number of Communist clandestine stations has increased from fourteen to seventeen, the total broadcasting volume rising by 42 percent, from 450 to 639 hours weekly. The additional effort is aimed mainly at Southeast Asia, presumably in the hope of filling a vacuum left by the expected U.S. pullback from the area.

The expense of this vast effort has been estimated at a billion dollars yearly in construction and operation costs, exclusive of the several hundred million dollars doled out every year for jamming by the USSR, China, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia.²

THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION

So, more money and men are going into international broadcasting, and there is evidence that this will continue. But are more people listening? What has been or will be the effect of the development of domestic mass media, particularly television?

Wherever TV has taken hold, it has had a powerful effect on radio listening, and on virtually every other leisure-time activity, as well. The most comprehensive international study of the subject has been carried out under Dr. Alexander Szalai of UNITAR, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research.³ It covers, on a twenty-four-hour basis, the leisure-time activities of comparable control groups in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, East Germany, West German, Hungary, Peru, Poland, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. John P. Robinson of the University of Michigan was one of the sociologists involved. In the Summer, 1969, issue of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, he discusses TV-watching in these twelve countries. He points to evidence that in all countries, apparently independently of the total amount of leisure time available and of the different types and quantity of programming offered, the average amount of time spent by the population in viewing television rises at approximately the same rate and in direct proportion to the increase in the number of sets in operation.

At the saturation point, as in the United States—and apparently in Britain and Japan, although they were not among the participating

countries—people sit in front of the “boob tube” for about two hours daily, which in the United States amounts to about 40 percent of their leisure time.⁴ They generally watch, not because they have favorite programs, but because they have nothing better to do. There is little televiewing in the morning or during the daytime, even in those relatively few countries that have extensive daytime programming.

As for radio listening, in the twelve countries surveyed, this has become almost entirely a “secondary” occupation; people listen while driving their cars, doing the housework, eating, shaving, and so forth. In the countries covered, time spent listening to the radio in 1966 varied from thirty-six minutes a day in West Germany through one hour in the United States and up to an hour and forty-eight minutes in Czechoslovakia.

It is obvious that, at the very least, nighttime radio listening is bound to be affected—has probably already been seriously affected—by the growth of TV in the urban areas of East and West Europe and in Latin America, as well as in Japan, the United States, and Canada. People don't very often watch television and listen to the radio simultaneously. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the total number of people listening to radio is decreasing, or that the aggregate amount of time spent listening to radio is falling off. Nor does it mean, necessarily, that there is less listening to international radio, even in the urban areas affected.

WHO LISTENS TO INTERNATIONAL RADIO?

There were about 370 million radios in the world outside of the United States in 1970; of these, approximately one-third can tune short-wave. There were an additional 275 million sets in the United States, of which only two million could tune short-wave. By 1980, the world's population will have increased by 1.3 billion, while the number of radios—and the number of shortwave sets—is expected to double.⁵ Per-capita radio listening in the United States and West Europe will probably remain steady.⁶ As the transistor revolution continues, hundreds of millions of people who have seldom had access to the radio in the past will begin listening regularly—in the rural areas of Latin America, even in the outback of Siberia and Soviet Central Asia.⁷

As far as Asia and Africa are concerned, with the major exception of Japan, radio will remain communications king during the seventies and beyond. In China, “radio has become a crucial Maoist tool of mobilization.”⁸ The late Gamal Abdul Nasser, as he was launching the remarkable expansion of Radio Cairo, wrote:

It is true that most of our people are still illiterate. But politically that counts far less than it did 20 years ago. . . . Radio has changed everything. . . . Today, people in the most remote villages hear of what is happening everywhere and form their opinion. Leaders cannot govern as they once did. We live in a new world.⁹

Noting United Nations predictions that Asia and Africa have a long time to go before they have enough newspapers and cinemas, Wilbur Schramm writes that "the picture points to the importance of radio in the decade ahead."¹⁰

In considering the future audience of listeners specifically to international radio, it is important to keep a number of factors in mind. Already mentioned is the fact that many international broadcasters cover vast areas with strong medium-wave signals, as well as by short wave. Also important—and this often comes as a surprise to Americans—is the widespread use of short wave outside the United States. Many countries, particularly very large ones like the USSR, China, India, the Congo, and Brazil, make extensive use of short wave for domestic broadcasting, since it constitutes the cheapest means of covering widespread areas. Broadcasting in Indonesia, a land of thousands of islands stretched over three thousand miles of water, is almost exclusively via short-wave. Most would be inclined to think that the cost of 729 hours of English-language programs broadcast via short-wave to North America every week is money down the drain, but even here it is claimed that some one million Americans listen with some regularity and that they are, in fact, influenced by what they hear.¹¹

WHY DO THEY LISTEN?

Signal strength and frequency aside, people listen to foreign radio to get something they don't get from their domestic media. This may be certain types of entertainment, such as Western jazz and pop music. They may listen out of sympathy for political views barred at home, or simply "to get the other fellow's point of view." Major Western broadcasters are convinced, however, that the primary motive is the desire—often the need—for timely, accurate, objective information, which the domestic media of most of their target countries fail to provide. After the 1968 imposition of censorship in Brazil, for example, Agence France Presse reported that the BBC and VOA had become the sole reliable sources of news on events in Brazil itself. "It is not rare in Brasilia," said the AFP dispatch of December 20, 1968, "to see officials desert receptions and return home to listen to the British and American radio." Although scientific surveys are scarce, evidence is sufficient that people in Communist countries will go to the trouble of listening to jammed broadcasts that are only fifteen minutes long in order to get information denied to them by their own media.¹² Other means of international communication can be controlled by government authorities but radio broadcasting, as the BBC's External Services Director, Oliver Whitley, has said, "cannot be confiscated, or refused a visa, or burnt in the public square."¹³

For Communist broadcasters, providing the current line to the party faithful may take precedence over building up a listening audience among those who thirst for objective information.¹⁴ At any rate, available surveys almost always show Moscow, Peking, and other communist stations

trailing far behind Western stations. Of regular listeners to foreign radio in Hungary in 1967, Gallup has reported 64 percent listened to Radio Free Europe, 31 percent to the BBC, 30 percent to VOA, and 16 percent to Radio Moscow. In Poland in 1969, it was 36 percent for VOA, 32 percent for RFE, 31 percent for BBC, and just 1 percent for Radio Moscow. Among college graduates surveyed in East Africa in 1968, the Voice of Kenya had 70 percent, BBC 61 percent, Radio Uganda 45 percent, VOA 36 percent, Radio Tanzania 33 percent, Radio Brazzaville 19 percent, Voice of the Gospel 17 percent, Radio Moscow 7 percent, Deutsche Welle 7 percent, and Radio Peking 2 percent. A general population survey carried out by the German government in Argentina in 1968 shows the BBC on top among foreign broadcasters with 3.4 percent, VOA 3 percent, Moscow 1.1 percent, Deutsche Welle 1 percent, Spain 1 percent, France .6 percent and Havana, Peking, and CBC all .5 percent. Only in India does Moscow do relatively well. According to a 1969 survey of regular listeners to foreign broadcasts, Radio Ceylon had 83 percent, BBC 66 percent, VOA 58 percent, and Radio Moscow 55 percent.

Within government bureaucracies, the debate will doubtless continue as to what audiences their radio operations should try to reach. Some will advance the "elite" theory—called the "target group concept" within the U.S. Information Agency, and described informally by BBC programmers as "the pernicious doctrine of the influential few." Most professionals in the business of international radio will agree that they want most of all to reach the "opinion leaders." But they understand this term in the sense used by sociologists, beginning with Paul Lazarsfeld in the 1940's: that is, not as limited to representatives of the elite and of the media, but as made up of individuals in all walks of life who influence their peers. It is further argued that persons sufficiently motivated to listen to foreign broadcasts are likely to belong to such groups, which include potential leaders not otherwise identifiable. It is this large body of people—estimated at from 10 to 20 percent of the adult population of most countries—that forms "public opinion," a force that has been growing at a quickening pace over the past two centuries. Diplomats, writes Lloyd Free,

do not include in their calculations the degree to which the public all over the world has, in fact, got into the act; nor the extent to which propaganda, popular persuasion, and information and cultural programs have become major instruments of the new diplomacy.¹⁵

HOW INFLUENTIAL IS INTERNATIONAL RADIO?

We have seen that a tremendous effort is going into international broadcasting, and that the audiences are large. But what effect does all this have?

Obviously, there is no pat answer. Don Smith notwithstanding (see footnote 11), it is hard to believe that short-wave broadcasts have had any appreciable effect on the thinking of Americans. But in much of the rest of

the world, international broadcasts may be as influential as local radio, occasionally even more so. In Africa, radio has been "an essential instrument of national development,"¹⁶ and BBC, VOA, and ORTF have all seen it to be in their interest to help propagate this development. Radio is also seen as the "most powerful" and "crucial" weapon in the "war for men's minds" on the dark continent.¹⁷

In Nigeria, Brazil, and India, for example, Everett Rogers found the broadcast media particularly important in the diffusion of innovations. Of the world's largest country, Ithiel de Sola Pool has said:

Most of the things of a positive character that are happening in the Soviet Union today are explainable only in terms of the influence of the West, for which the most important single channel is radio. There is now enough communication to keep us part of a single civilization, to keep us influencing each other, to assure that any Western idea circulates in the Soviet Union, too. The pessimistic expectation that totalitarianism could develop an accepted heinous civilization of its own by 1984 or any other year has been defeated primarily by the forces of communication, and above all by international radio.¹⁸

CONCLUSION

The public for international radio will continue to be a broad one, including a wide spectrum of the intellectually curious. Its influence will vary, depending upon signal penetration, competition of local media, area listening habits, the presence or absence of crisis situations, and other factors. Morning listening will become relatively more important where televiewing has become widespread. The purpose of international broadcasts may shift slightly in the direction of plugging the industries or products of the sponsor country, as has happened in recent years with the BBC and the Deutsche Welle. . . . [The] Director General of the BBC, describes the role of the External Services as "the cultivation of trade and good will."¹⁹ Yet the prime aims will undoubtedly remain political; to win friends, explain policies, break down the other fellow's monopoly on information, and, particularly for "clandestine" operations, support rebel movements and subvert the governments of target countries.

The race to build bigger transmitters and mount more programming becomes increasingly expensive. Yet in the last analysis, the major international broadcasters cannot afford to fall behind. They fear to leave the field open to others, whose interests are less than identical at best and sharply inimical at worst. For the future of international radio it is safe to predict: more of the same.

NOTES

¹ For Europe, North Africa, and Asia. Figures compiled by FBIS and VOA.

² VOA is jammed in Havana, but rather ineffectually. Suspicious interference with Western broadcasts has also been reported in Cairo and Alexandria. The USSR jams Peking's broadcasts in Russian, but China leaves Moscow's Mandarin programs unmolested. China also leaves BBC alone, concentrating on the VOA and the Republic of China's 274 hours a week out of Taiwan in eight different Chinese dialects. In 1963, Khrushchev lifted Soviet jamming of VOA and BBC—not Radio Liberty—but it was resumed within hours of the

invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968. Jamming of Western broadcasts in Czech and Slovak was also resumed at that time.

³ Alexander Szalai, "Multinational Comparative Social Research," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 10 (December, 1966). Two volumes of the results of this study are due for publication later in 1971.

⁴ Some U.S. surveys have put the time spent in televiewing as high as three hours daily or even more, but Dr. Robinson has told me that he considers these figures inflated. Various studies by the R-TV Culture Research Institute of NHK, the Japanese national broadcasting system, put the Japanese average at about three hours daily.

⁵ Edgar T. Martir and George Jacobs, "Shortwave Broadcasting in the 1970's," in J.M. Frost, ed., *How to Listen to the World* (Pontllanfraith, Wales; Pendragon Press, 1971), pp. 4-8.

⁶ The *European Broadcasting Union Review* of July, 1970 reports "a general stabilization of the over-all audience with a slight increase in certain countries" and "an upward trend in the early morning."

⁷ According to Radio Liberty, the number of sets in the Soviet Union, exclusive of wired speakers, stood at just 50 million in 1970, or about one to every five persons. Twenty-eight million sets tune to short wave. However, there was a great concentration of sets in European Russia.

⁸ Alan P. Liu, "Mass Communication and Media in China's Cultural Revolution," *Journalism Quarterly*, 46 (Summer, 1969), p. 314.

⁹ Gamal Abdul Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of a Revolution* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955).

¹⁰ Wilbur Schramm, "World Distribution of the Mass Media," in Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John C. Merrill, eds., *International Communication* (New York: Hastings House, 1970), p. 157.

¹¹ See Don D. Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience: Twenty-Five Years Later," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 33 (Winter, 1969/70), pp. 537-545; and "Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Winter, 1970/71), pp. 539-551.

¹² Over one-half of the blocks of vernacular language broadcasts carried by the BBC External Services are no more than fifteen minutes long.

¹³ *BBC Handbook* (London: Cox & Wyman, 1970), p. 16.

¹⁴ An article in the May 27 issue of the Turkish newspaper *Son Havadis* charged that "there were identical passages in broadcasts of the Communist 'Our Radio' transmission from East German and Hungary, and articles by certain writers in Turkey."

¹⁵ Lloyd A. Free, "Public Opinion Research," in Arthur S. Hoffman, ed., *International Communication and the New Diplomacy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 52.

¹⁶ Rosalyn Ainslie, *The Press in Africa* (New York: Walker and Co., 1966), pp. 153-176.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹⁸ Address in Workshop in Communications with the People of the USSR, sponsored by the Radio Liberty Committee and the Department of Communications in Education, New York University School of Education, November 19, 1965. Professor de Sola Pool reports that information amassed over the past six years has further confirmed this statement.

¹⁹ *BBC Handbook*, 1970, p. 16.

PROPAGANDA THROUGH THE PRINTED MEDIA IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES*

By Y. V. LAKSHMANA RAO

Developing countries fear the introduction of alien and undesirable influences in the form of printed media from the outside world. Unlike the developed countries, developing societies are almost exclusively consumers of international communications, not producers; audience, not communicator. The "flow of communications" is essentially unidirectional in such cases.

* * * * *

THE PRINT MEDIA

Insofar as the printed media in the developing countries are concerned, there are certain specific factors which one can discuss as leading to an international intercourse which is neither planned nor propagated deliberately. It is difficult, in the absence of any systematic study, to point out how much of this international intercourse is "propaganda" and how much is non-persuasive content affecting thought and behavior. To the extent that in many of these countries a relatively free press does exist and that outright censorship does not exist, there is scope for a considerable amount of international flow of information. But there are other factors within the structure of the printed media themselves which lead to a situation where a great deal of non-indigenous material comes in. These factors are worthy of consideration.

The post-colonial era left a number of newspapers in the hands of foreign investors and of expatriate editors and editorial staff who gained their experience during the colonial period. We are not now dealing with those newspapers which printed surreptitiously and perhaps provoked people into rebellion or some other manifestation of an anti-colonial nature leading thereby to independence. We are talking only about those newspapers which were economically viable and which have continued to publish after the countries gained independence. The editorial staffs of these papers have continued, generally speaking, as the "Westerners" did. They have continued to belong to an elite group which is invariably far removed from the mass of the people; they have continued, by and large, to talk a certain "language"—which is usually the language of *The Times* of London or the *Daily News* or the *Daily Express*. These have been the newspapers which the average journalist in the developing countries still tries to emulate, whether or not he has the benefit of the audience of, say, *The New York Times*. This has led to a certain professional conformity which is international. It has also limited their appeal, viewed in the context of communities where broad based governments

*Excerpts from "Propaganda Through the Printed Media in the Developing Countries," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 398 (November 1971), pp. 93-103. Reprinted with the permission of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the courtesy of the author.

and political structures are now generally the rule. This has left the newspapers catering only to a small minority, however important that minority may be in the decision-making process.

Another factor leading to such conformity is both economic and professional in nature: the presence of the big international news agencies, and in many ways their stranglehold on the newspapers of the developing countries. It is professional because of the quality and the convenience which these agencies provide; it is economic because most of the newspapers cannot afford to have correspondents in the major news centers of the world. An additional reason is that many of the developing countries cannot afford to have national news agencies of any reasonable size; and even where these exist, such agencies in turn have to subscribe to one or more of the international agencies for their inflow of world news.

The pressure toward "objectivity" and accuracy to satisfy a mixed clientele—including governments, commerce, and industry, as well as news media of varying political beliefs—has already led to conformity among the newspapers in the industrially advanced countries, where it is increasingly common to have only one newspaper in each town. Although not quite to the same extent, a similar situation seems to be developing in other parts of the world. In the absence of human and material resources to support competing newspapers, news agencies, or feature services, the content of newspapers is becoming increasingly standardized.

SPECIALIZED AUDIENCES

In the case of magazines, however, the situation is perhaps slightly better, but only slightly. While these publishers do aim at more specialized audiences—youth, women, the educated elite, the business community, and so on—even they are finding it more convenient and cheaper either to subscribe to syndicated material from abroad or to buy regional rights to publication of new books in serialized form.

Even where book publishing is concerned, it is becoming increasingly common for publishing firms to establish similar relationships with publishers abroad. One need only to go into a book shop or a stationery shop in a developing country to find this uniformity of taste (innate or developed) extending to such things as posters and phonograph records.

Among the widely circulated magazines, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Life* and the *Reader's Digest* come immediately to mind as those which have special editions for specific regions, with local advertising and well-organized distribution systems. Newspapers like the international edition of the *Herald Tribune*, the *Sunday New York Times*, or the weekly English edition of *Le Monde*, reach the far corners of the earth within a day or two of publication. And books, whether they be *The Death of a President*, *The Ugly American*, or *Candy*, are to be found on the bookshelves of the rest of the world at almost the same time as they reach the homes of Americans.

It is obvious, therefore, that, for good or bad, international intercourse made possible through the ever-expanding channels of communication has indeed led to a certain amount of commonness and uniformity through the printed media, even as it has led to the same result through the non-print media.

One must note, however, that insofar as the developing countries are concerned, this commonness and uniformity, internationally speaking, have so far been generally confined to small minorities—minorities which are well educated and relatively high up in the socio-economic scale. It is only a matter of time before these tastes, these values and beliefs, percolate downward and begin to affect the majorities. This will happen as intra-national communication networks begin to function as effectively as the international channels perform today. The tragedy in many of the developing countries is that it is easier, in both a practical and a psychological sense, for a person in a capital city to communicate with London or Paris or New York or Moscow than with someone in a smaller town or rural community in his own country.

The recognition of this phenomenon in the developing countries has been fairly recent. Fears are being expressed openly by the leaders in these countries that the process has already gone so far that it cannot be reversed. The question now is: should efforts be made in fact to reverse it, or is it the inevitable result of development and modernization? After all, these are, in most cases, the same leaders who only a few years ago not only recognized the need for international intercourse but also insisted upon it. The price, if indeed it is a price, had to be paid. If pressures are growing for a reversal of the process, these pressures are being exerted, by and large, by the senior citizens, to whom such change has perhaps been too rapid for adjustment and too intense for emotional comfort. Where such a feeling of going too far has been felt by the leaders themselves, it is very political in nature, and only social and cultural to a lesser degree. Foreign investment, welcomed in other fields, has been seen as a threat—a political threat—when it impinges upon the media. There has been a growing concern about expatriates owning and/or operating the media, for fear that public sentiment may be swayed in favor of political ideologies repugnant to the basic tenets of the present leaders.

One of the more cogent arguments of the leaders of developing countries today is that political stability is perhaps more important than political philosophy—and especially the freedoms that go with it—and that a country cannot afford the luxury of a clash of ideas or a clash of interests while it is dealing with the more fundamental problems of food and shelter.

As far as the printed media are concerned, the pressure is toward more conformity—not conformity with international standards or international symbols but with national aspirations, with national needs and national priorities, and therefore with national governments. The printed media

therefore are standing today amid a great deal of talk about international intercourse, and are on the brink of disaster, for the very reason that in their shortsighted quest for internationalism—admittedly propounded by their own national leadership at an earlier stage—they are paying the price for neglecting their own national roles.

It has been said repeatedly in the literature of communication that a country's media networks and media content are but a reflection of the country's own structure, its own values, beliefs, and aspirations, and its own stage of development. To the extent that the printed media are in the throes of intellectual ferment, they do reflect the mood of their countries. The media as producers have been found wanting; the media as importers have been shortsighted. By importing material to satisfy their own immediate needs and by not making efforts meanwhile to develop their own production capacities, they are in danger of neither producing nor being allowed to import further.

The implication of such a state of affairs, viewed from an international point of view, propagandistic or otherwise, is frightening. This discussion has dealt with the problem deliberately and almost exclusively from the point of view of the developing countries because the more developed countries have had such intercourse for a long time and have built their own safeguards and their own forms of attack. The United States and the Soviet Union, for example, have worked out a fairly convenient way of exchanging publications, such as *America Illustrated* and *Soviet Life*. The number of copies, the content, and the like, are all fairly well standardized. No overtly propagandistic material is permitted, but each knows what type of content may subtly influence the readers.

The developing countries are new at this game. But they are beginning to learn the rules and it would be a great shame if, because of their own lack of experience and lack of foresight, they were to stop playing the game altogether. Propaganda used in its broadest and healthiest connotation can add greatly to a society's education and experience. The political aspects of it can perhaps be controlled if all parties concerned can achieve some kind of understanding in a spirit of give and take. But to lose sight of the social and cultural advantages accruing from international exchange of information, and so to reject them, is tantamount to throwing out the baby with the bath water.

In his oft-quoted discussion on *Political Propaganda*, Barlett said as long ago as 1940 that

today propaganda is in the air and on it. There is no escaping from its insistent voice. Even were it only half as effective as it is often claimed to be its power would be enormous. . . . It is at work to fashion the education of the child, the ambition of youth, the activities of the prime of life, and it pursues the aged to the grave.¹

It is this fear of propaganda, right or wrong, that the leadership in the developing countries shares.

NOTES

¹ "The Aims of Political Propaganda," Daniel Katz, et al., editors, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1954), p. 464.

EVALUATING FILMS FOR DEVELOPMENT*

BY TULSI BHATIA SARAL

A qualitative evaluation of film effectiveness in communicating development principles.

In order to be able to criticize or evaluate . . . films [in the international development process] we must first be clear in our minds about the goals and purposes we want these films to serve in the process of development.

We must, for example, determine decisively whether we want the films to inform people about what is happening in their villages, or whether we want the films to be consciously used as instruments of change to facilitate acceptance of new ideas. Do we want the films to serve as tools for imparting new skills and techniques, or do we want them simply to provide recreation in the otherwise dull and monotonous life of the village? Are our films to serve the villagers, the elected village leaders, the paid government workers employed for development work at the village and block levels, or the rare elite, usually far-removed from the realities of village-life but unfortunately actively involved in the decision-making processes affecting the very future of the village-community? These, and a host of similar questions need to be posed, thoroughly studied, and satisfactorily answered before any systematic and serious attempt to formulate evaluation procedures for developmental films can be made.

THE EXPECTATIONS

Odd as it may appear, the exact role of films in development has never been clearly specified. All of us engaged in development work all over the world, in our sacred enthusiasm, assume that the communication process is basic to development, diffusion of innovations and modernization, and that if we are to succeed in sparking the expansion of the productivity of underdeveloped nations, we must somehow become more effective communicators. We also assume that of the mass media readily available or commissionable in developing countries, film is the most effective (it has moving pictures, combined sight and sound, has a novel appeal, etc.) and has the potential to cut across the language and cultural barriers.

Without ever caring to test any of these seemingly sound yet vague and rather general assumptions, production units all over the world have been spending vast sums of money turning out movies on development and related topics, and development agencies—governmental, non-governmental, national, international—have been helping finance their large-scale production and distribution in the remotest parts of the world, wishfully thinking that once the people come out of their shells and

*Excerpts from "Evaluating Films for Development," *International Development Review*, VIII, No. 4 (December 1966), pp. 39-41. Reprinted with the permission of The Society for International Development, copyright holder.

expose themselves to these wonderful vehicles of opinion, attitude and behavior-change, they will feel inspired to change their outlook if not their living habits, and the task of development will be that much easier.

THE FAILURES

To our great disappointment, however, the miracle does not happen. After successive screening of hundreds of brilliantly produced works of art, which invariably draw large audiences whenever and wherever screened, the message of development does not seem to be getting across—people, somehow, do not seem to be changing their attitudes and behavior in the desired direction. What is more frustrating is that we do not know where our failure lies because we never knew what we wanted our films to achieve to begin with.

Is it because most of the available films, originally produced for a specified audience, are shown indiscriminately to any available audience? (This seems doubtful, because most of the films, unfortunately, are not produced with a specific audience in view.) Is it because the content of the films is too technical, too complex, too obviously propaganda-oriented that the audience turns off its receptivity at the very outset? (An Indian villager, for example, does think of efforts at propagating developmental activities as propaganda but nevertheless exposes himself to such media. Obviously, the villager expects from these media some entertainment value. In the case of a movie, it is a moving picture and he can see people and things in motion—very often people with whom he can identify and things which he can recognize.) Or is it that our basic assumption that movies cut across language and cultural barriers is invalid—maybe they don't; maybe every geographic region and every cultural region employs and understands a completely different visual language—a completely different film-language, if you please. It may be that certain meanings or messages in a particular region communicate an entirely different and irrelevant meaning or message in a different region or culture!

We know, by now, that the simple skeletal diagram of communication, SENDER—MESSAGE RECEIVER, is not a valid representation of how communication works. (If it were, the task of rural development would be vastly easier than it is!) There are, in addition, the questions of audience-pre-disposition, self-selection, and selective perception. We have been forced to realize that mass communications as such are not really powerful enough to bring about significant changes in deep-rooted attitudes or widespread adoption of new practices. Functioning simultaneously (sometimes reinforcing and sometimes retarding or counteracting), are a host of other important factors such as the audience's image of the source of communication, the group-orientation of the audience-members and the degree to which they value the group-membership, social aspects of the content of communication, and so on. As of now, we have no way of formulating any systematic description of what effects are effected how,

or of determining the role and weight of one or more of the many potential factors in such a process.

An important facet of the role of communication is its relation to the growth of popular aspiration toward betterment. Unless the desire for change and for appreciably higher living standards takes root in the peasant communities, new techniques from outside will not be accepted or exploited fully. Unfortunately, however, development in most countries is a government responsibility, and many of the developmental agencies—particularly the international organizations—largely base their development efforts on the governmental assessment of plans, priorities and people's aspirations. Often, such assessments are either far removed from the real aspirations of the people, or are unrealistically overenthusiastic. No wonder films made to fit such a framework fail to trigger the motivation of people to change.

SOME COMMUNICATION CLICHES

It is fashionable today to say that any communications program, to be successful, must carry information that is "local" in character, is acceptable and understandable to the village people and is relevant to the problems that villagers themselves sense as problems serious enough to warrant action toward their solution. It is more easily said than implemented that communication must consider local traditions, habits and beliefs that should not (or cannot?) be shaken. The real problem arises when an attempt is made to translate such seemingly simple and straightforward propositions into action, because we have no objective criterion by which to determine the "localism" of a particular piece of information or problem, nor do we know where to draw a line between the traditional beliefs that must be given up and those which may be blended with, or can perhaps co-exist with, the modern belief systems.

NEED FOR THOUGHTFUL ACTION

The need is to define more precisely the prevalent terms and describe more explicitly the relationships we assume to exist between various facets of communication and development. This relationship between communication and development in all its aspects is a field of study with relatively recent origins; and so far, conscientious and well organized use of media, based on behavioral patterns and on sociological and psychological factors relating to individuals and groups, has not been made in the field of development. The film section of this *Review* can make a vital contribution by pinpointing blind spots in this field and by specifying directions for immediate research attention. A beginning can perhaps be made by compiling a bibliography of available evaluation reports of mass communications in general, and films in particular, in the process of development, in order to facilitate the pooling of knowledge and speedy exchange of experience. A systematic effort may perhaps then be made to propose some exploratory studies, to probe, to test, and to stimulate

more rigorous research on relationships between variables that come into play in communications and development.

EFFECTS ANALYSIS

The effects of persuasive communications are particularly difficult to ascertain because in practice it is usually impossible to isolate the cause of observable results. To discover if enemy troops defected within a certain time after a direct appeal to do so does not prove the appeal had anything to do with the defection, and certainly not that the appeal was the defection's primary cause.

Clearly, then, the major need in effects analysis—and to a somewhat lesser extent in the SCAME categories—is the isolation of appropriate methodologies to measure effect or at least assist in its determination. The first essay, by Lieutenant Colonel R. P. Morris gives some idea of the diversity of approaches currently used by Army personnel to measure effect and effectiveness. His article is based upon survey research as well as an extensive literature search.

The second and third papers illustrate methodologies used or recommended by various researchers for the evaluation of effectiveness. Similarly, Joseph G. Whelan's essay demonstrates the techniques used to determine effect by a source involved in political communications with an audience to whom the communicator does not have unimpeded research access.

Donald D. Smith's essay on the effects of Moscow's short-wave transmissions to North America is interesting in terms of both methodology and findings. The article illustrates that audience predispositions may bring about the *success* of international communications even when other conditions presumed necessary for effectiveness are lacking.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM: INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS AT THE U.S. ARMY DIVISION LEVEL*

By R. P. MORRIS

A review is made of the numerous indicators of effectiveness used by the U.S. Army in the Vietnam era

This study reviews the types of PSYOP indicators employed by Army divisions in South Vietnam and suggested by Army personnel at the U.S. Command and General Staff College.

CASE STUDIES

*Excerpted and adapted from "Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the Division Level," student thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1969, pp. 34-93. Reprinted with the permission of the author.

1. 1st Infantry Division

In the 1st Infantry Division a total of seventeen PSYOP feedback indicators of effectiveness were identified. These indicators ranged from quantifiable direct indicators, such as the number of *Hoi Chanh* (returnees to Government of Vietnam control from VC/NVA ranks) per month in the division area of operations, to subjective indirect indicators, such as conversations with the division Vietnamese Army Liaison Officer and attached Vietnamese Army interpreters.

The indicator given the greatest significance during 1968 was the Chieu Hoi (Vietnamese Government Open Arms Program) rate.¹ The rate was figured on the number of ralliers per month in the division area of operations. This indicator was considered to be significant because the main thrust of the division PSYOP effort was directed toward causing members of the enemy forces to defect from their own units and to rally to the side of the free world forces. A related indicator utilized by the 1st Infantry Division was interrogation information obtained from among ralliers in the division area. Another indicator was the "mass rally rate," or the frequency in which multiple ralliers from the same enemy organization defected to the allied side together.

Two other statistical PSYOP indicators used by the division that are related to the Chieu Hoi Program are: (1) the rate of ralliers per month who turn themselves over to U.S. units rather than to Vietnamese officials,² and (2) the number of ralliers who volunteer to serve with the division in the "Kit Carson Scout Program."³ The Kit Carson Scout data is considered significant from a PSYOP viewpoint because the participation in the program reflects not only defection from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army ranks, but reflects complete reversal of loyalties to the point where the rallier takes up arms against his former comrades in an active and hazardous manner.

According to PSYOP doctrine, one of the functions of tactical PSYOP is to reduce interference by civilians with tactical operations. The extent to which PSYOP accomplishes this function is judged by the next indicator used by the division, which is "direct observation." The extent to which people in the target audience follow instructions (often simple administrative instructions) broadcast from an overhead PSYOP helicopter can usually be observed directly from the helicopter by the PSYOP crew aboard. A variation of the direct observation indicator by U.S. troops on the ground is used to check the technical effectiveness or the operational capability of the electronic broadcast equipment aboard PSYOP helicopters. On certain operations where U.S. troops are known to be on the ground in the close vicinity of the ethnic target audience, a control message is often broadcast in English so that the U.S. troops can provide rapid feedback as to the technical effectiveness of the electronic equipment.

Another important effectiveness indicator used by the division is feedback information from prisoners of war.

The division participates in a combination intelligence and PSYOP

program known as the Volunteer Informant Program. In return for voluntary services, the people may be compensated with money, rice, or other commodities. The resultant effectiveness of these efforts is indicated by the number of informant tips received, the number of weapons turned in, and the frequency of other positive services rendered to the friendly forces by the people in the target audience.

Captured enemy documents are used as indicators of PSYOP effectiveness because they sometimes contain specific information concerning enemy reaction to PSYOP broadcasts and leaflet drops.

Two additional indicators of effectiveness that originate outside the division, but relate to the division PSYOP effort, are: (1) the monthly reports of province senior advisors, and (2) periodic civilian attitude reports from the province advisory staff.⁴

The number of Medical Civic Action Project (MEDCAP) patients treated per month is considered to be a direct PSYOP indicator. A variation of this indicator is the number of dental civic action project (DENTCAP) patients treated per month; however, the figures are usually consolidated into a single MEDCAP figure that includes both the medical and the dental patients.

Another direct PSYOP indicator is the attendance rate at division-sponsored movies provided for the benefit of local audiences. These movies are publicized by PSYOP media and the attendance at the movies is considered to be "responsive action" on the part of the target audience; hence, this data qualifies as a direct PSYOP indicator under the criteria set forth in the official field manual on PSYOP doctrine.

Another PSYOP effectiveness indicator is the monthly "Hamlet Evaluation System" report which shows the percentages of hamlets that are considered to be pacified in degrees ranging from unsecured to secured.

The final PSYOP indicator revealed by the data on the 1st Infantry Division is an indirect indicator. This indicator concerns specific VC/NVA PSYOP actions directed against the division PSYOP efforts.

In summary, the 1st Division case study has produced a total of seventeen different PSYOP indicators of effectiveness that are or have been used by the division in evaluating the results of its PSYOP effort.

II. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

The data examined concerning the 1st Cavalry Division yielded eight major PSYOP indicators of effectiveness. Of these eight indicators, six were the same or were variations of indicators that were also identified in the 1st Infantry Division case study.

Of the two new indicators developed, the first one was "voluntary surrender broadcasts" or "quick reaction messages" broadcast by ralliers to their VC or NVA units.

The other new indicator developed from the 1st Cavalry Division study consisted of incidents in which the enemy fired upon PSYOP helicopters broadcasting messages.

III. 4th Infantry Division

Fifteen indicators of PSYOP effectiveness were identified in the 4th Infantry Division. Seven of the fifteen indicators were not mentioned in the studies of the 1st Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions.

Of the seven new indicators, one was "results per dollar cost," and the other was "results per manpower unit." An internal staff study found the average monthly cost of the 4th Infantry Division PSYOP program to be \$19,420 and 11.5 or 12 manpower spaces. To complete the ratios, results were quantified in terms of *Hoi Chanhs* who had rallied in a given time period and the number of items of intelligence value reported to the division during a given time period.

Weather conditions were also cited in the 4th Infantry Division as a subjective indicator. The damp, soggy conditions brought about during the wet monsoon season work against PSYOP effectiveness by limiting loudspeaker ranges and by reducing the legibility of paper leaflets lying on the ground in the jungle. On the other hand, the rainy monsoon season works for PSYOP effectiveness by creating less desirable living conditions for the VC/NVA forces and thus possibly making the target audiences more susceptible to allied PSYOP efforts.⁵

Another subjective indicator of PSYOP effectiveness that was cited in the 4th Division was "status of enemy medical care."

Similar to the reports received concerning the status of enemy medical care, was another closely related subjective indicator. This indicator consisted of interrogations which directly reported upon the state of morale within the enemy ranks.⁶

The 4th Infantry Division disseminated a two-to-four page news leaflet by air drop to suspected enemy areas. The leaflet was named *Binh Minh*, a Vietnamese phrase which means "First Light." The PSYOP indicator in this situation was the number of *Binh Minh* clippings found on the bodies of enemy troops.

Another different indicator that was developed through the 4th Division study was "JUSPAO analyses of VC propaganda." This indicator is subjective and is based upon a series of periodic field memorandums published by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office in Saigon. This indirect indicator of PSYOP effectiveness is unique in that it is based on material developed at the national level from which information can be extracted that pertains to the local division area of operations.

IV. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)

The study of the 101st Airborne Division revealed seven PSYOP indicators of effectiveness, of which three had not been mentioned previously in this research project.

Probably the most unusual example of PSYOP effectiveness in the 101st Division was the incident in which PSYOP was used successfully to aid in the repatriation of forty Vietnamese Government troops who were being held captive by the Viet Cong in a prison compound. In the confusion following a raid on the prison compound, the prisoners scattered into

the surrounding jungle areas. It was only after the airborne PSYOP loudspeaker reassured the repatriated prisoners as to their safety that they were successfully brought back under friendly control.

The three indicators which had not been mentioned previously in this study were: (1) the repatriated prisoners' response to PSYOP, (2) the verbal surveys conducted by the armed propaganda teams, and (3) the monitoring of the tactical operations of target groups.

V. Americal Division

In the Americal Division a total of nine PSYOP indicators of effectiveness are utilized. These indicators were identified in a letter from the Division Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Lieutenant Colonel Norman L. Robinson, dated January 5, 1969. The nine indicators used by the Americal Division are common to the other divisions previously discussed.

VI. 9th Infantry Division

No letter response was received by this investigator from the 9th Infantry Division; however, some data was available from other sources, and six PSYOP indicators were identified. These indicators generally follow the pattern of those mentioned most frequently in the studies of the other U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam.

VII. 25th Infantry Division

The data available on the 25th Infantry Division revealed seven PSYOP indicators of effectiveness. All seven of these indicators have also been identified in the *modus operandi* of other divisions in Vietnam.

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE (CGSC) SURVEY

The approach to the problem in this research study was the consideration of two major batches of data—division case studies and a survey of Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students. There were eight PSYOP indicators of effectiveness mentioned by multiple respondents. The indicators most frequently cited by the respondents and the percentages of same are shown in Figure 1.

Of the eight indicators mentioned by multiple respondents, all but two indicators had been developed in the case studies of the divisions. The two new indicators were the following: (1) number of desertions in enemy ranks reported per period of time, and (2) the number of prisoners captured per period of time.

There were fourteen other PSYOP indicators mentioned by respondents only a single time. These additional indicators covered a relatively wide range and included six indicators that had not been mentioned previously in the study. The six new indicators were: (1) attitudes and behavior of Vietnamese civilian laborers employed on U.S. base camps, (2) frequency of enemy rocket/mortar attacks against division base camps, (3) number of "high impact" Vietnamese patients treated successfully by division surgeons (medical conditions remedied in a dramatic manner with resultant favorable psychological impact, such as correction of cleft palates, removal of cataracts, quick cures of advanced pneumonia with massive doses of antibiotics, correction of crossed-eye conditions,




Figure 1. PSYOP Feedback Indicators Identified by Multiple Respondents.

and treatment of remedial blindness), (4) number of Vietnamese patients voluntarily participating in the in-patient hospital care program at the division headquarters base camp, (5) frequency of enemy incidents directed against U.S. division medical personnel operating among the Vietnamese local populace in enemy-dominated or contested areas, and (6) data obtained through in-depth conversations by specially trained U.S. division personnel.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

This report [has been] concerned with the examination of data available from the division case studies and the CGSC survey. From these two groupings of data [36] feedback indicators of PSYOP were identified.

I. Central Patterns

It was found that the indicators that were identified and developed in this study could be arranged into six general categories. These categories were: (1) Chieu Hoi statistics, (2) intelligence from interrogations, (3) intelligence from captured documents and intercepted messages, (4) observations, (5) enemy counter actions, and (6) miscellaneous. Of these general categories, there was sufficient data to justify further division of three of the general categories into specific subdivisions.

The "interrogations" group was further divided into interrogations of: (1) prisoners of war, (2) detainees, (3) members of the local populace on a voluntary basis—Volunteer Informant Program, (4) *Hoi Chanhs*, and (5) intelligence agents.

The "observations" group was subdivided into observations by: (1) U.S. PSYOP teams—in the air or on the ground, (2) U.S. troops on tactical operations, (3) province advisory team personnel, and (4) Vietnamese officials at the province and district level within the tactical division area of operations.

The "enemy counter actions" group was subdivided into: (1) enemy broadcasts—both by radio and by local ground mounted loudspeaker systems, (2) leaflets distributed in and around U.S. division areas, (3) enemy roadblocks and tactical operations in the U.S. division areas, and (4) enemy restrictions placed upon their own troops against reading or listening to U.S. propaganda messages and literature.

All of these indicators are shown, by major groupings, in Figure 2, in which the various indicators from the division case studies and the CGSC survey have been synthesized into a single figure. From an examination of this figure, it can be seen that these groupings do reflect the central tendencies. The "Chieu Hoi statistics" and the "interrogations" categories were the most frequently identified indicators, followed closely by the "enemy counter actions (leaflets)" and "miscellaneous" categories.

It was also noted that there was a definite mutual pattern of support between the general indicators developed within the division case studies and by the CGSC survey. This pattern of support existed within all six of the major categories of PSYOP indicators.

II. Evaluation of Indicators

It was found that "Chieu Hoi statistics" were universally used by the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam as an indicator of PSYOP effectiveness. This indicator lends itself to this purpose particularly well because the data involved can be readily presented in a quantitative form on a briefing chart or in a report to higher headquarters or to other interested agencies. A weakness of this indicator is that misleading statistics can be easily developed unless a careful, accurate, and honest reporting system is used. In situations where more than one U.S. division is operating within a given Vietnamese province, it is possible that each division could report the same province Chieu Hoi center returnees solely within its own totals for a particular month, rather than pro-rating the numbers or using some other system that would approximate the truth. Another weakness of the Chieu Hoi statistic is that in the enthusiasm for meeting quotas or exceeding the results of a previous reporting period, the staff officers concerned may simply accept each feeder report without question and simply add the new numbers to the old. This type of accounting can lead to duplication of data and inaccurate reporting of the totals, for a given *Hoi Chanh* might be reported by a subordinate unit as one rallier on a particular day to that unit; later this same rallier might be reported again as a new acquisition by the local province Chieu Hoi center. Therefore, it can be seen that a careful and valid accounting system is necessary if the Chieu Hoi data is to be meaningful, and great care must be taken to identify specific *Hoi Chanh* by name and by other specific identification means in order to preclude fallacious or ambiguous reporting.

The "interrogations" PSYOP feedback indicators provide quantitative and subjective information for the PSYOP analyst. The division case studies and the CGSC survey reflected wide use in Vietnam of interrogations, particularly interrogations of people under the "Volunteer Informant Program" and interrogations of *Hoi Chanh* personnel. The numbers of individuals interrogated successfully can be quantified. The amount of munitions, the number of weapons turned in, the number of mine and booby trap locations, and the number of intelligence tips of value received can be quantified and used as a numerical yardstick of effectiveness in a relative manner. But, as was pointed out by Colonel Bamberg, former G5 of the 1st Cavalry Division, in his letter to this investigator, there is an inherent "desire to please" that characterizes people within the oriental races, and this desire to say what the questioner would like to hear is a factor that must be taken into account when making subjective evaluations of PSYOP feedback information obtained through interrogations.⁸

With respect to participants in the Volunteer Informant Program and individuals acting as regular intelligence agents, there is the element of "payment for services rendered" involved in the interrogations. The informants (the informants who are being paid for their information) have a product to sell and it would be natural to assume that such informers would be eager to please their benefactors in the hope of making even

more money. When the primary motivational factor becomes money, then it seems that the indicators of PSYOP effectiveness thus produced must not be accepted purely at face value. These indicators must be evaluated in a careful manner or there is the possibility that information provided may be somewhat less than accurate, less than objective, and less than completely reliable. Even if the intent of the informer is sincere, the information may be of doubtful veracity because of the qualities of the various sources along the reporting line.

Another disadvantage of interrogations as a source of indicators is that in many cases the information must be obtained through the use of either Vietnamese or U.S. interpreters. Therefore, the quality of the information obtained through interrogations must be tempered and assessed in terms of the qualifications and reliability of the person who interprets and translates the thoughts from one language to another. Colonel Wolfred K. White, in his article in *Military Review*, "Interpreter—or Filter?" has examined this problem and has cited the pitfalls inherent in the use of interpreters in the less developed countries of the world. Colonel White has explained the situation in the following terms:

Nothing can replace the person-to-person exchange of ideas in a language common to both individuals. At best, the interpreter is a substitute for no communication at all.

The interpreter's lot is not a happy one. His task is demanding, his responsibilities are great, and too frequently his reward is scant. The interpreter's abilities are determined by a number of factors including:

Detailed knowledge of the formal aspects of the languages in which he is working.

Command of the idiomatic expressions in each language.

Technical vocabularies applicable to the interpretive situation.

Ability to convey accurately the tone, spirit, and nuance of each speaker.

Native intelligence.

It is infrequent that the military advisor is fortunate enough to acquire an interpreter possessing all of these qualities in adequate measure. In most instances, he is forced to settle for less—much less.

.....
One of the most frequently expressed complaints of the advisor concerning his interpreter is the real or imagined reluctance on the part of the interpreter to convey criticism, bad tidings, or censure.*

Although Colonel White's remarks are directed specifically at situations involving advisor-counterpart relationships, it seems that the thesis he presents would apply equally to interrogations of prisoners, detainees, volunteer informants, or any conversation or communication between U.S. personnel in tactical units and members of the indigenous cultures.

The obvious alternative to the problem of unreliable interpreters might be to dispense with native interpreters entirely and to conduct interrogations using only highly qualified U.S. personnel who are fluent to the highest degree in the local dialects. But, people with the requisite language skills are in short supply within our armed forces, in spite of efforts to train personnel in the service schools. Colonel White has summarized this paradox as follows:

INDICATORS	DIVISIONS					CGSC
	1st Inf	1st Cav	4th Inf	101st Abn	Amer-ical	CGSC
1. Chieu Hoi statistics	X	X	X	X	X	X
2. Intelligence from interrogations						
a. PWs	X	X	X		X	X
b. Detainees	X				X	
c. Populace (VIP)	X	X	X	X	X	X
d. Hoi Chanhs	X	X	X	X	X	X
e. Agents	X			X	X	
3. Intelligence from captured documents and intercepted messages	X	X	X			X
4. Observations by						
a. PSYOP teams	X	X		X		
b. U S. troops	X		X			
c. Province advisors	X					
d. GVN officials	X				X	X
5. Enemy counter actions						
a. Broadcasts			X	X		
b. Leaflets	X	X	X	X		X
c. Roadblocks and enemy operations	X			X		
d. Restrictions on own forces	X	X				
6. Miscellaneous	X	X	X	X		X

Figure 2 Central Patterns—Division Case Studies and CGSC Survey.

... At a time in our history when we have the greatest requirement for citizens capable of speaking a wide variety of foreign languages, we are discovering the difficulty of developing rapidly these required skills.

Undoubtedly, the lack of U.S. advisors adequately trained in the language of the host country has frequently caused misunderstanding, impeded progress, and complicated the task of aiding emerging nations.¹⁰

Captured documents and intercepted messages are another indicator of PSYOP effectiveness that has been used by U.S. tactical divisions in Vietnam. This indicator has also been cited in the CGSC survey. The number of documents and messages processed that allude to PSYOP effectiveness can be quantified; however, it seems that the same disadvantages that have been mentioned concerning the evaluation of information through interpreters can be equally applied to the evaluation of

captured documents and messages. Whether the translator is a native of Vietnam or whether he is a U.S. native, there is the pitfall of "filtering" or of unintentional misrepresentation of the facts or data contained in the documents or messages processed. If a division has a highly developed intelligence capability, then it would seem that the problems encountered with interrogations and translations would be greatly ameliorated and the two indicators, "interrogations" and "captured documents and intercepted messages," would become significantly more valid.

The "enemy counter actions" indicator seems to have gained general acceptance in Vietnam. Enemy leaflets were mentioned most frequently as the medium of action. Since the leaflets directed against the U.S. troops are written or printed in the English language, the interpreter/translator problem is of no consequence. However, the value of this indicator would probably depend upon the availability of adequately trained personnel within the division resources who could properly evaluate the meaning and exact underlying significance of the messages and broadcasts, *vis-a-vis* judging the effectiveness of the corresponding U.S. PSYOP activity that may have had a direct or indirect bearing upon the enemy side producing a particular counter action.

The "observations" indicator of PSYOP effectiveness was the one mentioned less frequently than any of the other indicators. This situation may be due to the fact that PSYOP personnel and other U.S. and GVN personnel are so close to many activities that have PSYOP significance that the observations of the effects are missed in spite of the close proximity. Another way of expressing this thought is by reference to the saying that often one "can't see the forest for the trees."

Direct observation is a technique that avoids the pitfalls inherent in the use of interpreters, translators, and third-party persons involved in intelligence networks. It is believed that this indicator has merit in that results should be forthcoming with relatively little on-the-job training or experience. An enlisted specialist aboard a PSYOP helicopter should be able, it would seem, to observe directly whether or not the populace of a local village is moving to a designated assembly point as may have been directed in a previously broadcast message from the PSYOP helicopter loudspeaker system. It appears that U.S. troops, officers and enlisted personnel on the ground, should certainly provide feedback information concerning the quality of English language "test" messages broadcast to check whether the electronic communications equipment is functioning in an audible and intelligible manner or not. Certainly, it would seem, the local U.S. advisor teams at the province and district level, who are in daily contact with the local people, could provide observations concerning behavior of the local populace. The corresponding GVN officials could provide information concerning behavior and attitudes through channels and directly to U.S. division PSYOP or G2 personnel. It may be that because the PSYOP function is relatively new to many U.S. division staff officers that the possibilities of direct observation as an indicator of PSYOP effectiveness have not yet been fully explored.

The "miscellaneous" category of PSYOP effectiveness indicators seems to have merit because the indicators reflect the imagination and development of many different individuals and organizations. The apparent disadvantage of the indicators in this category is that most of them are not generally known to the operators in the field. The fact is that these miscellaneous indicators have been identified by individuals and organizations that have been professionally associated with U.S. divisions in Vietnam. Collectively these indicators reflect a relatively large amount of thought and experience.

As with any other indicators or yardsticks used by any sort of analyst, unless the indicators are employed with care and a certain degree of subjective judgment, their usefulness to a commander at the tactical level of operations can be lost. Judiciously utilized, these indicators have served as useful tools in the management of PSYOP and tactical resources in the Vietnam environment.

NOTES

- ¹ Robert P. Morris, G5 Workbook (Lai Khe, Vietnam, March 1-June 19, 1968), p. 93.
- ² Morris, R. P., *op. cit.*, p. 137.
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 123.
- ⁴ Morris, R. P., *op. cit.*, p. 111.
- ⁵ Henry C. Evans, Jr., "Staff Study: PSYOPS Study" (Vietnam, July 5, 1968).
- ⁶ Robert Apt, "Staff Study: The Effectiveness of Psychological Operations Conducted by the 4th Infantry Division" (Vietnam, February 25, 1968).
- ⁷ Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter with inclosures from James E. Fiscus, January 12, 1969.
- ⁸ Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from James R. Bamberg, January 20, 1969.
- ⁹ Wolfred K. White, "Interpreter—or Filter?" *Military Review*, XLVIII (February, 1968), 80.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN OVERSEAS INFORMATION CAMPAIGN: A CASE HISTORY*

BY LEO BOGART

A survey demonstrates the proposition that a short-term information campaign is more likely to provide people with a rationale for reinforcing their existing beliefs and attitudes than for changing them.

* * * * *

The attempt to measure communications effects in the field has been most frequently made in the subject areas of politics and marketing, where the stakes are high and where substantial research budgets can be met. In their studies of the 1940 and 1948 election campaigns Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and their associates, relate changes in voting intention to mass media effects (among other things).¹ Large

*Excerpts from "Measuring the Effectiveness of an Overseas Information Campaign: A Case History," *Public Opinion Quarterly* XXI, No. 4 (Winter 1957-1958), pp. 475-498. Reprinted with the permission of *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

corporations have sometimes made similar studies of the effectiveness of advertising or marketing campaigns, but these remain unpublished.

Two notable community studies have utilized the familiar scheme of interviewing cross-sections of a population before and after large-scale public information efforts. In Cincinnati in 1949, Shirley Star and Helen Hughes found that the effects of an information campaign on behalf of the United Nations were untraceable in the light of the problems which the organization itself faced during the same period.² A study of a venereal disease information program in Columbus, Ohio, made by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, also showed disappointing results. Those who were most apt to expose themselves to VD were least apt to expose themselves to the media which carried information on the subject.³

The present study is presented as a case history in the same area of research. It was planned not with theoretical objectives in mind but with the immediate objective of evaluating a test campaign.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The communications campaign in this case was conducted in Greece in the later part of 1952 as part of the U.S. information program in that country. The U.S. Information Agency has used a wide variety of communications techniques; the test campaign represented an experimental use of paid newspaper advertising as a means of conveying ideas to a wide overseas public. A series of 14 advertisements was prepared for insertion in Greek newspapers and a booklet, "The March of Freedom," was offered free to the readers of the ads. The appearance of the advertisements, both in their size and styling, was such as to make them stand out in the newspaper.

The research was organized and timed as an integral part of the campaign itself.⁴ The objectives were to determine (1) whether or not these materials succeeded in attracting the attention of a wide popular audience; (2) what kinds of people they reached; (3) what the readers thought of them; (4) what kinds of information the ads and the booklet managed to convey to their readers; and (5) what political attitudes they modified, if any.

The newspaper advertisements aimed to create or reinforce the conviction that the U.S. and Greece are joined together in the cause of freedom and that their common ideals are those embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The advertisements used large photographs and brief texts to illustrate and discuss the rights enjoyed by citizens in a democracy.

These freedoms were visualized in terms of the "rights of children" which might be expected to gain warm acceptance virtually everywhere. The underlying point of view is expressed in the following quotation from one of the ads:

We believe it is important to the U.S.A. that this child and every child in every land shall have these basic human freedoms.

We believe this because we deeply love the freedoms we are building in our own life . . . and we know that our own freedoms are not fully safe until freedom is safe for anyone, born anywhere.

This does not mean, of course, that we want Greece and other countries to try to be like the U.S.A. Each free people will always have its own way to build its own use of freedom.

But the goals we seek are common.

Emphasis in the ads was not on the present *threat* to freedom; only the last ad in the series referred directly to the Soviet Union and the "cold war." They were, rather, focussed on the positive aspects of human liberty.

One ad mentioned the Declaration in its headline, and another focussed on the booklet offer. All the rest referred to individual rights, covered in nine of the Declaration's Thirty Articles. All the ads except one featured large photographic illustrations of children.

"The March of Freedom" was a 32-page booklet illustrated with two-color drawings which showed significant stages in the development of human rights from Hammurabi's Code to the United Nations. It contained no direct references to Communism. Its objective was rather to show the historical continuity of the democratic tradition.

Between November 16, 1952, and January 3, 1953, the 14 advertisements were run on a twice a-week alternating schedule in all four Salonica newspapers.⁵ (These papers claim a combined total daily circulation of about 50,000.) Every ad appeared once in each paper, but no ad ever appeared in more than one paper on the same day. Approximately 17,000 copies of "The March of Freedom" booklet were distributed by the U.S.I.S. Library in Salonica directly and by mail.

METHOD OF STUDY

The study was designed to permit comparison of the attitudes of a cross-section of adults in Salonica, who were interviewed shortly before and again immediately after the advertisements ran in the press. To overcome any possible "panel effect," the second wave of interviews (after the ad campaign) was conducted not only with the *same* people who had been in the original sample, but also with *another* parallel cross-section of the population, a sample whose members had not been interviewed previously.

Changes in opinion between the first and second survey periods might have occurred quite independently of the advertising campaign, through the impact of world events or of political developments in Greece.⁶ For example, attitudes toward the United States might have become more favorable between the first and second wave of the study because of a general improvement in opinion throughout the country rather than as a result of the ad campaign. Or opinion might have remained about the same in Salonica, while it became less favorable elsewhere in Greece (that is, the ads might produce their effect not by *improving* attitudes but by preventing a decline which was evident elsewhere).

To take these possibilities into account, a simultaneous before-after survey had to be run in *another* Greek city in which no advertising or

information campaign was conducted. In the control city selected, Patras, two identical random samples (consisting of separate individuals) were interviewed in two waves corresponding with the two waves of the Salonica survey.⁷ The survey was completed by the addition of a special sample of persons in Salonica who had sent or called for "The March of Freedom" booklet at the U.S.I.S. Library. The first wave of interviews took place between September and October, 1952. The second wave took place immediately after the ad campaign ended, during the week of January 4-11, 1953. A total of 2,238 interviews was conducted.

* * * * *

THE CLIMATE OF OPINION

To understand what the ad and booklet campaign accomplished we must first look at the *existing* pattern of public opinion and information which the campaign sought to influence. We must also note the points on which opinions in the test city and in the control city (Patras) were similar and different.

Economic problems were most on people's minds at the time of the survey. . . . With such a focus of attention, other subjects received relatively few mentions. Virtually no one discussed the threat of Communism. . . . It appears therefore that the U.S. information campaign, centering as it did on *political* rights and freedoms, faced a challenge in the form of a widespread public preoccupation with the immediate day-to-day problems of making a livelihood.

In answer to the question, "Does the attitude position of a little country such as Greece influence the future shaping of international events?," the great majority of those answering said that Greece's attitude mattered a great deal. Most of the answers stressed Greece's strategic geographic position, and its potential importance as a military base.⁸

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In both cities, Communism's growth was attributed much more often to a national movement caused by economic conditions than to Russian stimulation. In Salonica this was the prevailing opinion by a larger margin (39 percent, as against 12 percent) than in Patras (42 percent against 28 percent) perhaps showing greater Communist influence in the larger city.

Although many Greeks thought Communism arose independently of Russian imperialism, this by no means placed them in the Communist camp. The survey findings showed the United States to be the most popular and respected nation in Greek eyes, while the Soviet Union was widely criticized and disliked.⁹

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The preponderant hostility toward the Soviet Union took the form of a general belief that Soviet power was on the wane. To the query, "Ten years from now do you think Russia will have increased or decreased its following among other nations?," virtually all of those replying said that Russia would decrease her following, and almost everyone said this was a good thing. Conversely, the overwhelming majority said the United

States would increase its following in the next ten years and that this was good.

Over-all feelings toward the U.S.A. were described as being *very* favorable by most of the respondents (more so in Salonica than in Patras). . . . The generally favorable outlook toward America was reflected in an overwhelmingly affirmative response to the question, "Do you think the U.S. is doing all it can to help Greece?" and in a strong belief that the U.S. wants to help Greece remain free and independent rather than to dominate it.

Although the ultimate purpose of the U.S.I.S. campaign was to influence opinion, its immediate objective was to increase knowledge of democratic rights and freedoms. How much awareness existed to begin with?

When respondents in both cities were asked to name the rights and freedoms which citizens enjoy in a free country, their response was similar, with freedom of opinion and expression far in the forefront, and references to working men's rights strong in Patras. An average of 1.4 rights was mentioned in Patras, and 1.1 rights in Salonica; 18 percent and 27 percent were unable to name any rights at all.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was emphasized in the ads and booklet was unknown to all but a tiny minority. In the interviews made before the campaign began, 8 percent (P) and 26 percent (S) claimed to have heard of it, but only 2 percent (P) and 6 percent (S) were able to explain what it was. The democracies rather than the Communist countries were named as the ones who signed it. In other words, the campaign was designed to inform its audience on a subject with which they were not too familiar. There was considerable room for expanding knowledge of democratic freedoms in general, and of the Declaration of Human Rights, in particular.

THE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS AUDIENCE

The campaign was based on the assumption that newspaper advertising is an effective means of reaching the public in Greece, as it has proven to be in the United States, though Greek newspapers do not have the mass circulation of the American press. In Salonica, for instance, the four daily papers, with a total city circulation of 21,000 must serve the needs of 300,000 residents (about 190,000 adults over 18) in the city, and additional thousands in the surrounding region.

However, . . . it may be estimated that in Salonica each copy of the newspaper reaches approximately five adult readers represented by pass-along readership, reading in coffee houses, and the practice of paying the news vendor a small sum for the privilege of looking at the paper. About one in five in the sample proved to be illiterate.

How many people were reached by the ads and the booklet? How did they react to what they read? Were people who had not been directly exposed to the campaign aware of it in any way? These questions were answered by the second wave cross-section of Salonica residents who were interviewed after the campaign. Their answers closely parallel

those given by members of the panel who were interviewed on both waves.¹⁰

The ads were seen by a large proportion of the reading public. . . . All but a handful of those who said they had seen the ads associated them with the United States. Four out of five of those who said they had seen the ads could answer a question on the main point.

Readership of the ads was estimated in two ways: (1) by asking the respondent directly how many ads he had seen, and (2) by actually taking him through the ads one by one, in each case asking whether he had previously seen it or read it.

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There were notable differences in the degree to which various groups in the population came into contact with the campaign. Since literacy was higher among men . . . than among women, . . . men read more newspapers every day. . . . More of them, therefore, claimed to have seen at least one ad . . . More men were also aware of the booklet (48 percent against 26 percent).

The expected differences may be found when we compare exposure for different socio-economic groups, as in Table 1.

Of those who were known to have called or written for the booklet, 84 percent were men, and 30 percent were under the age of 20. They were considerably better educated than the average; at least 34 percent of them (probably more) were students.

Of those who claimed to have seen the ads, 21 percent were unable to recall the main idea, 24 percent described the ads as being about human rights, and 17 percent mentioned freedom of the individual. An almost equally large number of responses were expressed not in terms of human rights in general, but of *children's* rights. One fourth said the ads were about the freedoms and rights of children. An additional five percent said the ads were supposed to teach people to give their children rights and privileges; six percent said that the ads were supposed to teach young children about freedom. Only one percent referred to "The March of Freedom" booklet.

Thus for a good many of those who saw the ads, *attention* was drawn from the *ultimate* point (U.S.—Greek unity in support of universal human rights) to the *immediate* appeal. The ads visualized human rights in terms of the rights of children in order to capture reader interest and to arouse a favorable sentiment for the *underlying* message. Apparently this is what happened, since the ads were (by American standards) extremely successful—not only in reaching an enormous part of their potential audience, but in impressing their central theme upon the memory of the people who saw them. Of all those who saw or heard of the ads, 87 percent commented favorably on them, while only 5 percent had critical reactions. Comments on production and format outnumbered those on the content of the ads, four to three. The ads were liked precisely because their readers accepted them at face value: they were

TABLE 1
*Exposure to the Campaign, by Socio-Economic Status**

	Salonica Booklet Sample	Salonica Cross-Section, Wave II		
	Got Booklet	Saw Booklet	Saw or Read Ads	Not Exposed
Well-to-do	12%	14%	8%	5%
Middle Class	66	68	56	29
Poor	22	18	36	66
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N(100%) =	(254)	(62)	(493)	(235)

*Percentages not weighted by sex.

not thought of as propaganda serving a selfish interest. Everyone who had seen or heard of the ads was asked what their purpose was. They answered with references to the ads' literal meaning rather than with any sophisticated inferences about their underlying political objectives; 22 percent said the purpose was to enable people to learn their rights and freedoms. . . .

Another eleven percent said the purpose was to educate and inform people on the subject of freedom . . . , and eight percent said it was to show the life of the free world. . . . Significantly, 22 percent of those answering said the purpose of the ads was to help youth. . . . While this is a favorable judgment, it suggested that the pictures of children, while they attracted interest, distracted some readers from the ads' main message and purpose.

Of those who knew of the ads, 88 percent thought it was a good thing for the U.S. to publish them.

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Although, when asked directly, readers did not indicate that the purpose of the ads was to gain support for the United States, one in three thought the ads were good because they worked to this end!

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The purpose of the ads was, of course, not merely to create a favorable impression, but to influence the thinking of the Greek people. A majority of those who saw the ads had the impression that they were influenced (whether or not they actually were). Fifty-four percent replied affirmatively to the question, "Would you say the ads contributed in any way to your knowledge or attitudes?" Thirty six percent said that they hadn't—a substantial minority which probably includes not only the critical and the apathetic, but a great many people who felt already as much convinced as they could possibly be.

Since attitudes were so predominantly favorable to begin with, the major potential for change was on the part of a small minority of critics. If

all those who said the ads affected their attitudes and knowledge had really been influenced, the campaign might be considered spectacularly successful.

A principal objective of the ads was to stimulate interest in "The March of Freedom" booklet. Of the public as a whole, 28 percent said they had noticed the statement about the booklet in the *ads*, and 9 percent had heard about the booklet in some other way; 63 percent had not heard about it. Eight percent of the public claimed to have read the booklet (21 percent of those who knew of it). Of these, a third had gone to get it at the U.S.I.S. Library, and 37 percent had sent for it. The remainder had read a copy obtained by another family member or by a friend.

Of all those who read the booklet, more than two out of five said it described the *historical* growth of freedom or liberty. Another two out of five said it was about human rights or freedom in general. As in the case of the ads, comments concentrated on production and format rather than on content. Like the ads, the booklet seems to have been accepted at face value, and not thought of as propaganda. Half said its purpose was to teach people about the idea and meaning of freedom. One in every five or six said its aim was to show the development and evolution of freedom in a historical sense. About as many believed it had a general educational mission. Only a small number said its purpose was to win friends for the United States.

Among those who had read the booklet, opinion was virtually unanimous that it was a good thing for the U.S. to publish. This was explained most often by the argument that it informed and educated people about their rights and freedoms. A sizable proportion explained that it was a good thing because it was beneficial to the United States. Thus in the case of the booklet as in the case of the ads, the information campaign won approval for doing the very job of propaganda which its audience did not *think* it was designed to do.

OPINION CHANGES IN THE TEST AND CONTROL CITIES

Thus far we have described the climate of opinion in Salonica and Patras before the U.S. information campaign began, and the audience which the campaign reached in Salonica, the test city. To determine what effect the campaign had on public opinion, we must make a series of comparisons between those who were and were not reached, before and after the campaign took place. The design of the study makes it possible to look for effects in three distinct ways: (1) by comparing results before and after, for the test and control cities; (2) by comparing results, before and after, for exposed and unexposed groups within the test city; and (3) by internal analysis of changes within the test city panel.

Let us first consider whether changes in opinion or knowledge took place in Salonica as a direct result of the campaign, but not in Patras. There was no significant shift of opinion in either city in the proportions who:

1. Felt very favorably toward the U.S.
2. Thought that the U.S. was interested in dominating Greece.¹¹
3. Thought that Russia was the country most guilty of meddling in Greek affairs.
4. Thought the U.S. was doing all it could to help Greece.
5. Thought that Communism was mainly caused by economic conditions.

On a number of points, opinions changed between the first and second waves of the study, but they generally changed the same way in *both* Salonica and Patras, apparently as the result of attitude trends throughout Greece.

* * * * *

In a number of respects, however, the campaign appeared to have had an effect in the test city. The number who claimed to have heard of the Declaration of Human Rights was greater on Wave II than on Wave I, in both cities.¹² In Patras, there was a small increase in the percentage who could demonstrate that they knew what the Declaration was. However, in Salonica the proportion familiar with the Declaration jumped from six percent of the public before the campaign to 27 percent afterwards.¹³

* * * * *

Knowledge of the countries that had signed the Declaration and knowledge of the rights and freedoms which citizens enjoy in a democracy increased in Salonica but not in Patras between Wave I and Wave II. There was a major drop in the percentage who could not answer the question, and *more* individual rights and freedoms were named. . . .

* * * * *

There was an increase in Salonica of those who mentioned the right to free choice of employment, the right to own property, and freedom of religion: while fewer persons mentioned these rights on the second wave in Patras. . . . Freedom of opinion and expression was mentioned more often on Wave II in both cities, but the increase was significantly greater in Salonica.

On one other major point there was a clear-cut change of attitude in Salonica only. Although there was no change in the proportion who said the U.S. was sincerely interested in keeping Greece free and independent, the proportion able to support this point of view with *reasons* increased enormously in Salonica. It remained the same in Patras.

* * * * *

EXPOSURE AND ATTITUDES

Thus far we have seen that *opinions* underwent only slight changes in

Salonica, the test city, compared with Patras; while knowledge of the subjects stressed in the ads underwent major increases. Were these changes due to the direct influence of the campaign, or did they occur independently? We can answer this question best by seeing how those who were *most* exposed compare in knowledge and attitudes with those who had *no* contact with either the ads or the booklet.

To do this, a comparison has been made of the special booklet sample (the people who actually *went or sent for* the *booklet*) with those members of the Salonica cross-section who *saw* the *booklet*, those who *saw or read* at least one *advertisement*, and those who were completely unexposed.¹⁴ The evidence indicates that not only knowledge, but some important attitudes, were different among these different exposure groups.

Those who were least exposed were least able to answer the question as to whether Greece can influence international events. . . . Considering only those who express opinions, it is apparent that, the greater the exposure, the greater the feeling that Greece's opinion matters in world affairs. This is a political sentiment (that is, an expression of patriotism and of conviction that thinking about current events is important). It may also be a reflection of the respondent's personal pride and dignity, of the feeling that his views matter. It is probably a good index of political interest and activity. . . .

* * * * *

While there was no direct indication of anti-American feeling, and very little neutrality, one indication of real opinion about the United States is the distinction between "very favorable" and merely "favorable" views.¹⁵ By this criterion, the people who read the booklet were most strongly pro-American, . . . and those who saw the ads more pro-American, . . . than the non-exposed. . . .

* * * * *

Of those who read the booklet, 87 percent said they were familiar with the Declaration of Human Rights, while 45 percent of those who saw the ads, and only nine percent of the unexposed, made this claim. The greater the exposure, the more familiarity was shown with the rights enjoyed by citizens of a democracy. . . .

* * * * *

Knowledge of democratic rights was greatest among the well-to-do, and least at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder.

* * * * *

Did the campaign tend to select for its audience people who were already predisposed to be favorable toward its objectives? By comparing the responses given before and afterwards by the same individuals in the Salonica panel, we can see to what extent people who started out with a particular opinion (on Wave I) became exposed to the campaign, and compare them with those who initially held other opinions.

* * * * *

There was . . . remarkable similarity in the degree of exposure found among people who were initially very favorable, regardless of their social characteristics. About half the people who were predisposed to be friendly to the U.S. read the ads or the booklet—and this was true regardless of what kind of people they were.

Of those who claimed to have heard of the Declaration of Human Rights on the first wave of interviews, only a minority were actually able to explain what it was. These few became a very highly exposed group. Whatever their personal characteristics, 18 of the 23 cases (79 percent) read the ads or the booklet.

THE EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE ON ATTITUDES IN THE SALONICA PANEL

We have seen (1) that attitudes and knowledge, as well as exposure, differed among different kinds of people, and (2) that though exposure was widespread, it was greatest among those who were the most friendly at the start. With these findings understood we can consider whether exposure *changed* information of attitudes. Table 2 shows the shifts which took place in the percent feeling "very favorable" toward the United States.

There are several points to be noted:

1. The less the exposure, the less favorable was the original attitude on Wave I.
2. Regardless of exposure, between a third and a half of the respondents shifted in their response on this important question. Among those who had read the ads or the booklet a smaller percentage (35 percent) shifted opinion than among those who were less exposed (47 percent).
3. In spite of the fairly large fluctuation of opinion within the panel, shifts in one direction cancelled out shifts in the other direction—

TABLE 2

*Per Cent Very Favorable to U.S.
(By Exposure to the Campaign, Salonica Panel)*

	Read Booklet	Read Ads	Saw Ads	Unexposed
Very Favorable				
Both waves	46%	50%	32%	24%
Before campaign only	17	17	23	29
After campaign only	17	18	26	13
Neither time	20	15	19	34
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N(100%) =	(24)	(116)	(90)	(55)
Net Change	0	+1	+3	-16

except in the case of those who were completely unexposed. This group was less favorable (by 16 percentage points) *after* the campaign, suggesting that exposure to the campaign offset a generally unfavorable trend.

Although this difference is not statistically significant, there appears to have been a very marked pattern in the shift of opinion. Regardless of exposure, the groups which on Wave I were most apt to give no answer to this question (women, older persons, and the low-income group) became more favorable on Wave II, or at least showed no change. Their move from "no answer" to "very favorable" may have been due to the effect of being interviewed twice, rather than to any real modification of attitudes attributable to the campaign.

By contrast with the considerable shift of opinion on this general attitude question, there was relatively little change of judgment as to whether or not the U.S. was helping Greece all it could, with about three-fourths of the respondents holding to the affirmative both times. There was also no real shift of opinion—either among the heavily exposed or the lightly exposed—as to whether Greece influenced international events a great deal.

Although the campaign did not modify opinions significantly, it appears to have been most successful increasing knowledge on the subject with which it dealt: the Declaration of Human Rights. On the first wave, eight percent of the total panel had heard of the Declaration and could describe it. By the second wave this proportion had increased to 32 percent of the total. This increase is entirely attributable to the campaign, as Table 3 demonstrates.

* * * * *

There was also increased familiarity with the individual democratic rights and freedoms. . . .

In the mention of individual rights and freedoms, there was considerable shifting between the two waves. The effect of the campaign was shown most dramatically on the subject of free speech or expression, stressed in the ads. Although in every exposure group there were more mentions on the second wave than on the first, the net increase was greatest among the most heavily exposed (50 percent for those who read the booklet and 33 percent for those who read the ads, compared with 20 percent for the unexposed).

* * * * *

The campaign was extremely successful in conveying information about human rights to the people who were exposed to it, in every sector of the population. At the same time our findings indicate that it did not *directly* affect fundamental attitudes. When we examine the shifts in public opin-

ion which took place between Wave I and Wave II, it is evident that those who read the ads and the booklet did not move in a favorable direction to any greater degree than the less exposed respondents. We found no evidence that this was true within any of the sub-groups of the population, when information was analyzed separately by sex, age and social status.

CONCLUSION

Any campaign which sets out to convey ideas may tend to select in its audience a large concentration of persons who are favorable to its objectives, and who expose themselves in order to reinforce their prior opinions. The Greek ad campaign appears to have gotten its *greatest* exposure among people who were somewhat more friendly to the United States to begin with and more articulate in their views. But these people were an important target, precisely because they were drawn from the more articulate and presumably more politically active sectors of the public.

The ads and the booklet won the approval of their readers; they were considered "a good thing" for the U.S. to publish; their execution and subject matter were liked and even admired. It seems likely that this approval was in part a reflection of the initial attitude of approval for America and things American, as well as an expression of the readers' specific reaction to the ads themselves.

What seems more significant is that readers accepted the ads and the booklet at face value. They were interpreted as a genuine attempt to inform people about rights and freedoms, rather than as an attempt to preach at them or to change their views. The fact that the ads and the booklet were not directly perceived as "propaganda" is as important as the fact that the motives behind them were seen as worthwhile or disinterested. Those who said their thinking had been influenced by the booklet or the ads explained this by references to the subjects on which they had become better informed, rather than by references to changes in conviction or point of view.

TABLE 3

*Per Cent Who Know of Declaration of Human Rights
(By Exposure to the Campaign, Salonica Panel)*

	Read Booklet	Read Ads	Saw Ads	Unexposed
Both waves	8%	10%	3%	—
Before campaign only	—	4	2	—
After campaign only	79	43	19	5
Neither time	13	43	76	95
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N(100%) =	(24)	(116)	(90)	(55)
Net Change	+79	+39	+17	+5

The comparative findings indicate that the campaign increased public knowledge of the subject on which it was focussed, the Declaration of Human Rights, and that it increased familiarity with the individual rights and freedoms enjoyed by citizens in a democracy.

This increase in knowledge took place in Salonica but not in the control city, Patras. The gain was greatest among those who were most highly exposed, and it took place among those exposed within every element of the population.

Increased familiarity with the individual rights and freedoms came about through a large number of small increases in the mentions of individual rights (including a number which were *not* stressed in the ads as well as those which were). Had the ads concentrated on a smaller number of rights, with each one being covered in several different ways and several different times, recollection might have been even higher than it was. However, the purpose of the campaign was not to stimulate recall of the individual rights as such, but to build recognition that they exist as an important bond between Greece and the United States. In this respect the campaign was successful, since it heightened awareness and knowledge of the subject.

Experimental studies have repeatedly shown that it is easier to convey information than to change attitudes, even where there is a large amount of room for improvement in attitude change. In the present case, because opinions were so favorable at the outset, there was slight opportunity for favorable change. Of the minority who, at the outset, were not very favorable in their attitude, a certain proportion were probably "hard-core" Communists, and an additional number were politically apathetic and largely beyond reach of the mass media. This left a comparatively small residue of individuals with a neutral, suspicious or critical view of the United States who might be considered primary targets for a campaign to change attitudes, but who tended to be people who were harder than average to reach through conventional channels.

Careful exploration has yielded no evidence to prove that any change due to the campaign took place in fundamental attitudes. It is important to note that a *simpler* study design might have suggested that major changes took place on a number of points. We have seen that in some cases opinions became more favorable in Salonica (but they also became more favorable in Patras). On the second wave in Salonica, the exposed were more favorable than the non-exposed (but the same individuals were also more favorable to begin with). The use of several methods of control in the design of the study made it possible to rule out such spurious indications of effect.

Only one facet of opinion appears to have been influenced as the direct result of the campaign: it seems to have made people better able to give

reasons in support of their existing conviction that the United States wants Greece to remain free and independent. Most particularly it seems to have made more people believe that America's general attitude (and not any selfish interest) favored such a desire—that America was in effect a country devoted to human rights and freedoms, including the rights of small nations. This interesting development demonstrates how the campaign's effects in conveying information may begin to be translated into attitudes. What happened was not so much an attitude change (attitude was favorable from the beginning on this point). Rather the campaign seems to have confirmed already favorable opinion by giving it a supporting argument.

Changes in public opinion come about slowly, and international propaganda always functions within the context of world events. This survey adds to the already considerable weight of evidence which shows that (apart from political acts) attempt to influence opinion must be carried on consistently and over a period of time before any major shifts are detectable. If, in the long run, what the Greek people *think* of the United States, or of democracy, is a product of what they *know*, then the Salonica test campaign contributed toward the larger purpose of the U.S. information program.

NOTES

¹ Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet, *People's Choice*, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944. Also Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, William N. McPhee *Voting*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

² Shirley A. Star and Helen MacGil Hughes, "Report on an Educational Campaign: The Cincinnati Plan for the United Nations," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LV (January 1950), pp 389-400.

³ *VD Means Trouble*, Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research, New York, 1950 (Unpublished).

⁴ The writer assumed responsibility for this project after the completion of the field work. The original research design was prepared by Herta Herzog and Donald B. Armstrong, Jr. The field work was under the direction of William Reynolds. Een Gedalecia headed the Office of Research and Evaluation of the U.S. Information Agency at the time the study was made. The interpretations and statements made in this article are solely those of the writer and in no way reflect either the official position of the Information Agency or that of the writer's own organization.

⁵ *Macedonia, Fos, Ellinkos Vorras, Neo Alithia*.

⁶ During this period, elections were held both in Greece and in the United States, truce negotiations were bogged down in the Korean War, and the Soviet bloc continued to spar with the West in the U.N. General Assembly.

⁷ Both cities surveyed are major ports—though Salonica is a larger and more prosperous one than Patras. In Macedonia, only 50 or 60 miles from the Bulgarian and Yugoslav borders, Salonica became a part of modern Greece only in 1913. It is the country's second largest city, with 300,000 inhabitants (and another 150,000 in the surrounding area). More cosmopolitan, and because of its size, position and history, more internationally minded than Patras, Salonica was closer to the centers of Communist rebellion during the Greek civil war. Patras, with a population of 67,000, is a provincial city in the Northwestern Peloponnesus.

⁸ More complete answers were received for this part of the question on the second wave of interviews, so that they could be coded in more detail. On this second wave, 47 percent (P) and 45 percent (S) specifically mentioned Greece's importance as a military base.

⁹ While responses on this point may have been affected by the prevailing political atmosphere, the pro-Communists would be more apt to give no answer than to give a false one. Even if the percentage not answering these questions is considered to be (in part, at least) hostile to the United States, the over-all picture is still extremely favorable.

¹⁰ To simplify the presentation, the statistics for the panel are not reported here. On some points the percentages are somewhat different for the two samples. In part this is due to sampling variations. In part it stems from a "panel effect" often noted in studies of this kind, which comes about because respondents have been asked the same or similar questions previously and are sensitized to the subject matter and the interview situation. The data for the panel group are examined in detail later.

¹¹ As opposed to those who said that the U.S wants Greece to remain free and independent.

¹² The rise in Patras may be due to independent mentions of the Declaration in the Athens and Patras papers, or simply to a difference in interviewing technique between the two waves of the study. Knowledge of the Declaration, rather than the claim to knowledge, is the major consideration here.

¹³ Although the jump from two percent to ten percent in Patras is also statistically significant, it simply reflects the increase in the number who claim to have heard of the Declaration, whereas in Salonica there was a great rise in the proportion as well as the number who knew what it was.

¹⁴ The actual, rather than the sex-weighted totals are used here, since the booklet sample is so predominantly male.

¹⁵ Anti-American respondents who feared to express their views openly might be expected to give the weaker of the two responses.

RADIO LIBERTY'S AUDIENCE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS*

BY JOSEPH G. WHELAN

This discussion of Radio Liberty's attempts to obtain some feedback from its audience indicates the political and societal limitations on audience analysis in closed societies.

* * * * *

I. POSITIVE MEANS FOR EVALUATING RADIO LIBERTY'S EFFECTIVENESS

A. Interviews with Soviet Citizens

1. Some Sources for Judging Audience Response

Despite known disadvantages, which by the nature of things cannot be easily corrected, Radio Liberty (RL) attempts, nonetheless, to establish some positive basis for judging audience impact, however imprecise it may seem compared with the reasonably accurate techniques in American public opinion research. It does this by collecting evidence on audience reaction, (1) in interviews with Soviet visitors to the West, legal Soviet expatriates, Soviet defectors, and with some Soviet listeners actually living in the Soviet Union itself; and (2) from letters received from Soviet listeners through the indirect method of a mail drop in the

*Excerpts from Chapter VI, "Radio Liberty—A Study of Its Origins, Structure, Policy, Programming and Effectiveness," The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., February 29, 1972.

West. The substitute audience panel and the special program auditions panel provide another input, though limited, into assessing possible audience response.

Through these efforts [the Audience Research Division of Radio Liberty] (ARD) attempts to fill the gap between the speaker and the audience, to determine an accurate image of the listener and the listener's image of RL (both essentials for success in communications), and to build the foundations for a continuing dialogue with the audience. The Director of ARD files a quarterly report containing an analysis of and references to listener mail, reactions to RL emanating from the media of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, conversations with Soviet listeners at home and abroad, and related background material on attitudes and conditions in the Soviet Union.

2. Difficulties in Interviewing

Interviews, or "conversations" as RL prefers to term them, presumably since they lack the formal structure and statistically-workable ingredients of professional poll-taking known in the United States, are regarded as a prime indicator of audience response. During FY 1971 interviews were conducted with hundreds of Soviet citizens, of whom well over one-half were foreign radio listeners. But, interviews are very difficult to conduct. Polling by Soviet Government agencies has only begun in recent years in the Soviet Union, and the people do not regard them as scholarly efforts but rather as instruments of the KGB. The problem is especially acute in the Soviet Union where the climate of suspicion impedes a genuine exchange of views, especially with a foreigner. Even interviews conducted with Soviet visitors in the West are carried out with difficulty. It is estimated that only one out of eight contacts will yield a fruitful interview.²

The results of interviews are sent to RL headquarters in Munich by field correspondents where they are compiled in a final Target Area Listeners Report that is prepared by ARD and distributed throughout the organization. These reports describe the interviewee, his occupation, nationality, age, and language facility. They include such details as place, listening times, language of broadcast, audibility, jamming effectiveness, and specific programs of interest. In addition, the conversation is summarized, and this may include statements about public reactions, comments on recent events and expectations about future developments.

3. Analysis and Use of Interview Data

RL approaches analysis of audience research data conservatively. ARD does not claim to have enough data at its disposal from interviews to speak about a "sample"—that is, as interpreted in a statistical sense.³ It does not go beyond the claim of having only "bits and pieces of samples that could be indicative of some certain groups." Yet, Mr. [Howland] Sargeant [President of the RL Committee] has written that such interviews have been collected and properly coded, transferred to cards and

can be processed by machines to show "an increasingly accurate picture of the listeners, and of potential listeners." ⁴

Accordingly, ARD is able to give RL programmers some perception of their audience's image and scattered evidence of impact and effectiveness. In recent years this perception and measure of effectiveness have no doubt become more reliable because the percentage of ARD interviews has been progressively increasing from 17 percent in 1969, to 23 percent in 1970 and up to 41 percent during the first quarter of 1971.⁵ The ages of RL's listeners were estimated in mid-1971 to be 35 percent in their 20s; 31 percent in their 30s; and 16 percent in their 40s.⁶ The preferred listening time was cited at 2001-2400 for 57 percent of listeners, with the next highest percentage preference at 16 percent from midnight to 0400.⁷ The distribution of audience occupation in 1970 was concentrated heavily among the intellectuals, including university students: 72 percent of the listeners were said to be from the intellectual professions.⁸

Clearly, audience research data of this nature confirms RL's judgment on audience structure, policy content, and program design. This is especially true of ARD studies on audience reaction to samizdat [the private publication and circulation of one's own works in the Soviet Union], presently the main staple of RL's programming. Again, RL's judgment was reaffirmed. During the first quarter of 1971, 87 percent of the interviewees mentioned samizdat favorably, 3 percent with mixed or neutral reaction, 10 percent hostile reaction. During the fourth quarter of 1970, 100 percent of the interviewees mentioned samizdat in a friendly manner; for the third quarter of 1970, there was 90 percent with 10 percent mixed or neutral. The total overall percentage for this mini-month time-frame from July 1, 1970 to March 31, 1971 was 85 percent friendly, 4 percent mixed or neutral, and 11 percent hostile. Moreover, RL's focus on the intelligentsia was reaffirmed. The majority of listeners mentioning samizdat (70 percent) belonged to various segments of the intelligentsia.⁹

Undoubtedly the most comprehensive assessment of empirical evidence of RL's effectiveness drawn from interviews is contained in ARD's quarterly reports. The report for the second quarter of 1971 generalized on the data collected in an effort to determine listener profile, effects of jamming, specific program interests, programming suggestions, RL's impact and image in the eyes of its listeners, attitudes on specific problems such as samizdat and Jewish emigration, criticism of RL, and responses from the nationality areas.

On the basis of empirical evidence the listener profile for the second quarter of 1971 looks like this: RL respondents came from all walks of life, although the number of those holding positions in the technological, scientific, and cultural fields outweighed those in other professions. Many listeners were under 40 and an "overwhelming majority" supported RL and its aims. Listening took place mainly in large industrial cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev and their surroundings, though a sizeable number in Siberia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia, to

Georgia and Armenia in the South. [sic] Most listeners whose nationality was ascertainable were Russians, followed by Ukrainians, Belorussians, Karelians, Georgians, Kazakhs, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Tatars, Bashkirs, and others from Eastern Europe.¹⁰

Other categories within the report either directly or indirectly provide some indication of RL's effectiveness, but perhaps none so much as "Radio Liberty's Impact and Image in the Eyes of Its Listeners." Under this category numerous comments were made about reasons for listening to RL and what its impact was judged to be.

For a scientist, RL had become a "most important source of information and a link between our more free-thinking intelligentsia and the Soviet working people." A musician considered that "normalization" of Soviet life could only come through the creation of a public opinion which would exert pressures for change. Since there was no freedom of information at home, the initiative had to come from abroad—and RL, he said, was the only possible source. "Thanks to Radio Liberty's broadcasts," said a Moscow engineer, "I have learned to think and develop a 'free relationship' with the outside world." This theme was reiterated by a Soviet musician who said that "free voices from abroad, especially the voice of Radio Liberty, are the only forces which can wake people up and open their eyes."

Listeners were aware of regime attacks on RL and expressed concern for the radio's future. According to a Moscow engineer, rumors were being circulated to the effect that the station would soon cease broadcasting.

RL was of special interest to a Leningrad scientist since, in his words, "It is what a Russian radio station would have been like if we had had freedom of speech in our country." A traveler from Sverdlovsk considered RL to be "a free and international" station, not government operated like the BBC or VOA, and this enabled it to devote so much time to Soviet problems. He appreciated this. A Kiev intellectual who previously thought RL was an "American propaganda station" had changed his opinion when he became more familiar with its broadcasts. He now felt that, although financially supported by the United States, it was working for the good of Russia. Whenever an official announcement was made in Soviet media, said one engineer, it was very common to hear people remark: "That's what 'ours' said. But we still have to know what 'they' will say." "They" was RL.¹¹

Scattered evidence of impact and effectiveness like this and other evidence included in the quarterly report cannot constitute a "sample" according to the statistical requirements of public opinion research. RL is the first to acknowledge this limitation. Yet, it would seem to be a commonsense judgment that comments by opinion leaders such as scientists, engineers and others within the intelligentsia could be reflective of important preferences and predilections of others within the Soviet intelligentsia and perhaps even in broader segments of Soviet society.

* * * * *

B. Letters from Soviet Listeners

1. Techniques for Eliciting Listener Response

Interviews as a means of evaluating audience response are supplemented by letters from Soviet listeners. Such letters are regarded as documentary evidence upon which judgements can be made on Soviet listening behavior and on Soviet attitudes toward RL programming.

There are two ways in which letters are received from the Soviet Union. One is by establishing give-away accommodation addresses in the West. Under this system the listener is asked to write a particular box number in a designated West European city, and he will receive in return certain give-away material, such as books and records. A popular give-away book of particular interest to radio enthusiasts is the *World Radio TV Handbook*. This is merely a standard radio handbook available in any major reference library in the West.

The other system of eliciting listener correspondence is to urge the listener to communicate with the RL speaker at an address given in the West. In both cases, the mail is forwarded to RL where it is categorized according to favorable and unfavorable letters, location of sender, etc. Such letters-to-the-editor type of correspondence and give-away offers to listeners are common practice in a free society such as that in the United States.

2. Statistics on Listener Mail

According to RL, audience feedback through mail has increased considerably in the past decade.¹² Except for a momentary decline in early 1971, apparently, the general trend continues upward. Actual numbers of letters received are not available for publication; percentages are. This may not be entirely satisfactory, but it does serve the purpose of giving some indication of listener response through mail, and at the same time denying important information to the Soviet censor.

Increasingly, more listener mail has originated from the Soviet Union than from the countries of the Soviet bloc. In 1968, 31 percent came from the USSR; 69 percent from the bloc. In 1969, 56 percent from the Soviet Union; 44 percent from the bloc. In 1970, 62 percent from the Soviet Union; 38 percent from the bloc. And for the first three months of 1971, 87 percent from the Soviet Union; 13 percent from the bloc.¹³

In the second quarter of 1971, listener mail decreased in number. Aside from the seasonal factor (the second and third quarters of the year usually have less mail than the fall and winter quarters), the decrease in listener mail in the second quarter was ascribed to RL's discontinuance of give-away offers and to the hostile and systematic campaign which Soviet media have been waging against RL during the past three quarters. In fact, only one letter was a response to a former give-away offer, while most of the other mail items contained comments, both friendly and critical, to problems and questions raised in RL's programming. It was

during the first quarter of 1971 that 105 attacks against RL in Soviet and orbit media were recorded, a figure surpassed only during the previous quarter when 156 attacks were recorded.¹⁴

Audience mail does serve the useful purpose of giving RL some perception of its listenership. In the first quarter of 1971, 96 percent of the mail was regarded as substantive in content; 4 percent without substantive content. In the second quarter, the percentages were 95 and 5 percent respectively.¹⁵

Russian is the language in which most of the broadcasts were heard. In the first quarter of 1971, the percentages were 85 percent Russian, 13 percent Ukrainian, and 2 percent Georgian. In the second quarter, the percentages were 74 percent Russian, 16 percent Ukrainian, 5 percent each for Belorussian and Bashkir.¹⁶

As for geographical distribution of audience mail, in the first quarter of 1971, 56 percent came from the RSFSR, 30 percent from the Ukrainian SSR, 4 percent from the Georgian SSR, and 2 percent each from the Latvian, Estonian, and Moldavian SSRs. Those addresses that could not be ascertained were placed at 4 percent for the entire USSR. For the second quarter the percentages were 50 percent, RSFSR, 31 percent Ukrainian, 6 percent Belorussian, 6 percent each for the Latvian and Lithuanian SSRs. From the other Communist countries in Eastern Europe the percentages were as follows: 30 percent Rumania, 30 percent Poland, 20 percent Czechoslovakia, and 10 percent each from East Germany and Bulgaria.¹⁷ In 1967, RL reported that "an extremely high proportion" of its mail comes from Moscow.¹⁸

RL also categorizes its mail according to "repeat writers" and "first-time writers." In the first quarter of 1971, the letters from repeat writers were 6 percent from the Soviet Union and 71 percent from the bloc countries. Letters from first-time writers were 94 percent from the USSR and 29 percent from the bloc countries. In the second quarter of 1971, the percentages were 6 percent repeat writers from the USSR, 67 percent from bloc countries; and 94 percent first-time letters from the USSR, and 33 percent from the bloc countries.¹⁹

Moreover, RL records the sex of its correspondents. In the first quarter of 1971, 81 percent of the correspondence was from males, 19 percent from females. In the second quarter, 68 percent was from males, and 16 percent from females, with 15 percent unascertainable.²⁰

3. Content of Letters

RL also categorizes the content of its mail according to "friendly" letters and "hostile/critical" letters. The report for the second quarter of 1971 stated that the proportion of hostile to friendly letters was not as high as in the previous quarter, but was "still substantial." "Some of the hostile letters," the report said, "indicated that their authors were acquainted with the official reactions to Radio Liberty's activities."²¹

In general, friendly listeners praise RL's operations and criticize their own Soviet media. Judgments are made within the context of compari-

as between Soviet "democracy" and genuine democracy in the West. RL is also praised for providing information to the Soviet listener in the tradition of a free press. One listener from the Ukraine commented favorably on RL for its "regular and accurate information." In turn, he criticized the Soviet leaders who "maintain a cowardly silence and wish to hide a pig in a poke from their very own people. . . ." The writer continued:

In so doing, of course, to our shame and regret we have to learn the truth not from the voice of the public, but from abroad. And all this only serves to undermine more and more their authority in the eyes of their own people . . . Let me express over and over to you my acknowledgment that you have been able to open my eyes and broaden my horizon.

Taking issue with RL's question on the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the writer continues:

I only regret that I am a Russian and still live in this wretched Russia and have to write in shameful block letters like an illiterate at a time of freedom of the press and speech. And I am not sure whether my letter will reach you and whether I will find out about it in your broadcasts. If you receive it, may I ask you strongly to put over its message in several programs; for, because of the strong jamming, I may not hear my own voice. . . .²²

Another writer from Stravropol Kray, The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), a woman listener, made the sweeping judgment that "everybody [in the USSR] listens to Radio Liberty." In the buses, she said, people exchange comments about its broadcasts. She praised RL's *Women's Show* series devoted to the Soviet working woman but added this critical comment: "Your in the West have no idea what . . . [the life of a Soviet Woman is like], but you are not to blame for that."²³

RL also receives and records in its files letters that are hostile and critical. A worker at the Zaporozhstal factory, claiming to speak for his comrades, denied both the persecution of Jews and the restrictions on freedom for Soviet writers. Seemingly well informed about the activities and works of a number of Soviet dissidents, he compared the virtues and achievements of the Soviet constitution with the "freedom" in America where "in broad daylight" a President is murdered.²⁴

A letter in a similar vein from a listener in Moscow Oblast dismissed the "slanders" whose "cast-iron throats will be silenced," and concluded: "The day will come when there will be no more West Germany, U.S. or any other capitalist country."²⁵

Another letter from a group of Tatars and Bashkirs charged that RL presented their life "in a distorted way;" that they "have got enough of everything;" and expressed compassion for the lot of former Soviet citizens living in the West in these words: "We are sorry for you, brothers."²⁶

RL categorizes responses from listeners according to "friendly" and "hostile/critical" reactions and attempts to measure the response in percentages. During the first quarter of 1971, the category "friendly" response recorded 43% for letters and 85% for interviews; the category "hostile/critical" recorded 57% for letters and 15% for interviews. For the second quarter, the percentages for the "friendly" category were 74% for letters, and 88% for interviews; and for the "hostile/critical" category, 26% for letters and 12% for interviews. The total percentages for both

quarters and for both letters and interviews were 81% for "friendly" and 19% for "hostile/critical."²⁷

4. Significance of Listener Mail

Listener mail provides RL with another important input of data, despite acknowledged imperfections, to flesh out its perception of the Soviet audience and to measure its effectiveness in broadcasting. It provides further documentary evidence, though minimal, of audience reaction. What is important to bear in mind in measuring the value of listener mail was pointed out by George Perry, namely, that "people write when they are really motivated, either pro or con"—meaning that listener mail reflects a significant reaction to programming and thus takes on a special value of its own in determining audience reaction.

On the other hand, the value of this reaction may be somewhat diminished by the fact that, apparently, RL strongly encourages listener response by mail; in fact, the practice may be overdone. As one senior RL staffer said in a post-broadcast audition on the matter of soliciting listener mail: "Perhaps we are unwittingly giving it more emphasis than is advisable."²⁸

Nevertheless, this does not devalue listener mail per se as an important input factor in measuring audience impact; for, listener mail, whether pro or con, is an affirmation of RL's purposes, namely to provoke the Soviet people to think critically and independently and to contemplate alternative solutions to problems on the basis of more complete information. Dr. Sosin inferred as much in a statement evaluating the evidence on RL's listenership. The evidence that RL is heard in the Soviet Union, he said, comes from hundreds of interviews with Soviet tourists, members of delegations in the West, conversations with Soviet citizens held by Western tourists, guides and students, and "perhaps most important," he said, "from letters which slip through the net of Soviet censorship and reach Radio Liberty's mail drop in the free world." "The great majority of this audience mail is favorable," he continued, "and encourages Radio Liberty in the conviction that its basic premise is sound, namely, that in all walks of Soviet life people are thirsty for information and ideas denied them by the official media; that in the current era of ferment after de-Stalinization they seek a deeper understanding of their own society."²⁹

C. Other Bases for Evaluating Effectiveness

1. References to RL in Soviet Literature

For internal organizational purposes RL relies wholly on interviews and listener mail as positive means for evaluating its effectiveness. Still, the frame of reference for audience reaction could be broadened to include comments in Soviet literature (not regime attacks) on RL and other foreign broadcasters, and also to include general evaluations on RL's activities made by Western authorities, private scholars or officials in government.

With regard to the first point, that is, references in Soviet literature, there has been a steady growth of evidence to demonstrate the value of

RL in the eyes of many Soviet listeners. Frequent references have been made to Western broadcasts in Soviet literature, particularly in samizdat, and appeals have been voiced urging that such broadcasts be continued.³⁰ Yuri Galanskov, author of the samizdat, "Organizational Problems of the Movement for Full and Universal Disarmament," made this reference in an appeal on behalf of imprisoned dissenters:

The Western press, and especially Western radios in the Russian language, give wide currency to facts of arbitrary judicial actions and administrative perversion, pinpoint their social nature, and force the state organs and officialdom to take urgent measures. This overcomes the natural inertia and conservatism of the bureaucracy . . . In functioning like this, Western press and radio perform the task of an organized opposition which is presently lacking in Russia, and thus stimulate our national development . . .³¹

A recent example of this sort of evaluation by indirection was the revelation in *The New York Times* in August 1971 of the existence of a publication in the Soviet Union called, "Political Diary." It was described as an exceptional example of political samizdat. Typical of the disquiet evident in this publication was a letter dated February 1966 and sent by an educator to Premier Kosygin. Of particular importance for this study is the writer's reference to Western radio broadcasts. The letter, printed in the Diary, said that people had "a great many questions to which they are not getting direct answers, either in the press or on the radio, or in the speeches of our party and Government leaders. It is not surprising that many of our people are beginning to find their answers in foreign radio broadcasts."³²

Another form of evaluation by indirection is the frequency with which the upper echelons of the Soviet ruling elite draw upon foreign broadcasters like RL as sources of information. This statement cannot be documented with the precision of the above reference to the "Political Diary;" but it is known that the Soviet leadership draws heavily upon daily monitored news from abroad. As Dr. Pool observed: "For the Soviet elite there is, of course, as there always has been, substantial coverage of foreign news sources in the classified monitoring reports."³³ Even middle and upper class Russians have shortwave radios available, and, accordingly, as Dr. Pool noted, "BBC, Voice of America, and Radio Liberty broadcasts are normal information sources for high status Soviet professionals or bureaucrats."³⁴ By implication, therefore, the Soviet leadership itself places a high positive value on foreign broadcasters such as RL.

What effect such access to outside information sources has on the ruling elite cannot be determined. In a comment on the immediate prospects of samizdat developing into "any sort of important political force," Peter Reddaway made an observation that has relevance to this larger question. "I happen to think," he said, "that samizdat at its present stage and in the present state of the Soviet society has little or no direct impact on policy-making by the leader. I do not see it as part of a political struggle. On the other hand, I see it as potentially of the greatest significance . . ."³⁵

2. Views of Former Soviet Citizens and Western Authorities

Other sources of evidence upon which to judge RL's general audience impact are the assessments of former Soviet citizens now living in Israel and the West who had been listeners while in the USSR, and also assessments by Western authorities who through their various academic and official connections have established credentials for passing judgment. All comments found tended to support the radio. This does not necessarily mean, however, that there has been no adverse criticism. The following are examples of favorable commentary.

Dr. Boris Tsukerman, Soviet physicist and human rights activist who left the Soviet Union in January 1971 and is now a citizen of Israel, declared that "Radio Liberty has its own audience in the USSR. This conclusion is the result of my conversations with many people."³⁶

Mrs. Natalia Belnikov, wife of the deceased Soviet writer Arkady Belnikov, lecturer at Yale University, and former staff member of the Sociological Department of the Moscow Radio and Television Committee, described their listening habits and those of their friends while in the Soviet Union. What seems most significant about her comments is the high value that is placed on the work of foreign radio broadcasters and also the widespread influence these broadcasts have within the Soviet intelligentsia. Mrs. Belniko said:

I well remember the efforts made by my friends to hear, despite difficulty, the unfettered word filtering through jamming. My invalid husband would spend hours sitting tensely before the radio, operating the volume and tuning controls with both hands. We saved our money, and even went without necessities, in order to buy the most sensitive receiver; all of us had homemade schedules of broadcasts by the BBC, VOA, and Liberty. People brought (illegally, of course) special adapters for Soviet-made receivers in order to increase the range of frequencies. We would report to each other immediately on what we had heard, and set up a timetable to take turns listening. I happen to know that recently this timetable has been operating throughout the right time when the jammers are ineffective. The technique of listening has been perfected. Broadcasts are being recorded on tape recorders. The broadcasts that are most prized by listeners get transcribed on the typewriter and become part of *samizdat* . . .³⁷

Western specialists on Soviet affairs have also made assessments on the effectiveness of RL as a broadcaster. Peter Reddaway, Soviet specialist at the London School of Economics, stated that from his "intensive study in recent years" on the democratic tendencies and movements in the Soviet Union he has accumulated "massive evidence of the importance which these tendencies and movements attach to Radio Liberty."³⁸ Another scholar, Jean Train, Professor of Russian at the Ecole Polytechnique, declared that according to many of his informants, RL "is listened to avidly by most of the intellectuals and leaders in the Soviet Union" with whom he has been in contact for many years. So important are RL's programs to these intellectuals that a number of groups have been formed, he said, "for the express purpose of listening to them and discussing them afterwards."³⁹

Governmental authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have commented favorably on RL's effectiveness. Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of

State for European Affairs, acknowledged that estimates of the number of RL's listeners are "of necessity less precise" than those of RFE, still, "there is extensive corroborative evidence which shows that . . . it has a large and tenacious audience." Mr. Hillenbrand went on to say that further evidence of audience impact comes from foreigners living and working in the area "who confirm that these peoples depend on the radios and that a significant proportion of the broadcasts penetrate the jamming." "One of my colleagues, fluent in Russian, who recently spent a two-year tour in the Soviet Union," Mr. Hillenbrand continued, "has said that in all his wide travels in that country he seldom met an individual who did not admit to listening to Radio Liberty." ⁴⁰

A similarly favorable appraisal came from Asher Lee, a British specialist on Soviet affairs and BBC Director of External Audience Research from 1948 to 1970. "In their research work conducted by us at BBC," Mr. Lee said, "we received many indications that this unique service provided by Radio Liberty was widely heard and appreciated by a significant audience in the USSR who, to a great extent, rely on Radio Liberty for information and an analysis of events in their land and abroad." Many Soviet listeners regard RL as their own station, he said, adding that RL broadcasters are regarded by Soviet listeners not "as foreigners transmitting from abroad, but as friends who enlighten." ⁴¹

Taken together, many of these statements, and others that are included in RL's formal presentation to Congress and appended to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, have the ring of a self-serving commercial so frequently seen on American television; but this is a matter of tone and style, and does not devalue the substance, for many of the scholars making these assessments are leading and respected specialists in Soviet affairs in the Western world; thus their judgments have validity; they carry the weight of authority. Negative appraisals by scholars could not be found in published literature.

II. REGIME ATTACKS AND JAMMING AS MEANS OF EVALUATION

A. Regime Attacks on RL

1. Soviet Tradition of Attacking RL

Documentary and empirical evidence are positive means which RL uses to determine impact and effectiveness. RL uses other means, essentially negative, that provide another measurement, however imprecise, namely, the number of regime attacks and the persistency of Soviet jamming.

Soviet attacks on RL are nothing new. What is new is the intensity and frequency of these attacks. The Soviet book, "U.S. Radio in Psychological Warfare," published a few years ago summarized the regime's inveterate opposition to RL in these words:

It is well known that of all types of Western "freedoms" "Radio Liberty" makes intensive use of one—freedom of slander, or falsifying facts and of fabricating provocative rumors. Up to the present day, "Radio Liberty's" broadcasts [transmitted] in the languages of the peoples of the USSR consist of overt and malicious

subversive propaganda. All of this has been mentioned more than once in the Soviet press.⁴²

* * * * *

B. Soviet Jamming of RL

1. *Extent of Soviet Jamming*

An equally important measurement of RL's impact and effectiveness, even though negative in character, is the persistency of Soviet efforts to jam its signal. Within 10 minutes after RL went on the air in March 1953, the Soviet Government began jamming operations; it has continued ever since, jamming RL around-the-clock 24 hours a day.

This has not been the case with other foreign broadcasters. As early as 1956, jamming operations ceased against the BBC on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit to Britain. VOA experienced a similar respite in 1959 when Khrushchev visited the United States. Between these years and 1963 both stations experienced periods of selective jamming during which many of their broadcasts got through without interference. In June 1963, the Soviet Government suspended its jamming of all major non-Communist world broadcasters, except RL.⁴³

III. RL's AUDIENCE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS

A. What Does It All Add Up To?

How is it possible to make any valid judgments on the extent of RL's impact and effectiveness? Hundreds of interviews a year from a narrowly selected audience provide one input for measurement. Listener mail, some 6,000 letters since 1956 (an average of some 33 letters a month), provide another.⁴⁴ Both represent positive means for judgment.

Assessment of regime media attacks and calculations of Soviet investment in time, resources and energy into jamming provide essentially negative inputs. Yet, they, at least, have the virtue of creating greater certainty in a very uncertain area of human judgment.

But, what does it all add up to?

* * * * *

B. Possible Modifying Factors

Commonsense seems to dictate that the positive inputs of interviews and listener mail can at best give RL only a hazy image of its audience and an uncertain estimate of its effectiveness. Still, this judgment might be modified somewhat by the knowledge that interviews, particularly those among the scientific intelligentsia, have an especially high value in weighing impact since they represent opinion leaders within Soviet society. Moreover, the number of interviews are, apparently, on the increase, especially with the expansion in the last few years of the Soviet Union's scientific and cultural exchange programs in the West.

This judgment might be modified still further by an awareness that while RL may have an opaque view of its audience, nevertheless, by the expertise of its staff, the quality of research, and particularly the emergence of the samizdat phenomenon, an unknown quantity in the early to mid-1960's which provides rich new insights into the workings of

Soviet society, RL itself can make assessments of its audience, programming needs, and probable effectiveness that may make this ordinarily opaque image appear somewhat clearer. Thus, it is possible, though not provable that RL may not be "flying blind" entirely, to use Mr. Sargeant's metaphor, and perhaps may even be in atmospheric conditions that are somewhat clearer than "a pea-soup fog."

NOTES

¹ Analysis Report #6-71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), July 26, 1971. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2)

² Hopkins writes: "So far, Soviet mass communications researchers have done little to measure radio audiences and listenership. All that Soviet authorities know is that the radio broadcasting network is technically capable of reaching all but a fraction of the Soviet population." (op.cit., p. 249.)

³ According to one RL paper, "direct, though random, contact with the listener is established through listener mail, of which there has been a considerable flow since 1960, and through interviews with Soviet citizens visiting in the West. While these contacts are not quantitatively large enough to provide a representative sampling of the audience for statistical purposes, the substantive information contained in the *Listener Mail Reports* and *Target Area Listener Reports*, issued by the Audience Research Division, serves frequently to confirm or refine policy judgments, and on occasion listeners have made direct programming suggestions which were considered worthy of instituting in Radio Liberty programs" (RL Policy Formulation, June 1971, p. 19. In, RL, v. IV, pt. 7).

⁴ Sargeant, Communications to Open and Closed Societies, p. 176.

⁵ RL Visual Exhibits, Illustration 4 (RL, v. V, pt. 11).

⁶ Ibid., Illustration 5.

⁷ Ibid., Illustration 6.

⁸ RL Inter-Office Memorandum, Briefing Material, Chart VI, Audience Occupation Distribution, p. 6. (RL, v. V., pt. 12).

⁹ RL's Russian Service Programming samizdat programming, April 1971, section V, pp 20-21. (RL, v. II, pt. D2).

¹⁰ RL, Analysis Report #6-71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), July 26, 1971, p. 7. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2).

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

¹² RL Policy formulation, June 1971, p. 19 (RL, v. IV, pt. 7).

¹³ RL, Inter Office Memorandum, Briefing material, August 26, 1971, p. 3. (RL, v. V, pt. 12).

¹⁴ RL Analysis Report #6-71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), July 26, 1971, p. 1 (RL, v. XII, pt. 2)

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 16

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 16

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁸ NYU-RL Conference, Communicating with Soviet Youth, 1967, p. 4 ff

¹⁹ RL, Analysis Report #6-71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), p. 18. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2).

²⁰ Ibid., p. 18

²¹ Ibid., p. 1.

²² Ibid., pp. 1-2

²³ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 3-4

²⁵ Ibid., p. 4

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 19

²⁸ RL, Post-Broadcast Audition Report, Audition of RL Russian Program for Wednesday/

Thursday, Oct. 14/15, 1970, November 13, 1950, p. 11. (RL, Post-Broadcast Auditioning File).

²⁹ Sosin, Role of Radio Liberty, pp. 95-96.

³⁰ RL Formal Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 8. (RL, v. I).

³¹ Ibid., p. 8. Italics added.

³² Gwertzman, Bernard. Notes from the Russian Underground. *The New York Times*, August 22, 1971, p. 32.

³³ Pool, Ithiel de Sola. "The Changing Soviet Union: The Mass Media As Catalyst," *Current*, (No. 67, January 1966:15).

³⁴ Pool, Final report, p. 11

³⁵ RL, Future of Samizdat, p. 16. (RL, v. II, D1).

³⁶ RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 46 (RL, v. I).

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 43-44

³⁸ Ibid., p. 27.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 35 Prof. Hugh Seton-Watson, a leading British specialist on Soviet affairs, declared that despite the elaborate and expensive measures the Soviet Government has taken to prevent RL's broadcasts from reaching the Soviet audience, "there is much evidence that the present audiences can be counted in millions." (Ibid, p. 29).

⁴⁰ SFRC, Report, pp. 20-21.

⁴¹ RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 34. (RL, v. I).

⁴² U.S. Radio in Psychological Warfare, pp. 33-34.

⁴³ RL, Soviet Counter-measures against Radio Liberty, pp. 1-2. (RL, v. III, pt. M).

⁴⁴ RL, The Soviet shortwave audience, p. 2. (RL, v. III, pt. J)

SOME EFFECTS OF RADIO MOSCOW'S NORTH AMERICAN BROADCASTS*

By DON D. SMITH

Opinion change may result from an "unexpectedly better" audience impression of communications.

* * * * *

Although international political communication is now a very prominent part of international political activity, actual empirical research in this field is quite scanty.¹ This study continues to report some research in one area of international political communication—short wave radio broadcasts from an official source in one nation to an audience in some other nation.

Some research reported recently in *Public Opinion Quarterly* found that there is a sizable audience in the United States to political programs broadcast directly to this country from other nations by short-wave radio.² What effect do such broadcasts have? The last controlled research on the effects of short-wave radio broadcasts to American audiences was conducted in 1942. In that study of German and Italian broadcasts, Allport and Simpson found that the broadcasts were generally ineffective, although some positive effect was noted on a few issues under certain conditions.³ In the 27 years since that research was conducted, international political broadcasting has intensified to the point where it now represents a major part of the international political communication

*Excerpts from "Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXXIV (Winter 1970-1971), pp. 539-551. Reprinted with the permission of *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

expenditure of many nations.⁴ Moreover, when compared to the efforts of a generation ago, considerable skill has been developed in communications designed to persuade. What are the effects, then, if any, of short-wave radio broadcasts on the current audiences?

Replies from the current American audience certainly suggest that such broadcasts do affect their political opinions and beliefs. These "real-life" listeners say that the broadcasts "help them see the other side of the story," and "provide a broader perspective of international events."⁵ Another response from this actual audience which is of particular relevance for the study reported here is that one of the stations to which they listen most frequently is Radio Moscow.⁶ This paper reports the results of an experimental study which examines some effects of Radio Moscow's English language North American broadcasts. To gain experimental control, the subjects are not a "real-life" audience, but the results will be compared to those reported by actual listeners.

THEORY

A very small but intensive pilot study provided the theoretical leads utilized in this research.⁷ In that early research it was found that (1) by our standards of effective communication, the content (and the manner in which that content was presented) of Radio Moscow's North American programming was very poor, and would probably not be considered effective no matter what the goals of the communicator might be;⁸ (2) the program content was biased and anti-United States, and the listeners perceived it to be such; (3) but the listeners were quite surprised that the content was not even more biased and more anti-United States. (4) Despite these negative characteristics, the respondents felt themselves to be influenced by what they had heard. The study reported here began with a search for a theoretical orientation which would provide a meaningful frame-work for the interpretation of these preliminary observations.

Social psychological research has noted that the response of an individual to a message is a function of the perceived relationship of that message to some internalized standard. Individuals evaluate incoming stimuli against some standard which they bring to the situation, and the direction and extent of their response is a consequence of that comparison. Within this framework, cognitive congruity or consistency formulations have emphasized the logical "fit" of the stimulus with some pre-existing cognitive structure, that structure usually being viewed as consisting of those attitudes and beliefs held by the individual which he relates to the incoming stimuli.⁹ More recent assimilation-contrast and social judgment formulations have emphasized the evaluation of a stimulus against a range of internal reference points.¹⁰ In both approaches, there has been increasing recognition that an individual's expectations about the stimulus are a prominent part of the baseline or standard against which he compares incoming stimuli.

The conclusions of such research have been that small deviations from

what is expected produce positive affect and positive construal of the stimulus, while gross deviations from what is expected produce negative affect and negative construal of the stimulus (with confirmation of expectancies resulting in some negative affect also). These results have been obtained regardless of the direction of the deviation from expectancy. In this view, gross disconfirmation of expectancy, no matter whether the stimulus is perceived as better or worse than expected, should result in negative response to that stimulus.¹¹

In real-life contexts, such experimental results have rather startling implications. According to this thinking, we should respond negatively if something turned out to be much better than we expected it would, or respond positively if something turned out a little worse than we expected it would; a student would respond negatively on learning he had passed a test he expected to fail, and respond positively on learning he had barely flunked a test on which he expected to get by; or a traveler in a foreign land would respond even more negatively on finding his original negative stereotype about the host country clearly disconfirmed. There are enough readily observable everyday situations which do not fit such a pattern to indicate that something is missing from these theoretical formulations.

Harvey and Clapp have added an important point by recognizing that the baseline or standard with which a stimulus is compared has evaluative dimension.¹² They note that human beings have hopes and desired goals as well as expectancies, and evaluate stimuli against these hopes as well as comparing them with their expectations. Harvey and Clapp found support for the hypothesis that deviations from expectancy in a direction supporting one's hopes would result in positive affect and positive construal of the stimulus, while deviations from expectancy in a direction negating one's hopes would result in negative affect and negative construal of the stimulus.¹³

An important addition should be made to these statements by Harvey and Clapp. The perceived deviation of the stimulus from expectancy is a judgment *relative* to what is expected; it is not a categorical, "all or none" judgment. It follows that an individual may be positively affected by a negative stimulus (negative in terms of his hopes) if he perceives the stimulus to be less negative than he had expected. Thus our student, although hoping to pass the test, might respond positively to flunking it because he did not flunk it as badly as he expected he would; and a student who easily passed a test he expected to pass easily might not be affected as positively as the student who barely passed a test he expected to fail.¹⁴

Several characteristics of the subjects in this study are pertinent at this point. (1) All of them assessed international cooperation, understanding, and peace as "very desirable" goals (the hope condition), and (2) all of them expected the stimulus to be incompatible with these hopes; that is, they had very negative expectations about Radio Moscow and its programming. They expected it to be very santed and very anti-United States

in content, consisting of blatant propaganda and "fanatical" attempts to change their minds (the expectancy condition). Also pertinent here for a full understanding of the hypotheses of this study is the point, to be documented later, that the broadcasts to which the subjects listened were indeed biased and noticeably negative to the United States, and were perceived as such by these American subjects. With these characteristics in mind, the following hypotheses may be derived from the foregoing discussion: (1) Listeners perceiving these negative broadcasts to be relatively better than their negative expectations will respond positively to the broadcasts. (2) Listeners perceiving these negative broadcasts as confirming their negative expectations will respond negatively to the broadcasts. (3) Listeners perceiving these negative broadcasts to be relatively worse than their negative expectations will respond most negatively to the broadcasts.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design consists of an experimental panel of 122 university students and two control panels of 43 and 54 university students respectively. This excludes, from an original experimental panel of 151 students, those individuals who had ever listened to Radio Moscow's broadcasts before. It is perhaps indicative of the success of our own country's political socialization that, in the original panel of 151 subjects, only 11 had favorable expectations of Radio Moscow's broadcasts; these individuals are also excluded from this report. The experimental panel listened to Radio Moscow's North American broadcasts one and one-half hours each week for two and one-half months—a total of 15 hours exposure. The broadcasts were monitored, taped, and replayed to the students usually within one to three days of their actual transmission.¹⁵ The subjects, all volunteers, submitted to a before-after questionnaire consisting of semantic differentials, opinion scales, and both structured and open-ended questions. The subjects were assigned a number at the beginning of the study, so that the before-after responses of each individual could be matched while protecting his anonymity.

As a control for any sensitizing effect to international news from other sources that might be created by participation in the study, control group I (CI) was fully informed about the research, and we attempted to instill a full sense of participation in these individuals. Subjects in control group II (CII) were unaware that they were a part of any larger study, and unaware that they would be queried again some two months later on the same issues.¹⁶

Utilizing Radio Moscow's practice of three one-half hour program blocks, which are rebroadcast in rotating order throughout the same evening, and some of which are repeated on still another evening of the same week, the experimental panel was presented with tapes which exposed them to each type of program in the same proportion in which it appeared on live programming. This included the usual news and political

commentary, scheduled programs such as "Science and Engineering," "Viet Nam Fights Back," "What is Communism," "Moscow Mailbag" (with its inimitable slogan, "You couldn't do better than write us that letter"), and short serials such as "The Pechala Family."

Several characteristics of the programming are particularly important. First, content analysis indicated that most of the programming did not deal with international political affairs per se.¹⁷ Aside from short news items, some political commentaries, and a few regularly scheduled programs on political issues, the broadcasts dealt mainly with such topics as urban planning in Moscow, descriptions of the educational system in the USSR, grain production, the rebuilding of the city of Frunze, the booming concrete and cement industry, and the excelling of work norms in tractor production—all quite descriptive and factual in character. Second, by both content analysis and a panel of 15 judges, the programs were evaluated as "moderately biased."¹⁸ These judges also rated the manner of presentation as "dull, boring, and unimaginative."

One striking exception to both of these observations, and one of particular significance in the analysis of results, was the issue of Viet Nam. The subject of news shorts, political commentaries, and a weekly feature of its own entitled, "Viet Nam Fights Back," this issue was frequently presented in a blatantly one-sided manner, characterized by highly charged negative statements likely to be viewed as incredible by an American listening audience, such as reports of U.S. troops ramming flaming bamboo splinters underneath the fingernails of captured prisoners, or U.S. troops pushing captured Viet Cong out of high-flying helicopters without parachutes.¹⁹

Several separate indices were used as indicators of the subjects' perception of the broadcasts in comparison with their expectations. The results reported here are based on the subjects' replies to questions in the after questionnaire which asked whether or not the content of the broadcasts, and the manner of their presentation, were what they thought they were going to be before they listened and, if different, how and in what way they were different. These items provide the basis for categorization of the subjects into those individuals who perceived what they expected (referred to hereafter as the expected group), those individuals who perceived the broadcasts to be worse than they expected (the unexpectedly worse group), and those individuals who perceived the broadcasts to be better than they expected (the unexpectedly better group).

RESULT

Data are given here on the following items: the Soviet government (evaluated by semantic differential), separate measures of the subjects' views of the Soviet government's sincerity, the legitimacy of that government's actions in world affairs, and that government's actual desire for world peace (each item evaluated on a nine-point opinion scale), the Russian people, and American military participation in Vietnam (the

latter two each measured by semantic differential).²⁰ Since the subjects were continually exposed to the many reinforcement patterns of their own society while being exposed to Radio Moscow's broadcasts, we could hardly expect actual conversion of their opinions, consequently, the measurement here is of the *direction* of opinion change rather than conversion of opinion.

The initial results are given in Table 1. Even without any breakdown within the experimental group, it is clear that the broadcasts did have some impact.²¹ In Table 1 there is no significant difference between the opinion change occurring in CI and that change occurring in CII, an indication that participation in the experiment was not a significant factor influencing the opinions of the participants. On the other hand, there is a significant difference between the experimental group and CI (in the case of the desire item, CII) on all issues but Vietnam, an indication that the broadcasts did indeed result in considerable opinion change.

Table 2 shows the data bearing on the specific hypotheses of this report. Hypothesis 1 stated that those listeners who perceived the broadcasts to

Table 1
Percentage of Subjects Modifying Opinions Toward the USSR

Issues	Experimental Group (N = 122)		CI (N = 43)	CII (N = 54)
Desire				
Changed favorably	39			25
Changed unfavorably	36	(p < .05) ^b	*	29
No change	25			46
Legitimacy				
Changed favorably	39		24	23
Changed unfavorably	38	(p < .05)	32	24
No change	23		44	53
Sincerity				
Changed favorably	51		28	26
Changed unfavorably	22	(p < .05)	33	28
No change	27		39	46
Soviet government				
Changed favorably	49		28	31
Changed unfavorably	13	(p < .02)	19	19
No change	38		53	50
Russian people				
Changed favorably	46		25	
Changed unfavorably	20	(p < .05)	19	*
No change	34		56	
U.S. in Vietnam ^c				
Changed favorably	27		23	
Changed unfavorably	34	n.s.	30	*
No change	39		47	

* Data on this issue were not collected from this group

^b All statistical tests in this table are X² two-tailed

^c For purposes of this table it is assumed that opposition to the U.S. military participation in Vietnam would be favorable to the USSR

be relatively better than their negative expectations would respond positively to their exposure. In Table 2 it may be seen that this unexpectedly better group consistently changed in a direction more favorable to the Soviet Union on all issues except Vietnam, an issue which, as we have noted, possesses considerably different characteristics. The change is particularly striking on such issues as sincerity (70 percent of the subjects became more favorable, while only 8 percent became more unfavorable), and on the semantic differential of the Soviet government, on which 63 percent of the subjects moved in a favorable direction and 7 percent became more unfavorable.

In contrast, on Vietnam, the one issue which was clearly dealt with in the "hard line" fashion the groups had expected, the unexpectedly better group did not move particularly toward the Soviet Union. Although we have no separate measure of their perception of this specific issue, subjects in the unexpectedly better group frequently indicated that on this one issue, they perceived the broadcasts to be as negative as they had expected.

Hypothesis 2 stated that those listeners who perceived their negative expectations to be relatively confirmed would be negatively affected by their exposure. In Table 2 the data are mixed for this hypothesis. On the issues of desire and legitimacy, individuals in this expected group did move in a direction more unfavorable to the Soviet government.²² However, they split evenly on the issue of the government's sincerity, and, on the measures of the Soviet government and the Russian people (both obtained by semantic differentials), they actually became more favorable (although certainly not as much so as the unexpectedly better group). These results suggest that under some conditions subjects who generally perceived the broadcasts negatively can be positively affected. It may well be that, just as the unexpectedly better group perceived the Vietnam issue differently from other issues, the negative expectations of the expected group were not confirmed on these specific issues. In future research separate measures of expectation should be obtained for each specific issue.

Hypothesis 3 stated that those individuals who perceived the broadcasts to be relatively worse than their negative expectations would respond most negatively. Although the N in this group is so small as almost to preclude the results from reaching a .05 level of statistical significance, opinion change in a direction more unfavorable to the Soviet Union is, as hypothesized, clearly the most pronounced among subjects in this group (see Table 2). Individuals in this unexpectedly worse group consistently moved in a direction negative to the Soviet Union on all issues except sincerity (on which they split in the direction of their opinion shift).²³ On the issue of desire, for example, 46 percent of the group moved in a direction unfavorable to the Soviet Union while 15 percent became more favorable. Even on the item of the Russian people, about whom all categories in the experimental group originally had rather favorable

Table 2

Prior Expectations	Issues					U.S. in Vietnam	N
	Desire	Legitimacy	Sincerity	Soviet Government	Russian People		
Unexpectedly better ^b	55 ^c	48 ⁱ	70 ^d	63 ^d	53 ^d	34	59
Changed favorably	26	35	8	7	15	30	
Changed unfavorably							
No change	19	17	22	30	32	36	
Expected ^b							
Changed favorably	25 ^a	30	34	40 ^f	44 ^f	22 ^a	50
Changed unfavorably	46	38	34	16	18	38	
Changed favorably							
No change	29	32	32	44	38	40	
Unexpectedly worse ^c							
Changed favorably	15 ^h	33 ⁱ	33	23	23 ⁱ	15 ⁱ	13
Changed unfavorably	46	58	32	31	46	39	
Changed favorably							
No change	39	9	34	46	31	46	

participation in Vietnam would be favorable to the USSR

* For purposes of this table, it is assumed that opposition to the U.S. military participation in Vietnam would be available to all.

All statistical tests for the groups are the McNemar test for the significance of change, corrected for continuity.

Due to the limited number of cases, the statistical test used for this case

opinions, the unexpectedly worse group responded quite negatively, with 46 percent becoming more negative, and 23 percent more favorable.

The subjects' open-ended replies on the after questionnaire flesh out the results of these before-after measures. Some excerpts from the unexpectedly better group illustrate the subjects' reactions:

- [1] A very silly effect, perhaps, but all of a sudden I realized that Russia's citizens are ordinary people.
- [2] You know, here we are always cast in the good guy role. It (the broadcasts) helps you to step back and get a possible view others might take of us and their reasons.
- [3] You begin to see that the Soviet Union is not a monster with atomic bombs in each hand; instead they're human, as concerned with human affairs as we are.
- [4] Through the dark and heavy mist, every once in a while I felt they really did seem to want world peace, at least those in control of the broadcasts, and as I look over the world situation as a whole, I can begin to see where this could be true.

Such replies are very similar to those we consistently get in interviews with actual American listeners to Radio Moscow's North American broadcasts. Frequent comments from the "real-life" audience are: "It makes you realize they are people just like us"; "You see that there are two sides to most of these international problems"; "You begin to see their side of the story too."²⁴

The open-ended responses also provide additional support for the theory entertained in this research—that the process involves a comparison of what the respondent heard with what he expected to hear:

- [1] I expected it to be one mass of making the U.S. look black and completely positive for the Russians. I thought I would hear more bad points than I did. I was surprised, they seemed so much like us. From the general idea we get in America we are told the Soviet Union is bad, so I assumed they would try to make us look bad too. They were fairly reasonable about it and it made me think maybe they really were trying to help us understand each other better.
- [2] You can't believe all they say, but they didn't hit us hard on the things I thought they would, like race riots, as if they really were trying not to make trouble.
- [3] I thought they would try to persuade me. Instead they played music and frankly answered those questions from Americans. They seemed so sensible about it—it makes you realize they're honest people trying to help international affairs.

There are undoubtedly many sociological and psychological factors at work to account for why some subjects perceived what they had expected in the broadcasts and some did not.²⁵ In our research so far, we have examined only one of these factors—dogmatism, with the more dogmatic individuals purportedly more resistant to opinion change and more prone to distort information to fit pre-existing opinions and beliefs.²⁶ There is some indication in these data that those individuals scoring high on the dogmatism scale perceived the broadcasts as they had expected them to be, while the low dogmatics found the broadcasts to be something different from what they had expected ($t = 1.37, p < .15$).²⁷

DISCUSSION

This study obtained a measure not only of the specific point on an opinion measure which a subject indicated most exactly characterized his

own position, but also the range of his acceptance and rejection of other positions on the opinion measure. The results of this study are accentuated when this additional dimension is taken into account.

This rather exploratory experiment leaves many important variables uncontrolled, and the results are legitimately subject to diverse interpretations. Nevertheless, they suggest some fruitful directions for additional research. For one thing, disconfirmation of expectancy in the direction of hope or goals seems to suggest why some opinions change—a welcome contrast to the abundant evidence we have on why opinions do *not* change. The results also highlight the fact that political opinion change is a sociological as well as a psychological phenomenon. In this study, the entire social system of the audience must be considered for a full understanding of the impact of Radio Moscow's broadcasts. The broadcasts seem to have had an effect, not because of any particular skill in communication, but because conditions in our own society had led the audience to hold unrealistic negative images which, upon actual exposure, were clearly refuted for many of the listeners. According to the replies of the subjects in this study, the domestic mass media were among those aspects of our society which played an important role in determining their response to these foreign broadcasts. The domestic media came in for specific censure from individuals in the unexpectedly better group as a prime source of their unrealistic expectations.²⁸

Some implications for traditional issues in international political communication may also be found in these results. To cite but a few, there is the issue of the comparative effectiveness of political communications that deliberately attempt to persuade and "propagandize," in comparison with a relatively candid and straightforward presentation.²⁹ The results of this study suggest that national groups which expect biased political persuasion from a source in another nation, and get (or perceive) the communication in that form, tend to respond negatively; national groups which expect biased political persuasion from a source in another nation, and do not get (or perceive) the communication in that form, tend to respond positively. Since most people are taught to expect political "propaganda" from their nation's adversaries, this fact has obvious implications for developing effective political communications to the people of other nations.

Related to this point is the political import of overtly nonpolitical content in international political communications. Having expected overt political persuasion attempts, but confronted rather with concerts, accounts of everyday life in the Soviet union, and descriptions of Soviet social institutions, the subjects frequently cited this overtly nonpolitical content as prominent in the refutation of their expectations. Many other areas of relevance could be cited, such as the relation of expectancy confirmation to the frequently noted "boomerang" phenomenon, and the value of side effects in political communication.

In sum, these results strongly suggest the value of continuing to

examine the factor of confirmation/disconfirmation of expectations in assessing the effectiveness of international political communications.

NOTES

¹ International political communication is considered here as the deliberate attempt by a communicator in one nation to further the political interests of that nation through the dissemination of messages to audiences in other nations by means of the mass media.

² Don D. Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience: Twenty-five Years Later," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 33, 1969, pp. 537-545.

³ Floyd H. Allport and Mary M. Simpson, "Broadcasting to an Enemy Country. What Appeals Are Effective and Why," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 23, 1946, pp. 217-224.

⁴ See W. Phillips Davison, *International Political Communication*, New York, Praeger, 1965; Eron M. Kirkpatrick, ed. *Target. The world*, New York, Macmillan, 1956; *Internationales Handbuch für Rundfunk und Fernsehen*, Hamburg, Hans-Bredow-Institut, 1960.

⁵ Smith, *op. cit.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Don D. Smith, "Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts: An exploratory Study," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 42, 1965, pp. 643-645.

⁸ It is an assumption, of course, that at least one of the goals of the broadcasts is the creation of favorable opinions about the communicating nation.

⁹ See Robert P. Abelson *et al.*, eds., *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1968.

¹⁰ See Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, *Social Judgment*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961.

¹¹ Cf. J. Merrill Carlsmith and Elliot Aronson, "Some Hedonic Consequences of the Confirmation and Disconfirmation of Expectancies," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 66, 1963, pp. 151-156; Edward E. Sampson and Linda B. Sibley, "A Further Examination of the Confirmation or Nonconfirmation of Expectancies and Desires," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 2, 1965, pp. 133-137; Salvatore R. Maddi, "Affective Tone during Environmental Regularity and Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 62, 1961, pp. 338-345. Also see Harry Helson, *Adaptation-Level Theory*, New York, Harper, 1964. A recent study by Keisner indicates that negative affect as a consequence of strong expectancy disconfirmation is limited to public conditions; see Robert H. Keisner, "Affective Reactions to Expectancy Disconfirmations under Public and Private Conditions," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 11, 1969, pp. 17-24.

¹² O. J. Harvey and William F. Clapp, "Hope, Expectancy, and Reactions to the Unexpected," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 2, 1965, pp. 45-52.

¹³ Harvey and Clapp, *op. cit.*; also see J. Scott Verinis, Jeffrey M. Brandsma, and Charles N. Cofer, "Discrepancy from Expectation in Relation to Affect and Motivation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 9, 1968, pp. 47-58, and David C. McClelland, *et al.*, *The Achievement Motive*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.

¹⁴ For other treatments of the confirmation and disconfirmation of expectancies in real life situations see Robert T. Bower and Laure M. Sharp, "The Use of Art in International Communication: A Case Study," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 20, 1956, pp. 221-228, and Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang, *Politics and Television*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1968, pp. 43-48.

¹⁵ This taping took place between October 7, 1966 and December 15, 1966.

¹⁶ The before-after responses of this group were matched by social background data.

¹⁷ Generally, no more than 25 percent of a given evening's broadcast content dealt overtly with international political affairs.

¹⁸ All of the judges were students who had previously listened to Radio Moscow's North American broadcasts and who were familiar with the literature on opinion-attitude forma-

tion and propaganda. They listened to a one-hour sample of the same tapes presented to the experimental group and responded on a semantic differential.

¹⁹ Replies from the subjects (and the panel of judges) indicate that they did indeed view this material incredulously.

²⁰ The subjects' opinions on all items were measured on the evaluative continuum of favorableness-unfavorableness.

²¹ There were no significant differences in the initial opinions held on these issues by either the experimental group or the control groups.

²² Although the results do not reach the .05 level of statistical significance.

²³ The broadcasts appear to be particularly effective on the issue of sincerity. Again, the need is clear in future research to obtain measurements of prior expectations on each specific issue.

²⁴ Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience."

²⁵ In this study 41 percent of the subjects perceived what they had expected in the broadcasts, 48 percent saw the broadcasts as better than they had expected them to be, and 11 percent found them to be worse than expected.

²⁶ Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, New York, Basic Books, 1960.

²⁷ In interpreting these results, it should be mentioned that a highly shortened version of the dogmatism scale was used. See Rolf H. K. Schulze, "A Shortened Version of the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale," *Journal of Psychological Studies*, Vol. 13, 1962, pp. 93-97.

²⁸ Indeed, some of the respondents, finding the stance taken in the broadcasts to be so different from what they had expected, felt "betrayed" by American media coverage.

²⁹ Ralph K. White, "The New Resistance to International Propaganda," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 1, 1952, pp. 539-551.

THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM POSES THREAT OF SPECIAL DIMENSIONS*

BY HAMMOND ROLPH

This article illustrates the use of captured documents as a measure of the effectiveness of psychological operations programs. The selection is an assessment of the impact of the Chieu Hoi Program through textual and documentary material.

Ever since the Viet Cong insurgency reached serious proportions in the early 1960's, the Saigon government has had some kind of program for inducing defectors from the revolutionary movement. These were not highly organized or very effective, however, until the present *chieu hoi* or "open arms" plan was instituted about three years ago. Furthermore, the military situation in the earlier period did not favor Viet Cong defection. . . . The basic program was designed to persuade NLF soldiers and lower-level personnel to lay down arms and rejoin the national community, with assurances of full constitutional rights, a fraternal welcome, and material assistance. It was supplemented in April, 1967 by a National Reconciliation Policy specially aimed at inducing defection by higher-level Viet Cong military officers and political cadre leaders.

*Excerpts from "Viet Cong Documents on the War (III)," *Communist Affairs*, VI, no. 1 (January-February 1968), pp. 21-25. Reprinted with the permission of *Studies in Comparative Communism* (successor to *Communist Affairs*) and the author, copyright holders.

Defections to date have been largely from the hamlet and village level and from the ranks of the local guerrillas and functional associations, but there have been some "ralliers" of distinctly greater importance, and recognition of the threat to the cadre structure is explicit in the NLF documents on the subject. A report . . . taken from a cache in the Iron Triangle area north of Saigon in Binh Duong Province during Operation "Lam Son 67" by the U.S. 1st Division, blamed the success of *chieu hoi* on poor security policies, loose personnel procedures, lack of vigilance, and weak ideology. It also recognized the key operative element in the defections: appeals from the families of Viet Cong members.

The Current Affairs Committee has published directives concerning internal protection against the enemy "Open Arms" activity. All echelons, organizations, and branches complied with this, but the results were limited. Secrecy preservation classes have been conducted for all cadre and personnel of all committee echelons, organizations, and societies. Some organizations have reestablished the personal history statement, controlled to some extent the internal political situation, set up protection teams, and constructed defense works to protect the organizations. This was successful in avoiding regrettable casualties to some extent. However, from time to time and in some areas, particularly at district and village levels, the preservation of secrecy was not strictly carried out. This was evidenced by the lack of secrecy in conversation. Moreover, the loss of documents was noted in some areas. The recruitment of soldiers and personnel was done without caution; defense against psywar and "Open Arms" was not rigorously undertaken . . . As a result many soldiers and workers have lost spirit and become demoralized. There were also cases of dereliction of duty. This was common everywhere . . . Some of our soldiers and cadres are misled by the enemy, have surrendered to the enemy, carrying important documents and weapons with them. As compared with 1965, the rate of deserters is higher. In some areas, the number of soldiers and cadre workers who deserted or defected to the enemy as a result of the appeals of their family amounted to 80 percent, and the number of village guerrillas, hamlet guerrillas and cadres and civilians was 70 percent. The rest were district-level cadres and higher (including workers, District and Province Concentrated Forces). Some defectors . . . have shown the enemy our base areas and installations, thus causing some damage to us, much political effect on the people, and reducing the people's absolute confidence in our cadres and soldiers. Worse still some people began to doubt our cadres' and soldiers' loyalty.

The above situation was caused by many things, primarily because of the failure to heighten the vigilance by the committee echelons and organization Party Headquarters. It was also due to: Failure to fully understand the principle of building up and defending the Party's revolutionary forces, failure to thoroughly understand the cunning scheme of the enemy; too little emphasis on ideological and political instruction which was designed to heighten the cadres' and soldiers' revolutionary spirit and awareness. . . .

In the near future, psychological warfare on a greater scale will be initiated by the enemy. Intelligence, "Open Arms" activities, and military activities will be increased in support of his resettlement and pacification activities. Other activities will include demagoguery and bribery. Indications are that television sets will be brought to rural areas to support psychological warfare and "Open Arms" activities.

To frustrate the enemy psywar and "Open Arms" plan, all committee echelons, Party and group agencies, and the commanding officers of the other organizations should understand that the building up of our forces and the security protection for our revolutionary forces are a common task. The protection of forces is as necessary as the development of forces. Without due protection, our forces will not last long before the cunning scheme of the enemy. . . .

Therefore, the security protection of the unit, defense of our revolutionary force against the enemy's psywar, *chieu hoi* and "appeal to surrender" attempts, at present, and in the future, constitute the most important and urgent mission. . .

* * * * *

Continue to watch after the unit's political situation. We should grasp fast the people who have doubtful political tendencies or those who are still wavering. Cases of unclarity, signs of corruption, bribery, and demoralization should be halted in time, and each problem should be carefully judged, then solved logically and legally. Avoid mechanical settlements which may create antagonism in the internal organization. Concerning the suspected elements, the Party officials and security authorities concerned should submit proposals to the Party committee on the action to take against these elements and request that the committee echelon take drastic measures against them. The people who still have doubtful political tendencies but are not directly against us or considered dangerous should be continually educated, if they really want to progress, so they can adopt a decisive attitude and discern friends from foes. The core elements which assume key missions should be truly pure and clean.

The people in charge of recruitment should be careful and determined to put an end to easy and careless admission.

Special emphasis should be placed on the education of the servicemen's and soldiers' families in weak areas . . . the organizations should have a plan to contact the cadres' and soldiers' families and fight the enemy's dangerous attempts to lure them through their families.

A secret report from a district unit commander to his district committee . . . spoke bluntly of the difficulties the *chieu hoi* program is causing in his area.

An overall review of the Vietnam battlefield at the start of the winter and spring campaign shows that we have suffered both military and political failures. The enemy . . . intensified military action, and uninterrupted raids have eroded the will to fight of our army and people. Coupled with his military effort, the enemy has stepped up his perfidious *chieu hoi* campaign in his attempt at undermining our fighting spirit.

The impact of increased enemy military operations and *chieu hoi* programs has, on the whole, resulted in lowering the morale of some ideologically backward men, who often listen to enemy radio broadcasts, keep in their pockets enemy leaflets, and wait to be issued their weapons in order to go over to the enemy side.

* * * * *

They might betray the revolution by having their parents, wives, children, relatives and friends establish contact with the enemy to make arrangements for their eventual defection. They will steal documents, weapons and other equipment and cause us losses prior to going over to the enemy to betray the Revolution.

* * * * *

Addressees, upon receipt of this memorandum, will confer with their respective [Party] chapter committee authorities to work out plans for finding out these "bad elements," reeducating them as individuals and their units, as a whole.

On Nov. 20, 1966, the political department of the South Vietnam Liberation Army (the Viet Cong armed forces) issued a directive for action against the *chieu hoi* and other GVN-U.S. psychological warfare programs. The document was captured by a unit of the U.S. 25th Division in February, 1967.

The *chieu hoi* program, one of the most important activities of the enemy psychological warfare, is a national policy of the neocolonialist war. True to the nature of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, their psywar reflects aggression, reaction, and injustice. It is carried out under many aspects but its main purpose is to deceive, flatter or oppress us and impair our morale and ideology.

In an attempt to weaken our combat spirit and sow doubt and fear, the enemy uses the label of false independence, seduces our men with money, women and sympathy, or resorts to bombs. These factors are used to make our troops surrender.

Such a scheme is very dangerous. Therefore we must counter their psywar activities permanently in order to maintain the morale of the troops, their combat spirit and their firm viewpoint.

* * * * *

Our cadres still underestimate the value of the enemy's propaganda. Our men still listen to the enemy broadcasts and read enemy magazines and newspapers.

The political views of our troops are still insufficient and loose due to the ignorance of the enemy's cruelty. The enemy tries to increase the fear of sacrifice and encourages pacifism. As a result, a number of our soldiers have been influenced by the enemy's deceitful propaganda. . . .

Security maintenance is not properly observed by cadres and soldiers.

* * * * *

Defection occurs frequently in various armed forces. Many cases have resulted in disastrous consequences. Some have killed our cadres and soldiers, destroyed weapons and stolen secret documents before surrendering to the enemy.

* * * * *

Point out the danger of this scheme. Its influence is so bad that it weakens our ideology, impairs our combat spirit, and finally induces our cadres to side with the enemy and to become traitors.

The struggle against the psywar and *Chieu hoi* program is a class struggle. It is a long-range and complicated struggle during which we must increase indoctrination for class consciousness, lay bare the enemy's deceitful propaganda, and control our ideology and our organization closely.

* * * * *

To stop enemy influence, the first basic thing to do is to strengthen the personality of each of our cadres and fighters. . . . When one has a deep hatred of the enemy and a noble revolutionary ideal, one is immune to the threat of arms, the appeal of money and beautiful women, and the lure of deceitful tricks. Our cadres and soldiers must be taught how to make a distinction between right and wrong so that they will be able to help one another with the force of collectivity. This is the most revolutionary and effective way according to the Party line. When enemy propaganda reaches our units, we must on the one hand organize the collection of these documents, and on the other, proceed with the analysis of enemy materials with a view to unmasking his deceitful arguments in the eyes of the people. Do not underestimate enemy propaganda. Actually it does not affect anybody specifically. Its influence penetrates our minds day after day and will cause disastrous consequences. Therefore, we should heighten vigilance in order to expel it from our mind.

* * * * *

Provisions of the internal regulations must be strictly observed by cadres at committee levels. Listening to enemy broadcasts and reading enemy newspapers, magazines, and leaflets are forbidden. Provisions concerning the political administration in the unit and assignment of personnel to important units must be strictly observed.

* * * * *

Investigate the attitude of those influenced by enemy psywar operations and straighten it out in time

* * * * *

Help and motivate families whose children joined the Revolution. We must make them believe in the revolutionary movement, take part in the resistance, and encourage their children to fulfill their duties. Point out the enemy's plot to bribe their children, induce them to side with them. This shows confusion and weakens our combat determination.

In a directive . . . from the Party Committee of Military Region I, entitled "Counter *Chieu Hoi* in the Armed Forces," the campaign to neutralize this dangerous GVN program is elaborated upon. There is no

attempt to minimize the impact of the political arm of the enemy's "two-pronged attack," and severe countermeasures are directed.

In the psywar and "Open Arms" programs, due to our failing to pay attention to cope with the situation and provide correct guidance, the enemy has been positively active and has achieved certain definite results among the people and among our armed forces, especially the guerrilla forces and regional troops. In recent years, they have attached much importance to that attempt and have organized the psywar branch from highest to lowest level and placed that branch under military command. They have also organized the "Open Arms" branch from central to district level, formed and sent many "Open Arms" cadres to work in close coordination with pacification cadres, intelligence agents, spies, U.S. advisers and their vassals, namely the Formosans, South Koreans, Malaysians, etc. . . . They have devoted to this task a great deal of money and reserved all available means for this task . . .

* * * * *

Thus, it is obvious that the enemies have for a long time considered their attempts to induce our cadres and fighters to surrender and rally as a well-organized strategic plot, properly guided from top to bottom and involving the use of a great deal of money and means. All their attempts are directed toward the masses and especially toward our armed forces. At present, within the framework of their attempting to launch a two-pronged attack, the enemies are actively carrying out their effort to induce our people to rally in a well-organized manner and with more cruel and furtive plots. Concurrently, they also step up their fierce military activities. . . . a great majority of our cadres and fighters have proved themselves to be confident and have fought bravely to achieve greater and greater merits and feats of arms in really hard fighting situations which require them to surmount countless difficulties.

However, we must recognize that recently our enemies have achieved, through their "Open Arms" activities, certain definite results. This is because, on the one hand, they have been working actively and have resorted to many tricks and, on the other hand, because we really still have many shortcomings in our task of fighting against enemy attempts to induce us to surrender or rally through their "Open Arms" activities. . . .

Generally speaking, our cadres and fighters still underestimate enemy tricks and "Open Arms" activities and have failed to follow closely their tricks and activities to educate and guide their units to fight against and defeat these enemy plots . . .

Cadres and fighters tune to various enemy radio stations, U.S. and British stations and the Saigon radio station, without regard to regulations prescribed by higher levels; listen to all kinds of news and "Open Arms" broadcasts through enemy programs of music and artistic performances. People also read enemy reactionary newspapers and magazines.

People are allowed to read enemy leaflets freely . . . Some people even bring these leaflets to their offices to serve as wrapping paper or envelopes. . . .

Cadres and fighters who get in touch with their families often return with pictures of their family members. Among them are such people as puppet officers, GVN officials, security agents and policemen. They consider such pictures as free from all bad influence and keep them in their pockets . . . Leading cadres are aware of this but have failed to take determined, constructive and adequate measures against such occurrences.

* * * * *

Leaders have not succeeded in controlling the state of mind and thoughts of each of the men in their units. . . . They have failed to follow closely and thoroughly understand the difficulties that must be overcome, so as to be able to prevent their men from being upset and pessimistic, thus vulnerable to enemy psywar.

* * * * *

Certain units have admitted many people into their ranks in a reckless manner and without regard to prescribed procedures and principles. They have freely accepted relatives and friends, whose "curriculum vitae" they do not thoroughly know about, into their ranks.

* * *

In certain units, cadres usually do not pay attention to the physical and spiritual life of their fighters. This is because they are inclined to think that it is taken for granted that their men will have to endure hardships, however great these hardships may be. Thus, they never pay attention to improving their fighters' way of living with means that are within their reach and capacity. Moreover, conditions in which cadres fail to share the sweet and the bitter with their fighters still exist at certain places.

* * * * *

... Party commissars and leading cadres in units and organizations are to reinforce and increase education in current matters in a continuous manner, with a view to showing people clearly our advantageous position and the weak position of our enemy.

These cadres must also educate their men to closely and constantly follow enemy plots and "Open Arms" activities, so as to design proper measures to cope with such situations in time.

Properly carry out regulations prescribed by the army concerning the question of listening to enemy radio broadcasts and reading enemy newspapers and magazines. Severely judge and exert disciplinary measures against cadres and fighters who transgress such regulations.

* * * * *

Concerning the dissension between China and Russia, leaders must explain to cadres and fighters that these are only certain differences of concepts that can be smoothly settled. Leaders are to emphasize the fact that, at present, China and Russia are actively supporting our people in all fields to defeat the U.S. aggressors. Leaders must also tell those who listen to Chinese and Russian radio broadcasts not to discuss any sensitive news before receiving official explanations emanating from the Party.

* * * * *

Party chapters, organization and unit commanders are to maintain firmly all activities of such organizations as the three-men cells in their units, pay attention to isolated elements operating in weak areas, assign hard-core cadres to keep well in hand the daily routine and thoughts of each person so as to discover any mistake and help correct it immediately.

Party chapters and organization commanders are to keep well in hand the family situation of each of their men, their strong points and weak points regarding their way of thinking, behavior, and psychology as well as their aspirations so as to constantly help them. And, especially with people who have committed certain mistakes, Party chapters and organization commanders are to analyze such mistakes, judge them, and create for them favorable conditions to progress and achieve merits instead of over-criticizing them and having prejudices against them.

* * * * *

The question of getting in touch with family members must be thoroughly studied and correctly organized and carried out. However, in this critical situation, such contacts ought to be limited. Commanders must educate their men prior to their departure and motivate them to reeducate their family members. For people whose standpoint and thought are still shaky, commanders must not allow them to contact their families at once. In emergency cases and when facing righteous aspirations of these people, commanders are to assign some other people to go with them to strive to educate their families if this is possible. (Avoid causing people to think that we are doubting them when having them accompanied by some other people.)

* * * * *

We must not, even when short of personnel, admit into our ranks doubtful elements whose "curriculum vitae" we do not know about, so as to avoid all possible infiltration.

* * * * *

Actively control and implement regulations guaranteeing the realization of democracy in organizations and units, raise to a higher degree the people's attitude toward Party chapters cadres and commanders, promote unity among the cadres and fighters; absolutely fight against despotic, bureaucratic, imperious, nepotistic, and militaristic thought and gesture among the ranks of the army, especially among the ranks of the cadres

Actively realize the . . . task of supplying our troops and taking care of the material needs of cadres and fighters within the reach of our capacity . . . Absolutely fight against the thought of refusing to share the sweet and the bitter with everybody and striving to improve personal benefits

* * * * *

In case we discover a cadre or fighter who induces some other people to desert our ranks, we are to thoroughly study the case to see whether that cadre is someone sent by the enemy or just a person who could no longer endure hardships and has resorted to such a wrong means.

If the man happens to be a real enemy, then we must deal with him in a proper manner. If he happens to belong to the second case, then we must reeducate and reform him right at the unit.

In case some cadres and fighters receive appeals from their families to return and inform us about such moves, we are to promote their revolutionary spirit and comfort them. We must also make public such a revolutionary spirit and have it studied by other people. Concurrently, we are to consolidate their thought and strive to prevent them from being shaken by other appeals that will be launched by their families at other times. Finally, we are to motivate people to write letters to build revolutionary concepts for their families or inform regional authorities to take care of that work.

It is evident from the above directive that restoration of discipline is a mixture of persuasion and coercion, with the former preferred whenever possible. The NLF leaders apparently realize that Draconian measures would tend to erode the psycho-political underpinnings of the revolution. References to the requirement that cadres share "the bitter and the sweet" with their subordinates are frequently seen in Viet Cong operational and training documents dealing with criticism and self-criticism. There is no evidence, however, that such directives are ever put into full effect. In fact, gross inequality between cadres and rank and file (particularly in food rations and access to sexual pleasures) is built into the system.¹ Furthermore, some Communist POW's have expressed surprise at the degree to which combat dangers shared by American officers with their men exceed those to which NLF cadres expose themselves.

NOTES

¹ I. de Sola Pool, *op cit*, p. 56

ON ANALYZING PSYOP CAMPAIGNS BEFORE USING THEM*

BY RICHARD H. ORTH

CONSIDERING POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS

In attempting a persuasion campaign, it is best to use a step-by-step procedure. First, the PSYOP planner decides which attitudes or behaviors are to be changed. Next he determines the desired direction of the change, and then he writes the message. If the message is to go to an audience that does not speak the writer's language, it is translated into the language of the audience. (If there is time, the message may be translated back into the original again to check the adequacy of the translation.) Then the message is disseminated via the available media and one hopes for the best.

The PSYOP planner must then assess the effect this campaign had on the target audience. This he can do in several ways. He could make surveys or he could analyze the media of the target, or he could note the effects of the audience. If the campaign appeared to work, there is a feeling of satisfaction over a job well done. If it did not work, a plethora of rationalizations are available either from the technical literature or from the contingencies of the situation. For example, if leaflet drops were used as the distribution method, one can easily blame the lack of success on bad luck (that is, high winds, skirmishes, and the like).

If, however, the PSYOP evaluator dwells only on the determination of success or failure, he does not gain any insight into the factors that caused the success or failure. When operating in the field, clearly the psyoperator does not have the luxury of addressing himself to all, or even a portion, of the factors that may enter into the persuasion process. The question then becomes, what can and should he do to anticipate the potential effectiveness of a campaign. An answer may be found in W. J. McGuire's analysis of the persuasion process.¹ Although this analysis is specifically meant to deal with some aspects of personality and persuasibility, it can reasonably be extended to other areas of the persuasion process.²

THE THREE-FACTOR THEORY


The model proposed by McGuire has been labeled the "three-factor theory." The name of the theory is derived from the three factors examined: (1) receiving, (2) yielding, and (3) opinion change. Essentially, it says that the likelihood of opinion change derives from the answers to two questions. Although the two questions may seem oversimplified, they really go to the heart of the issue as will be shown later. The

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth

questions are: (1) what is the probability that an individual will receive* the message and (2) what is the probability that he will yield** to the message. The combination of these probabilities gives the probability of opinion change taking place. An example could be the effects of intelligence (mental acuteness) on the probability of receiving the message and of yielding to it. It seems reasonable to expect that the more intelligent the individual is, the more likely he would be to understand the message. Moreover, one would also expect that the more intelligent he is, the less likely he would be to yield to the message. This expectation comes from the notion that the more intelligent person would be more likely to have considered the arguments being presented and to have dismissed them as not being sufficient to support their side of the question.³ It is suggested that the probability of opinion change is the product of the probability of perceiving and the probability of yielding. Thus, we have the equation:

$$\text{Pr}(O) = \text{Pr}(R) \times \text{Pr}(Y)$$

where $\text{Pr}(O)$ is the probability of opinion change, $\text{Pr}(R)$ is the probability of receiving, and $\text{Pr}(Y)$ is the probability of yielding. This equation can be plotted graphically as shown in Figure 1.



*Note: Since probabilities range between zero and one, they are really fractions. Multiplying by a fraction always tends to reduce the absolute value rather than to increase it as would be the case with whole numbers.

FIGURE 1

Examination of Figure 1 shows that opinion change is least likely to occur at the extremes of intelligence and most likely to occur in the middle ranges of intelligence as discussed in the text above.

*The term "receive" is used here to indicate understanding or attending, it is a general term to indicate whether or not the message gets through to the target.

**The term "yield" is used here to indicate an acceptance of the content of the message

THE THREE FACTOR THEORY AND THE COMMUNICATION MODEL

Obviously, the intelligence of the target audience is not always the crucial factor in the PSYOP situation; it is even less often known. However, the three factor theory may still be of utility to the psyoperator once its elements are related to the general model of the communication process. The most frequently cited model of the communication process is diagrammed in Figure 2




FIGURE 2

As originally conceived, the three factor theory concerns itself only with the receiver, with some concern for the decoding process. The model, as will be shown in the following text, can easily be expanded to cover all the elements of the communication system. The probability that a message will be received is not only affected by the characteristics of the receiver, but also by the channel and by the encoding process. The probability of yielding, again, need not be dependent only on the receiver but also on the sender and the channel. For example, a message encoded into Spanish will have a low probability of being received (that is, little impact) in Vietnam; a message delivered by a woman to a male Cua tribesman would have a low probability of yielding, since women have much lower status than do men among this tribal group.⁴ In summary, various aspects of the communication (persuasion) process can be considered in light of the three factor theory. More detailed information on this process will be presented in the following portions of this essay.

THE SENDER

The nature or qualities of the source of a message have received attention for many years. Usually the investigators subsume all the source qualities under the rubric of "credibility," and the caveat for persuasion attempts is to use a credible source. This oversimplification is of little assistance in most PSYOP applications. First of all, often no source is cited. Secondly, when it is evident, the source of a message is usually an impersonal one (that is, a nation, an army, and the like), for which some aspects of credibility are difficult to determine.

The following set of questions should be of concern to the psyoperator in attempting to deal with source problems in a campaign:

1. Who will be thought of as the source of the message?
2. To what degree will the source be seen as being similar to the receiver?
3. Is the source likely to benefit from the proposed opinion?
4. What is the record of the source on past campaigns?

5. Is the source knowledgeable about the problem discussed in the message?

It has been shown that the receiver is more likely to be rwayed by a source that resembles himself than by someone else. Using the three factor theory this consideration is diagrammed in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Similarity Between Source and Receiver

Keeping this basic idea in mind we can diagram a specific situation likely to arise in a conflict situation. Many campaigns are organized around the idea that a defector from the enemy should be used as the source. Thus, an officer who has defected is asked to write a message suggesting that more of his former comrades join him. The principle, as can be seen from Figure 3, seems sound on the surface. This source is much more like the target than anyone from the psyoperator's side. Yet if the psyoperator asks question number three ("Is the source likely to achieve some gain?"), his conclusions might be different. An individual defector has much to gain (easier treatment, money, and the like) from taking the side of the former enemy. As a consequence, an appeal focused on one such source may well be doomed to failure. Figure 4 shows such a situation graphically.




Figure 4

The probability of yielding is derived from the combination of two different probability curves as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5*.

* $Pr'(Y)$ is the probability curve for the similarity and $Pr''(Y)$ is the probability curve for the potential gains: $Pr(Y) = Pr'(Y) \times Pr''(Y)$.

This discussion should serve to illustrate the need to criticize the accuracy of our perception of the credibility of the source as well as the perceptions of the targets before the campaign is initiated.

ENCODING AND DECODING

The encoding process involves putting a thought or idea into a form which can be communicated. In contrast, the decoding process takes the form in which the idea was transmitted and puts it back into a thought or idea. For example, a person has a mental image of a joke. He translates that into spoken language to "tell" the joke to a friend. The friend then translates the telling (words) back into a mental image. Although this seems like a relatively simple process, its difficulty is illustrated in that not all people will laugh at the joke. The process can break down in a number of respects, that is, the mental images created in the receiver were not the same as the ones held by the source.


In analyzing a proposed campaign, the psyoperator should ask several questions including:

1. Is the language used by the encoder the same as the language of the decoder?
2. Is there a similarity in the past experiences of the two elements?
Do they have like frames of reference that can be drawn upon?

Whereas the analysis of the source most often involves the probability of yielding, for the present elements (encoder and decoder), the probability of receiving is also usually involved, but the yielding factor becomes more important. The following example should serve to illustrate the process for analyzing the elements of encoding and decoding. Once again, let us assume that the sender is a defector from the enemy forces and the campaign is aimed at the soldiers in the forces he came from. Furthermore, let us assume that he was an officer in his former position.

Consider now simply the encoder and the decoder. (Note: again, we are using the terms encoder and decoder to imply a processing agent within

the individual that transforms thoughts into language and language into thoughts, respectively. They are mechanisms possessed by the individual, but are not the individual himself.) The analysis is quite straightforward. For example, ask the question: "How similar are the frames of reference of the two elements?" The graph representing the probabilities for this consideration is shown in Figure 6.




Thus, the more alike the frames of reference, the more likely that opinion change will occur. A specific example would be whether the officer concentrates on the strategic and political factors behind the value of surrender rather than on the tactical and corporeal factors. The decoder, if he is an ordinary soldier, will most likely use the latter as a frame of reference, and the message will have little effect on him if the encoder uses the former as his frame of reference.

THE CHANNEL.

At one level, the analysis of the channel is extremely simple. One need only ask: Is the channel one that is available to the target? The probability of yielding does not enter into this question. If the answer is no, the probability of receiving the message is zero, and, consequently, the probability of opinion change is also zero. If the channel is available to the audience, then additional questions can be asked involving yielding as well as receiving.

1. Is the channel one that is trusted by the target?
2. To what extent does the channel reach the audience?
3. What characteristics in the channel can create interference in the transmission?
4. To what extent are the interfering characteristics present?

Again, following through with the example of the defector suggesting surrender to his former comrades, what would be the effect of utilizing leaflets? Assuming that the means of distributing them is available, how much trust does the target have in them? It is reasonable to expect that if the audience had been exposed to leaflets before and the promises contained on them had not been kept (or not perceived as having been kept), it will assume that the contents of the leaflets are worthless. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 7.



*Note: The conditions are such that reception ($Pr(R)$) has virtually been guaranteed

Figure 7

In summary, it is obvious that consideration of the channel is important. However, often the data one needs are not available, nor does one always have the luxury of deciding what channel should be used. Under the latter circumstance, if one has analyzed the previous effects of using the channel, one will still be able to estimate what to expect from the campaign, and will not be at a loss to explain why the campaign had little or no effect.

THE RECEIVER

The importance of the receiver in determining the effectiveness of a planned campaign cannot be overemphasized. What characteristics should be examined? The following list is intended only to be illustrative, not exhaustive. (Each question can either refer to one individual or a group of persons.)

1. How strongly held are the receiver's views?
2. What are his group memberships?
3. What are the commonalities in basic personality variables among a group of individuals?
4. What data are available about the intelligence level of the receiver?
5. What is the receiver's previous experience with propaganda efforts?
6. What are the cultural variables that can affect the receiver's predisposition toward mass communications?

Continuing with the same illustration, let us ask the question of how committed the target is to his current opinions? First, examine the probability of receiving. There is some indication that as commitment becomes stronger the individual will be more likely to give his attention to messages related to the opinion he holds, but this is true only up to the

point where his commitment is so strong that he will simply not attend to any alternatives. On the other hand, the probability that he will yield should decrease steadily as he becomes more committed* to his opinion.




Figure 8

Figure 8 shows how this looks graphically. This suggests the following hypothesis: if an individual is at the extremes of commitment, he will be less likely to change his opinion. Thus, it would be more efficient to launch a campaign directed at another, related area when this is found to be the case. It is reasonable to expect that if a number of related opinions can be changed, the target will be likely to move along the continuum of commitment to an area where he will be more susceptible to efforts to change that opinion.

SUMMARY

In this essay the three factor theory has been used to analyze the potential effects of various states of elements in the communication process on the likelihood of completing a successful PSYOP campaign. Although the elements were discussed separately, they are closely related. If one follows through the example used in this essay, it will become obvious (from the fact that the same situation was used throughout) that all the elements should be examined and that they are related. For instance, while the decoding process and the receiver were discussed separately, the former is clearly a part of the latter. The receiver's intelligence level will determine some of the constraints of the decoder.

From the above paragraph, it should not be assumed that separating the elements is not beneficial to an analysis of effectiveness. Indeed, it is often necessary for the following reasons. First, if all the elements are lumped together before the final analysis, it is easy to forget one that will turn out to be critical. Second, data (or impressions) about certain elements are often scarce or unavailable and there may be a temptation to skip the entire analysis if this is true. Last, it is better to have knowledge about a portion of the process than none at all.

*Commitment increases, for example, as more people are aware of his opinion concerning a particular issue.

It should also be reiterated that no actual numbers need be used in the analysis and the actual shape of the graph (whether it is a straight line or a curve) is not important. The important factor is how the rough shapes, if they had actual numbers, would determine the outcome. We are dealing with fractions, and if one fraction is extremely low, it will decrease the other drastically.

NOTES

¹ W. J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence," *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research*, E. S. Borgatta and W. W. Lambert, eds. (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1968).

² Richard H. Orth, "The Acquisition of Attitudes as an Instrumental, Conditioned Response with Consideration of the Developmental Aspect of the Effects of Delayed Reinforcement" (Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1969).

³ Adapted from W. J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence," *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research*, E. S. Borgatta and W. W. Lambert, eds. (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1968).

⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam*, Ethnographic Studies Series Pamphlet 554-105 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966) p. 100.

CONCLUSION (CHAPTER IX)

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA*

BY L. JOHN MARTIN

Most propaganda is facilitative communication, not persuasive communication. Confusion of the two has impeded the search for effective measures of communications effectiveness.

It is impossible even to estimate the amount of money that is being spent on international propaganda. Knowing the budgets of the propaganda agencies of individual countries would be inadequate, since their sum is only a fraction of the total amount involved. The major effort appears in the guise of numerous official activities that do not go by the name of propaganda or by one of its euphemisms. It is safe to assume that the international outlay on propaganda is in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Hardly any country is too small or too poor to invest in it. One can say this quite authoritatively without extensive investigation for one simple reason: there is no consensus either among the practitioners or among the theoreticians as to what constitutes propaganda. Definitions range from very specific types of messages transmitted through very specific types of media for every specific end—to deeds that often in

*Excerpts from "Effectiveness of International Propaganda," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 398 (November 1971), pp. 61-70. Reprinted with the permission of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the courtesy of the author. Copyright is retained by the original copyright holder.

retrospect, result, or are intended to result, in particular behavior on the part of the target. With this latitude in interpretations one can fearlessly make statements such as the above.

By any definition, the amount of money and effort that goes into what people take to be international propaganda—including the people who pay for it—is impressive. For purposes of this article, I will define *Propaganda* as a persuasive communicative act of a government directed at a foreign audience. I would have liked to exclude the activities of the diplomatic corps when they are dealing with their counterparts in an official exchange; but nowadays that is difficult. In the old days, such activity was called diplomacy. Today, the target of international propaganda quite frequently is made up of government officials, and the channel or medium often is the interpersonal relationship of a cocktail party. Yes, one might say, but the message is different. A diplomatic exchange is legally, or at least diplomatically, binding. Propaganda is not. This is cold comfort. Often nowadays, diplomatic moves are publicized through the mass media, while diplomatic exchanges are repudiated without qualms.¹

The expenditures on international propaganda are especially remarkable in view of the fact that there is very little assurance that the activity will have the desired effect; frequently there is very little indication that the propagandist knows what effect he desires, nor does he have any theory as to why his propaganda activity is likely to produce a particular effect. Such a theory is necessary if he is to satisfy economy-minded guardians and disbursers of the public funds, who normally insist on evidence of effectiveness. As Edward A. Suchman has pointed out, "A test of 'Does it work?' presupposes some theory as to why one might expect it to work."²

What will come as the greatest surprise to most people, however—not least to the propagandist himself—is that by far the largest chunk of the propaganda budget is not spent on propaganda at all. It is spent on what I shall call *facilitative communication*. This is an activity that is designed to keep lines open and to maintain contacts against the day when they will be needed for propaganda purposes. It is a ploy that is familiar to the newspaper correspondent faced with a press conference and a limited number of telephones on the premises to phone back a hot scoop. He puts an assistant on a phone to his home office and thus keeps the line open until he is ready with his story.

Facilitative communication by international propaganda agencies most frequently takes the form of radio newscasts, press releases, books, pamphlets and periodicals of a general or technical nature, artistic and other cultural programs, exhibits, films, seminars, language classes, reference services, and personal social contacts. None of this, naturally, is engaged in or performed with any conscious, limited objective other than the generally conceded hope of creating a friendly atmosphere, or, as a psychologist might put it, a favorable *affect*.

I have made no systematic study of the content of the world's so-called international propaganda as opposed to its facilitative communication, but my educated guess is that in peacetime, between 95 and 99 percent of the communication activity that is paid for by governments—because they think that engaging in international propaganda is the “in thing” to do—is really not propaganda at all. Ironically, few governments will publicly admit that they are engaged in propaganda because of the pejorative meaning the term has acquired. They prefer such euphemisms as *information program* or *cultural activity*. But for budgetary purposes it is justified as propaganda and serious efforts are made to measure its effectiveness in terms of its persuasiveness.

TYPES OF COMMUNICATION

I have defined propaganda as a persuasive communicative act. All communication is purposive by definition,³ but not all communication is necessarily persuasive in intent. Besides propaganda, there are other forms of persuasive communication, such as advertising, education, and political campaigning. These differ from propaganda in source, purpose (or content), and target. What they have in common is the process. They are all forms of communication. The question is, how effective are they?

There is no doubt that one human being can affect and even persuade another through communication under certain circumstances. All communication, no matter how insignificant (even a brief “Hi!”) leaves a mark on the receiver. Communication specialist Wilbur Schramm likens the effect to calcareous water dripping on a stalagmite. Occasionally a drop leaves an especially large deposit, but generally it merely contributes to the imperceptible growth of the spur. There is some empirical evidence of this lasting effect. Psychologist Harold E. Burt, for example, occasionally read passages from Sophocles to his two-year-old son in the original Greek. He did this daily for three months, then put the experiment aside until the child was eight years old, when he had the boy memorize a number of selections. He now found that it took a significantly larger number of repetitions for the child to learn passages he had never heard than it took him to learn the ones he had heard six years earlier—a clear indication of a residual effect.⁴

The question, however, is not whether communication leaves a mark—that is whether it is purposive—but whether it is effective. Effectiveness by definition assumes a *predetermined* outcome. One cannot speak of effectiveness—that is, attaining an intended or expected objective—unless one has a prior objective in mind. This, in essence, is the connotative meaning of persuasion. Purposiveness does not have that connotation. It does not necessarily imply movement or change. Persuasiveness does.

Is persuasive communication effective, then? Generally, the answer is, “No, it is less than effective.” Raymond A. Bauer of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration has pointed out, for in-

stance, that an advertiser seldom expects more than 2 to 5 percent of his target audience to be influenced by his message. Is this effective? Is it .02 to .05 effective, but it could represent new sales of 150,000 to 400,000 if his medium is a magazine with a circulation of seven to eight million. A politician would probably be happy with a persuasive communication that was 10 to 15 percent effective, while a teacher would expect at least 70 to 80 percent effectiveness, realizing that 100 percent effectiveness is a pipe dream. There is an interesting difference between the advertiser and politician on the one hand and the educator on the other. The first two often (though perhaps not always) have very specific objectives when they engage in persuasive communication. Generally, these center in the cash register or the ballot box. The educator, on the other hand, frequently has only a vague notion of his objectives. The tests and exams used in measuring the effectiveness of his "persuasive communication" are, therefore, often attacked by those taking them as "subjective" and "unfair"—meaning that the tests do not adequately measure the effectiveness of the persuasive communication.

The propagandist has much in common with the educator. As I pointed out above, most of the time he is engaged in facilitative rather than in persuasive communication and, ironically, most of the time he does not realize it. As a result, he searches feverishly but, naturally in vain for evidence of his effectiveness, so that he can justify his continued existence to the controllers of his budget. What he ends up with—and this is true of propagandists the world over—are some figures that attest to the effectiveness of his facilitative communication.⁵ But not realizing that this differs from persuasive communication, he feels guilty and frustrated about having to present clearly inadequate data.

Yet there is a fundamental difference between the measure of the effectiveness of persuasive communication and that of facilitative communication. The former is measured from the top down. The objective is to persuade a given target, and effectiveness is approached though seldom attained. In fact, by the time it is attained the objective has changed, since objectives in international propaganda are defined and circumscribed in terms of time, space, and publics. The effectiveness of facilitative communication, on the other hand, is measured cumulatively from the bottom up. Since its objective is to open or to maintain channels of communication with a given individual, group, or public as potential future targets, effectiveness is measured incrementally, rather than decrementally as is the case with persuasive communication. One can only be more effective, not less than effective. Everyone is potentially a target and must be counted, until a specific objective involving persuasive communication specifies and delimits the target. Obviously, propagandists would just as soon their open channels were never put to the test, since that would involve decremental measurement, in which they almost invariably come out relatively poorly.

HIERARCHICAL IMPACT MODELS

Facilitative communication requires no more than exposure as evidence of effectiveness. If we think in terms of a hierarchy of impact measurement, beginning with the input of the propagandist and ending with a change in the behavior of the target, we can conceive of several intermediate points at which measurement is feasible. Besides measuring input in terms of the number of hours of broadcasting, pages, pamphlets, pictures, periodicals, projections, or what-have-you emitted by the propagandist, one might measure the number of people exposed to the input. Many communication specialists ⁶ say that the next step in the hierarchy of the effectiveness process is awareness, which involves a conscious knowledge of the subject. Nothing will happen unless the communication can carry the individual on to the interest stage and, possibly, an evaluation stage, which requires an understanding and a "reception" of the message. This is followed by an acceptance, trial, or yielding stage, often thought of as a stage in which attitudes are changed. I refer to this as "collimation of the receiver's cognitive world," since what happens is a realignment or reorientation of a person's attitudes, values, opinion, and behavior within his "reality world." This may be likened to a magnet passing over a piece of iron and changing the orientation of its molecular magnets; only, here the change is in the salience (that is, the psychological closeness of an object to a person) and pertinence (that is, the relative importance of objects) of the situations, objects, and people in his cognitive world.⁷ A final adoption or behavioral change step is suggested by some communication specialists, which involves overt action on the part of the target. This, in my opinion, is tautological, since behavior follows from the readiness to act when the opportunity presents itself, and this is inherent in a person's attitudinal orientation.

This hierarchical model encompasses two distinct processes rather than one. The first is the process of facilitative communication that begins with input and ends with exposure. With exposure, the process has been completed. The line of communication is open and that is its sole purpose. The question of efficiency may be raised: What is the cost-per-exposure of opening and maintaining this channel of communication? But effectiveness is achieved once a single contact is made. The second process involves persuasive communication, and begins with awareness. Awareness is clearly unnecessary for facilitative communication; it is crucial for persuasive communication. The step from exposure to awareness is a quantum jump because it moves communication from the physical plane to the intellectual. It is a step that some people can never take because of intellectual or educational deficiencies. John R. Mathiason, studying the urban poor in Venezuela, found that exposing them to more mass media was futile since they had not been trained to process the information transmitted to them. "The poor of Ciudad Guayana have difficulty defining their situations," he concluded.⁸

VALUE OF FACILITATIVE COMMUNICATION

Does facilitative communication have any propaganda value? Yes, it has been shown that familiarity itself tends to create a positive feeling toward an object or subject. Numerous experiments using Chinese characters, nonsense syllables, and human photographs support the theory that repeated exposure—that is, familiarity—creates a favorable attitude toward an object. True, people will tune to a novel stimulus or situation in preference to a familiar one when they have a choice. But exploration or search for novelty correlates negatively with liking.⁹ In this sense, therefore, as Marshall McLuhan would say, the medium is the message.

There are two caveats, however, in a propaganda situation as opposed to a laboratory experiment. The favorable *affect* (that is, feeling or emotion) toward the channel—say, the Voice of America—engendered by mere familiarity may be tempered or even reversed if the original attitude of the target either toward the communicator or toward his message was negative. This will be discussed in more detail. Secondly, the positive feeling is limited to those who voluntarily expose themselves to the channel, and this, in turn, raises two questions: Were these people friendly to the channel in the first place, or did they become friendly as the result of exposure? And, more importantly, when at some future date it is necessary to transmit a persuasive communication—that is, propaganda—through the channel, will those who have been linked to it by facilitative communication also be the target of the prescribed persuasive communication?

PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION

And now, finally, we come to the pay dirt in the propaganda mine. How effective is propaganda, which by all definitions is *persuasive* communication? This question has plagued and intrigued communicators the world over, although it was not studied systematically until the twentieth century, which happens to coincide with the period of the development of social science.

Both inductive and deductive approaches have been tried.

INDUCTIVE APPROACHES

The inductive approaches are exemplified by the applied research begun by the Army's Information and Educational Division during World War II and contained by Carl I. Hovland and his colleagues in the Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program. These researchers and others who proceeded along the same lines of enquiry examined the effects of communication through controlled experiments in which they carefully subjected one variable after another to the test. Their findings have included the following:

1. The Communicator

A credible persuasive communicator—and, in most instances, a likeable one—has a great initial advantage over a non-credible communicator. A credible source is one that is seen to be “trustworthy” and “expert,” although researchers have found it hard to disentangle the two attributes. It helps if the communicator also appears to have views in common with his audience. The initial advantage of credibility disappears a few weeks after the message is heard, the tendency being to forget who the communicator was. This is called the *sleeping effect*.⁹ Other factors, such as age and appearance, have been found to enhance a communicator’s effectiveness under certain conditions. Unfortunately for the propagandist, credibility, attractiveness, and similar positive attributes are not characteristics of the communicator but are judgments of the audience.¹⁰ In other words, the propagandist has little control over them.

2. The Message

The effectiveness of propaganda is increased if its message fulfills a need or an aspiration of its target and if it agrees with existing values, attitudes, opinions, beliefs, norms—or whatever one would like to call them—of the audience. It was also found that presenting only one side of an issue is more effective than presenting two sides when the audience is not well educated, already convinced, and unlikely to hear the other side; that presenting both sides of a case is more effective with those who are well educated or initially opposed, and that in general, two-sided presentations tend to inoculate against future counterpropaganda. Effectiveness of a communication is influenced by the order in which the pro and con arguments are presented, but the differential effect depends on the number of sources, how the message is introduced, what happens before or after each side is presented, and the type of audience. Fear-arousing and threatening communications have in some cases been found to be directly related, and in other cases inversely related, to effectiveness. The same is true of emotional as against national presentations. A liked message has a better chance of being remembered than a disliked one, a selected message better than one that the audience chanced onto. One fact pervades all these studies: every variable appears to interact with audience factors over which the communicator has no control.

3. The Medium

Because of the great difference in the cost of communicating through the various mass media, much emphasis has been placed by all “persuasive communicators” on determining the differential effects of the media. The findings have been very disappointing. While a cross section of the public is reached by each medium, with a small decline in magazine readership and a large one in book readership at lower educational levels, each channel—by which I mean the specific radio or TV program, newspaper, newspaper column or page, magazine, and so on—has a very

distinctive audience with little overlap.¹¹ Given the same audience segment, researchers have found no consistent pattern of advantage in one mass medium over another. Joseph T. Klapper, in his often quoted study of the effects of the mass media, concludes that

*All other conditions being equal, as they are in the laboratory, face-to-face contact is more efficiently persuasive than radio, which in turn is more efficient than print. TV and films probably rank between face-to-face contact and radio, but this latter point has not been empirically demonstrated.*¹²

He goes on to say that all other conditions are rarely equal in real life. This is an understatement. They can rarely be made equal even in the laboratory, as numerous studies, especially in the field of education, attest. Much depends on the communicator, and this carries over into intimate, face-to-face communication. Not only does interpersonal communication of necessity reach smaller numbers than communication through the mass media, but the impact of the communicator is more vivid and is likely to have a negative effect if he is attempting to persuade individuals on a matter involving personal values.¹³

4. The Audience

More than anything else, effectiveness of persuasive communication depends on the past history of the receiver of a message—the ground in which the seed is sown. This includes the cognitive system—the values, attitudes, beliefs, opinions—and the habitual behavior patterns of the individual, which in turn, also depend on such idiocratic factors as age, sex, education, socioeconomic status, geographic region, and race. Equally relevant are such personality factors as need for social approval, aggressiveness, authoritarianism, high versus low need for clarity or simplicity, self-esteem, and whether the target is particularly topic-bound, appeal-bound, communicator-bound, media-bound, style-bound, or situation-bound. People, it has been found, expose themselves selectively to messages, although it is no longer believed, as it once was, that they will tend to expose themselves only to supportive communications. They will tend to perceive selectively, or, more correctly, their retention is selective, since they must have perceived a message before deciding to reject it. Finally, the pressure of group norms tends to inhibit attitude change except insofar as the group itself is changing in its values.¹⁴

DEDUCTIVE APPROACHES

The deductive approaches to the study of communication effects have started out with either a behavioristic or a cognitive theory of attitude formation.

Behaviorists

The behaviorists such as Leonard Doob, Burrhus F. Skinner, Caryl Bem, and Arthur and Carolyn Staats base their theories of attitude change on learning theory. Theirs is essentially a hypodermic model of attitude formation and modification, in which a communication stimulus

leads to an observable opinion or behavioral response mediated by an attitude. This, in turn, is a tendency, learned through conditioning, to respond in a given way.

Cognitive Theorists

The cognitive theorists such as Leon Festinger, Fritz Heider, Charles Osgood, and Theodore Newcomb have developed consistency models that explain attitude modifications in terms of a strain toward balance in the beliefs and emotions of the individual. It is a homeostatic model in the sense that a person tries to maintain a logical consistency in the things he knows and likes. Thus, if A likes President Nixon but doesn't like his China policy, he will attempt to restore cognitive balance either by changing his attitude toward Nixon or by modifying his attitude toward China. Festinger would add that he is liable to reduce his dissonance by refusing to believe that Nixon holds those views, or by misperceiving the news, or by minimizing the importance of China, or by forgetting what the President said.

These theorists not only explain why and how attitudes are formed and modified but also try to predict the outcome of a communication effort in terms of their theories. The models occasionally lead to incongruous conclusions. As Festinger once pointed out, regardless of how much a child likes Popeye, he can't be made to like spinach. Yet balance theories tend to suggest that he can. Festinger's dissonance theory has some useful applications to the analysis of persuasive communication if one can first measure the attitudes of the target on relevant factors. Sometimes the predicted behavior fails to materialize, which has led to the suggestion that "dissonance theory is almost Freudian in its ability to explain data, no matter how they come out."¹⁵

There are other deductive approaches that attempt to explain why people are influenced by persuasive communication, but they tend to be extensions of the two described above. One is based on the perceptual theory of Solomon Asch and on Muzafer Sherif's assimilation-and-contrast theory, suggesting that attitude change is due to a change in pertinence, or the relative importance of objects, rather than to a change in a person's feelings about the object. Another theory is based on the functional approach of Daniel Katz, who says that a person's attitudes are tied to his need system or ego-defensiveness. Any changes in his attitude would be due to a change in his psychological need.¹⁶

EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA

In both theory and practice, persuasive communication has been shown to have an effect. But this is a far cry from evidence of effectiveness. Nor is effective persuasion necessarily the same thing as effective propaganda. If we could select our audience on the basis of certain idiosyncratic factors—objective physical and personal characteristics peculiar to an individual, such as age, sex, race, education—we might increase by a

statistically significant fraction the proportion of those influenced by a message. But we would have no control over such factors as personality and susceptibility to persuasion, existing values, beliefs and opinions or attitudes toward the objects, subjects and situations involved in the persuasive message. We can choose our communicator but not determine his image. We can select the vehicle of transmission but not the channel of reception of the target of our communication. We could maximize the effect of all these factors for a single individual, especially if we were able to subject him to intensive precommunication analysis. But there is no way that this can be done for the diverse assortment of individuals who normally make up the audience of the mass media, the vehicles most commonly used in international propaganda.

What all this boils down to is that if our persuasive communication ends up with a net positive effect, we must attribute it to luck, not science. The propagandist cannot control the direction or the intensity of impact of his message, if, indeed, he reaches his target at all.

So much for the effectiveness of persuasive communication. Propaganda, as I said earlier, differs from other forms of persuasive communication in its source, its purpose, and its target. The purpose of propaganda may be to influence a government, but it is quite conceivable that the most effective and efficient way to accomplish this is to persuade a particular segment of the population whose composition is totally different from that of the individuals who make up the government. It is further possible that the propagandist is highly effective in his persuasive communication with this segment but that his effectiveness does not carry over to the ultimate objective of his propaganda—influencing the government. The effectiveness of propaganda may, therefore, be even less predictable and controllable than the effectiveness of mere persuasive communication.

Now, prediction and control are two key elements of effectiveness. Another element is an articulable objective. Measurement of effectiveness is, of course, impossible without a specifically stated objective, since we cannot say how well a person has succeeded unless we know what he is trying to do. Put another way, if you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there. Having an objective, the only way a person can successfully attain it is to have control of the vehicle that will take him to it. Finally, the only way he can control the vehicle is by being able to predict what will happen if he moves various knobs and levers in it.

* * * * *

NOTES

¹ A recent example was the feeler by the senior United States diplomat in the United Arab Republic, Donald C. Bergus, whose suggestions to President Sadat regarding a Suez Canal solution were termed his personal views by the State Department when they backfired. *The New York Times*, June 30, 1971.

² Edward A. Suchman, *Evaluative Research. Principles and Practice in Public Service and Social Action Programs* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967), p. 86.

³ Some have spoken of non-purposive communication—for instance, the reflexive "communi-

cation" of bees described by von Frisch—but admit that this is not true communication. See D. O. Hebb and W. R. Thompson, "The Social Significance of Animal Studies," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aaronson, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, vol. 2, 2d ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968), pp. 738-740.

* Harold E. Burt, "An Experimental Study of Early Childhood Memory: Final Report," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 58 (1941), pp. 435-439.

⁵ I have discussed this problem with British, German, Egyptian, Indian, Polish, Czech, and French propaganda analysts, to name just a few, and found that they all faced the same dilemma we did in the United States. At the time, my analysis of the problem had not yet crystallized in its present form.

⁶ Cf. Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 76-120; William J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence," in E. F. Borgatta and W. W. Lambert, eds., *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 1130-1187.

⁷ Cf. Steven H. Chaffee, "Salience and Homeostasis in Communication Processes," *Journalism Quarterly*, 44 (Autumn, 1967), pp. 439-444, 453. Leon Festinger has suggested that "when opinions or attitudes are changed through the momentary impact of a persuasive communication, this change, all by itself, is inherently unstable and will disappear or remain isolated unless an environmental or behavioral change can be brought about to support and maintain it" ("Behavioral Support for Opinion Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 28 (Fall, 1964), p. 514). I disagree. Festinger's own dissonance theory, when viewed in conjunction with Fritz Heider's balance theory, points to the probability of collimation, which requires no change in the environment, only a reorientation toward it.

⁸ John R. Mathiason, "Communication Patterns and Powerlessness Among Urban Poor: Toward the Use of Mass Communication for Rapid Social Change," in *Studies in Comparative International Development* (St. Louis, Mo.: Washington University Center Studies Institute; forthcoming).

⁹ See Robert B. Zajonc, "Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology—Monograph Supplement*, vol. 3, no. 2, part 2 (June, 1968).

¹⁰ C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, *Attitude and Attitude Change* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1965), pp. 201-202.

¹¹ Alfred O. Hero, *Mass Media and World Affairs* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959), p. 50.

¹² Joseph T. Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Communication* (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 108-109.

¹³ This finding emerged from a study that was done by USIA in India under my supervision. Intellectuals in India having close personal contacts with Americans were less favorably influenced toward Americans than was a matched sample of Indians without such contacts. On the other hand, they were more favorably influenced toward America as a country. *Opinions of USIS Target Groups and Other Literates in Delhi, India*, unpublished report (Washington: USIA, Research and Reference Service, September, 1968).

¹⁴ A good general review of the literature in this field is provided in Ralph L. Boston and Edward J. Robinson, *Experiments in Persuasion* (New York: Academic Press, 1967).

¹⁵ Charles S. Kestel, Barry F. Collins, and Norman Miller, *Attitude Change* (New York: John Wiley, 1969), p. 136. This book also provides a good general review of the literature on deductive approaches to persuasive communication effects.

¹⁶ See McGuire, op. cit., pp. 1136-1138.

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CHAPTER X

FOREIGN IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA

What role does the ideology of a government play in its propaganda in international communications? What is the role of the form of government? Opinion is divided on these questions now, as in the past, although the trend of thinking of an increasing number of scientists since the late 1940s has been to emphasize national rather than ideological interests, to stress the similarities in the behavior of states over time rather than the differences.

Nevertheless, the form of government is an important consideration in some respects. For example, as an audience, a largely closed society presents major problems for the communicator. Penetration of the barriers can be made difficult, and the uniformity of ideas allowed open circulation by the government often limits the ambitiousness of the effort as well. However, the government often develops a credibility problem as a result of its communications control.

Neither is ideology's effect one-sided. Although an ideology may increase the personal commitment of its adherents and those whose conversion it seeks to complete, its economic, racial, religious, or other social ramifications may induce great fear in the majority, whose members usually cling to important cultural traditions in most societies, and may in the process alienate many leaders.

The essays in this chapter indicate, then, that the principles of communication are valid for all states, and that it is the audience and the objective that determine the theme and media used in a message, not the nature of the communicator's regime.

At the same time, a state identified with an all-embracing ideology may well choose to place many of its psychological initiatives in the framework of this ideology. Similarly, revolutionary regimes, which must present universalistic values as a *raison d'être*, often espouse equally intransigent positions in their propaganda. In neither case is the ideology determinative of the appeal; rather it is the interests of the communicator as he perceives them that take precedence.

It is stressed that the content of the illustrative material in this chapter should not be considered as having official Department of Defense approval, express or implied.

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM

Whether and to what extent political communications are effective may be influenced by the degree of control over the flow of the communications to and within the audience. It is clear that totalitarian regimes can exert a much greater control over communications channels, and hence over the information to which their citizens are exposed, than free societies. On the other hand, individuals in closed societies tend to develop filters for regime communications and increasingly rely upon other means of receipt-

ing information. Moreover, technological development and growth in the volume of communications recently have circumvented many of the controls that were formerly at the disposal of totalitarian regimes.

Democratic theory assumes public access to most information so that the public may reach decisions on matters of public concern after informed deliberation. Totalitarian government rests on almost complete control of information. From these antithetical positions it should not be assumed, however, that persuasive appeals should be eschewed by democratic governments domestically or internationally. Both models rely on domestic popular support—or at least tolerance—and both seek to justify their actions in communications to external audiences in order to obtain an international environment conducive to the realization of national objectives. Moreover, the two extreme points on the political spectrum serve to illustrate principles, not to portray governments actually in power which, inevitably, fall somewhere between the complete democratic model, on the one hand, and the totalitarian paradigm, on the other.

A survey of international communications shows that without exception each government explains its policies and practices to world audiences. Different techniques may be employed, different audiences appealed to, and different messages conveyed, but each regime, in its own style, attempts to sway attitudes in terms which may or may not employ ideology or other symbols to persuade.

PROPAGANDA AND THE MONOPOLY OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS*

BY CARL J. FRIEDRICH

and

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Central to the effective organization and operation of totalitarian government is the control of mass communication processes and output. Propaganda is woven into almost all aspects of life in totalitarian systems, it is not treated as merely one tool in isolation from others

* * * * *

The nearly complete monopoly of mass communication is generally agreed to be one of the most striking characteristics of totalitarian dictatorship. It is also one of the features which clearly differentiates it from earlier forms of autocratic rule, as we have noted. Modern mass-communication media, the press, radio and television, and the film, have been developing gradually and have, under competitive conditions, been looked upon as an essential condition of large-scale democracy. For,

*Excerpts from "Propaganda and the Monopoly of Mass Communications," Chapter 11, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* by Friedrich and Brzezinski, 2d ed. rev., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. Copyright 1956, 1965 by The President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted by permission.

without the possibility of communicating a great deal of information that is beyond the reach of the immediate community, even the casual participation in policy determination which the citizen of the modern state is called upon to perform would be impossible.

In totalitarian dictatorships, all these means of communication are centrally controlled by the government, regardless of whether they are also actually owned by the government, as in the Soviet Union, or continue under "private" ownership, as in fascist countries. Hence they are not available for the expression of criticism or even adverse comment. This monopoly of the channels of mass communication is reinforced by the control of the means of private communication, the postal services and more especially the telephone and telegraph. Wire tapping is a common practice, and there is of course no such thing as "privacy" of the mails. In the interest of combatting counterrevolutionary plots, the government claims the right to open all mail. What this means is that only word-of-mouth communication remains for those who wish to carry opposition beyond the point permitted by the government—surely a rather inefficient method under the conditions of modern mass society. All effective control over the content of communications is vested in the state, which in fact means the top party functionaries who usually possess, as a result of previous revolutionary agitation, considerable know-how in the field of propaganda.

Propaganda as such is not a peculiarity of totalitarian dictatorship. It has become increasingly recognized as an integral part of all organizational activity in a highly literate society.¹ Propaganda has been defined in different ways, depending in part upon what it was to be distinguished from. It should be pointed out here that the Soviets make a clear distinction between propaganda and agitation. Some of what we mean here by propaganda would, in Soviet terminology, more accurately be called agitation. To the Soviets, propaganda is restricted to a more refined, rational, documented appeal, designed to convince rather than to induce. Agitation tends to be more vehement, striking, and generally aimed at the masses.

It has been said that "propaganda is the other fellow's opinion." In line with such a superficial notion, many people think of propaganda as essentially untruth. But no propagandist worth his mettle will prefer an untruth to a truth, if the truth will do the job. This is the vital test of all propaganda activity: does it do the job? and what is the job? The needs, interests, and requirements of the organization for which the propagandist works determine the answer to this question. If it is the Red Cross, the "job" may be to secure contributions; if the *Ladies' Home Journal*, it may be subscriptions. The latter example shows that propaganda, under competitive conditions, resembles advertising; both are often soft-pedaled as "public relations." In short, propaganda is essentially action-related; it aims to get people to do or not to do certain things. That action focus may be either very visible or hidden away. But it always is there

and needs to be inquired into, if propaganda is to be understood. And since propaganda is carried on in behalf of an organization, it is equally important to inquire into who finances it. Many propagandists are reluctant, therefore, to reveal the source of their funds.²

In totalitarian dictatorships, virtually all propaganda is directed ultimately to the maintenance in power of the party controlling it. This does not mean, however, that there are not many sharp conflicts between rival propagandists. As will be shown later, the maintenance of totalitarian dictatorship does not preclude the occurrence of many internecine struggles; on the contrary, it lends to these struggles a fierceness and violence which is rarely seen in freer societies. This issue of the rival component elements in the totalitarian society poses very difficult problems for the over-all direction of propaganda. The chief propagandist often has to opt between such rival groups. (In the National Socialist Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, these rival claims to some extent found expression in the organization of the "desk," that is to say, of different bureaus which would report on different sections of the society and would thus mirror the conflicts.)³

The documentary evidence that has become available since the war tends to support earlier views regarding the inner workings of Goebbels' propaganda organization.⁴ There is no need here to go into details of the organization, but some outstanding features deserve brief comment. Perhaps the most important aspect of this "monopoly" control was the dualism of government and party. Each had its elaborate propaganda setup, both headed by Goebbels, who succeeded in maintaining a measure of effective coordination. But on the whole it would seem that the Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment and the party office of propaganda were in a coordinate position. However, key officials of the ministry who stood in sharpest antagonism to Goebbels, like Otto Dietrich, the press chief of the Hitler government, also occupied pre-eminent posts in the party's propaganda machine. This "personal union" extended fairly far down the line. The relationship has been described as follows: "The task of the Propaganda Ministry in the whole machine for controlling and creating public opinion might be compared with a Ministry of War. It coordinates, plans, and is responsible for the smooth carrying out of the whole propaganda effort of the German government. The Party Propaganda Department, on the other hand, is comparable to the General Staff of an army which actually directs operations and musters and organizes the forces and their supplies and ammunition."⁵ It is seen from this and other evidence that the two organizations had different functions within the regime, comparable to the difference between party and government. The aggressive boldness of a leader of the National Socialist movement was as much a quality required of Goebbels as was the forceful caution of a leading government official. It is generally agreed that the most important instrument of Goebbels in planning and coordinating all the far-flung activities of his two organizations was the Coordination

Division of the ministry. Here was centered the conflict between the rival requirements of the two organizations; here, if possible, such difficulties were solved by the key officials of the division or, if necessary, by Goebbels himself. But it was never an easy task to draw together the various divergent strands of the propaganda apparatus, and the difficulties experienced by the Ministry of Propaganda reflected the tensions of the moment. It is an ever present problem when total monopoly control exists.

The same problem, often in aggravated form, confronts the totalitarian propagandist in the field of foreign relations. While he gains the advantage of controlling all channels of information to other countries, he suffers under the distinct disadvantage of having little chance to secure the confidence of people abroad, including the foreign governments themselves about any information reaching them. Hitler showed considerable awareness of these difficulties. At one time, talking among intimates, he noted that a sharp distinction must be made between handling the domestic and the foreign press. Radio messages for foreign countries must similarly be differentiated. Such messages, if intended for Britain, should contain musical offerings, since they would appeal to English taste and accustom the British public to tune in to German Broadcasts: "As regards news-bulletins to Britain, we should confine ourselves to plain statements of facts, without comment on their value or importance . . . As the old saying has it, little drops of water will gradually wear the stone away."⁶ Goebbels added that the opinion of people who have confidence in their leadership can be effectively swayed by pointed and unequivocal value judgments. He therefore recommended that, in messages to the German people, reference should be made again and again to "the drunkard Churchill" and to the "criminal Roosevelt."

This attempt to create stereotype images of the enemy has been developed to a fine point in Soviet propaganda. All discussions and pictorial representations of the enemy stress some specific feature suggesting the enemy's alleged criminal nature and evil intent. Operating on a huge scale and addressing its appeal to the great masses of the Soviet people, Soviet propaganda strives to present a simple, unrefined, and strikingly negative portrayal, so as to create the politically desirable conditioned reflex in those to whom it is directed. . . . It is to some extent in terms of these negative symbols that the "consensus" develops. As a matter of common observation, shared hostilities are an effective source of political association. Indeed, some political analysts have gone so far as to assert that political parties essentially rest on these shared animosities. The totalitarian dictatorships have built upon such negativist positions a good part of the popular loyalty to the regime.

During the war, Soviet anti-Nazi propaganda usually associated "Hitlerite" with such terms as "vermin" or "beast," frequently with corresponding illustrations. The anti-American campaign has similarly employed certain words over and over, such as war-mongering and im-

perialist, in speaking of American leadership. *Krokodil*, the humor magazine, has become a real rogues' gallery of various criminal types, with beast-like faces, dressed either in U.S. Army uniforms or in top hats and morning coats, their fingers dripping with blood and threateningly grasping an atomic bomb. In external propaganda, the Soviet Union never fails to draw a distinction between the people as such and the leaders, who are the ones who fit the stereotype.

The nearly complete control of all means of mass communication gives the totalitarian dictatorship the very great advantage of being able to shift its general line of propaganda rather radically over short periods of time. This is especially helpful in the field of foreign affairs. After the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939, Communist and Nazi propagandists were stressing all of a sudden the common features of these "popular" regimes and their contrast with the "Pluto-democracies" of the West. Various points were brought forward in this connection—such as that the Russians and Germans were both young and vigorous as contrasted with the decadence of the West. Even more striking is Russia's recent turn in regard to Communist China, as indeed has been the change in China itself. Such reversals in official propaganda lines are inconceivable under competitive conditions.

But while these shifts may work in the Soviet Union, they certainly tend to bring on a crisis in the Communist movement in other countries. Many Communist followers, including important men, have changed sides in the past and may do so again. After the Hitler-Stalin Pact, twenty-one French Communist deputies out of a total of seventy-two abandoned the party.⁷ Similarly, Nazi sympathizers in a number of countries, especially the United States, were deeply disturbed, and anti-Nazi activities were assisted by this change. Even deeper were the fissures caused by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin. In fact, the repercussions of that move are still audible in the way Communist parties have been affected by the conflict between the USSR and China.

But even internally the alteration in an official line may have subcutaneous reactions, which the leadership fails to appreciate. When Hitler suddenly decided to invade the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, he was much pleased with his success in accomplishing this *salto mortale*. "I am proud that it was possible with these few men [himself, Goebbels, and a few aides] to shift course by 180 degrees. No other country could do the same."⁸ In this instance, we know from postwar documents that the effect on German public opinion was quite mixed. For, while some men who had previously stood aloof decided that in a life-and-death struggle with communism they must support Hitler, others concluded that, the game was up and joined what became a dangerous and large-scale opposition movement. Detached analysis suggests that it was not so much the propaganda as the very facts themselves which had the greatest effect.⁹

This instance serves to illustrate what is probably a very important aspect of all totalitarian propaganda. The fact of monopolistic control

gradually causes in the general public a profound distrust of all news and other kinds of information. Since people do not have any other sources of information, there develops a vast amount of rumor mongering as well as general disillusionment. And since a man cannot think without having valid information upon which to focus his thought, the general public tends to become indifferent. This in turn leads to a phenomenon we may call the "vacuum," which increasingly surrounds the leadership. Comparable problems have beset autocracies in the past. Well known is the tale of Harun al-Rashid, who stalked Baghdad at night disguised as a commoner to find out what was going on. Harun al-Rashid, so the tale goes, was wise enough to realize that his subordinates were prone to abuse their great power and, instead of employing it for the good of the community and the commonwealth, would oppress and exploit the people. He had no reliable way of ascertaining the common man's views through regular channels, since all of these were controlled by the very subordinates he wished to check up on, so the great Caliph disguised himself from time to time and mingled, in the dark of night, with the people in taverns and streets to listen to their tales of woe. On the basis of what he had heard, he would bring those to trial who had been talked about as vicious and corrupt. This problem of checking up occurs, of course, in all human organizations, but under orderly constitutional government (and the corresponding patterns of responsibility in private organizations), such checking occurs readily and continuously as a result of the open criticism that is voiced by members not only in formal meetings, but informally through press, radio, and all the other channels. Under the conditions of totalitarian dictatorship, the check-up becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

This failure to communicate effectively, both within the hierarchy and with the rest of the people and the world, we have called the "vacuum." There develops within the totalitarian regime a kind of empty space around the rulers, which becomes more and more difficult to penetrate. A slow disintegration affecting all human relations causes mutual distrust so that ordinary people are alienated from one another; all the bonds of confidence in social relationships are corroded by the terror and propaganda, the spying, and the denouncing and betraying, until the social fabric threatens to fall apart. The confidence which ordinarily binds the manager of a plant to his subordinates, the members of a university faculty to one another and to their students, lawyer to client, doctor to patient, and even parents to children as well as brothers to sisters is disrupted. The core of this process of disintegration is, it seems, the breakdown of the possibility of communication—the spread, that is, of the vacuum. Isolation and anxiety are the universal result. And the only answer the totalitarian dictatorship has for coping with this disintegration of human relationships is more organized coercion, more propaganda, more terror.

We know today that the SS of Himmler made extensive checkups on

the attitude of the German population during the war. Many of these reports show a remarkable candor about the faltering and eventually vanishing support for the regime.¹⁰ But there is every reason to believe that these reports never reached Hitler, even in abbreviated form. It is not even clear how many of them became available to Himmler. The terror that permeates the party and secret-police cadres, no less than the general population, operates as an inhibition to truthful reporting. Block wardens falsify their reports, in the hope of currying favor with their superiors. We shall see later how this tendency to pretend that results are better and more favorable to the regime than the facts warrant and to make adjustments, not only in reports about attitudes, but also in those about production and maintenance of industrial plant, interferes with industrial planning. . . .

A similar situation arose in Italy. We learn from Leto's *Memoirs* that only Rocchini among Mussolini's lieutenants had the courage to tell him that the Italian people were bitterly opposed to entering World War II; Starace even claimed that almost all Italians would unite behind the Duce. The Duce was similarly misinformed about the state of Italy's military preparedness; his subordinates preferred to flatter their chief by presenting rosy estimates, suggesting the prowess of his regime.¹¹

In the Soviet Union, the vacuum became most pronounced at the height of the Stalin terror. It has now become greatly reduced as a consequence of the policies of "popular totalitarianism." But even under the current regime, there is a good deal of it—as shown by the recurrent efforts of stimulating "letters to the editor." It also is operative in the world Communist movement and thereby affects the USSR's intelligence work in its foreign relations. It appears that Soviet intelligence is also handicapped by the fact that, in some respects at least, it must work with and through local Communist parties. If it tried to do without them, it would soon find itself in difficulties, particularly with reference to the problem of recruiting agents and contacts, as well as penetrating the government institutions of foreign powers.¹² But when the intelligence service employs the local party organization, it is exposed to the effect of this process of falsification, rooted both in fear of the Moscow center and in ideological blindness. Local Communist leaders, fearful of Moscow disfavor and subsequent purges, easily develop a tendency toward overestimating their strength and the degree of inner disintegration in the capitalist order. Soviet miscalculations in France and Italy are among many examples, dating back to the days of the Comintern and the unsuccessful Soviet venture in China. Also at the time of the blockade of Berlin, undertaken by the USSR in June 1948 to counteract the currency reform that the Allies had instituted after lengthy Soviet obstruction,¹³ it became clear that the Soviet Union, on the basis of East German information, had confidently counted upon the Germans in Berlin to abandon the Allied cause and submit to the Soviet position; even elementary intelligence work could have informed them to the contrary. In fact, there is reason to

believe that the entire Soviet policy in Germany was, to some extent, the result of such a failure of intelligence, because of excessive reliance upon German Communist information.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the Soviet Intelligence agency, both at home and abroad, operates like a man wearing red-colored blinders. Soviet leadership makes special efforts to develop alternate channels of information and control in order to eliminate precisely this element of coloring and distortion. Soviet espionage, apart from collaborating with the local Communist parties, also operates independent networks, which report directly to Moscow. Espionage revelations show that there are normally at least five such networks in a country subjected to intensive Soviet espionage: one working through the local Communist party, another run by the MVD, a military intelligence network, a commercial espionage network, and finally the foreign-service intelligence network. Excessive discrepancies can thus be more easily detected when all such reports are processed in Moscow and submitted to the policymakers. Similarly, in their domestic surveillance, the Soviet rulers are careful not to make themselves dependent on only one source of information. Apart from the secret police and the ordinary channels of the party, there exist the party Control Commissions, which investigate party activities in all walks of life; the Ministry of State Control, which is specially concerned with keeping in touch with administrative functions and making independent reports on their operations; and the prosecutor general and his subordinates, who have . . . been given additional investigating powers. There is also the technique of *samokritika*, or self-critique, according to which Soviet officials and functionaries as well as the people in general are encouraged, besides examining themselves, to criticize the operations, but *not the policy*, of the party, the state administration, or the economic enterprises.* This not only serves as a vent to pent-up aggression, but is also useful to the rulers in detecting current weaknesses, abuses, and public attitudes. As a result of this, the Soviet regime can, when it wants to, judge the responsiveness of its population to its propaganda with a surprising degree of accuracy. Also, besides these sources, there are the press and the letters to the press and party headquarters, which have, at least for Smolensk, been analyzed thoroughly.¹⁴ . . . There is one major problem, however: as the totalitarian regime maintains its internal coercion and indoctrination, the degree of apparent consensus will in time increase, and the secret police will find it much more difficult to do its work. There is no doubt that the Soviet population is today much less divided in its opinions and reactions than it was a generation ago. This naturally makes information gathering less reliable. But it also makes it less urgent, since such consensus means that

*"Self-critique" is preferable to the more frequent translation of "self-criticism." There is a Russian word *krititsizm* which means criticism. *Kritika* means critique, and the Soviet regime is interested in promoting the technique of critique, but not in encouraging a critical attitude through criticism.

the regime's ideology has been "internalized". . . . And propaganda is thereby greatly facilitated.

Such consensus, such internalizing of the ideology, did not occur to any extent in Germany under Hitler (except within the party). Goebbels was by no means unaware of the difficulties he was confronting. In his diaries¹⁵ . . . the problem is a recurrent theme. They also show how well he knew how to exploit the clumsy views which were being aired by the Allies regarding the German people as a whole, particularly the demand for unconditional surrender. As the plain facts of the Allies' successful air war against Germany mounted, the unconditional-surrender formula remained as one of the few propaganda weapons to fall back upon. Another one was provided by the Morgenthau Plan put forward at Quebec in September 1943. But not only did the Allies provide desperately needed propaganda weapons; the Soviet Union, by repeatedly demanding that ten million Germans be furnished for reconstruction purposes in the Soviet Union, allowed Goebbels to note: "Demands like that are wonderful for our propaganda. They stir German public opinion deeply. The idea that our soldiers might not return home at all but might have to remain in the Soviet Union as forced labor is a terrible thought for every woman and every mother. The German people would prefer to fight to their last breath."¹⁶ Incidentally, this is an illustration of the fact noted above that a propagandist prefers a good fact to the best lie. But in spite of such aids, the task of propaganda became ever more desperate as the war continued. What evidently kept Goebbels going was that he himself believed, at least until the end of 1943, in the Fuhrer's ability to avert disaster.

That critical views printed in the press need not have any significant effect in a totalitarian regime, unless the leadership sees fit to take them into account, is demonstrated by Hitler. Great difficulties resulted from his hostility to the German press. This contrasted curiously with his avid interest in reading press reports from abroad.¹⁷ But although they were brought to him almost hourly, they failed to influence his modes of expression and his basic propaganda lines. Nor did he receive sound information about the probable course of British and American policy, nor about the trend of opinion in both countries. When he arrived at his decision to go to war with Poland, he did not seem to have expected the British to do much more than make a gesture of protest, and he hoped until the last to be able to keep the United States out of the war. The efforts of certain qualified persons, especially in the Foreign Office, to furnish Hitler with more adequate data were thwarted by the predominant party cadres.¹⁸ This circumstance shows the catastrophic effect of the factor we are here analyzing: an unintended consequence of totalitarian terror is an almost complete isolation of the leader. At the time Hitler decided to go to war, in the fateful August days of 1939, he isolated himself, and no advisers, not even Goering, let alone foreign diplomats—according to Sir Neville Henderson's pitiful account—could secure access to Hitler.¹⁹

Not the vacuum specifically, but the effect of it on the totalitarian ruler has caused one leading student of these problems to make the following comment.

Where the instruments of public enlightenment are wholly under the domination of the active elite of power, the controllers of the media develop a fantasy world in which the images communicated to the people have little relationship to reality. The stream of public communication becomes dogmatic and ceremonial to such a degree that it is inappropriate to think of communication management as a propaganda problem. It is more accurate to think of ritualization than propaganda.²⁰

Undoubtedly this kind of ritualization exists to some extent. On the other hand, repeated shifts in the actual lines of communication, involving the leadership in serious self-contradictions, suggest that large amounts of propaganda as such continue to be issued. The "fantasy world" in which the dictator lives, and which is a product of the vacuum that the terror has created around him, plays its role in competition with the real world that he seeks to master.

The lieutenants of a dictator are often more clearly aware of the complexity of the issues and the risks involved in a particular course of policy. It is interesting that a key German official believed that Hitler's unrealistic propaganda lines were decidedly detrimental to the regime. His comments indicate a typical clash of views between the professional propagandist and the ideologue, whether educator or party fanatic, who is preoccupied not with the survival but with the advance of the totalitarian movement. This man's comments are so revealing that they deserve quoting in full:

I was of the firm conviction at that time that a national socialist Germany could live in peace with the world, if Hitler had been restrained in his actions, had bribed the radicalism internally, and had externally an objective which took account of the interests of other nations. The provocative demonstrations, unnecessary in their extent... the anti-semitic excesses, the inciting and tolerating of violence, and the world propaganda of Goebbels as embodied in the tone and content of his Sportpalast demonstrations, were psychologically unsuited to gain support abroad for national socialist Germany and to cause other nations to recognize the good side of national socialism. These tactless and offensive outbursts decisively influenced world public opinion against Germany immediately after 1933.²¹

That the propaganda was unwise probably is right, but it overlooks the fact that Hitler was not primarily interested in the German people and was basically motivated by his totalitarian mission, as he conceived it; for this the German people were merely the tool.

As in nature, so in society, the vacuum is relative. And since totalitarian dictators, as already mentioned, to some extent at least realize their isolation, various efforts are made to reduce the "thin air" around them. We have shown some of the techniques employed for increasing the intake of popular reactions; totalitarian regimes have also developed techniques for increasing the outgo. Apart from the party members' continuing function as spreaders of propaganda lines, there has been developed the technique of whispering campaigns. A high party official will call in some of his friends a little further on down the line in the party and, in strict confidence, tell them something highly startling or secret.

He knows perfectly well that they will go and tell somebody else, in similarly strict confidence, and so on. This technique was and is employed also for the purpose of reaching and misleading foreign correspondents. The technique is, of course, not unknown in other societies; but in them it serves a purpose radically different from that in a totalitarian dictatorship. It is the means of penetrating a fog rather than reducing a vacuum.

The vacuum has another curious effect, as far as outgo is concerned. As already mentioned, people under totalitarian dictatorships become so suspicious of all communication, suspecting every news item of being propaganda, that even paramount facts are disbelieved. Thus it appears that, as late as September 12, 1938, the Germans professed not to know, or rather not to believe, that Britain and France had declared war upon Germany. To the blatant headlines of Goebbels' propaganda press, their reaction evidently was: "Another of Goebbels' propaganda stories." At the time of the Franco rebellion, when the papers reported, quite truthfully, that the British navy was demonstrating in the western Mediterranean, a widespread public reaction in Germany created a genuine war scare, because people were convinced that the British navy was threatening instead the North Sea coast of Germany.²² Goebbels in his diaries reports a number of other instances of this kind, and the entire collection provides a striking illustration for the vacuum theory; as the war went on, the problem of reaching the German populace became more and more perplexing.*

In the Soviet Union, the war also gave rise to many rumors, which swept the population by means of the OWS news agency—a translation of the popular and symptomatic abbreviation for the Russian phrase, "one woman said. . ." During the period of initial Soviet reverses, many exaggerated accounts of Soviet defeats, flights of leaders, and so forth were passed from mouth to mouth, contradicting the official radio broadcasts and newspaper communiques. Later on, by 1943 and 1944, as a corollary to the many promises of a happy future made during the war by the Soviet leaders, rumors circulated that the Soviet government had decided to end collectivization of agriculture and to release all political prisoners. Possibly such rumors were even originated purposely by the regime itself in order to gain public support for the war effort. In any case, some interviews with former Soviet citizens suggest that these rumors were widely believed, and the population was quite disappointed by the postwar harshness of the Stalinist policies. A similar instance is the extensive misrepresentation of figures on the grain harvest in the late fifties, which so gravely affected Khrushchev's agricultural efforts.

It would seem from all the evidence at our disposal that the vacuum

* Actually, this problem also plagued the people in charge of wartime propaganda in the Western democracies, for during the war "constitutional dictatorships" were instituted, and the controls over news resulting from this temporary concentration of power caused the public to become increasingly suspicious.

works like a cancer in the totalitarian systems. This means that its growth endangers the continued existence of the totalitarian scheme of things. It may even catapult such a dictatorship into a calamitous foreign adventure, such as Hitler's wars. Stalin's ignorance of the agricultural situation similarly made the food problem in the USSR very much more acute, according to Khrushchev's revelations. Reality is hard to perceive in a vacuum created by fear and lies, buttressed by force—hence the Khrushchevian policy of reducing the vacuum by greater popular participation.

An important feature of totalitarian propaganda is its all-pervasiveness, the direct result, of course, of the propaganda monopoly. Not only the members of the party and the more or less indifferent masses, but even the more or less determined enemies of the regime fall prey to its insistent clamor, to the endless repetition of the same phrases and the same allegations. A general pattern of thought, almost a style of thinking, proves increasingly irresistible as the regime continues in power. This is the basis of the consensus formation in the USSR. "It is clear," we read in one thorough study of these problems, "that there are people in all ranks of life who believe implicitly what they read and hear." Arguing from a presumably hostile sample, these analysts say that despite this "it is striking how the more implicit aspects of Soviet official communications, the mode of thought and the categories in which events are grouped, are reflected in the thought patterns and expression of our informants."²³

It has been, as a matter of fact, the frequent experience of interviewers of former Soviet citizens to find that even those who profess the most violent hostility to the Soviet system tend to think in patterns instilled into them by that regime. Their attitudes on such matters as freedom of the press or the party system are often inclined to mirror, even by contradiction or negation, official Soviet propaganda. Similarly, in such matters as word usage, words laden with propaganda-derived value judgments are used as part of their daily vocabulary. They thus serve unconsciously as unwitting propagandists for the regime they abhor.

This singular success of totalitarian propaganda is the result of constant repetition. Soviet press, radio, oral agitation, and propaganda operate ceaselessly, supplementing the party and Komsomol activities and the ideologically oriented training system.²⁴ Soviet newspapers, controlled centrally, repeat day after day the political themes set by *Pravda*, the organ of the party Central Committee, and *Izvestiya*, the central-government organ. *Pravda* itself, with a circulation of well over three million, is read and studied throughout the Soviet Union, particularly in the party cells, where it is compulsory reading. Local newspapers, many with circulations of several hundred thousand, such as *Pravda Ukrainy* and *Leningradskaya pravda*, re-echo the essential points of the Moscow daily, often reprinting its editorials and commentaries. The local press is also sometimes given special instructions about the handling of the news

and the sequence in which the various statements of the leaders are to be presented. For instance, after Malenkov's "resignation" in February 1955, Radio Moscow issued such special instructions to all the provincial papers. In addition to *Izvestiya* and *Pravda*, there are a large number of specialized papers for youth, the trade unions, the military, and others, published centrally and distributed throughout the USSR. All these newspapers, with a combined circulation of over forty-seven million in the 1950s, play an important role in the Soviet process of indoctrination.²⁵

This process is backed by the other two basic media of propaganda and indoctrination: the radio and personal agitation. The radio, with an estimated listening audience of about forty million, quite naturally devotes a great deal of its time to political matters.²⁶ A reliable estimate places the amount of time devoted to political and scientific broadcasts at 28 percent of the central program time. One of the most important Moscow radio broadcasts is the morning reading (7:00 a.m.) of the *Pravda* editorial, which is relayed simultaneously by all other Soviet stations.²⁷ Soviet radio publications openly admit the political importance of radio broadcasting, as seen in the following statement: "Radio helps considerably in the Communist education of the workers. It is one of the most important means of disseminating political information, of spreading the all-triumphant ideas of Marxism-Leninism, popularizing the most advanced industrial and agricultural techniques and the achievements of socialist culture, science, and art."²⁸ News and editorial programs particularly are designed to complement the press propaganda coverage and highlight the important points in the current propaganda themes. Foreign news is rarely given prompt treatment, and it is usually presented as a commentary. Furthermore, the use of radio-diffusion speakers, which work on the basis of wire transmission and are therefore useless for listening to non-Soviet stations, is promoted. This, of course, insures complete monopoly for Soviet broadcasting, and about 70 percent of all sets in the USSR are of this type.²⁹ Similar sets are now being introduced in the satellite regimes of Central Europe.

The third and, in some ways, the most important device is that of direct, personal agitation. This involves literally millions of agitators, some full-time, some part-time during special campaigns, who organize mass meetings, give lectures, visit families in their homes, distribute literature, set up study and discussion groups, and, in general, attempt to draw everyone into active participation in the indoctrination process. The estimated number of regular agitators is around two million, thus providing one agitator for every hundred Soviet citizens (including children).³⁰ In a sense, this mass indoctrination constitutes an effort to conduct a nationwide process of brainwashing, which only a very few succeed in completely avoiding. It is on these propaganda processes, as well as on the educational training system, that the regime depends for the achievement of total ideological integration of its people. It is these instruments of mental molding that are used by the administration to

produce a generation of convinced followers, thinking and acting in disciplined union.

The technique of personal agitation has been elaborated by the leaders of Communist China. Based upon their experience during the long period of incubation when they were struggling to survive—a time they speak of as the "low ebb"—they have evolved, systematized, and tested what they call the democratic "mass line." As early as 1934 Mao charged the party cadres with mobilizing the broad masses to take part in the revolutionary war.³¹ Although the situation has radically changed, since Mao and his party took over the government of all mainland China and established a totalitarian dictatorship, they have retained, adapted, and elaborated these techniques. "The mass line is the basic working method by which Communist cadres seek to initiate and promote a unified relationship between themselves and the Chinese population and thus to bring about the support and active participation of the people." There is nothing particularly novel about the mass line; it is the propagation of the party line, applied under primitive technical and intellectual conditions, to millions of illiterate followers. To vulgarize and in the process distort and corrupt Marxist economic and social analysis was and remains no mean task. The detailed methods are in each case molded naturally by the folkways of the particular people. "This method includes the two techniques of 'from the masses, to the masses,' and 'the linking of the general with the specific,' the basic formulization [sic] given by Mao Tse-tung in 'On Methods of Leadership' (June 1, 1943)," writes the most penetrating student of Communist Chinese leadership methods.³²

Fascist propaganda techniques placed a similar emphasis upon the spoken word. Both Mussolini and Hitler were powerful orators who served as examples to many of their subleaders. Both also explicitly favored the technique; Hitler had supported this method emphatically in *Mein Kampf*, and it became a key policy of the Goebbels operation. One whole section of the party's propaganda apparatus was dedicated to the training of speakers, and there was a deliberate effort made to cultivate oratory rather than written communications. Thousands of men were thus trained to emulate Hitler in developing the technique of rousing the mass assembly, with its emotional outbursts and its vague longings, to violent action against the Jew, the Marxist, and the November criminal.

All in all, the system of propaganda and mass communication developed in the totalitarian systems is of crucial importance for the maintenance of the regime. It may be doubted whether it could function so well without the terror, but it cannot be doubted that as it actually functions it is highly effective. If manipulative controls are carried beyond a certain point, the system becomes self-defeating. Hence the loosening up after Stalin's death was intended to make the anti-Stalin propaganda effective. Now that there has developed a distinguishable "Soviet style of thinking," there can be some easing of the controls. But "it would be unduly optimistic to assume that the Soviet leadership is to any major degree

moving toward the establishment of free discussion."³³ The principles of thought control, as maintained by Lenin and other Communist leaders, are merely more flexibly applied. In a sense, such thought control dehumanizes the subjects of the regime by depriving them of a chance for independent thought and judgment.

NOTES

- ¹ Klaus Mehnert, *Soviet Man in His World*, (New York: 1962), pp. 261ff.
- ² Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitution and Government and Democracy*, Boston, 1950, Chapter 24.
- ³ Carl J. Friedrich, *The New Image of the Common Man* (Boston: 1951), Chapter 3. All attempts to define propaganda in terms of the content of the communications or the psychological effect tend to obscure these crucial political features.
- ⁴ Otto Dietrich, *Zwölf Jahre mit Hitler* (Munich: 1955).
- ⁵ Derrick Singleton and Arthur Wiedenfeld, *The Goebbels Experiment—A Study of the Nazi Propaganda Machine* (London: 1942), esp. Chapters 2, 3.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17. It may, however, be argued that the real dualism was that between Goebbels and Dietrich. In the party, Dietrich's position was equivalent to Goebbels'; he was Reichsleiter and press chief of the Reich, and although he was Goebbels' subordinate as secretary of state in the Ministry of Propaganda, he wore another hat as press chief of the government, which gave him direct access to Hitler.
- ⁷ H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), *Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944* (New York: 1953), pp. 389-390; see also Adolph Hitler, *Tischgespräche*, edited by H. Picker (Bonn: 1951), p. 128.
- ⁸ F. Borkenau, *European Communism* (London: 1953), *passim*.
- ⁹ Hitler, *Tischgespräche*, p. 128; Trevor-Roper, *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, pp. 341-342.
- ¹⁰ Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: 1948), esp. pp. 85ff.; Allen Welsh Dulles, *Germany's Underground* (New York: 1947), p. 136 and elsewhere.
- ¹¹ Bernhard Vollmer, *Volksopposition in Polizeistadt—Gestapo—und Regierungsbereiche 1934-1936* (Stuttgart: 1956).
- ¹² Guido Leto, *Memoirs. OVRA Fascismo—Antifascismo* (Bologna: 2nd ed., 1952).
- ¹³ Royal Commission, *Reports on Espionage in Canada, 1946, and Australia, 1955* (Ottawa and Canberra), for excellent source material.
- ¹⁴ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, 1950, pp. 358-392; J. Bennett, "The German Currency Reform," *Annals of the Academy of Political Science*, vol. 267 (January 1950), pp. 43-54.
- ¹⁵ Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), Chapter 20.
- ¹⁶ Louis Lochner (trans. and ed.), *The Goebbels Diaries* (London: 1948).
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 519.
- ¹⁸ Dietrich, *Zwölf Jahre mit Hitler*, p. 154.
- ¹⁹ Paul Seabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats Under the Nazi Regime* (Berkeley: 1954); Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York: 1948).
- ²⁰ Sir Neville Henderson, *The Failure of a Mission* (New York: 1940), pp. 258-301.
- ²¹ H. D. Lasswell, in Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1954), p. 367.
- ²² Dietrich, *Zwölf Jahre mit Hitler*, translation ours.
- ²³ Lochner (ed.), *The Goebbels Diaries*, *passim*.
- ²⁴ Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen—Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1959), pp. 185-186.
- ²⁵ Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1958).
- ²⁶ M. Strepukhov, "Powerful Instruments for Mobilizing the Masses to Carry Our Party and Governmental Decisions," *Kommunist*, vol. 6 (April 1955), pp. 91-102.
- ²⁷ Inkeles, *Public Opinion*, p. 275.

²⁸ *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1955), p. 10.

²⁹ Radio Moscow, September 1954.

³⁰ Inkeles, *Public Opinion*, p. 248.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

³² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (5 vols., 1954-1961) (London and New York).

³³ John W. Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963).

THE CHANGING SOVIET UNION*

BY ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL

Monopoly of mass communications has been made more difficult as technological progress has improved and increased the channels of communication the sender and receiver may use.

"When Stalin ruled the Soviet Union only 2 percent of the Soviet people had the physical possibility of hearing foreign radio broadcasts. Today over a third of the people have that chance. That is a difference of monumental significance. . . .

"There never was a time when the Bolshevik attempt totally to control the information that reached Soviet citizens succeeded in full. There were always heroes who kept alive in the privacy of their heads, or within their families, political or national or religious faiths that the regime proscribed. There were also always islands of freedom in prison. Men to whom arrest and imprisonment had already happened, who had already written off rewards in this life, who knew that their neighbors also were enemies of the regime could sometimes talk more freely to each other than could people still trying to make their way up the treadmill. . . .

"There was also always in Stalin's Russia a rumor net that covered the country. Typically, each person in a totalitarian society, for sanity's sake, has to have one or two trusted friends in whom he can confide. Without that his thoughts will change: brainwashing will work. A completely unexpressed view does not survive. In Stalin's Russia . . . the net of personal confidence covered the country even though each person usually could talk freely to only one or two close friends. That is enough to permit very high saliency messages to diffuse rapidly throughout the country. . . .

"That kind of rumor net is, however, an inefficient kind of information channel. It carries only the dramatic item. It provides little richness of detail and little interpretive background. The best feature of rumor is that it may be accurate, contrary to common impressions. The evidence from various rumor studies suggests that rumors change little in the

*From "The Changing Soviet Union," *Current*, no. 67 (January 1966), pp. 12-17. Reprinted with the permission of *Current*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

course of transmission in the real world, and that what change takes place is in the direction of plausibility. If the truth is indeed implausible, that will result in message distortion; but since the truth is more often plausible, change in the message is often correction. Rumor . . . was and still is an important source, and on many topics the most reliable one, in Soviet society, but it is a grossly inadequate and thin source. In the absence of other and more detailed media, even persons very hostile to the regime and people who grossly distrust the official sources nonetheless become the captives of the totalitarian worldview because they do not have enough information to construct a valid picture of reality. . . .

"Recognition of this phenomenon by which total control of information captures the mind and shapes the worldview of even those who oppose the regime, was what led many free world writers in the latter years of the Stalin regime to fearfully anticipate a 1984 of brainwashed automated men. Orwell, Koestler, Milosz and many other writers expected the younger generations, wholly educated under totalitarian control, to yield to a value system and world view utterly at odds with Western civilization.

"Now in retrospect we see that they were too pessimistic. Soviet youth is unquiet. But too often we attribute the rebellious and liberal spirit sometimes found among Soviet youth simply to the psychology of adolescence and the inevitable conflict of generations. That is too simple. Such conflict can take many forms. It was not foreordained that Soviet youth would like beat jazz or that Soviet artists would paint abstractions. These are not the only forms that protest can take. The style of rebellion of the flappers and their companions in the 1920's was not the same as the style of today's adolescents. Rebellion against tradition in the intellectual milieu of the *philosophes* was not the same as that in Greenwich Village and Leningrad today.

"Why are the forms of rebellious individuality so similar in Russia and in the West today? Clearly not by coincidence, nor, I would argue, by any inevitable law of industrial society, but because of communication. There is now enough communication to keep us part of a single civilization, to keep us influencing each other, to assure that any Western idea circulates in the Soviet Union too. The pessimistic expectation that totalitarianism could develop an accepted heinous civilization of its own by 1984 or any other year has been defeated primarily by the forces of communication and above all, by international radio. . . .

THE IMPACT OF RADIO

"In 1940 there were about 1 million wave radio sets in the Soviet Union. By 1952 there were about 5.8 million. By now there are perhaps 35 million. If we simply assume that two-thirds of the sets could receive foreign short-wave broadcasts and that a set is available to all members of a family, then as a very rough approximation we can say that about one person in 57 could listen to a foreign broadcast if he dared to in 1940,

perhaps one in 13 in 1952, and one in 2.5 today. This is a highly significant change, for it changes drastically 1) the richness of foreign information available and, therefore, also changes 2) the role of rumor and 3) the role and reactions of the domestic media. . . .

"We have said that the accessibility of foreign broadcasts to something like one Russian in 2.5 (and that means to a large majority of urban, educated, white-collar Russians) increases the richness of foreign information available. Mere availability, however, would be of no interest if the available broadcasts were not used. After all, how many Americans listen to foreign broadcasts? *All the evidence, however, is that the Russian listener eagerly uses his short-wave bands.*"

Rumor is still important as a source of information about world affairs, "but in a very different way from what it was in Stalin's Russia. When one person in 57 had access to direct foreign news and maybe one in a couple of hundred heard any one item, its dissemination was largely conditioned by the filtering and sometimes distorting character of the oral net. In the present situation where one person in two or three has access to direct foreign news, in any small circle of friends or co-workers there will typically be several who have heard any major item [and] can diffuse, discuss, or correct it.

"Lest I be misunderstood let me emphasize that even a wide access situation does not overcome distortion and misunderstanding in the flow of information between countries or cultures. After all, the understanding by the American citizen of life in Russia is poor indeed, even though no censorship bars knowledge from him. But. . . he misunderstands because he has little motivation to learn about Soviet affairs, and to the extent that he does see Soviet affairs as relevant to him, it is in the narrow context of a threatening foe. Soviet facts are functional to him, therefore, insofar either as they fit the stereotype of evil or are reassuring about the intentions of limited capabilities of the potential foe. The American media reinforce these limitations on knowledge. . . .

"On the Soviet side, the development of worldwide media has in one respect made the situation similar to that in the West, though in other respects it is entirely different. The growth of access to foreign news sources with their rich picture of reality means that, as in the West, the only absolute barrier to full and accurate information is the psychological one. No longer do the devices of a police state successfully keep the Soviet citizen in the dark. What he learns or fails to learn is now primarily determined by the filters of what is functional to him.

"The lifting of jamming on almost all foreign broadcasts was the last step in making the major filter the citizen's interest. News was receivable with enough effort to evade the jamming before, so it was not a decisive barrier. But now it takes no significant effort by any radio owner who wants the world news to get it. For the Soviet citizen who craves information about the outside world international radio is but one, though the most important one, among a number of media that have been re-opening

the channels of contact with Western civilization. There are exhibits and dramatic performances and TV kinescopes . . . that are part of cultural exchange programs. Personal contact with visitors from abroad has also been increasing as well as travel abroad by Soviet citizens. The number of the latter to get abroad is in the hundreds of thousands (although an overwhelming majority travel to non-capitalist countries.) Travelers to the Soviet Union now run at about the same rate including a significant number of cultural, educational, scientific and marine personnel. . . .

Getting the News Sooner

"The printed word from abroad is also increasingly, but still sparsely, available. . . . [Yet] the motivated Soviet citizen can receive an increasing amount of international information from the Soviet media. These have had to respond to an increasingly competitive environment. In the Stalin era an unfavorable development abroad might be smothered in silence, and generally the Soviet media system waited a day or two until *Pravda* could first be told how to treat an unfortunate event, and then tell other media how to treat it. That is no longer possible. As officially stated in 1960, and reiterated in 1963: 'The central radio stations in Moscow must first of all assure timely broadcasts of important political information, effective commentary on domestic and foreign events, and the organization of various artistic programs. . . . Because radio should give the population the important news before the newspapers do, Tass has been instructed to transmit news immediately to central and local radio stations. Radio should communicate to the population all important news earlier than do the newspapers.'

"The Soviet radio has had to change drastically in response to its new foreign competition. It now has to report the world news as it occurs and not wait for a day. If it waits, it will be scooped by an interpretation other than the Soviet one. Silence encourages listening to foreign radio.

"For the same sort of reason the Soviets have started publishing magazines of reprints of foreign materials. There is *Inostrannaya Literatura* (*Foreign Literature*) and *Za Rubezhom* (*Abroad*). [The latter] is the great success story of the Soviet magazine world. This weekly, started in 1960, had reached a circulation of 400,000 by last September. In earlier years of paper shortages, rationed magazine subscriptions, and absence of foreign or domestic competition such a press for alien material would have been forbidden. But the Soviet Union today proudly claims that it can meet the demand for all magazines and that it now sells subscriptions to general magazines to all comers. *Za Rubezhom* has been allowed to meet the spontaneous and phenomenal demand. The interested Soviet common man can now read Walter Lippmann or the editorials from *Le Monde* in a legitimate and extensive, even if highly selected, Soviet source.

News for Elite Eyes Only

"For the Soviet elite there is, of course, as there always has been, substantial coverage of foreign news sources in the classified monitoring reports. These are of differing degrees of completeness according to the receiver's rank. Every day *Tass* sends virtually the entire nonlocal, political contents of *The New York Times* to the Soviet Union. Translations of whole Western books get produced in editions not for sale to the general public. Daily monitor reports can be read by authorized persons (besides those who get them personally) in numerous government offices and research institutes. The classified foreign news reports issued daily by *Tass* run to about 200 pages a day. . . .

"The change in access to foreign information that we have been describing is taking place in the context of a still wider though not deeper change in the Soviet communication system, namely, the growth of domestic mass media. Just as in still broader economic context the Soviet Union is changing from an underdeveloped into an industrialized nation, so too its communication system is changing from a word of mouth system into a mass media system. . . .

Promoting Middle-Class Values

"We know too little about the psychological difference between living in a mass media system of communication and a pre-mass media system, but there are differences. Daniel Lerner has written about the role of the mass media in widening empathic capacity, i.e., enabling people to understand ways of life and roles that they have not experienced at first hand. Others have written of the role of the mass media in homogenizing society or in creating a mass society or in debasing culture. Actually, little of this speculation has much solid basis in research, but it does suggest some of the kinds of changes in the character of life that mass media bring in. They bring easy, passive, but obviously enjoyable, entertainment. They change patterns of social visiting, of friendships and of family life. They tend to encourage a value system and social structure that is more personal or familial, more pleasure oriented perhaps, certainly less group focused. They promote uniform middle-class values. In these respects a mass media system unifies society and dissolves some of the hold of special ethnic or class groups that make it up.

"Some of these changes can be seen in the Soviet Union. Russification, decay of folk culture, amalgamation of rural and urban ways of life, adoption of middle-class ways and modern values, increased orientation may have other causes too besides media growth, but the development of modern mass media reinforce such tendencies.

"The Soviet press writes about some of these and related trends in ways that sometimes sound much like the parallel discussions in this country. There are Soviet pedagogues, for example, who worry that TV watching is impinging on reading. One recalls the frequent post-Sputnik observation that the Russians are a nation of book readers. The taxi

driver with a classic in hand is a favorite idol of visiting journalists. It must be recognized that in part this book-reading habit simply reflected the aridity and also, to some degree, unavailability of mass media entertainment. Magazines, newspapers, radio and TV were scarce and what was available was ponderous, political and dull. They were dull to the point of driving the audience away. . . .

"Rejection of the dull Soviet mass media is still a characteristic citizen reaction but less so than ten years ago. Dullness and repetition in programming, is also a prime subject for Soviet discussions on radio and television. . . . The mass media revolution that is in process in Soviet society consists not only of the increased availability of magazine subscriptions, tape recorders, transistor sets, and TV, but also in a major effort to lighten their contents. . . .

THE MASS MEDIA AS PARTY RIVAL

"As such material becomes available and as effective mass media become a major means of coordinating social action and organizing life one very subtle but important consequence has been the decline of the agitprop system. When Alex Inkeles wrote his classic book on *Public Opinion in the Soviet Union*, the most characteristic feature of the Soviet communication system was the use of oral agitators. Two million agitators, getting their guidelines from *Bloknot Agitatora*, bored the rest of their fellow countrymen at regular, sometimes daily, meetings at all sorts of places of work. None of that has now changed in any dramatic way, but a distinct erosion has set in. . . .

"The organizational network can, of course, still be mobilized at important moments. The last total mobilization was after Khrushchev's Twentieth Congress speech which was diffused not by publication but at meetings of party members all over the country. . . . It is true that the party machine with its secretary in every organization is the ruling machine. . . . But, just as in the West, political machines which still exist have been eroded in favor of direct use of the mass media by the top leaders to reach the public. . . .

"It is easy to oversimplify the picture of that trend. Let us not do so. Let us digress for a minute from the Soviet Union onto the general problem of the relation between mass media and face to face organization at various stages of development. Mass media and face to face communication are not completely substitutable commodities. Communications research in recent years has demonstrated that there are some things best done by the mass media and some things best done by word of mouth. They complement each other. The mass media are the cheapest way to diffuse knowledge rapidly, but personal influence is essential to get people to act. Any effective program of persuasion or leadership has to mesh mass media propaganda with some sort of organization. Effective marketing requires not only advertising but also a distribution network through stores and salesmen. . . .

"In general, modernization substitutes mass media influence for certain forms of traditional control and indoctrination within the family and other primary groups. While it loosens the grip of these primary institutions, however, it does not destroy them, and it also impels the growth, not the decline, of various forms of civic, commercial and social organizations.

"It is this complex, double-barrelled process that is taking place in the Soviet Union too. On the one hand, as the Soviet Union becomes a more complex industrial society the number and variety of organizations that it needs to create to carry out its myriad economic, social and scientific programs grow and grow. On the other hand, as the mass media become an increasingly important mobilizing, homogenizing and value-setting institution, many of the functions performed previously by the most primary and most personally controlling organizations, particularly the family and the local party organizations, are taken over by the media.

Competition at Home

"In a non-Communist society the most natural outcome of the mixed relationship in the process of development between the mass media and organization, is pluralism. A complex society which mobilizes itself partly by the essentially noncoercive but unindividualized means of mass media persuasion on the one hand, and partly by a myriad of specialized organizations on the other, tends most naturally to a pluralistic pattern of partial and overlapping loyalties and affiliations. This pattern is in sharp contrast to the kind of pre-modern society that socializes and controls each person within a single all-embracing primary group, be it a family, caste or clan, or be it a guild or party organization.

"In short, the Soviet conception of organization of society, via an encompassing structure of activities arranged at the place of work under the full direction of the local party organization was appropriate for mobilizing an underdeveloped country without an effective mass media system. It is an incubus in the complex society of today and is inevitably eroded to the degree that there are effective mass media. . . .

"No issue in Soviet life will be more important over the coming years than the struggle over the role of the party. The conservatives will continue to insist on effective control via party organization even at the inevitable cost of inefficiency and backwardness. The struggle will center to some degree on the role and character of the mass media, for, to the extent that the mass media are allowed to become lively and appealing, they must escape party control and indeed will tend to undermine party control. To the extent that the mass media are, on the contrary, held to the limited role of loudspeakers for party policies and resolutions, their potential for effectively mobilizing society are partially sacrificed. Without the debaters being fully aware of it, the debate over the mass media is also a debate over the party.

Competition from Abroad

"It is in the light of these issues about the domestic Soviet media that the importance of international media must be evaluated. Foreign radio and other foreign media have a profound influence on the course of Soviet development over and above their influence as direct sources of ideas. As competitors for the audience they force the Soviet media to become more candid, more lively, more varied. (In that respect, incidentally, foreign media succeed precisely as they lose their audience.) To the extent that these things happen the role of the party is changed and diminished."

What will happen to Soviet society as a result of the new influence of the mass media it is difficult to say. "Change is not necessarily gradual and continuous. All sorts of things may happen. Nonetheless, it does seem possible to predict that in the long run Russia will achieve a more modern type of society with a more normal form of social coordination that relies more heavily on freer mass media instead of party control and is generally more pluralistic."

PROPAGANDA AND DEMOCRACY*

BY JACQUES ELLUL

The success of psychological appeals is as important to democratic government as it is to other forms of government

DEMOCRACY'S NEED OF PROPAGANDA

On one fact there can be no debate: the need of democracy, in its present situation, to "make propaganda."¹ We must understand, besides, that private propaganda, even more than governmental propaganda, is importantly linked to democracy. Historically, from the moment a democratic regime establishes itself, propaganda establishes itself alongside it under various forms. This is inevitable, as democracy depends on public opinion and competition between political parties. In order to come to power, parties make propaganda to gain voters.

Let us remember that the advent of the masses through the development of the democracies has provoked the use of propaganda, and that this is precisely one of the arguments of defense of the democratic State—that it appeals to the people, who are mobilized by propaganda; that it defends itself against private interests or anti-democratic parties. It is a remarkable fact worthy of attention that modern propaganda should have begun in the democratic States. During World War I we saw

* Excerpts from "The Socio-political Effects," Chapter V of *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, translated from the French by Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1965, pp. 232-242. From *PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S ATTITUDES*, by Jacques Ellul. Copyright © 1958 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

the combined use of the mass media for the first time; the application of publicity and advertising methods to political affairs, the search for the most effective psychological methods. But in those days German propaganda was mediocre: the French, English, and American democracies launched big propaganda. Similarly, the Leninist movement, undeniably democratic at the start, developed and perfected all propaganda methods. Contrary to some belief, the authoritarian regimes were not the first to resort to this type of action, though they eventually employed it beyond all limits. This statement should make us think about the relationship between democracy and propaganda.

For it is evident that a conflict exists between the principles of democracy—particularly its concept of the individual—and the processes of propaganda. The notion of rational man, capable of thinking and living according to reason, of controlling his passions and living according to scientific patterns, of choosing freely between good and evil—all this seems opposed to the secret influences the mobilizations of myths, the swift appeals to the irrational, so characteristic of propaganda.

But this development within the democratic framework can be understood clearly if we look at it not from the level of principles but from that of actual situations. If, so far, we have concluded that inside a democracy propaganda is normal and indispensable, even intrinsic in the regime, that there are one or more propagandas at work, nothing seems to make propaganda obligatory in *external* relations. There the situation is entirely different. There the democratic State will want to present itself as the carrier of its entire public opinion, and the democratic nation will want to present itself as a coherent whole. But that creates some difficulty because such desire does not correspond to a true and exact picture of democracy. Moreover, this implies an endemic, permanent state of war. But, whereas it is easy to show that permanent wars establish themselves at the same time as democratic regimes, it is even easier to demonstrate that these regimes express a strong desire for peace and do not systematically prepare for war. By this I mean that the economic and sociological conditions of the democracies possibly provoke general conflicts, but that the regime, such as it is, is not organically tied to war. It is led there, *volens nolens*. And it adjusts poorly to the situation of the Cold War, which is essentially psychological.

Another circumstance imprisons democracy in the ways of propaganda: the persistence of some traits of the democratic ideology. The conviction of the invincible force of truth is tied to the notion of progress and is a part of this ideology. Democracies have been fed on the notion that truth may be hidden for a while but will triumph in the end, that truth in itself carries an explosive force, a power of fermentation that will necessarily lead to the end of lies and the shining apparition of the true. This truth was the implicit core of the democratic doctrine.

One must stress, furthermore, that this was in itself a truth of an ideological kind that ended by making history because it imposed itself on

history. This attitude contained the seeds of, but was at the same time (and still is) the exact opposite of, the current Marxist attitude that history is truth. Proof through history is nowadays regarded as *the* proof. He in whose favor history decides, was right. But what is "to be right" when one speaks of history? It is to win, to survive, *i.e.*, to be the strongest. This would mean that the strongest and most efficient, nowadays, is the possessor of the truth. Truth thus has no content of its own, but exists only as history produces it; truth receives reality through history.

One can easily see the relationship between the two attitudes and how one can pass easily from one to the other: for if truth possesses an invincible power that makes it triumph through itself alone, it becomes logical—by a simple but dangerous step—that triumph is truth. But—and this is frightening—the consequences of the two attitudes are radically different.

To think that democracy must triumph because it is the truth leads man to be democratic and to believe that when the democratic regime is opposed to regimes of oppression, its superiority will be clear at first sight to the infallible judgment of man and history. The choice is thus certain. What amazement is displayed again and again by democrats, particularly Anglo-Saxon democrats, when they see that a man selects something else, and that history is indecisive. In such cases they decide to use information. "Because democratic reality was not known, people have made a bad choice," they say, and even there we find the same conviction of the power of truth. But it is not borne out by facts. We will not establish a general law here, to be sure, but we will say that it is not a general law that truth triumphs automatically, though it may in certain periods of history or with respect to certain verities. We cannot generalize here at all. History shows that plain truth can be so thoroughly snuffed out that it disappears, and that in certain periods the lie is all-powerful.

Even when truth triumphs, does it triumph through itself (because it is truth)? After all, the eternal verities defended by Antigone would, in the eyes of history, have yielded to Creon even if Sophocles had not existed.

But in our time, the conviction of democracy and its claim to inform people collide with the fact that propaganda follows an entirely different mechanism, performs a function entirely different from that of information, and that nowadays facts do not assume reality in the people's eyes unless they are established by propaganda. Propaganda, in fact, creates truth in the sense that it creates in men subject to propaganda all the signs and indications of true believers.

For modern man, propaganda is really creating truth. This means that truth is powerless without propaganda. And in view of the challenge the democracies face, it is of supreme importance that they abandon their confidence in truth as such and assimilate themselves to the methods of propaganda. Unless they do so, considering the present tendencies of

civilization, the democratic nations will lose the war conducted in this area.

DEMOCRATIC PROPAGANDA

Convinced of the necessity for using the means of propaganda, students of that question have found themselves facing the following problem. Totalitarian States have used propaganda to the limit, domestically in order to create conformity, manipulate public opinion, and adjust it to the decisions of the government; externally to conduct the Cold War, undermine the public opinion of nations considered enemies, and turn them into willing victims. But if these instruments were used principally by authoritarian States, and if democracies, whose structure seemed made for their use, did not use them, can they now be used by democracies? By that I mean that the propaganda of the authoritarian State has certain special traits, which seem inseparable from that State. Must democratic propaganda have other traits? Is it possible to make democratic propaganda?

Let us quickly dismiss the idea that a simple difference of content would mean a difference in character. "From the moment that propaganda is used to promulgate democratic ideas, it is good; if it is bad it is only because of its authoritarian content." Such a position is terribly idealistic and neglects the principal condition of the modern world: the primacy of means over ends. But one may say—and this is a matter worthy of reflection—that democracy itself is not a good "propaganda object." Practically all propaganda efforts to promulgate democracy have failed. In fact, one would have to modify the entire concept of democracy considerably to make it a good propaganda object, which at present it is not.

Also, in passing, I will mention the following thought: "From the moment that democracy uses this instrument (propaganda), propaganda becomes democratic." This thought is not often expressed quite so simply and aggressively, but it is an implicit notion found in most American writers. Nothing can touch democracy: on the contrary, it impresses its character on everything it touches. This prejudice is important for understanding the American democratic mythology and the tentative adoption of this principle by other popular democracies.

Such positions are so superficial and so remote from the actual situation that they do not need to be discussed. Besides, they usually come from journalists or commentators, and not from men who have seriously studied the problem of propaganda and its effects. Even the majority of the latter, however, retain the conviction that one *can* set up a propaganda system that expresses the democratic character and does *not* alter the working of democracy. That is the double demand that one must make of propaganda in a democratic regime.

It is argued that the first condition would be met by the absence of a monopoly (in a democracy) of the means of propaganda, and by the free

interplay of various propagandas. True, compared with the State monopoly and the unity of propaganda in totalitarian States, one finds a great diversity of press and radio in democratic countries. But this fact must not be stressed too much: although there is no State or legal monopoly, there is, nevertheless, indeed a private monopoly. Even where there are many newspaper publishers, concentration as a result of "newspaper chains" is well established, and the monopolization of news agencies of distribution and so on, is well known. In the field of radio or motion pictures the same situation prevails: obviously not everybody can own propaganda media. In the United States, most radio and motion picture corporations are very large. The others are secondary and unable to compete, and centralization still goes on. The trend everywhere is in the direction of a very few, very powerful companies controlling all the propaganda media. Are they still private? In any event, as we have already seen, the State must make *its* propaganda, if only under the aspect of disseminating news.

Assuming that information is an indispensable element of democracy, it is necessary that the information promulgated by the State be credible. Without credibility, it will fail. But what happens when a powerful private propaganda organization denies facts and falsifies information? Who can tell where truth lies? On whom can the citizen rely to judge the debate? It is on this level that the dialogue really takes place. The problem then is whether the State will support a private competitor who controls media equal or superior to its own but makes different propaganda. It may even be entirely legitimate for the State to suppress or annex such a competitor.

Some will say: "Freedom of expression is democracy; to prevent propaganda is to violate democracy." Certainly, but it must be remembered that the freedom of expression of one or two powerful companies that do not express the thoughts of the individual or small groups, but of capitalist interests or an entire public, does not exactly correspond to what was called freedom of expression a century ago. One must remember, further, that the freedom of expression of one who makes a speech to a limited audience is not the same as that of the speaker who has all the radio sets in the country at his disposal, all the more as the science of propaganda gives to these instruments a knock effect that the non-initiated cannot equal.

I refer in this connection to the excellent study by Rivero,² who demonstrates the immense difference between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in this respect:

In the nineteenth century, the problem of opinion formation through the expression of thought was essentially a problem of contacts between the State and the individual, and a problem of acquisition of a freedom. But today, thanks to the mass media, the individual finds himself outside the battle . . . the debate is between the State and powerful groups . . . Freedom to express ideas is no longer at stake in this debate. . . . What we have is mastery and domination by the State or by some powerful groups over the whole of the technical media of opinion formation . . . the individual has no access to them . . . he is no longer a particip-

ant in this battle for the free expression of ideas: he is the stake. What matters for him is which voice he will be permitted to hear and which words will have the power to obsess him. . . .

It is in the light of this perfect analysis that one must ask oneself what freedom of expression still means in a democracy.

But even if the State held all the instruments of propaganda (and this becomes increasingly probable for political, economic, and financial reasons—particularly so far as TV³ is concerned), what characterizes democracy is that it permits the expression of different propagandas. This is true. But it is impossible to permit the expression of all opinion. Immoral and aberrant opinions are justifiably subject to censorship. Purely personal opinions and even more, certain political tendencies are necessarily excluded. "No freedom for the enemies of freedom" is the watchword then. Thus the democracies create for themselves a problem of limitation and degree. Who then will exclude certain propaganda instruments? For the Fascist, the Communists are the enemies of truth. For the Communists, the enemies of freedom are the bourgeois, the Fascists, the cosmopolitans. And for the democrats? Obviously all enemies of democracy.

Matters are even more serious. In time of war, everybody agrees that news must be limited and controlled, and that all propaganda not in the national interest must be prohibited. From that fact grows a unified propaganda. The problem that now arises is this: We have talked of the Cold War. But it seems that the democracies have not yet learned that the Cold War is no longer an exceptional state, a state analogous to hot war (which is transitory), but is becoming a permanent and endemic state.

There are many reasons for that. I will name only one: propaganda itself.

Propaganda directed to territories outside one's borders is a weapon of war. This does not depend on the will of those who use it or on a doctrine, but is a result of the medium itself. Propaganda has such an ability to effect psychological transformations and such an impact on the very core of man that it inevitably has military force when used by a government and directed to the outside. There is no "simple" use of propaganda; a propaganda conflict is hardly less serious than an armed conflict. It is inevitable, therefore, that in cold war the same attitude exists as in the case of hot war: one feels the need to unify propaganda. Here democracies are caught in a vicious circle from which they seem unable to escape.

The other principal aspect of democratic propaganda is that it is subject to certain values. It is not unfettered but fettered;⁴ it is an instrument not of passion but of reason.⁵ Therefore, democratic propaganda must be essentially truthful. It must speak only the truth and base itself only on facts. This can be observed in American propaganda: it is undeniable that American information and propaganda are truthful. But that does not seem to me characteristic of democracy. The formula with which Ameri-

cans explain their attitude is: "The truth pays." That is, propaganda based on truth is more effective than any other. Besides, Hitler's famous statement on the lie is not a typical trait of propaganda. There is an unmistakable evolution here: lies and falsifications are used less and less. We have already said that. The use of precise facts is becoming increasingly common.

Conversely, the use of nuances and a certain suppleness reveals an attitude peculiar to democracy. At bottom there is a certain respect for the human being, unconscious perhaps, and becoming steadily weaker, but nevertheless still there; even the most Machiavellian of democrats respects the conscience of his listener and does not treat him with haste or contempt. The tradition of respecting the individual has not yet been eliminated, and this leads to all sorts of consequences. First, it limits propaganda. The democratic State uses propaganda only if driven by circumstances—for example, traditionally, after wars. But whereas private and domestic propaganda is persistent in its effects, governmental and external propaganda evaporate easily. Besides, such propaganda is not total, does not seek to envelop all of human life, to control every form of behavior, to attach itself ultimately to one's person. A third trait of democratic propaganda is that it looks at both sides of the coin. The democratic attitude is frequently close to that of a university: there is no absolute truth, and it is acknowledged that the opponent has some good faith, some justice, some reason on his side. It is a question of nuances. There is no strict rule—except in time of war—about Good on one side and Bad on the other.

Finally, the democratic propagandist or democratic State will often have a bad conscience about using propaganda. The old democratic conscience still gets in the way and burdens him; he has the vague feeling that he is engaged in something illegitimate. Thus, for the propagandist in a democracy to throw himself fully into his task it is necessary that he believe—i.e., that he formulate his own convictions when he makes propaganda.

Lasswell has named still another difference between democratic and totalitarian propaganda, pertaining to the technique of propaganda itself, and distinguishing between "contrasted incitement" and "positive incitement." The first consists of a stimulus unleashed by the experimenter or the authorities in order to produce in the masses an effect in which those in power do not participate. This, according to Lasswell, is the customary method of despotism. Conversely, the positive incitement, symbolizing the extended brotherly hand, is a stimulus that springs from what the powers that be really feel, in which they want to make the masses participate. It is a communal action. This analysis is roughly accurate.

All this represents the situation in which democracies find themselves in the face of propaganda, and indicates the differences between democratic and authoritarian propaganda methods. But I must now render a very serious judgment on such activity (democratic propaganda): all that

I have described adds up to ineffectual propaganda. Precisely to the extent that the propagandist retains his respect for the individual, he denies himself the very penetration that is the ultimate aim of all propaganda: that of provoking action without prior thought. By respecting nuances, he neglects the major law of propaganda: every assertion must be trenchant and total. To the extent that he remains partial, he fails to use the mystique. But that mystique is indispensable for well-made propaganda. To the extent that a democratic propagandist has a bad conscience, he cannot do good work; nor can he when he believes in his own propaganda. As concerns Lasswell's distinction, the technique of propaganda demands one form or the other, depending on circumstances. In any event, propaganda always creates a schism between the government and the mass, that same schism I have described in the book *The Technological Society*, and that is provoked by all the techniques, whose practitioners constitute a sort of aristocracy of technicians and who modify the structures of the State.

According to Lasswell's analysis, propaganda based on contrasted incitation expresses a despotism. I would rather say that it expresses an aristocracy. But the famous "massive democracy" corresponds to that, is that. Ultimately, even if one tries to maintain confidence and communion between the government and the governed, all propaganda ends up as a means by which the prevailing powers manipulate the masses.

The true propagandist must be as cold, lucid, and rigorous as a surgeon. There are subjects and objects. A propagandist who believes in what he says and lets himself become a victim of his own game will have the same weakness as a surgeon who operates on a loved one or a judge who presides at a trial of a member of his own family. To use the instrument of propaganda nowadays, one must have a scientific approach—the lack of which was the weakness that became apparent in Nazi propaganda in its last few years: clearly, after 1943, one could see from its content that Goebbels had begun to believe in himself.

Thus, some of democracy's fundamental aspects paralyze the conduct of propaganda. There is, therefore, no "democratic" propaganda. Propaganda made by the democracies is ineffective, paralyzed, mediocre. We can say the same when there is a diversity of propagandas: when various propagandas are permitted to express themselves they become ineffective with respect to their immediate objective. This ineffectiveness with regard to the citizens of a democracy needs more analysis. Let us merely emphasize here that our propaganda is outclassed by that of totalitarian States. This means that ours does not do its job. But in view of the challenge we face, it is imperative that ours be effective. One must therefore abandon the traits that are characteristic of democracy but paralyzing for propaganda: the combination of effective propaganda and respect for the individual seems impossible.

There is a last element, which I shall mention briefly. Jacques Drien-court has demonstrated that propaganda is totalitarian in its essence, not

because it is the handmaiden of the totalitarian State, but because it has a tendency to absorb everything. This finding is the best part of his work.⁶ It means that when one takes that route, one cannot stop halfway: one must use all instruments and all methods that make propaganda effective. One must expect—and developments over the past dozen years show it—that the democracies will abandon their precautions and their nuances and throw themselves wholeheartedly into effective propaganda action. But such action will no longer have a special democratic character.

... [To measure the effects that the making of propaganda has on democracy], we must distinguish between external and domestic propaganda. We must not retain the illusion that propaganda is merely a neutral instrument that one can use without being affected. It is comparable to radium, and what happens to the radiologists is well known.

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NOTES

¹ Perceptive authors agree that without propaganda a democratic State is disarmed at home (vis-à-vis the parties) and abroad, the latter as a result of the famous "challenge" that sets the democracies and the totalitarian States against each other. But one must not overlook the many setbacks that democracy has suffered for lack of propaganda. Maurice Megret shows (in *L'Action psychologique* [Paris: A. Fayard; 1959]) that the crisis in which the French Army found itself from 1950 on was in large part caused by an absence of psychological action on the part of the government, and he demonstrates that the famous Plan was less than a great success for the same reasons. Finally, we must remember that if the democratic State is denied the right to make propaganda, such propaganda appears in the form of Public Relations at the expense of the State, and is all the more dangerous because camouflaged.

² "Technique de formation de l'opinion publique," in *L'Opinion Publique* (1957).

³ In France. (Trans.)

⁴ Propaganda as such is limited in the democracies by law, by the separation of powers, and so on.

⁵ See, for example, "Trends in Twentieth-Century Propaganda," by Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, who contrast the appeal to the super-ego and to the irrational by authoritarian propaganda with democratic propaganda, which is directed at the ego.

⁶ *La Propagande, nouvelle force politique* (Paris: A. Colin; 1950).

IDEOLOGY

In a real sense, all international persuasive communication implies an ideology. Within this general concept, however, differences in ideological content are vast and highly significant. The inherent applicability of any specific ideology to psychological operations is often lessened as the meaning of the ideology is explicated in detail. This is because such specification forces an ideology to define itself in terms of concrete choices, choices which will alienate some even as they will attract others. The individual aspects of a broad philosophy can appeal however to different audiences, and the prudent, ideologically motivated communicator will be aware of the aspects he must emphasize and de-emphasize to appeal to different audiences.

A second major weakness of ideologically based appeals is, as Bernard

Yoh points out, that another government or group may choose to emphasize the contradictions between the communicator's ideology and the traditions and values of the audience.

Against such weaknesses must be weighed the ability of universalistic ideologies to produce "true believers." An all-encompassing ideology is an entire value system with its own justification and ethical code which some converts may find appealing, and in support of which they may become jealous or even fanatical.

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND REVOLUTION*

BY JOHN H. NORTON

Selected elements of Marxian theory lend themselves unusually well to either totalitarian regimes' justification or stimuli for revolution.

* * * * *

An ideology is a philosophical construction which explains everything about the historical process by logical deduction from a single basic idea. Unlike other philosophies an ideology usually claims a monopoly of truth and is intolerant of other outlooks. In these aspects it bears a resemblance to religion, with which it is often compared. Unlike revealed religions, however, ideologies claim to be based upon scientific truth, since they deal with natural and not supernatural processes and since they are internally consistent. In this assertion, however, they err by ignoring the basis of scientific truth, which is composed of tentative (heuristic) propositions to be tested independently by many individuals against observable reality and discarded if they do not meet that empirical test. Despite the fact that they demand acceptance in the name of science, ideologies are dogmas which display very little curiosity about the real world. But in this respect they are less secure and more subject to change than religions. They purport to explain natural events, and they are therefore open to challenge when they fail to predict them.

Ideologies play an important role in social change. They seem to arise from the psychological stresses produced when a social system is not in equilibrium, and they serve the individual who accepts them as a means for relieving these tensions. In this respect they offer a consistent picture of the universe which gives meaning to the life of the individual and offers an explanation of the events he witnesses. Often they serve as replacements for old value systems which have broken down under social change, and they serve as a rallying point for those individuals who are dissatisfied with the social system.¹

Because of their religious and pseudoscientific nature, ideologies can be used to influence and organize people. Those who use them for this

*Excerpts from "Russia, China, and Insurgency," *Naval War College Review*, XXIII, no. 2 (October 1970), pp. 60-68. Reprinted with the approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review*, and the author.

purpose are not necessarily cynical or sinister manipulators; it is more likely that they have accepted the ideology too.² Particularly for those at the center of a revolutionary movement, the psychological satisfaction of directing that movement toward a meaningful ideological goal can be tremendous.³ So, aside from the intrinsic appeal of the ideology itself, there are powerful psychological and social rewards for those who subscribe to it.

Marxism and its offshoots are just such ideologies.

Marx proposed a theory of history and economics which, with modification, is still widely accepted. He saw history as a process in which people's thoughts, attitudes, and actions are largely determined by economic factors. These factors were held responsible for the division of people into classes and for the struggle between those classes which would—after passing through periods of feudalism and capitalism—finally and inevitably result in a revolution of those who produced wealth (the workers), which in turn would bring about a utopian classless society.

Marx's view of this society was optimistic and idealistic. He foresaw it as a society in which . . .

men would exercise a much greater, and equal, control over their individual destinies; would be liberated from the tyranny of their own creations such as the State and bureaucracy, capital and technology, would be productive rather than acquisitive; would find pleasure and support in their social cooperation with other men, rather than antagonism and bitterness in the competition with them.⁴

This utopian vision still has much appeal today. It represents enough universal human longing to attract the radical students in the industrialized countries as well as the peasant societies of the Third World.

Four points in Marx's theories are particularly important. First is his argument that misery and want are not *natural* conditions, but *political* ones—the results of social institutions and not of scarcity. In this, his philosophy continues in a direct line from that of the French Revolution, whose leaders saw human happiness and the alleviation of poverty as the ends of revolution. (Note the significant contrast of this idea to that of the American Revolution, which was fought to free individuals to seek their own happiness within a political order based on their own consent. This is an important practical and philosophical difference.⁵)

Second is Marx's emphasis on historical determinism. Despite his concern with human happiness, human beings are seen not as individuals with individual needs and capabilities, but as agents of an historical process over which they can have little control. The corollary of this notion is purely ideological—that humans can best find happiness now by joining, not resisting, the inevitable movement toward socialism and the victory of the working class.

Third, we have Marx's conception of the dialectic of the historical process, which meant that out of the conflict of thesis (the old society) and antithesis (reaction to its injustices) would emerge a new synthesis (the

new order). A corollary of this idea was that reforms of the old order only slowed the historical process and the ultimate revolution and were therefore undesirable. In short, "real" change could only be brought about by revolution.

Finally, we come to Marx's idea of the alienation (estrangement, dehumanization) of man in industrial (capitalist) society, by which he meant that the division of labor and the necessity for bureaucratic administration created by the advance of technology had resulted in a condition wherein man received no self-fulfillment from his work and life. It is this concept, seized upon by Marcuse and other contemporary social critics, which has crystallized opposition to unthinking commercialism and bureaucratic government by the student left in the industrialized countries.

The problems with Marx's original theories are well known. The labor theory of value, upon which he based much of his argument, was later shown to be deficient. His touching confidence that human nature would change from acquisitiveness to cooperation with the imposition of different social institutions was ill founded. He failed to see that his scheme provided no safeguards against the conversion of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the tyranny of a party; his classless society allows for no other institutions which could compete with the state or offer that society some defense against the totalitarianism of the new elite.

Nevertheless, the elements of Marx's theory mentioned above make it unusually susceptible to perversion into dogma for ideological purposes, either as the charismatic justification of a totalitarian system or as a stimulus to revolution. The theory tells men that they can achieve happiness by changing certain political institutions held to be responsible for their misery. It tells them that they will be acting against history if they do not change these institutions in a certain way (revolution). It explains their present discontent, and it gives them a sense of participation in history if they adhere to the theory. In short, it claims a monopoly of truth, supports all those who believe in it, and provides a justification for ignoring or eliminating those who disagree. Marx was clever enough to have been able to recognize these problems, had he lived into the 20th century. An enemy of classes and bureaucracy, he would very likely be appalled by the Communist states today. Even at the end of his life he wrote to his son, "I am not myself a Marxist."

It was left for Lenin to covert these theories into ideology. . . . He made two important contributions. He extended the theory of revolution to include not only the proletariat, but the large mass of peasants as well. And he forged the priesthood of the Communist Party as the conspiratorial vehicle for revolution and the guardian of the dogmatic faith of Marxism.

Mao Tse-Tung's addition to Marxist ideology arose out of his well-known experiences in mobilizing a peasant base to struggle against the Nationalist Government and the Japanese. In the course of this struggle

he continued to move away from reliance on the proletariat and toward reliance on the peasants as the backbone of communism. He thus incorporated into the body of Marxist doctrine the peasant who had been despised by Marx and his European followers and who had been utilized but largely overlooked by Lenin.

The success of Mao's organizational efforts and guerrilla tactics in China moved him to elevate the new emphasis into dogma and extend it to international politics, where he now postulates a worldwide "guerrilla war" of the underdeveloped, rural Third World against the metropolitan powers of Europe and North America.⁶ This element in Mao's ideology has been both the instrument and the motivation for China's mischief making in the Third World and, of course, contributed also to the break with Russia.

What then is the role of contemporary Marxist ideology in the unstable social and political situation existing in the developing countries? How much is it responsible for the unrest there? What appeal does it have to individuals in those societies and why? To what degree is it merely a tool of Soviet and Chinese interests?

... The Soviets and China have promoted revolution and the spread of Marxist ideology in the underdeveloped countries for their own political purposes. But to believe that the influence of communism in these areas is solely, or even chiefly, the result of conspiratorial, outside Communist "takeover" tactics is to ignore the inherent relevance of this ideology to the Third World and to render ourselves incapable of dealing with the complex situation in the Third World except in the emotional and somewhat simplistic manner in which we have reacted in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

Do we really think that modern Communist ideology could have taken such deep root in Asia and Latin America if it did not have some meaning to the people there? The Third World is not Eastern Europe, where communism was imposed on an unwilling population by Stalin's armies. It stretches the imagination to believe that the hundreds of thousands of highly motivated Vietcong can be but dupes of clever organizers and propagandists.

Marxist ideology and Communist organization are, and will continue to be, successful in the underdeveloped countries for at least five reasons:

(1) Marxist utopianism fits right in with the natural utopianism which exists in all peasant societies.

(2) Communist organization offers a quick, practical means for native intellectuals to gain a pervasive control of their societies.

(3) Communist governments are effective in creating political controls capable of holding a society together in today's world.

(4) The hostility of Communist doctrine to Western Europe and the United States provides a rationale for developing countries to cast off odious colonial influence and inappropriate Western-style political systems.

(5) Both the ideology and the hierarchical social organization of modern communism offer the individual a satisfying substitute for the vanishing social institutions of extended family, tribe, and local community.

Utopianism is a common phenomenon among those whom Morris Wainick calls the "history-less" peoples of the world—those whose actions are governed by custom, and whose imagination spans only one generation.^{7,8} There it acts as a psychological safety valve for the trials of a difficult existence. When social institutions begin to break down or to change rapidly, this utopianism bursts forth frequently in desperate, futile peasant rebellions (e.g., the 16th century Bauernkrieg in Europe on the eve of the Reformation).⁹ Such rapid social change is occurring today in the Third World under the impact of new ideas.

This native drive for millennial rectification of perceived wrongs is usually directed against whomever is in authority as the society disintegrates. But it is doomed to achieve nothing unless it can be effectively organized. It can be organized by means of appropriate ideology and methods of control. Communism in its present form offers both. The elements of Marx's theory accord perfectly with the millennial dream of the peasant in time of stress "Alienation" and "class exploitation" explain his unhappiness, the "classless society" provides his goal, the "need for revolution" shows him how to act, and "historical determinism" gives him the sense of participation in an historical process.

Who then are attempting to use this ideology to control and manipulate the dissatisfied majority? Foreign agents? Local Communists trained in Moscow and Peking?

Most revolutionary leaders in the Third World are indigenous intellectuals who are otherwise excluded from positions of power in their societies, who find communism relevant to them personally, and who see it as the best tool to modernize their countries.^{10,11} In Marxist ideology they, too, find self-justification; in Communist organization they find the means to put themselves in power and to guide their societies toward the more sophisticated political systems necessary to survive in the last third of the 20th century. The backgrounds of Communist leaders have been found to be surprisingly similar to those of their local nationalist opponents.¹² Except in rare cases they are not workers or peasants, but men educated in modern ideas.

Here we find many similarities with prerevolutionary Russia and China (similarities which are not lost on Third World leaders). Communism was not imposed upon Russia from without. It was eagerly adopted by native Russian intellectuals who used it as a tool to overthrow Kerensky's provisional government, install themselves in power, and work for modernization. In China, after the nearly disastrous manipulations of Russian agents, it was a homegrown intellectual, Mao, who guided the country to a successful Communist revolution. A look at the biographies of current Vietcong leaders reveals few peasants and workers, but a high proportion of schoolteachers, architects, and engineers, whose "foreign training"

was usually acquired in Paris.¹³ It is especially with regard to these indigenous revolutionary leaders that we usually underestimate communism as a compelling, relevant force in the developing world by labeling such people "dupes," "foreign agents," or "Power-hungry cynics."

Does communism deliver what it promises to these modernizing nationalists? Although many of the promises are not kept, it does satisfy what is perhaps the greatest immediate *need* of their societies—not economic development, but political cohesion. The Communists offer effective government based on widespread mobilization of the community in political and economic programs. To label these governments totalitarian dictatorships may be true, but it does not tell the whole story—perhaps not even the most important part of it. The significant difference between the dictatorships of Ho and Diem was that Ho constructed the institutions necessary for a modern political system, while Diem did not. The United States' great failure in dealing with insurgency in the Third World has been that we have never offered these peoples an effective alternative to totalitarian control as a *rapid* means to political modernization. I believe we must try, for I believe that democracy and effective government are not mutually exclusive.¹⁴

Points 4 and 5 above probably need less discussion. It seems obvious that the old colonial powers appear as more of a threat to the new leaders than do Russia or China, partly because many of their economies are tied to the West (a fact which is seen as "nonpolitical" in the United States; after all, it's just business). These economic relations with the powerful, industrialized countries are often perceived in the developing countries as exploitation and, therefore, "neocolonialism." Witness our current problems in Latin America. Similar Soviet economic relations, such as the natural gas sales to Western Europe, are only just beginning and are therefore not so clearly perceived.

Furthermore, the Western Powers, in an unsophisticated, idealistic, and parochial manner have attempted to push the forms, if not the substance, of Western Constitutional democracy upon developing countries for whom these institutions are not very relevant—less relevant, in fact, than homegrown communism. These systems have in many cases been properly rejected or modified out of existence, and the new nations are now experimenting with their own institutions—sometimes with disastrous results. If we hope to encourage other peoples toward systems of government we believe best, we had better study carefully the elements in other systems which are perceived by them as more appropriate for their own needs.

The psychological rewards of modern communism as a substitute for decaying traditional social institutions have already been mentioned and explored. They are a powerful motivating force for which men will give their lives.

Hopefully, the above discussion will have demonstrated that the popularity of Communist ideas and the penetration of Soviet and Chinese

influence in the Third World have not been simply the result of tactics used by Communist insurgents to organize and control a population, but rather the result of the relevance of certain elements of Marxist ideology and Leninist political organization to conditions in developing societies. For our own national interest we simply cannot afford any longer to ignore these elements because of our hostility to "communism."

NOTES

- ¹ Chalmers A. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 80-87.
- ² Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 104.
- ³ E. Victor Wolfenstein, *The Revolutionary Personality. Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), *passim*.
- ⁴ Thomas B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 132.
- ⁵ Hannah Arendt's discussion of the question of human wants and political institutions is brilliant on this point and may indicate why some of our domestic institutions are failing us now. See her *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 53-110.
- ⁶ U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Lin Piao Article Commemorating V-J Day Anniversary "Long Live the Victory of the People's War"* ([Washington]: 3 September 1965), p. 22.
- ⁷ Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of Communism to the Underdeveloped Peoples," John H. Kautsky, ed., *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 317.
- ⁸ Margaret Mead, *Culture and Commitment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1970), pp. 32-97.
- ⁹ Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 453-483, discusses the social conditions aside from peasant utopianism, which provoke peasant revolts.
- ¹⁰ Harry J. Benda, "Reflections on Asian Communism," *Yale Review*, October 1966, pp. 1-2.
- ¹¹ Kautsky, ed., *Political Change*, p. 77.
- ¹² Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, *World Revolutionary Elites* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1965), pp. 97-178.
- ¹³ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 421-436.
- ¹⁴ For a detailed discussion of the institutions of modern political systems and for an analysis of how Leninism can also help provide them. I urge the reader to consider Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 334-343.

PROPAGANDA AND IDEOLOGY*

BY JACQUES ELLUL

Ideology limits propaganda, propaganda alters and destroys ideology.

THE TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP

A relationship between propaganda and ideology has always existed.

*Excerpts from "The Socio-political Effects," Chapter V in *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, translated from the French by Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1965, pp. 194-202. From PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S ATTITUDES, by Jacques Ellul. Copyright © 1968 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

The pattern of that relationship became more or less established toward the end of the nineteenth century. I will not give here an original or specific definition of ideology, but will merely say that society rests on certain beliefs and no social group can exist without such beliefs. To the extent that members of a group attribute intellectual validity to these beliefs, one may speak of an ideology. One might also consider a different process by which ideology is formed: ideologies emerge where doctrines are degraded and vulgarized and when an element of belief enters into them. However that may be, it has long been known that some ideologies are compatible with passive behavior, but most of them are active—i.e., they push men into action.

Moreover, to the extent that members of a group believe their ideology to represent the truth, they almost always assume an aggressive posture and try to impose that ideology elsewhere. In such cases ideology becomes bent on conquest.

The drive toward conquest may arise within a society as a conflict between groups (for example, the proletarian ideology vs. others within a nation), or it can aim at targets outside, as a nationalist ideology will. The expansion of an ideology can take various forms: it can accompany the expansion of a group and impose itself on collectivities being embraced by the group, as with the republican ideology of 1793 or the Communist ideology of 1945, which accompanied the armies.

Or an ideology such as that of Labor in a bourgeois society may expand by its own momentum on a purely psychological plane. In this case, the ideology assumes a non-imperialist attitude; meanwhile it penetrates the group that represents such an attitude. In this fashion the ideology of Labor helped bring about the bourgeois orientation of all Western society in the nineteenth century.

Finally, an ideology can expand by certain other means, without force and without setting an entire group in motion: at that point we find propaganda. Propaganda appears—spontaneously or in organized fashion—as a means of spreading an ideology beyond the borders of a group or of fortifying it within a group. Evidently, in such cases propaganda is directly inspired by ideology in both form and content. It is equally evident that what counts here is to spread the content of that ideology. Propaganda does not lead a life of its own; it emerges only sporadically—when an ideology tries to expand.

Propaganda organizes itself in conformity with that ideology, so that in the course of history we find very different forms of propaganda, depending on what ideological content was to be promulgated. Also, propaganda is strictly limited to its objective, and its working processes are relatively simple in that it does not try to take possession of the individual or dominate him by devious means, but simply to transmit certain beliefs and ideas. That is the current relationship between ideology and propaganda. The classic pattern, still in existence in the nineteenth

century—and considered valid today by many observers—no longer prevails; the situation has undergone profound changes.

Lenin and Hitler found a world in which the process of ideological expansion was more or less set. But their intervention in this domain would be the same as their intervention in all others. What actually was Lenin's and thereafter Hitler's great innovation? It was to understand that the modern world is essentially a world of "means"; that what is most important is to utilize all the means at man's disposal; and that ends and aims have been completely transformed by the profusion of means. The fact that man in the nineteenth century was still searching for ends led him to neglect most of the available means. Lenin's stroke of genius was to see that, in reality, *in our twentieth century*, the ends had come to be secondary to the means or, in many cases, of no importance at all. What mattered was primarily to set all available instruments in motion and to push them to their limits.

Moreover, Lenin was carried along by the conviction that such extreme utilization of all means would, a priori, lead to the establishment of Socialist society. The end thus became a postulate that was easily forgotten. That attitude agreed exactly with the aspirations of the average man and with his firm belief in progress. That is why Lenin designed a strategy and a tactic on the political plane. There as elsewhere he permitted the means to assume first place; but that led him, on one hand, to modify Marx's doctrine, and on the other, to give the doctrine itself a level of importance secondary to action. Tactics and the development of means then became the principal objects even of political science.

With Hitler one finds precisely the same tendency, but with two differences: first of all, a total lack of restraint. Lenin envisaged the application of progressive, limited, adjusted means. Hitler wanted to apply them all, and without delay. Second, the end, the aim, the doctrine, which Lenin merely had demoted to second place, disappeared altogether in Hitler's case—the vague millennium that he promised cannot be regarded as an aim, nor can his anti-Semitism be considered a doctrine. Instead, we pass here to the stage of pure action, action for action's sake.

This completely transformed the relations between ideology and propaganda: ideology was of interest to Lenin and Hitler only where it could serve an action or some plan or tactic. Where it could not be used, it did not exist. Or it was used for propaganda. Propaganda then became the major fact; with respect to it, ideologies became mere epiphenomena. On the other hand, ideological content came to be of much less importance than had been thought possible. In most cases, propaganda can change or modify this content as long as it respects such formal and customary aspects of the ideology as its images and vocabulary.

Hitler modified the National Socialist ideology several times according to the requirements of propaganda. Thus Hitler and Lenin established an entirely new relationship between ideology and propaganda. But one must not think that Hitler's defeat put an end to that; actually, it has

become more widespread. There is no question that the demonstration was compelling from the point of view of effectiveness. Moreover, the trend launched by Lenin and Hitler touched on all prevailing ideologies, all of which now exist "in connection" with propaganda (*i.e.*, live by propaganda) whether one likes it or not. It is no longer possible to turn back; only adjustments can be made.

THE NEW RELATIONSHIP

These new propaganda methods have completely changed the relationship between propaganda and ideology, and as a result the role and value of ideologies in the present world have changed. Propaganda's task is less and less to propagate ideologies; it now obeys its own laws and becomes autonomous.

Propaganda no longer obeys an ideology. The propagandist is not, and cannot be, a "believer." Moreover, he cannot believe in the ideology he must use in his propaganda. He is merely a man at the service of a party, a State, or some other organization, and his task is to insure the efficiency of that organization. He no more needs to share the official ideology than the prefect of a French department needs to share the political doctrines of the national government. If the propagandist has any political conviction, he must put it aside in order to be able to use some popular mass ideology. He cannot even share that ideology for he must use it as an object and manipulate it without the respect that he would have for it if he believed in it. He quickly acquires contempt for these popular images and beliefs; in his work, he must change the propaganda themes so frequently that he cannot possibly attach himself to any formal, sentimental, political or other aspect of the ideology. More and more, the propagandist is a technician using a keyboard of material media and psychological techniques; and in the midst of all that, ideology is only one of the incidental and interchangeable cogs. It has often been stated that the propagandist eventually comes to despise doctrines and men. This must be put into context with the fact, analyzed above, that the organization served by propaganda is not basically interested in disseminating a doctrine, spreading an ideology, or creating an orthodoxy. It seeks, instead, to unite within itself as many individuals as possible, to mobilize them, and to transform them into active militants in the service of an orthodoxy.

Some will object that the great movements that have used propaganda, such as Communism or Nazism, did have a doctrine and did create an ideology. I reply that that was not their principal object: ideology and doctrine were merely accessories used by propaganda to mobilize individuals. The aim was the power of the party or State, supported by the masses. Proceeding from there, the problem is no longer whether or not a political ideology is valid. The propagandist cannot ask himself that question. For him, it is senseless to debate whether the Marxist view of

history has more validity than any other, or whether the racist doctrine is true. That is of no importance in the framework of propaganda.

The only problem is that of effectiveness, of utility. The point is not to ask oneself whether some economic or intellectual doctrine is valid, but only whether it can furnish effective catchwords capable of mobilizing the masses *here and now*. Therefore, when faced with an ideology that exists among the masses and commands a certain amount of belief, the propagandist must ask himself two questions: First, is this existing ideology an obstacle to the action to be taken, does it lead the masses to disobey the State, does it make them passive? (This last question is essential, for example, for propagandists who operate in milieux influenced by Buddhism.) In many cases such an ideology will indeed be an obstacle to blind action, if only to the extent that it sparks some intellectual activity, no matter how feeble, or provides criteria, no matter how insecure, for judgment or action. In this case the propagandist must be careful not to run head-on into a prevailing ideology; all he can do is integrate it into this system, use some parts of it, deflect it, and so on.² Second, he must ask himself whether the ideology, such as it is, can be used for his propaganda; whether it has psychologically predisposed an individual to submit to propaganda's impulses.

In an Arab country colonized by whites, in view of the Islamic ideology that has developed hatred for Christians, a perfect predisposition to nationalist Arab and anti-colonialist propaganda will exist. The propagandist will use that ideology directly, regardless of its content. He can become an ardent protagonist of Islam without believing in the least in its religious doctrine. Similarly, a Communist propagandist can disseminate a nationalist or a democratic ideology because it is useful, effective, and profitable, and because he finds it already formed and part of public opinion, even if he himself is anti-nationalist and anti-democratic. The fact that he reinforces a democratic belief in the public is of not importance; one now knows that such beliefs are no obstacle to the establishment of a dictatorship. By utilizing the democratic ideology that Communism supports, the Communist party obtains the consent of the masses to its action, which then puts the Communist organization in control. Propaganda thus brings about the transition from democratic beliefs to a new form of democracy.

Public opinion is so uncertain and unclear as to the *content* of its ideologies that it follows the one that says the magic words, not realizing the contradictions between the proclamation of a catchword and the action that follows it. Once the "Machine" is in control, there can be no objection to it by those who adhered to the previously prevailing ideology, which is always officially adopted and proclaimed by the new organization in power. People live therefore in the mental confusion that propaganda purposely seeks to create.

In the face of existing, usable ideologies, the propagandist can take one of two paths: he can either stimulate them, or mythologize them. In fact,

ideologies lend themselves well to both methods. On the one hand, an ideology can be expressed in a catchword, a slogan. It can be reduced to a simple idea, deeply anchored in the popular consciousness. And public opinion is used to reacting automatically to the expressions of a former, accepted ideology: words such as *Democracy*, *Country*, and *Social Justice* can now set off the desired reflexes. They have been reduced to stimuli capable of obtaining reflexes in public opinion, which can turn from adoration to hatred without transition. They evoke past actions and aspirations. To be sure, if a formula is to be able to stimulate, it must correspond to existing conditioned reflexes that were forged gradually in the course of history by adherence to an ideology. The propagandist limits himself to what is already present. From there on he can use any ideological content at all, no matter where or when. Differences in application will be determined according to psychological, historical, and economic criteria, to insure the best utilization of ideology in the realm of action. I have said that ideology is a complex system capable of evoking one aspect while leaving out another; the propagandist's ability will consist precisely in making these choices.

On the other hand, the propagandist can proceed by transforming ideology into myth. Some ideologies can indeed serve as a springboard for the creation of myths by the propagandist. Such transformation rarely takes place spontaneously. Generally, ideology is quite vague, has little power to move men to action, and cannot control the individual's entire consciousness. But it furnishes the elements of content and belief. It weds itself to myth by the complicated mixture of ideas and sentiments, by grafting the irrational onto political and economic elements. Ideology differs radically from myth in that it has no basic roots, no relation to humanity's great, primitive myths. I have already said that it would be impossible to create a complete new myth through propaganda. However, the existence of an ideology within a group is the best possible foundation for the elaboration of a myth. In many cases, a precise operation and a more pressing and incisive formation will suffice. That the message must be formulated for use by the mass media automatically contributes to this: the fact that the widespread belief is now expressed in one-third the number of words and shouted through millions of loudspeakers, gives it new force and urgency.

The coloration supplied by psychological techniques, the power of efficiency demonstrated by the integration in an action, the over-all nature attributed to the construction of an intellectual universe in which ideology is the keystone—all that can be accomplished by the propagandist. In such fashion Socialist ideology was transformed into myth by Leninist propaganda, patriotic ideology became national myth, and the ideology of happiness was transformed into myth at the end of the nineteenth century. In this fashion, too, the myth of Progress was constructed from a group of propagandas based on bourgeois ideology.

Finally, the propagandist can use ideology for purposes of justification.

I have shown on several occasions that justification is an essential function of propaganda. The existence of a generally accepted ideology is a remarkable instrument for providing a good conscience. When the propagandist refers to collective beliefs, the man whom he induces to act in accord with those beliefs will experience a feeling of almost unshakable self-justification. To act in conformity with collective beliefs provides security and a guarantee that one acts properly. Propaganda reveals this consonance to the individual, renders the collective belief perceptible, conscious, and personal for him. It gives him a good conscience by making him aware of the collectivity of beliefs. Propaganda rationalizes the justification that man discovers in the prevailing ideology, and gives him the power to express himself. This holds true, for example, for the ideology of peace utilized by the Communist party: as soon as this ideology is used, everything, even hatred, is justified by it.

For a long time, man's actions, just as certain of his reactions, have been partially inspired by ideology. The masses may act because of a spontaneous belief, a succinct idea accepted by all, or in pursuit of an objective more or less vaguely outlined by an ideology; democratic ideology sparked such behavior. But the relationship of ideology to propaganda has completely changed this.

In a group in which modern propaganda is being made, man no longer acts in accord with a spontaneous ideology, but only through impulses that come to him from such propaganda. Only the ignorant can still believe that ideas, doctrines, beliefs can make man act without the utilization of psycho-sociological methods. Ideology not used by propaganda is ineffective and not taken seriously. The humanist ideology no longer provokes a response: in the face of modern propaganda, intellectuals have been completely disarmed and can no longer evoke the values of humanism. Torture (of political enemies) is implicitly accepted by public opinion, which expresses its dismay only in words, but not in action. With regard to the war in Algeria, it is well known that the most ardent defenders of P. H. Simon (a young lieutenant who exposed the practice of torture during that war) defended him only verbally and when they could afford to: once they were in combat, plunged into action, such "ideas" were relegated to a secondary level, and the F.L.N. and military propaganda—which, on both sides, accused the enemy of torture and thus legitimized its own actions—took over again. The same is true for Christian ideology, which no longer inspires action: Christians are caught in a psycho-sociological mechanism that conditions them to certain practices, despite their attachment to other ideas. Those ideas remain pure ideology because they are not being taken over by propaganda; and they are not taken over because they are not usable. In this fashion, such an ideology loses its reality and becomes an abstraction. It loses all effectiveness in relation to other ideologies being used by propaganda.

Moreover, in this relationship between ideology and action, we emphasize that nowadays action creates ideology, not vice versa, as the

idealists who relate to past situations still would like to believe. Through action one learns to believe in "some truth," and even to formulate it. Today, ideology progressively builds itself around actions sanctioned by propaganda. (For example, in order to justify certain actions in Algeria, an entire, complex ideology was created.) Thus, in various ways—all the result of propaganda—ideology is increasingly losing its importance in the modern world. It is devalued whether propaganda uses it or not; in the latter case because it reveals its ineffectiveness and cannot prevail against the competition; in the former, because when used, it is broken up: some aspects of it are used and others pushed aside.

The same holds true for ideology as for doctrine; when propaganda uses it, it destroys it. The transformation of the Marxist doctrine by propaganda, first Lenin's and then Stalin's is well known. Works such as those by P. Chambre, de Lefèvre, and Lukacs explain this "evisceration" of doctrine by propaganda very well. All that is believed, known, and accepted is what propaganda has promulgated. It is the same for ideology, which is merely a popular and sentimental derivation of doctrine. One can no longer establish anything at all on genuine ideologies in social groups; one can no longer hope to find in such ideologies a solid point of support for redressing man or society. Ideology has become part of the system of propaganda and depends on it.³

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NOTES

¹ Ideology plays a certain role in propaganda. It can prevent propaganda from developing when the governmental centers themselves are the seat of an ideology. . . . On the other hand, it has been shown how the belief in certain utopias (goodwill of the people, harmonization of international interests, and so on) is also a negative factor here, just as the ideology of democratic elites is less suitable than that of an aristocracy as the basis for a propaganda plan. Conversely, when the belief of the elites is progressive, it will lead to a powerful propaganda. Thus ideology partly determines whether a climate is favorable or unfavorable to the creation and use of propaganda, but it no longer is the decisive factor.

² This is why one ideology cannot serve as a weapon against another ideology. Propaganda will never proclaim the superiority of an ideology over that of the enemy, for in doing so it would immediately fail. Against an opposing ideology one can only counter with a waiting attitude, an attitude of hope, and with questions as to what the future will bring. By thus asking an ideological adversary concrete questions pertaining to the future, the propagandist follows Marx's method of "progressing from language to life."

³ This can have decisive consequences, for one must not forget that this is the road by which a change in "culture" (in the American sense of the word) can take place, that is, a true change of civilization, which was so far maintained by the stability of ideologies and "chain-thinking."

PSYCHOLOGICAL TOTAL WAR*

BY BERNARD YOH

Social contradictions may be used by or against revolutionary ideology

Psychological warfare has been used throughout military history as one

*Original essay by Bernard Yoh.

among many tactics to attain military goals. The use of psychological initiatives—for example, ruse, showing the flag, war cries, threat—in conflict has often brought about the turning point of a battle or war. Yet, even more often, these techniques have been learned and used haphazardly without having been systematically studied and taught.

Historically, the people who have used psychological warfare most extensively are the Chinese. (The Chinese historical novel, *The Three Kingdoms*, describes numerous battles in which psychological tactics played an important part.) And in the words of Sun Tzu, the best known strategist in China (200 B.C.), "The first choice is to conquer a nation without fighting a war."

TRADITIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL TOTAL WAR

In the Western world, medieval concepts of chivalry evolved into the unwritten rules of "conventional" warfare, which characterized both world wars and numerous smaller conflicts. The "Marquis of Queensbury" approach discouraged the use of psychological techniques, which were considered underhanded and unethical.

Even today, psychological warfare is limited by inadequate study, incomplete understanding, and suboptimum use. In the military forces of most Western countries there is little dedication to the use of psychological operations and relatively slight stress upon its development as a weapon.

Communist doctrine, however, puts a high priority upon psychological warfare. Indeed, military action is viewed by Communist armed forces as a tool for the achievement of a psychological condition which will in turn bring about the realization of political objectives. This reversal of priorities has created a new dimension in warfare.

One indication of this change is in the structure of Communist armed forces. Every unit from a platoon to an army has one or more "political cadre member" or "political commissar" to oversee the psychological implementation at every level. They are usually of equal rank to the commanding officer. But regardless of rank, the political officer always has the last word on all policy decisions. Furthermore, the political officer has his own chain of command and communication—outside the regular military organization—directly to a member of the politburo.

This emphasis on thorough indoctrination and consistent predominance of political objectives even at the lowest levels is designed to guarantee the psychological contribution to the campaign, to insure that each member of each military unit is a "true believer," is devoted to his cause, is prepared to make the sacrifices requisite for furthering that cause, remembers to place all military circumstances in their "proper" political contexts, and is awake to the psychological potential inherent in every situation.

GUERRILLA WARFARE: THE BAIT—SOCIAL DISORDER: THE TRAP

Since the end of World War II, numerous revolutionary groups have challenged the legitimacy of governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Having recognized their conventional military inferiority in personnel and equipment, many have relied upon guerrilla techniques to overthrow the incumbent regimes. However, it has rarely been the strategy of revolutionaries to rely on guerrilla military successes alone. Instead, aware of the Communist conception of psychological total war, they have concentrated much of their resource base and many of their hopes on psychological victories—the creation of dissension, dissatisfaction, and disorder in society.

As the government focuses on the “war effort” and asks greater sacrifices of the nation, severe strains are placed on the loyalty, patience, and understanding of the populace. It is this increased cost that the government demands of its citizenry that the guerrilla hopes to exploit.

CONTRADICTION AND IDEOLOGY: A PAIR OF TWO-EDGED SWORDS

The philosophy of the revolutionary is to “utilize contradiction, control contradiction, and promote contradiction.” These “contradictions” are therefore the seeds of destruction of government, powerful psychological tools the incumbent regime provides the insurgent. The objective of the government that wishes to preserve its dominion in the face of such a challenge is clear, then: it must eradicate contradiction between the government and the people. Corruption, electoral fraud, power abuse, ineffectual and arrogant bureaucrats may be fatal to a government under revolutionary siege.

On the part of the revolutionary force, ideology is often a powerful weapon because its sweeping generalizations allow many charges to be levelled at government in the name of ideology. But ideology also constitutes a potentially severe handicap to the revolutionary forces. If the generalizations can be used to castigate specific programs of the government, they can also be employed by the government to point out contradictions between revolutionary beliefs and the underlying attitudes and traditions of the population.

Too often, however, governments, concentrating on control of the economic, political, and military environments in which the revolution has developed, have neglected the potential for a psychological offensive, have neglected to use ideology to defeat insurgents through their own contradictions. The primary objective of psychological total war must be to marshal all available societal resources to secure the allegiance of the communications media, the intellectual and academic community, the organized and professional political elements, the rural community, the

workers, and the business community. The support of each is necessary to government success. And the allegiance of all can only be secured by imaginative use of psychological stimuli. When these six basic components of society are definitely won over to the government cause, the revolutionary forces are destined to fail in their own goals. They will have lost to the technique mastered by their forebearers: psychological total war.

PROPAGANDA

The purpose of this section is to illustrate many of the principles discussed earlier in the context of diverse propaganda appeals from governments and insurgent groups around the world.

The geographical grouping used here is arbitrary. Different criteria could be employed to group such appeals. For example, propaganda is often dichotomized: revolutionary versus status quo; developed versus underdeveloped; democratic versus totalitarian; Communist versus non-Communist; government versus insurgent; and the like.

None of these dichotomies is satisfactory for the broader purposes of this casebook. Eventually, most governments will either abjure the use of ideology or force it to conform to the state's needs. Propaganda is used to support the interests of the communicating entity, interests that, in terms of the study of communications, need not usually be considered in country-specific terms.

Therefore, to conform to the purposes of this casebook, what follows here are grouped essays dealing with political matters almost exclusively (while in fact governmental propaganda addresses a wide range of subjects). However, these articles, though primarily political in emphasis, focus on objectives, methods, media, policy planning, and organization. They are arranged on the basis of origin of the propaganda.

Western Europe

THE PROJECTION OF BRITAIN ABROAD*

BY MAX BELOFF

Cultivating the desired image of a country in foreign audiences is an extraordinarily complex undertaking. The high costs support the thesis that reevaluation and analysis of techniques and effects should be a continuing function of government. A positive image can be created that is still not the desired image.

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Efforts directed towards creating a favourable image of one's own country are nothing new in the history of inter-state relations. The monarchs of the *ancien régime* who spent so much money on palaces and spectacle, who patronised the arts and men of letters, were clearly not

*Excerpts from "The Projection of Britain Abroad," *International Affairs* (London), XLI, no. 3 (July 1965), pp. 478-489. Reprinted with the permission of Oxford University Press and the author.

insensible to the political dividends to be drawn from such investments. It would be surprising if Britain were not concerned in this form of peaceful competition for:

If it is true to say as we believe, that of all the great Powers none is so dependent, for reasons of security and trade, on maintaining friendly relations with other countries as is the United Kingdom, then logically this country should spend more, in relation to population and resources, than other countries in order to maintain efficient Information Services overseas.¹

Nor is . . . [one] correct in assuming that information work can be limited to promoting particular ends of British policy as distinct from a more generalised projection of Britain's image. On the contrary, unless people have a high regard both for the country which is endeavouring to persuade them of the advantages of a certain course of action, and for the credibility and reliability of the institutions through which it purveys information in support of its views, the machinery available will not be able successfully to perform its required function when a specific case arises. Successful work in the information field demands a high degree of continuity both as to the regional area of concentration and as to the substantive content of what is offered. It cannot simply be turned on and off at will.

Finally, . . . the image that is used to attract tourists to this country, the beekeepers and thatched cottages—and that is for this specific sphere extremely successful, does in fact handicap the country's efforts to project quite other facets of Britain which are important for our commercial and even our political objectives. Tourists want to visit museums and antiquities; but a country whose image is limited to this aspect will hardly be looked to as a source of industrial equipment or new ideas in the fields of science, education, social institutions and so forth. We surely have no wish to see Britain regarded in the 20th century as was Italy in the 18th.

* * * * *

It is a perfectly valid point that it is much harder to individualise the appeal of a country which wishes to present itself as being in the vanguard of scientific or industrial advance; there is a common style pervading much of modern industrial civilisation, and national differences may be thought of as marginal, or as only perceptible to the expert in a particular field. But the fact that something is difficult does not mean that it is not worth doing. It is also true that rewards of investment in this field are very difficult to measure, though some would argue that modern market research is not without its application here; and the BBC has by now a relatively long experience of gauging the size of its foreign audiences, and the impact of its programmes upon them.

Furthermore, there are aspects of the effort itself which lend themselves to direct assessment. It is possible, for instance, to evaluate our exports of books, and reckon up the number of British books that secure translation into other languages. It is possible to work out the proportion of students from other parts of the world who come to our institutions of higher education to acquire specialised skills and more general prepara-

tion for positions of leadership in their own societies. It is harder, but it should not be impossible, to get some idea of their quality, and to know whether we are getting the best representatives of their generation or only those who cannot go elsewhere. We should be able to derive some information from the coverage of British affairs in the foreign Press and discover whether we need to do more to assist both resident correspondents, and the larger number of foreign journalists who come for shorter periods under official auspices.

In addition to such possibilities of concrete evidence as to Britain's standing there are other and more personal impressions to be evaluated—the feelings, for instance, that scientific, academic and other professional men derive from their travels and their contacts with foreign colleagues, a rather underworked vein in some people's view. And there is, above all, the large mass of information at the disposal of the world of business. Such impressions can at least be checked with advantage against the changes in the regional distribution of expenditure by the Foreign Office, the [Commonwealth Relations Office] CRO, the British Council and the BBC.

* * * * *

Naturally this does not mean that there is a direct relationship between the efforts of information or cultural agencies and the popularity of the country concerned. Other and more powerful motives may come into play. For instance, there is some reason, one would imagine, to believe that there is more latent goodwill towards Britain in that Cinderella-continent, Latin America, despite its relative neglect in these respects, than in the Arab Middle East which has absorbed a very high proportion of the total British effort. Indeed, the question of whether one should row with or against the tide is one of the hardest to answer; but the responsibility clearly lies with the policy-making departments rather than with the information agencies, and need not be much further explored here.

But one comment is perhaps in order. There is in Britain's case a peculiar political complication (not faced by the French or Germans) that arises out of our doubly complicated relationship with the United States. In the first place we are allied as the principal competitors with the Communist Powers for access to the hearts and minds of the "uncommitted" nations. In the second place, there is the fact that both we and the Americans are protagonists of the use of English as a "second language," and that individuals who have acquired the use of English can freely choose between British or American books, broadcasts and so forth, and are equally able to pursue higher studies or training in the United States or in the English-speaking countries of the Commonwealth, including Britain herself.

From these facts some people would draw the conclusion that it should be a matter of indifference to us whether it is the British or the American effort in the information field that prospers in any particular part of the world. Provided that the students we lose go to America and not to China or Russia, or provided the foreign literature in circulation is American

and not Communist, we have nothing to worry about and might indeed welcome on financial grounds the substitution for our own efforts of American ones.

Against this there is the alternative argument that the general similarity of our ultimate political objectives presupposes neither universal coincidence of opinions nor the absence of competition between ourselves and the United States. It is clearly not a matter of indifference to us whether British or American aircraft, automobiles or other industrial goods are bought by particular customers; nor, as we have all too good reason to know, is this matter of indifference to Americans.

Such commercial preoccupations have their counterpart in the informational and even cultural undertakings of the two countries. If students of technical subjects use British texts or go for training to Britain, the odds are that the apparatus they will want their countries to acquire will be British also. If the links they establish are with the United States, so too will the United States become the country to which they continue to look after their professional or industrial careers are established. It is true that the demands of the "underdeveloped" world are so enormous that Britain and the United States together cannot hope to meet them all; perhaps all the resources of all the developed countries are likely to fall short of what is needed. But we want to be in a position to choose how to direct our own limited resources, and in the matter, for instance, of bringing students to our universities to make certain that we get a fair proportion of the best ones.

If one accepts this view, certain practical consequences follow. For it is also certainly the view taken by the Government of the United States. It is perhaps most obvious in the field of book exports, which is of direct commercial interest to us quite apart from the impact it may have upon the "projection of Britain" at large. The American Government has gone much further in a variety of ways in facilitating the export of books to the "underdeveloped" countries and in subsidising or guaranteeing publishers in a variety of ways than our own Government has hitherto shown itself prepared to contemplate. And there are no signs that the United States would be prepared to regard the promotion of literacy in English, or the supply of educational material, as a co-operative rather than a national effort. In the circumstances the adaptability and performance of the British publishing industry is one of the most creditable parts of the record; but it may find itself outgunned if it is left to fight its own battles.

Where a more short-term appreciation of British attitudes is concerned, newspapers and magazines matter more than books. Here again, there is an element of competition though not in so direct a fashion. On the one hand there are the airmail editions of the English "quality" newspapers, whose growth is limited by their unprofitability—duties on newsprint are the obvious handicap imposed by the Government on their development. There is also the international role of "Reuters" as a supplier of news and trainer of journalists for overseas countries.

On the other hand there is the blanketing of the world market for news by *Time* magazine and to a much lesser extent by other similar American publications. It is not clear that there is any way in which this situation might be remedied to our advantage; there may well be economic reasons that rule out an operation of this kind from a British base. But that does not mean that the effects are not serious. It is worth reminding oneself, when people talk of British influence "east of Suez" or of reviving our links with Latin America, that for a large proportion of the people whose interest or support we wish to attract, what they know about Britain is what *Time* magazine can find room for, and that any voice that Britain may have independent of America's in world affairs must be a muffled one.

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In these circumstances our position depends very much on what advantages we can take of media that depend less on language, or where indigenous languages can be used with greater freedom, namely radio and television. One is, of course, familiar with the fact that the wartime effort of the BBC provides a remarkable example—perhaps the most remarkable of all—of the rapid exploitation to the utmost of what was still a relatively new technique. But wartime provides a stimulus of its own. Furthermore, from the technical point of view, one was trying to reach an audience much of which was located conveniently near at hand. Worldwide coverage is another matter, and if this is to be successfully achieved at high quality, much capital expenditure will be required for new relay stations and their equipment, as well as an increase in current expenditure. The direct return in the shape of sales of receiving equipment may be less important, since radio receivers of the cheaper kind are suitable for production in many countries. But in sound radio—whether it be direct broadcasts or transcription services—we start with some considerable advantages, which should not lightly be thrown aside.

The coming of television presents a more difficult problem. In the present preparatory phase where television is still for the minority (outside the advanced industrial countries) and where access to it is to be had by other countries mainly through the provision of films or other "canned" material, international competition takes the form of bids for supplying transmitters and studio equipment, and of offers to assist in the training of technicians and producers, which is a more complicated affair than it is for sound radio. Success in this important, though little publicised, form of competition (which involves private firms as well—in view of the dual structure of British television) may have direct economic consequences on the sale of receiving equipment, but it will also influence the choice of programmes by such stations, and therefore have a direct impact upon the image of Britain that is presented.

But as has been suggested, all this may only be a preliminary stage before we come to the television era proper. What at present distinguishes television from radio is its short initial range. We cannot even watch European programmes unless channelled to us through Eurovi-

sion. There seems a consensus of opinion that the development of earth-satellites will one day make this limitation obsolete. "Early Bird" shows what a relay through national networks can do: what will come is direct transmission which any individual can pick up as he can foreign radio broadcasts on short wave. The only question in dispute is how soon. Once this happens we may be in for a very fierce competition of a new kind, of which the lineaments are only dimly visible. We do not fully know what the immediacy of visual images can do in creating attitudes and responses; though we know something from Hollywood's effect upon the foreign image of America. It is certainly a case where considerable advance thought should be given to what is to be done, not forgetting the rather terrifying financial implications of entering this new epoch in the history of the international use of mass-media.

Even if we make the decision that to some extent Britain must project herself through all the means available to her, the problems do not end here. Britain has both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to competing in this field. The advantages consist in a high degree of professionalism, particularly but by no means exclusively, in radio, and the proved ability to communicate a national message without either the exaggeration that defeats its ends, or the vulgarity that goes with too pronounced an infusion of commercialism. We have managed with some skill to give the BBC a reputation for objectivity not subjected to the transient policies of individual British governments. The printed output of the Central Office of Information—the service organisation for all the field operations of the information services—shows a fairly consistently high quality of content and design within certain limits of expenditure which may be more tightly drawn than those of the Americans.

But it is more important to be conscious of what our weaknesses are, and to have some idea as to how to set about correcting them. One difficulty here is to fasten responsibility for the whole range of information and cultural services and the media through which they operate. Since some of the weaknesses can only be corrected through actual additional expenditure it would seem desirable that there should be a single Minister to decide upon priorities and to press the demands of these services upon the Treasury and the Cabinet. . . . On the other hand, not every Prime Minister has some actual or potential Cabinet colleague equally suited to the task.

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There is in Britain a not altogether suppressed nostalgia for an imperial past. It is perhaps this underlying wish to strike paternalist attitudes quite as much as deep political calculation, that makes such activities as teaching elementary English, or now-a-days rather training teachers, or teaching teacher-trainers the kind of thing most readily acceptable, as obviously desirable in itself, as compared with, for instance, the projection of Britain to more sophisticated audiences.

We have already noted this fact in connection with the post-Drogheda shift away from Europe in the weight of the British Council's activities.

. . . Whatever may be said about the advantage of a variety of experience in the case of diplomats, the case in respect of some aspects of the British Council's work remains unproven. And this is particularly so where it is a matter of projecting Britain at the rather sophisticated level of contacts with national academies, universities and other cultural institutions, where a rather deep acquaintance with a particular country's language and civilisation are essential to success.

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A similar preference for paternalist enterprises is shown in the decision to make the Ministry of Overseas Development responsible for relations with UNESCO. While it is true that the inculcating of mass-literacy has recently overshadowed the original scientific and cultural purposes of the organisation, it hardly seems a reason for abandoning the latter altogether, or for manifesting Britain's lack of interest in them.

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But there is, of course, another reason for the shift towards this exclusive preoccupation with the educational needs of developing countries, and that is the general failure of the British Government (and public) to appreciate the extent to which a country's scientific and cultural achievements are an important aspect of its prestige abroad. This failure is shown in many ways. No attempt has been made to get any of the international bodies through which contacts in the natural sciences, social sciences or humanities are maintained to set up their headquarters in London, or to hold their conferences and seminars in Britain. When they meet in foreign capitals, the British Embassies rarely pay the same social attentions to the delegates as do the Embassies of other major countries. No attempt has been made to exploit the fact that in both the natural and the social sciences many of the officers of such bodies have so far been nationals of this country. No doubt the fault is not all on one side; academics in Britain tend to fight shy of officialdom in the way their continental colleagues (who are, after all, themselves officials) do not. But the gap is patent.

The fact that the teaching profession in Britain is not part of the service of the central government has other consequences as well. It is not easy to obtain from hard-pressed local authorities a massive secondment of teachers such as the French have made in order to secure the perpetuation of the French language in their former imperial possessions; nor can those who go overseas receive such ready assurance that their career-prospects will remain undamaged. Similarly the British Council cannot call (as can the *Relations Culturelles* of the Quai d'Orsay) upon British university teachers to spend part of their career directing Institutes abroad.

But this is a parenthesis. The third major weakness on the British side arises from a certain suspicious puritanism. We mistrust the showy; yet in modern conditions a direct visual appeal may be essential. It is no good sending abroad highly talented cultural representatives of well-selected

libraries and hiding them away up flights of stairs in dingy and uglily-furnished buildings. It is natural that when pressed for funds, the British Council should rather spend them on men than on "plant." But where the projection of Britain is concerned, "plant" tells as well, and the choice is not one that should have to be made.

Less importance should be attached to what might be called '*Daily Express* puritanism'—the view that no public money should ever be spent on disseminating the products of Britain's artistic genius. In fact, the fine arts take up only a very small proportion of the British Council's outlay while reaching elements in foreign élites that can be appealed to in no other way. The main problem is that theatrical and ballet companies and orchestras are extremely expensive to send abroad while in the particular case of the theatre there is a very easy descent from the best we have to offer, for which the demand is insatiable, to the merely mediocre which may easily do much more harm than good.

There is the further difficulty of the conflict between the ancients and the moderns. Shakespeare is our best-selling line, but in what sense is even the best production of Shakespeare a projection of modern Britain? And to have to choose amid the pitfalls of the modern drama is asking too much of a semi-official body. Luckily, in the visual arts, particularly sculpture, this difficulty does not arise. We have there an open door. But in general the idea that a British government might indulge in frivolously extravagant expenditure upon the fine arts has only to be stated to be seen for the nonsense it is.

The fine arts have, of course, the further advantage that they can be regarded as less politically-oriented than some other aspects of our cultural offering. It is therefore easier to include cultural exchanges, in this sense, in conventions with countries where access to all external stimuli is government-controlled. On the other hand we should not be content with this. Such exchanges may prove that both we and the country concerned are capable of reaching high levels of excellence in the theatre, the ballet or whatever the particular field of activity may be, but not much more follows from this than from similar demonstrations in the field of sport. We are proving in an agreeable way what no one ever doubted. What we are concerned to do is to increase our knowledge of these countries in a much deeper sense, and to project an image of our society which can correct the distortions to which it is subjected by foreign official propaganda, and thus serve direct political purposes.

We are, then, trying to do something which the other participants in such negotiations wish to avoid. We are already an open society which they can study if they wish but do not on the whole wish to, unless for very specific and material reasons. They are closed societies which want to drive the hardest bargain they can, in return for any chunk in the curtain they are willing to open to us. One feels that those who are unacquainted with the difficulties of such negotiations, with the very tiny allotment of student places that we can secure, with the almost insuperable barriers still erected against access to our books, magazines and films,

are very often completely at sea in assessing either the cultural and political developments within such countries, or the role that cultural contacts abroad play in their scheme of things. Such countries think in terms of "delegations" and "manifestations"; we in terms of individuals and their direct interests. Possibly recent relaxations in the jamming of broadcasts should be taken as heralding an easier era in this respect, but one has the feeling that of all aspects of the task of "projecting Britain," this is by far the most difficult.

There is indeed one important additional reason for saying so. When we come to presenting our social and political institutions and ideas—and these parts of our culture are by no means insignificant—the most acceptable method is through free discussion. We want to show what we do and also discuss with others how they do things and where our ideas differ or coincide. Such a combination of the projection of Britain with free discussion is by far the most effective way of making the desired impression and arousing a permanent interest. Participation is always more effective than passivity. For this reason the institution known as Wilton Park, which has done this first on an Anglo-German, then on a European and now on an Atlantic basis, has some claims to be the most successful venture in this field that the British Government has ever undertaken. It would seem in many, though not of course all respects, both more effective and more economical than the sponsored tours of Britain by foreign journalists or politicians, which are its main competitors. On the other hand, the formula is almost impossible to apply to exchanges with countries where a high degree of totalitarian uniformity and dogmatism prevails. The one comparable Anglo-Soviet venture can hardly have been termed a success; nor have the Russians been willing to repeat it. Anglo-Polish exchanges understandably have shown much more promise. But the essence of the formula is free discussion between individuals in which a national uniformity of view is specifically excluded.

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But one comes back in the end from questions of organisation and media to questions of content and purpose. Our purpose can be stated clearly. We wish to present Britain as a country which, despite its loss of relative power in the world, can still offer much of interest in both the material and intellectual sphere. We know that there are difficulties in our internal arrangements for making our most recent and exciting achievements readily available for projection overseas. The fact that Britain's not inconsiderable output in important branches of the social sciences is so little known outside the Commonwealth may be due to the fact that there is as yet no organisation to do for the social sciences what the Royal Society has so long done for the natural sciences and what that odd and secretive body the British Academy is now attempting to do for the humanities. But the difficulties are partly due to our ignorance of ourselves. How can we expect to explain to foreigners what British universities have to offer when we read such ill-informed nonsense about them in the British press itself, and find it believed by those who should

know better? We have only recently become a fully self-conscious society, and some of the self-consciousness takes such morbid forms that the less it produces in the way of export, the better. We would not like to be judged on the basis of BBC "satire" any more than by the "beefeater, thatched cottage" image.

The content of our self-projection can thus be negatively defined. It is further limited by the country's own achievements. The best advertising is no use if the product is no good. All one can ask is that those responsible for informational and cultural work are fully acquainted with those aspects of the nation's achievements in which we may genuinely take pride. They should therefore have a sensitivity to developments in society and thought which, even if they have no direct mass-appeal, may still impress the élites of other countries. They must not allow enthusiasm for a new post-colonial role (with an expiation complex lurking in the background) to overshadow the importance of our dealings with highly advanced countries, whether or not these are friendly disposed towards us.

It would be absurd to compare the importance for Britain's international standing of her informational and cultural activities with the skill of her statesmen, the productivity of her industries or the courage and efficiency of her fighting men; but they remain an important part of our national armoury; their cost if not enormous is not negligible, and is almost certain to rise for the technical reasons already stated. It is one of those occasions when one must conclude by saying: if the thing is worth doing at all, it is worth doing as well as it can be done.

NOTES

¹ Summary of the Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas Information Service (Drogheda Report). Cmd 9138, 1954, par 12.

INTERNATIONAL FILM AND TELEVISION PROPAGANDA: CAMPAIGNS OF ASSISTANCE*

BY BERNARD RUBIN

All countries engage in propaganda, the more highly developed states more heavily than developing societies. As each government emphasizes the themes it considers to be most important to its national interests, different audiences attend to communications at levels based upon their perceived interests.

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WESTERN EUROPEAN FILM AND TELEVISION PROPAGANDA

Western European countries have developed sizable film and television programs for international persuasion purposes, emphasizing trade, cultural, and political objectives. France and Britain exchange information

* Excerpts from "International Film and Television Propaganda: Campaigns of Assistance" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 398 (November 1971), pp. 81-92. Reprinted with the permission of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the courtesy of the author.

with the independent countries formerly in their colonial empires. Both nations look to the maintenance and enhancement of important trading areas within the cultural regions they helped to shape in the past. The Federal Republic of Germany is anxious to win understanding for its political point of view and customers for its commercial and industrial offerings. All three nations are representative of the highly developed democracies whose main propaganda is geared to peaceful exchanges of information and technology.

Great Britain

Great Britain's overseas film and television program is largely directed by the Central Office of Information (COI), which works in close cooperation with other government departments and with relevant private organizations. On the film side, the *Overseas Film Library Catalogue 1970-71*, published by the COI for the benefit of potential clients, offers hundreds of productions dealing with British culture and history, Commonwealth developments, governmental planning and services, science and technology, sports and recreation, the arts, agriculture, commerce, industry, and labor.

An essential aspect of the enterprise is the determination of all concerned to "put Britain across" in its export program. A senior British official writes: "The promotion films we acquire—mainly for non-theatrical showings—are most important . . . and the trade theme features prominently in our television programs."¹

The over-all effort is impressive. In 1968/69 the COI distributed a weekly cinema newsreel to seventy-nine countries, two monthly and one bimonthly cinemagazine programs going to fifty-one countries, and eleven weekly television programs going to ninety-two countries. In that same period, COI completed twenty-six films requested by government departments concerned with home affairs and four on behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices. Two hundred and ten other films were acquired from commercial sources—mostly industrial—and of those, ninety-seven were distributed overseas.

Approximately 150 Commonwealth, colonial, and foreign lands receive COI films each year. . . .

The Films and Television Division of the COI cooperates closely with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Independent Television Authority (ITV). Reuters, the BBC, and the Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand broadcasting authorities form the partnership known as VISNEWS LTD., the news film agency which provides a daily international news service on film to television subscribers in sixty-eight countries.² The BBC and the ITV each distribute about sixteen thousand television programs a year to more than eighty countries.

By and large, the COI is reticent about the successes and failures of the film and television productions sent abroad. It states:

No attempt is made to evaluate the total film and television programmes. Comprehensive usage reports are called for each year from overseas posts on a sample range of films. In the television field, user stations are asked to report times and frequency of use.

The Federal Republic of Germany

The Federal Press and Information Office in the Federal Republic of Germany cooperates closely with several quasi-official and private organizations. Inter-Nationes, the German association for the promotion of international relations, is a non-profit institution primarily responsible for cultural programs. Official government missions abroad maintain inventories of films listed in the Inter-Nationes catalogue. Those missions thus act as clearing houses for a wide range of German organizations. They include: *Institut für Film und Bild in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, *Institut für den Wissenschaftlichen Film*, and *Deutsches Industrie-Institut*. The only limitations imposed by the missions before they will pass requests along to Inter-Nationes are that the clients order no more than four films from any one organization at a time, and that the order be placed a month ahead of the screening date.

Following other leading Western powers the West German government maintains film archives in key cities abroad and film depots to serve regional interests. "Kultur" institutes in seven less developed countries also serve as presentation centers for television and film works.

Trans-Tel, the only non-government TV organization partly sponsored by the federal government, is headquartered in Cologne. Its statutes forbid Trans-Tel to distribute in Europe, the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and Japan. Television companies, acting directly through their commercial agents, deal with those markets.

Trans-Tel does not produce anything itself but, from the two German networks, merely selects, edits, and dubs TV programs that promise to be of cultural, instructional, or public relations value in the developing countries. The fees are relatively low.

Because there is no governmental television agency in the Federal Republic, this joint undertaking of the two major and rival West German television services, ARD and ZDF (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*; *Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen*), is of prime importance in the success of foreign relations.

For the international market, Trans-Tel employs international teams of experienced film editors and commentators whose job it is to adapt and tailor the films, synchronizing them in English, French, Arabic, Portuguese and Spanish. By and large, adaptations of TV programs are handled by the staff of *Deutsche Welle*.³

France

The French government's film and television overseas enterprise in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs works closely with other government organizations such as the *Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française*

(ORTF) and the *Office Francais de Techniques Modernes d'Education*, and private companies.

In scope, the program ranges as widely as the American, British, and German, emphasizing distribution of film magazines, cultural films, television program series, theatrical films (several subtitled in English, Arabic, and Spanish), newsreels (Great Britain is the other main supplier of newsreels), educational films, and courses of instruction in the French language.

During 1970, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the help of private firms sent out the magazines *France: Panorama*, *Chroniques de France*, and *Aux Frontières de l'Avenir* (on scientific subjects), while ORTF produced *Pour Vous*, *Madame* and a magazine devoted to literature. Most of these productions were also prepared for audiences speaking English, Spanish, Portuguese, and Arabic. *France: Panorama* was prepared in a Russian language version in addition to the other languages.

ORTF productions form the mainstay of the general program. Variety, documentary, dramatic, and musical programs are sent to French-speaking countries in the same versions as seen at home, while other countries receive dubbed or subtitled versions. A strong effort is made in the area of education. The *Service de la Radio-Télévision Scolaire* emphasizes the sciences.

The volume of programming is impressive: approximately 6,500 hours of film and television magazines a year; 5,783 of ORTF domestic productions in 1969; and, in terms of copies sent out, approximately 1,600 copies of educational programs sent to 69 countries in 1969.¹

Estimating or speculating about the effectiveness of French television and film work is difficult. In the past few years governmental sensitivity seems to have increased in proportion to the increasingly important role France tries to play as a mediator between and manipulator of powerful opponents. In short, French reticence on the subject of program evaluation is at this time a fact of life.

THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

Films and television programs have been instruments for useful propaganda exchanges between the "have" and the "have-not" peoples. Cultural news has been the main ingredient in those exchanges, and this will continue. Unfortunately, cultural news is primarily one-sided, the "have" nations not learning much, if anything, about the people they communicate with.

However, some small insight as to foreign effectiveness with films is obtained from a limited recent survey (those interviewed were mainly young people considered to be potential technological change-agents), conducted in South America and Middle America. The results which follow (see Table) are in response to the question, "From what country or countries are the films which you see most?"²

TABLE—Foreign Film Reception in
Middle and South America

Source	Middle Americans (n = 119)	South Americans (n = 190)
United States	96	82
France	41	57
Italy	35	51
West Germany	26	12
Mexico	25	4
Great Britain	17	15
Eastern Europe	3	6
Spain	5	3
Argentina	4	3
Sweden	0	5
Japan	0.8	3
India	0	0.5

NOTE: The respondents in many cases named more than one country, which accounts for total of answers being larger than number of persons interviewed.

At the very least, provisions must be made for film and television propaganda to be mutual, if the general interest is to be served.

In a significant way, film and television propaganda constitutes schooling in development. Will it be effective? Perceptive students are skeptical. Here are a few reasons:

1. For a developing world torn by political difficulties, there is precious little use of films and television to warn emergent nations about the perils of repeating dreadful twentieth-century experiences of the advanced countries. The newsreels available from abroad have too little relevance to the local needs for news; much so-called news is documentary gloss and is lacking in truly educational information. It is a fact that "underlying causes of recurring crises are rarely explored . . . no account is given of what might be done to avoid or alleviate these crises."⁶ For both the developing and developed nations, there is a lack of adequate reporting about really serious problems like starvation and brutality. Coverage of the Biafran revolt or its aftermath in Nigeria, or about South African apartheid, are cases in point.⁷ . . . [One of the] savants produced by the American television industry, says "As journalists, we are not keeping pace with the realities; we report them but we do not truly understand them, so we do not really explain."⁸

2. Not enough study has been devoted to why development films fail to "contribute vitally to organic progress." We need more films of the type produced in the last decade by the National Film Board of Canada, such as *The Head Men* (which compares village chiefs in Brazil, Nigeria, and Canada), *You Don't Back Down* (a report of a two-year study by a young Canadian doctor in a village of Eastern Nigeria), and *The Stage to Three* (which contrasts leading theatrical personages of Greece, Thailand, and Canada).⁹

The developing nations are so caught up in rhetoric about communications technology that key Western leaders translate all worldly needs in terms of their own ambitions, and those ambitions by-pass objectives so necessary to progress in less developed countries. Propaganda becomes a mirror image of the developed West. Robert W. Sarnoff, chairman and president of the Radio Corporation of America, worries about the "social grasp" of communications and about communications satellites in particular. He warns that

If this new device is to realize its full potential, the nations of the world must come together to agree on matters of frequency, rates, copyrights, avoidance of interference, and freedom of access to the system's facilities.¹⁰

Such contemplation reveals all too dramatically the basic propaganda chasm of our times! The man in love with the idea of the machine is distinct from the man who desperately needs the ideas that are themselves the machines of progress.

NOTES

¹ Letter to Bernard Rubin from D. Willcocks, Deputy Director, Policy and Reference Division, British Information Services, New York, N. Y., dated November 24, 1970.

² Letter, Willcocks, op. cit.

³ The following sources were utilized in the discussion of West German activities: letters to the author from Dr. Johannsen, *Press- und Informationsamt Der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, Federal Republic, dated October 16, 1970, and December 8, 1970; letter from Wilhelm Hondrich, *Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen*, Mainz, Federal Republic, dated January 26, 1971; letter from Dr. Krause-Brewer, *Trans-Tel*, Cologne, Federal Republic; letter from Christian v. Unmielewski, Direktor des Kulturellen Programms, *Deutsche Welle*, Cologne, Federal Republic, dated November 16, 1970.

⁴ Letter to author from Alain Chaillous, Director, Press and Information Service, Embassy of France, New York City, dated January 26, 1971. Also, from same source, specially prepared document, 2 pp., "La Production des Films et des Programmes de Television Réalisés par le Gouvernement Français à l'Intention des Pays Etrangers." Also, see "UNESCO: Global Overview of Film Situation," in Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John C. Merrill, eds., *International Communication* (New York: Hastings House, 1970), p. 402.

⁵ See Paul J. Deutschmann, Hubert Elingsworth, and John T. McNelly, *Communication and Social Change in Latin America* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 79.

⁶ Max F. Milkkan and Stephen White, "TV and Emerging Nations," *Television Quarterly* 7, 2 (Spring, 1968), p. 31.

⁷ Robin Day, "Troubled Reflections of a TV Journalist," *Encounter* 34, 5 (May, 1970).

⁸ Eric Svarceid, "Address to the Massachusetts House of Representatives" (January 24, 1967), House No. 4408, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Also see, "How Influential is TV News?" *Columbia Journalism Review* 9, 2 (Summer, 1970), pp. 19-28; Sir William Haley, "Where TV News Fails," *Columbia Journalism Review* 9, 1 (Spring, 1970), pp. 7-11.

⁹ Jean Marie Ackermann, "Small Actions and Big Words," *International Development Review* 8, 4 (December, 1966), pp. 33-39.

¹⁰ Robert W. Sarnoff, "Proposal for a Global Common Market of Communications," *Communications News* 7, 4 (April, 1970), p. 8.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA LINE*

BY FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN

Soviet propaganda is not prevented by Communist ideology from adapting to changing international needs

* * * * *

Since the [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] CPSU's "general line," formulated and reiterated with appropriate modifications in certain key statements, sets the ideological and semantic framework to which Soviet propaganda must conform, a survey of a series of these propaganda directives may furnish a background useful for understanding the major propaganda themes.

The communications examined have policy as well as propaganda aspects. It should be noted here that in Soviet political communication it is unusually difficult, and sometimes nearly impossible, to distinguish clearly between the elements of policy and propaganda. One can, of course, seek to infer policy from action. In reading Soviet mass media, however, it is difficult to separate analysis and directive, on the one hand, from demagoguery and even deception, on the other. A heavy component of propaganda is built into most published Soviet statements, especially those intended for distribution outside of a relatively narrow circle of heavily indoctrinated, experienced communist party insiders. The party leaders tend to view even most communists as objects of propaganda manipulation. Moreover, difficulties arise because they are impelled to resort to guarded, esoteric communication patterns that reflect both the influence of the elitist, conspiratorial political structure in which they operate and probably also the inadequacy of Marxist-Leninist terminology as a political language.¹

Of course, the student of Soviet political prose learns to distinguish between statements intended primarily as policy directives for party executives and propaganda specialists, for example, and agitational statement designed to play upon the emotions of rank and file communists and of non communists. Thus, an analysis in a CPSU theoretical journal such as *Kommunist*, most of the readers of which belong to the Soviet political elite, of the "political essence" of the "national bourgeoisie" can be classified as primarily a policy document. Still, such an article may be permeated with propaganda connotations of a more or less covert nature. It may be intended, in part, to convey to Soviet and foreign communist functionaries instructions regarding tactics to be applied in dealing with, for example, Indian, Indonesian, or Brazilian "bourgeois" statesmen. By contrast, when Khrushchev openly and insist-

*Selections from "Development of the Propaganda Line" in Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (copyright © 1964 by Princeton University Press) Renumbering of footnotes. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press

ently advocates "universal and complete disarmament" but dodges the issues of control and inspection, he is dispensing propaganda, but of course within the framework of the policy line controlling Soviet behavior in the given period.

Many Soviet statements, perhaps particularly those concerned with professed values and long-range goals, offer a rather confusing mixture of propaganda and policy content. Such a characterization would appear to be applicable to the statement taken from the 1961 CPSU program, and quoted by *Pravda*, for December 3, 1961 that "Communism fulfills the historic mission of rescuing all people from social inequality, from all forms of oppression and exploitation, from the horrors of war and establishes in the world peace, labor, freedom, equality, fraternity and the happiness of all peoples." Such a statement embodies both long-range policy and short-run agitational content. It also contains an element of myth and the reader's evaluation of it depends upon his fundamental political philosophy and his level of intellectual sophistication.

Understanding of Soviet propaganda strategy is facilitated by familiarity with certain kinds of statements, or indicators, such as the slogans issued by the party central committee in connection with the May Day and November 6 revolutionary holidays, or the documents emanating from congresses and other important meetings of the CPSU and the international communist movement. As a rule, the instructions, demands, and perspectives contained in slogans and other influence-seeking messages remain valid indicators of the Kremlin's outlook until they are altered or superseded by new communications that reflect new analyses and new decisions. Of course, these indicators have their imperfections. Even the leaders of various national communist parties often have difficulty in deciphering their full meaning for their particular situations. Nevertheless, acquaintance with those sequences of statements in which the semantically flexible but attitudinally rigid international policy line of Soviet Communism have been embodied over time is essential to an understanding of Soviet foreign propaganda. Let us begin with a survey of the international implications of Soviet slogans.

A systematic analysis by Lasswell and Yakovson of trends in Soviet May Day slogans for the period 1918-1943 yielded significant results.² The central finding of the study, which covered a period, it should be noted, when Moscow was usually on the defensive, was a pronounced diminution in "universal-revolutionary" symbols.³ This was attributed to "changed expectations regarding the imminence of world revolution, and the resulting change in the relationship of the ruling elite to the world balance of power."⁴ During the dangerous year 1940 even the term "international proletariat" disappeared from the May Day slogans. It was in that year that the threat of "imperialist encirclement" seemed to the Soviet leaders to become more acute than ever before. In 1940 and again in the early months of 1941, the slogans reflected a desire "not to affect

adversely, by any hasty or unfriendly word, the established understanding with Berlin." ⁵

In 1942, during the first year of the Soviet-Nazi war, the slogans called upon the "proletarians" of all countries to fight against German-fascist aggression. The Nazis were referred to as "Hitlerite imperialist bandits," an expression calculated to mobilize both traditional Russian patriotic hatred of an invading enemy and the newer "Soviet patriotism" based upon devotion to Marxist-Leninist ideology and upon identification with Soviet institutions and achievements. The 1942 slogans significantly failed even to mention the Communist International. Its name was thus dropped well in advance of its official liquidation in 1943--either by reason of obsolescence or in an effort to appease the new democratic allies." ⁶ Beginning in 1943, such words as "proletariat" and "proletarian" were no longer used in the slogans. From that year on, the slogans themselves began to be referred to as "appeals." The 1942 and 1943 slogans contained cautiously friendly references to Great Britain and the United States.

In the late 1920's and in the 1930's, a theme gradually emerged which is vital in Khrushchevian propaganda, and which like so many of Khrushchev's propaganda lines owed its inception to initiatives taken by Stalin. This theme was the superiority of the Soviet model for industrialization of a previously backward society, and it took on increasing significance during the period of the great depression in the west, in the early 1930's. By 1939, the slogans declared that the "immediate task" facing the Soviet people was that of "overtaking and surpassing" the economically progressive capitalist countries.⁷ Even at this early stage, "the Soviet economy was ambitious to lead the world." ⁸ Of course, the introduction of the industrialization motif did not distract attention from urgent concerns connected with the difficulty of surviving in what Moscow correctly appraised as an exceedingly threatening world situation. The slogans, reflecting the bitter struggle of the Soviet leadership against external enemies and their real or fancied internal supporters, were dominated by warnings of impending dangers.

From the perspective of our times, however, it is significant that these slogans contained so many expressions of confidence about the future world role of the Soviet Union and of the communist movement in general. Despite the lesser prominence in the slogans and other contemporary communications of the general theme of "world revolution," this objective was, of course, not repudiated. For example, the famous "Short Course" on the history of the CPSU, published in 1938, stated in its introduction that the study of the history of the CPSU inspired confidence in the final victory of communism in the whole world.

World War II, while setting the stage for the second great period of expansion of world communism, also temporarily weakened the Soviet Union. In this complex and contradictory situation the Kremlin seized and, in the aftermath of the war, consolidated its control of as much

territory as it could in eastern Europe and in Asia. Reflecting alarm at Western resistance to Soviet expansion, the slogans, beginning in 1947, denounced the "warmongers" of the west. The May Day slogans, 1947-1952 inclusive, placed toward the beginning of the list such exhortations as "Workers of all countries: Struggle for a firm peace against the warmongers!"⁸

These slogans reflected Kremlin strategy in the period of military-political consolidation of the gains resulting from World War II.

May Day and November 6 slogans from 1953 on suggested only the broad outlines of the new world-wide propaganda strategy. Nevertheless, they furnished clues both to Soviet estimates of developing susceptibilities in various audiences and to the capability of the USSR to take advantage of them. In particular, they reflected Khrushchev's decision, from 1955 on, to exploit anti-western sentiments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The most striking over-all difference between the post-Stalin slogans and those of the late Stalin period was the reappearance and growing frequency of "internationalist" symbols. This trend was signaled by the May Day slogans in 1953 which were issued about six weeks after the death of Stalin. The very first slogan contained the exhortation, "Raise higher the banner of proletarian internationalism!"¹⁰ In every subsequent year following the death of Stalin this exhortation was repeated. Until 1962 it was contained either in the first slogan or in one of the first three, sometimes as part of one of the slogans and sometimes as a separate slogan. However, in 1962, it dropped to seventh place in the listing, perhaps reflecting a certain disillusionment in Moscow with the results of cultivating the foreign "Internationalist" audience—though the clue may be too minor a one to serve as a basis for interpretation.

It is possible to distinguish between two kinds of "internationalism" in Soviet propaganda since Stalin. There is the traditional kind of communist internationalism, which is directed toward some group assumed to be favorable to the USSR—such as "peace partisans" or "workers"—or which revives such symbols of international communism as "proletarian internationalism." There is also a "great power" internationalism, in which the Soviet Union or other great powers appeal to world audiences without regard to class or ideological considerations. The relative weight of both of these kinds of international or "foreign" appeals increased in Soviet slogans and in the total Soviet propaganda output after the death of Stalin. The increase in slogans with "ideological internationalist" connotations was particularly pronounced after 1957. This type of appeal was, however, played down in 1955, the year of the "Geneva spirit" and the high point of the post-Stalin campaign for "relaxation of international tensions."

An analysis of Soviet slogans since Stalin's death revealed trends of interest for the study of Soviet foreign propaganda.¹¹ There was a substantial rise in the percentage of attention devoted to "foreign" as against

"domestic" problems. The total number of slogans and especially the number devoted to foreign countries increased. The slogans reflected the fact that Soviet concern with and attention to the external world increasingly flowed outward from the Soviet-Chinese heartland into areas to which previously little attention had been given. The area of Soviet attention broadened to include more and more countries in the "neutralist" world.

* * * * *

The slogans issued to the world by the CPSU following Stalin's death indicated a revival of confidence that the forces of world social revolution were once again on the move, especially in the underdeveloped countries. At the same time, they also reflected acute awareness in the Kremlin of the enormous dangers involved in the confrontation of Soviet bloc and western military power. Finally, unlike those issued during the first few years of the bolshevik regime, the post-Stalin slogans suggested that the leaders of world communism regarded Soviet state power rather than the international proletariat as the chief instrument for remaking the world.

It will now be useful to briefly survey and compare the vitally significant and revealing communiques issued by the two world communist summit meetings of 1957 and 1960. The 1957 document was endorsed by the CPSU and eleven other ruling "communist and workers' parties." The 1960 document was subscribed to by eighty-one communist parties.¹² In essence, both of the communiques heralded a revival of the international communist movement particularly with reference to the underdeveloped countries. With the internal situation in the Soviet bloc once again under tight control late in 1957, the Soviet and other communist leaders apparently felt that the time was ripe for the resumption of the international propaganda and psychological warfare offensive. The very beginning of the 1957 communique asserted that the "fundamental content of our epoch" was the "transition from capitalism to socialism, begun by the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia." It went on to assert that the most important consequence of the increase in the influence of the "forces of socialism" was that it had "stimulated the rapid extension of the anti-imperialist national liberation movement in the post-war period." It listed various countries that had "shaken off the colonial yoke and established national independent states." It hailed the struggle of the peoples of "the colonial and dependent countries" for "national liberation."

Both communiques depicted the capitalist countries as fighting to preserve a deteriorating position of world power. The 1960 communique, officially entitled Statement of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties, referred to the contemporary historical period as a time of "socialist revolutions . . . nationalist revolutions . . . a time of the breakdown of imperialism . . . the abolition of colonialism . . . or transition of more peoples to socialism and communism on a world-wide scale." Both communiques described the world socialist

movement and the "national liberation movement" as natural allies in a bitter struggle to destroy capitalism. Both presented the "socialist camp" as the only possible model for economic and social development. Both also branded the United States as the leading exponent of reactionary policies and portrayed that country as the leader of a monopolistic, capitalist-imperialist bloc.

The two communiques both set forth similar strategical concepts. One was that of the non-inevitability of war between the capitalist and socialist blocs and the other was the doctrine of the "anti-imperialist" coalition. Both communiques expressed the conviction that the victory of socialism could be achieved without an all-out war. Such a war would be unprofitable for socialism. It was, however, necessary to keep socialist military strength stronger than that of the adversary in order to discourage a resort to war by the capitalist bloc. Perhaps because of the Chinese challenge to the thesis of the non-inevitability of all-out war, the 1960 communique dealt at much greater length than that of 1957 with the problem of peaceful coexistence. The 1960 communique held that peaceful coexistence was "the only correct and reasonable principle of international relations" and that this policy was "an ally of socialism." It certainly did not, however, imply a cessation of the class struggle or any reconciliation of socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it demanded an intensification of "the struggle for the triumph of socialist ideas."

With regard to the "anti-imperialist coalition," the 1960 communique defined it as "the world socialist movement, the international working class, the national liberation movement, and the countries opposing war, and all peace-loving forces."

The language of the two communiques indicated that the leaders of the international communist movement were confident that the socialist bloc could win the adherence of all the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to their general line of policy and leadership. In addition, they counted on gaining the support of neutral countries and of all factions in the western world that were opposed to war and to the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, they could rely on foreign communist parties to facilitate their efforts. By marshaling these political and social forces they expected to bring about, systematically and rapidly, the progressive isolation of the western democracies from any influence outside the North American continent and western Europe.

In keeping with this strategic analysis, the two communiques contained directives for propaganda tactics. They urged the defense of "peace." The 1960 communique demanded "an end to nuclear testing in the arms race, of foreign bases, foreign occupation, the disbanding of all military blocs, a peace treaty with Germany, the demilitarization of Berlin, and the prevention of the revival of militarism in Germany and Japan."

Secondly, the communist parties were urged to fight in defense of the "national and democratic interests" of the peoples of all countries. The 1960 communique was more radical, however, than the 1957 communique

with respect to the "national liberation struggle." It foresaw as the immediate objective of this struggle the establishment of an "independent national-democratic state," or "national democracy."

The 1960 communique defined an independent national-democratic state as: "A state that consistently defends its political and economic independence, struggles against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases on its territory; a state that struggles against new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capital; a state in which the people are assured broad democratic rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstrations, and establishment of political parties and political organizations) and the opportunity to work for agrarian reform and the satisfaction of other demands in the sphere of democratic and social transformations and for participation in the determination of state policy."¹³

It would seem, then, that a central criterion for the establishment of "national democracy" is the elimination of "imperialist," or in other words western economic, political and cultural influence. Further characteristics of the national-democratic state also appear from the above definition to include nationalization of the major sectors of the economy, a radical program of agrarian reforms, and freedom of action for the local communist party. It is expected that the national-democratic state will be established through the unification of all "progressive" forces "vitaly interested in abolishing the domination of the monopolies," these forces being the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia, and urban, petty, and middle bourgeoisie.¹⁴ It seems clear from the 1960 communique and from the resolutions of the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU that the stage of "national democracy" is regarded as one of preparation for the transition to socialism. This is evident from the 1960 communique, which stated that: "The participation in the struggle for democratic transformations by the broad strata of the population convinces them of the necessity of unity of action with the working class and helps to increase their political activeness . . . In the process of this struggle they continually strengthen their ties with the masses, raise the level of the masses' political consciousness and bring them to understand the tasks of socialist revolution and the necessity of achieving it. . . . Marxists-Leninists are firmly convinced that the peoples of the capitalist countries will in the course of their day to day struggle come to understand that socialism alone is the real way out for them."¹⁵

Soviet foreign policy and foreign propaganda efforts continue to be linked to the objective of fostering and accelerating world-wide social revolution. And, as we pointed out in the preceding chapter, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders continue to urge adherence to another Leninist policy, namely, that of making maximum possible use for communist purposes of temporary class allies such as the "national bourgeoisie" or various other non-proletarian strata and groups. The communists, of course, reserve to themselves the right of defining these groups and of

deciding when they cease to be useful and should be attacked or destroyed. However, while recommending cooperation with non-proletarian and non-Marxist groups and organizations whenever it is expedient, the 1960 communique and other current Soviet documents make it clear that the communists are prepared to resort to violence, or at least to threaten its use, to prevent the loss of any gains that may have accrued to them as a result of their exploitation of the national liberation movement and other contemporary social forces. In this connection it is significant that the 1960 communique also declared that it was the duty of all communists to oppose the "export of counter-revolution." This doctrine has assumed a particularly ominous significance since 1961 in connection with the Cuban problem and Khrushchev's ambiguous but nevertheless threatening statements that United States military action against the Castro government would mean war.

The main lines of the 1960 communiqué were reiterated in Khrushchev's speech of January 5, 1961, to a gathering of Soviet communists in Moscow, entitled, significantly, "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement," as well as the 1961 program of the CPSU. For example, the program indicated that although there could be differences in the "forms and tempo" of social revolution, revolution remained the only means and the dictatorship of the proletariat (declared by the program to be superseded inside the Soviet Union by the "state of the entire people") the inevitable outcome of the struggle still underway in the non-communist world.¹⁶

The above doctrines, reflected in Soviet strategy *vis-à-vis* such countries as Guinea, Laos, and Cuba, indicated Khrushchev's determination to achieve Leninist aspirations for world revolution even in the conditions of the nuclear age. Among many ominous manifestations of the post-Stalin rededication to the export of violent revolution, certain little-noticed Korean developments are worth mentioning. The Fourth Congress of the North Korean Workers (Communist) Party, in September 1961, called for establishment in South Korea of a "revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party," to fight against U.S. "imperialist occupation," and carry out an "anti-imperialist" program.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk in an address on July 10, 1961 noted that in Soviet policy, "the very language of international intercourse became distorted and contrived." "Peace" had, he observed, become a word to describe whatever condition would promote the communist world revolution. "Aggression" was whatever stood in the way of this revolution. He thus reminded the world of a communist practice, first applied on a global scale in the mid-1930's, of employing traditional symbols of democracy and liberalism for communist purposes. Of course, such terms as peace, negotiation, freedom, democracy, progress, etc., mean different things to communists than to western democrats, liberals, and non-communist socialists. The importance of what Lindley Fraser in his excellent study *Propaganda* called "double-talk" is that very often the

non-communist targets of the use of these terms by communists are not fully aware or perhaps not aware at all that, for example as Fraser puts it, "world peace will be for the first time achieved when the world as a whole is converted to communism." ¹⁷

The doctrines, directives, and messages which we have surveyed reflect the dominant and persisting influence exercised in Soviet propaganda strategy by what Brzezinski calls the "dichotomic" Soviet vision of the nature of international politics. The data examined would appear to support Brzezinski's contention that the Soviet international outlook has been shaped by "the notion that social developments throughout the world operate on the basis of a sharply definable dichotomy—a dichotomy that is *pro of per se* of an unbridgeable hostility between the emerging socialist state (later a system of socialist states) and the rest of the world." ¹⁸

But, as we have also observed, the dichotomic orientation permits and indeed requires the exercise of strategic and tactical flexibility. It is probably true, as Robert C. Tucker impressively but perhaps a little too forcefully argued in 1957 in his article "The Psychology of Soviet Foreign Policy," that Stalin in the last few years of his life was so obsessed with physical control over territory and people that he was, in contrast to his successors, unable to employ propaganda effectively as an instrument of foreign policy. ¹⁹ While there is much truth in such an interpretation of Soviet policy during the late Stalin era, it tends to exaggerate the differences between the policies of Stalin and those of his successors. During the last three years of Stalin's lifetime some essential elements of the strategy which has paid considerable political dividends to Khrushchev were worked out at least in preliminary form. The truth may be that Stalin, or some of his lieutenants, perceived the need for more flexibility in Soviet foreign policy and for a more persuasive manner of presenting it. But it is possible that the dictator was temperamentally incapable of adjusting fully to the challenges and opportunities which the emerging international constellation offered for the extension of Soviet influence.

Nevertheless, as Marshall D. Shulman has convincingly argued, Stalin adopted, in 1949-1952, a policy designed to disintegrate the unity and mobilization achieved by the western powers in their efforts to counter the Berlin blockade, communist aggression in Korea and other communist actions. Stalin turned to "the use of nationalism, the peace issue, neutralism, trade, and other forms of collaboration with elements of the bourgeoisie." ²⁰ Among the major propaganda operations in which the Soviet policy shift after 1949 were reflected, the Moscow International Economic Conference of April 1952, and a stepped-up "peace" campaign were perhaps the most conspicuous. Although with less enthusiasm and skill than Khrushchev was later to display, Stalin nevertheless attempted to convince foreign businessmen that it was profitable to trade with communist Russia. Shulman compares the late Stalin "right-wing policy" with other temporary Soviet retreats, succeeded, as was that of 1949-

1952, by renewed advances. He arrives at an interpretation which may seem reassuring because it differs from theories that emphasize neurotic compulsions in the personality of leaders as driving forces in Soviet policy, but should also serve as a warning against underestimating the effectiveness of that policy. Shulman sees in Soviet policy—and this writer agrees with his finding—a “largely rational responsiveness to changes in the world environment, particularly to changes in world power relationships.” What may be an irrationally intense urge for power is associated with sensitivity to many dimensions of social and political reality, including some often neglected by neo-communists, and with a formidable, coordinated program to shape the future of mankind in conformity with the Marxist-Leninist vision. If to these strengths one adds the energy displayed by Soviet communicators, and the resourcefulness they so clearly possess, it becomes possible to better understand the magnitude of the challenge posed by their urgent and persistent appeals to world audiences.

NOTES

¹ Aspects of the “exoteric-esoteric” dichotomy in Soviet political communication have been perceptively analyzed by Almond, *op cit*, especially in chap. 3, and by Nathan Leites, in *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Ill., 1953); see also Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev* (Washington, D.C., 1958) and Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.* (New York, 1961). Rush and Conquest are concerned primarily with Soviet domestic politics but their techniques of analysis have relevance also for the study of Soviet foreign policy statements.

² Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and associates, *Language of Politics* (New York, 1949). The article on slogans, by Lasswell and Sergius Yakobson, entitled “Trend: May Day Slogans in Soviet Russia, 1918-1943,” is on pp. 233-298.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

⁸ Lasswell and Yakobson, *loc cit*.

⁹ *Pravda*, April 26, 1947. The above was slogan No. 2. Slogan No. 3 urged the “workers of all countries” to “expose the aggressive plans of the imperialists! Tear the mask from the inciters of a new war!”

¹⁰ *Pravda*, April 22, 1953, p. 1.

¹¹ These observations are based largely on two quantitative studies, respectively, of May Day and November 6 slogans for the period May 1950–November 1958, by Mr. Arend Lijphart, and of November 6 slogans for the period 1954–1960, inclusive, by Mr. George J. Voyta.

¹² For the text of the 1957 document, see *Programmnye dokumenty borby za mir, demokratiyu i sotsializm* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 4–21. The text of the 1960 communique was published in *Pravda* and other central Soviet newspapers for December 7, 1960, and is available in English in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, for January 4, 1961.

¹³ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, January 4, 1961, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁶ *Pravda*, November 2, 1961, p. 3. See also Triska, *op cit*, pp. 29–34.

¹⁷ Landley Fraser, *op cit*, p. 144.

¹⁸ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York, 1962), chap.

iv. Quoted material on p. 101.

- ¹⁹ Robert C. Tucker, "The Psychology of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Alexander Dallin, ed., *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* (New York, 1960), pp. 228-243. In this brilliant article Tucker argues that Stalin's neurotic concern for physical control made it impossible for him to seek to exercise mere influence, for which the logical means would have been persuasion, and that Soviet foreign propaganda came to be devoted mainly to preserving an "official illusion about Russia and the world" required by Stalin personally for psychological reasons.
- ²⁰ Marshall D. Shulman, "Some Implications of Changes in Soviet Policy Toward the West, 1949-1952," the *Slavic Review*, vol. xx, No. 4 (December, 1961), pp. 630-640. See especially pp. 631-632.

PROPAGANDA FOR THE PLA SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO SUBVERT THE RED CHINESE ARMY*

BY RICHARD H. GIZA

An account of a two-year propaganda campaign using radio broadcasts to exploit tensions within the military forces of another country. In a conflict between ideological kinship and national interests the latter will win.

The withdrawal of Soviet military advisors and aid from Communist China in 1960 halted the modernization of the Chinese armed forces—the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Already in the late fifties, a debate was underway in China's military circles between professionals favoring an independent role for the military and the Maoists who advocated stronger party controls over the army.¹

The Soviet Union, seeking to exacerbate tensions between the opposing military lines in China, began a sophisticated propaganda campaign in early 1967 using radio broadcasts, especially designed and beamed to PLA listeners, to play upon the discontent within the armed forces. The tenor of these broadcasts makes it quite clear that the Soviets are attempting to subvert the PLA.

PLA WEAKNESSES

While the PLA with its approximately two and one-half million men is the only nationally effective, comparatively unified body in China, it has weaknesses. It is divided by regional alliances, personal loyalties, and political, as well as professional, aspirations. It is, however, the only organ with sufficient power to challenge the Maoist regime. Now that the PLA is playing a role in practically all aspects of Chinese society its loyalty is a vital factor in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the future of China.

The Chinese *Liberation Army Daily* admitted that a struggle existed between the "proletarian revolutionary line" represented by Mao Tse-tung and the "bourgeois reactionary line" in the PLA. It urged that troops be loyal to Mao and that they eliminate his opponents "who have wormed their way into the PLA."²

*From *Slavic Review*, XLIX, no. 3, September 1969, pp. 34-35.

The Soviet Union probably decided sometime in 1966 to take advantage of the growing opposition to Mao in military circles and openly intervene in the cultural revolution. Moscow no doubt felt that the area was fertile for exploitation and that there was not too much risk involved on her part. The beginning of the Soviet attempt to subvert the Maoist leadership and provoke discontent within the PLA was signaled by an editorial in the 29 December 1966 issue of *Red Star*, the Soviet daily military newspaper, entitled "Events in the Chinese People's Republic and the People's Liberation Army of China."³

ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN

The article begins with a commentary on the anti-Soviet campaign currently being waged in China and praises the PLA as representatives of the working class and true revolutionaries. It further states that the Maoist leadership is attempting to make the army a blind weapon for implementing its anti-Marxist-Leninist, anti-Soviet course. On purges, it stresses that those purged:

... were experienced military leaders and Communists who tried to base and strengthen the combat capability of the PLA with a consideration for national peculiarities and revolutionary traditions.⁴

Having purged the army of all those disagreeing with Mao's politico-military theoretical concepts, the article accuses the Maoists of attempting to strengthen the army's role in the nation's political life and make it a bastion for Mao's ambitions. The article closes recalling the history of friendship between the PLA and the Soviet Army and expressing the hope that they will march together again united.

The Radio Moscow phase of the campaign to turn members of the PLA against Mao's military thought began slowly in 1967 and picked up momentum toward the end of the year. In February 1968, the Soviets sharply escalated the attack by increasing their half-hour programs to PLA listeners from three broadcasts a week to daily programming with each broadcast repeated four times per day.⁵

The general format of a "Program for the PLA" usually consists of a commentary by a military officer. He holds the rank of colonel or above and in many instances is identified as a former Soviet advisor to the PLA. Frequently, the previous warm ties of friendship between the PLA and the Soviet Army are recalled before the commentator attacks various Maoist policies said to be harming the armed forces. The program usually closes with a summary of the main theme and the hope that the PLA will overcome the grave obstacles put before it and become united once again with the Socialist camp.

The propaganda effort by Radio Moscow toward the PLA is based on six basic themes: a general attack on Maoist military doctrine, combat weakness and training, the cultural revolution and the army, the purge, the use of the PLA for nonmilitary purposes, and the recall of historical ties between the PLA and the Soviet Union. It is evident that the aim of

these programs is to cause a breakdown in the morale of the PLA which could lead to an open revolt against the Maoists.

The following is a typical Soviet attack on Maoist military doctrine:

Mao's theory is basically erroneous, negative and defensive and points to defeatism. Mao promotes retreat and defensive maneuvers; giving the soil to the enemy. What was thought to be correct during the period of guerrilla war cannot be made the basis of present day combat maneuvers.

The broadcast closes with the following appeal:

We know the PLA is an army which has spirit, patriotism and love for the fatherland. It will not be a silent and passive tool in the hands of Mao.

On guerrilla warfare, Radio Moscow exhorts:

Mao's guerrilla war thesis is not only a mistake of a man who has no knowledge of military affairs but an ideological attack aimed at shattering the Chinese people's belief in the Soviet Union's advanced military science.

COMBAT DEFECTS

The broadcasts which probably have the greatest impact on professional soldiers are those which attack combat weakness in the PLA. This weakness is attributed to the lack of modern weapons and realistic training.

In a program for the PLA entitled "Fatal Effects of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thought on the Development of the Chinese PLA" on 14 July 1968, the Soviets played on their favorite theme with this quote from V. I. Lenin.

The ones who win the upper hand in war are those equipped with the best technological weapons, good discipline and behavior. War tactics depend on the level of military technological equipment. The finest army will be instantly mopped up by the enemy if it does not have the necessary arms, supplies and training.

The program concluded: "There are no planes or tanks in the PLA and the lack of spare parts makes useless those given by the Soviet Union."

Radio Moscow often quotes official Chinese Communist sources and then attacks the statement. In January 1968, it quoted a *People's Daily* statement that "the best weapon is Mao's thought as far as the Revolutionary Army in the contemporary era is concerned." The broadcast then charged that no PLA fighter can seriously accept this view and that planes and weapons are necessary for victory—not Mao's thought.

RHETORICAL QUESTION

The Soviets often use the rhetorical question to make their point. The query "Why does Mao's propaganda deny the importance of modern weapons in warfare?" is answered: "To have weapons you must first have a strong economy. The cultural revolution has dislocated the economy so that new equipment for the PLA is out of the question."

Individuals such as Lo Jui-ch'ing, former Chief of Staff of the PLA, are used as propaganda vehicles. One program stressed that Lo's purpose was

due to his suggestion that weapons play an important role in modern warfare and his insistence on the modernization of the army instead of following the thought of Mao.

The Soviets boast of their assistance to other countries. One program detailed the modern equipment and training the Soviet Union was providing to the North Vietnamese Army. The idea apparently is to make the PLA jealous of the North Vietnamese Army and indignant at Chinese leaders for the poor relations with the Soviets.

Ridicule is sometimes injected into the campaign. The New China News Agency is quoted in one program as announcing that a U 2 spy aircraft was shot down while the Chinese air commander used Mao's quotes. The Soviets say this is laughable and that all Chinese people know that the victory was achieved not through quotes, but through the use of Soviet MiG aircraft.

No doubt: the ultimate insult was a broadcast statement that the PLA was even inferior to Chiang Kai-shek's troops in technology and equipment.⁶

Maoist policy on military training stresses learning through actual combat. Moscow criticizes this policy as leading to great bloodshed at the hands of green leaders and points out that poorly trained troops cannot compete against modern armies. Mao is accused of betraying resolutions adopted at the 8th Party Congress which called for modern training for PLA cadres, for the PLA to master the skills possessed by Soviet troops, and for the PLA to guard the Socialist camp with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets set up the military school system in China, and many Chinese officers were trained in the Soviet Union. In the late fifties, the Maoists launched a campaign to deemphasize Soviet methods and doctrine. Today, Moscow broadcasts use ridicule to promote distrust of the present school system as a means for military preparedness. Commenting on a Chinese article announcing the establishment of an academy for training navy minesweeper personnel, a Soviet program had this to say:

The major subjects in the curriculum are class struggle and the struggle between the two roads. . . . Mao claims there was not a single qualified military academy prior to the Cultural Revolution. Training of two to three years is too long involving too much book work. . . . only one month is needed to train a good pilot.

An army which loudly recites Mao's slogans does indeed only need a couple of months of training.

The Soviets devote the largest percentage of programming to the cultural revolution and its effect on the PLA. They charge that opposition exists within the army and that Mao needs the army for the cultural revolution to succeed. In discussing an editorial in a PLA organ, which advises the army to keep away from factional conflicts, a Soviet broadcast concludes that this testifies to disturbances and disorder within the army and the factional conflict between supporters and opponents of Mao.⁷

In two programs in 1968 dealing with the opposition problem, Moscow claimed that 12 military corps do not support Mao, that Mao's policy in splitting this once closely knit group, the P. A. is contrary to China's

national interest, and that Mao is afraid of the PLA. The only answer for Mao is to split the army and sow discord.

PURGE STATISTICS

When a nation is in turmoil, the purge is no doubt the most feared consequence for those in power. Six programs for PLA listeners in 1968 were directly concerned with purges, and many other broadcasts alluded to them.

Statistics are frequently employed in exploiting this theme as indicated in an October 1968 broadcast

Ninety percent of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) military affairs committee in the last two years were expelled as well as sixty top level PLA commanders

Probably the best ploy used by Radio Moscow is the threat that the purge will be extended to the lower levels of the PLA. For example:

Mao Tse-tung does not limit his purge to high-ranking commanders, but has decided to expand the purge to reach the middle and low ranking commanders, such as commanders of regiments, battalions, and companies

SECRET POLICE

The Soviets also promote suspicion in the ranks of the PLA by referring to a secret police organization set up within it by Mao. The claim is stressed that any one can be arrested and units can be discarded at any time by the secret police.

The opposing military line in China has frequently complained that government use of the armed forces for nonmilitary purposes was detrimental to morale and combat preparedness. This theme is exploited by broadcasts which claim that the use of the PLA in propaganda efforts to spread Mao's thoughts and in military police work to put down clashes by the Red Guards detracts from its combat readiness and mastery of weapons. Radio Moscow calls on the PLA to refuse these tasks and not be manipulated.

For consumption by the Chinese civil populace, the Soviets claim "the army is everywhere having assumed the roles of police, judges, workers, executioners, peasants, and schoolteachers." To further opposition to the PLA and promote discontent among minority groups in China, broadcasts are directed to these people in their dialect. The aim is to unite the minority groups against the army and possibly provoke open opposition.

Stress is also placed on the deterioration of the PLA since the break with the Soviet Union. Weakness in the PLA is said to be due to the absence of cooperation with the Soviet Union, and this is Mao's fault. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact is held up as a symbol of unity and strength.

The PLA is asked in another broadcast why Mao attempts to incite hatred within the army for the Soviet Union. Moscow answers the question by stating that it does not matter what Mao attempts since Soviet and Chinese troops know the real value of combat friendship

These programs stress the "good old days" and contrast them with the turmoil of the present day. There always appears to be the hint lurking in the background that conditions would improve if Soviet aid were provided.

This two-year propaganda campaign by the Soviet Union to subvert the PLA began to taper off in late 1968, and, by the end of the year, it had virtually stopped. The Soviets may have felt that they had exhausted the subject or that the campaign was not accomplishing the results desired and quite possibly that it was becoming counterproductive.

NOTES

¹ The best known of these doctrines are concerned with the defense of mainland China and the Chinese Communist theory on revolutionary war. See Ralph L. Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines," *Asian Survey*, No. 4, April 1968, pp. 239-256.

² Samuel B. Griffith II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., N.Y., 1967, p. 302.

³ *Red Star*, 29 December 1966.

⁴ *Ibid*.

⁵ Radio Moscow in mandarin to China, 1 February 1968. Future reference to broadcasts will be Radio Moscow programs in mandarin to China during the period 1 January 1967 to 31 December 1968 unless otherwise footnoted.

⁶ Radio Moscow in mandarin to Southeast Asia, 4 September 1967.

⁷ Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 29 June 1967.

East Asia

POLITICAL WARFARE—QUALIFIED APPLICATION **

By MONTE R. BULLARD

The political warfare concept has been used as a system to promote governmental legitimacy and to develop supportive political attitudes within the military forces, as well as to close the gap between the military services and the civilian populace. A political warfare doctrine to be transferable must recognize and be able to adapt to the underlying traditions of the society to which the transfer is attempted.

The importance of political warfare in countering wars of "national liberation" is evident in the increasing discussion of the political side of warfare. Asians, as well as Americans, are conscious of the need to place more emphasis on the political. As a result, Asians have begun to review Asian sociopolitical experience in the hope of finding a model which fits Asian problems more precisely than the Western approach which stresses military technology.

One model which is considered quite successful by Asians is that of the Republic of China (ROC). It is considered successful because it seems to have reached an appropriate compromise between sociopolitical and technological considerations. The Republic of Vietnam was the first to adopt the Chinese system.

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* Excerpts from "Political Warfare—Qualified Application," *Military Review*, LI, no. 6 (June 1971), pp. 18-23.

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SUPPLEMENT OR SUBVERT?

When certain conditions exist in a developing nation, the ROC political warfare model can be a valuable institution. Even when the conditions are appropriate, however, the ROC model must be modified before it is applicable to other nations.

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The ROC model, in the eyes of the Vietnamese, seemed to fit the cultural patterns, history, and character of the people more closely than the U.S. military solutions for insurgency. It seemed to counter the threat of covert rather than overt aggression better than U.S. doctrine and tactics.

The principal political consideration concerns the length of time an incumbent government has been in power. A good government which has been in power for a long period may have proved itself by satisfying the demands of the people, thereby gaining their support. In other words, legitimacy has been established.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

New governments, however, have not yet established legitimacy. They cannot assume that the people will grant automatically their wholehearted support. The government which has just gained power must rely on a political socialization process to teach the people their new role in society. It must create political attitudes which will support it until it has shown that it can satisfy the demands of the people better than the insurgents. It must devise some active means of creating supportive attitudes without the use of coercion since, in the long run, coercion would weaken the government.

The political warfare concept was the tool selected by the Chinese to accomplish this task in the aftermath of the 1911 Chinese Revolution. The Chinese abandoned the political warfare concept during World War II, however, because Western advisors believed it counterproductive.

When the Republic of China withdrew to Taiwan in 1949, it began an intensive review of the causes of its defeat. Many well-trained and well-equipped military units would have proved proficient, but there was a key weakness—loyalty. Outstanding units, trained by Western advisors, following Western military doctrine, were useless, or even dangerous, when they decided to change sides in the middle of the civil war. The Chinese recognized that internal strife generated unique military problems which did not exist in wars between nations. Thus, they concluded that a political warfare system was mandatory to promote governmental legitimacy and develop supportive political attitudes within the military forces.

LOYALTY CONCEPT

Beyond the idea of creating support for the government, the concept of loyalty in Asia should also be considered. There is little tradition in Asia of loyalty to a nation or ideology. More important has been loyalty to an

individual or family. The leaders of China had the monumental task of transferring this loyalty from an individual or family to a nation or ideology. The political warfare system was a vehicle for this transfer.

China had no tradition of democracy with its emphasis on individual rights and dignity. Even under the political system as outlined by Sun Yat-sen in the "Three Peoples Principles," the individual was to be subordinated to the needs of the state. It was true that the people, the masses, came first in everything, political or economic, but the term people always referred to the people as a whole, a collective term, and not people as individuals. When this concept is combined with the authoritarian tradition, the concept of standing up for one's individual rights is lost. As a result, a type of passive submission to authority existed among the people, especially in the army.

If a company commander took advantage of his position to maltreat one of his soldiers or even the civilians in his area of jurisdiction, traditionally there was no recourse for the mistreated individual. The power of the commander was too great.

One possible influence on the commander was his education. If he were well read and understood the humanitarian principles of Confucius, he might be a benevolent leader, and there would be fewer problems. The majority of commanders, however, were not so well educated.

Often, economic temptations were great. The pay of officers, as well as that of soldiers in China, has always been low in comparison with other elements of society. Fringe benefits found in Western armies were lacking. There was no one to look after the moral or economic welfare of the troops.

ECONOMIC GAIN

Consequently, the unit commander, who received only a nominal pay, certainly not enough to support a family, began to take advantage of his position for economic gain. If he were given money to buy food for his troops, he embezzled a portion of it. If he had the opportunity, he confiscated some of the produce of local civilians in the name of the army and the revolution. But the soldiers sent to confiscate the local rice saw an opportunity for themselves. They confiscated more than the commander asked for and kept the difference for themselves. Corruption was even worse at the higher levels.

There was traditionally a deep-rooted enmity between civilians and soldiers in China. For centuries, the armies of China have maltreated, robbed, and abused the peasant. This is reflected in the old Chinese saying, "One does not use good steel to make nails nor does one use good men to make soldiers."

The political warfare concept was designed by Chinese leaders to close the gap between commanders and soldiers and between the military services and the civilian populace.

FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS

One important reason for the quick acceptance of the political warfare concept into China concerns basic family relationships. Traditionally, family authority and responsibility are vested in the eldest member. He is responsible for the livelihood and protection of the family members. In order to make this system function, strict rules govern individual behavior and discipline, and all members of the family are expected to comply with the wishes of the group leader, the oldest living relative.

As a result of this relationship, the individual derives a strong sense of security. He knows he can depend on his family to help him solve his personal problems, especially those with people outside the family group.

When an Asian youth is taken from the relative security of his family group, he experiences much more of a traumatic shock than his Western counterpart. He is completely lost when he finds that he must accept the full responsibility for his own actions and has no one to provide him guidance and support. The political warfare concept provided a solution for this problem. When the concept is carried out as it is intended, the military unit replaces the family, the political warfare officer provides assistance in solving personal problems, and the commander represents parental and supreme authority.

The concept of the military commander and the political warfare cadre acting *in loco parentis* is communicated to soldiers by means of military magazines, radio, and television, usually in the form of fictional stories which dramatize the role of the unit political warfare officer.

The role of the unit political warfare officer goes beyond serving *in loco parentis*. He is responsible for personalizing relationships within a unit. His goal is to make the unit into the soldiers' new primary group—that is, a surrogate family. The assumption is that, if the military unit becomes a *de facto* primary group, favorable patterns of behavior can be stimulated more easily, and new values can be formulated. The Chinese recognized the political warfare system as a possible solution for remolding attitudes and forming new values which could transfer the loyalty of soldiers from their real family to their new military family and beyond that to the nation.

A second sociological reason for the ready acceptance of the political warfare concept is directly related to the first. Personal relationships at the lowest level are virtually codified. Custom dictates how one individual deals with another. There are acceptable and unacceptable actions which can be taken. When a conflict between two persons arises, the means of resolving it is especially limited by the "code" of conduct. Conflict cannot be solved by direct confrontation. The traditional Asian way to resolve conflict between two individuals has been to use a go-between.

The problem of direct confrontation is especially difficult in the military hierarchy where the commander of a unit must maintain a special image. As a result, if a soldier has a grievance which might reflect adversely on

the capabilities of the unit commander, he must not seek redress because the commander cannot recognize the fact that something is wrong in his own unit. Consequently, the provision had to be made to resolve problems which were caused by the commander's actions

MEDIATOR ROLE

It was necessary that no culpability be attributed to the commander who must be made to appear the champion of his troops, striving to protect them from grievances brought about by "the faults of the time." The only means to achieve this, yet bring bona fide problems to the attention of the commander, was through a mediator. Political warfare officers serve this purpose—grievances can be aired before the commander without attacking his dignity.

These were some of the considerations which caused China and Vietnam to accept the political warfare concept. Even if we allow, however, that the political warfare concept is a useful tool for situations like Vietnam, there are still some qualifications which must be introduced if an undesired concentration of power is to be avoided. Political warfare doctrine should:

- Be taught as a model only where political and social conditions are appropriate.
- Come from the majority voice of a representative national congress.
- Include political, sociological, economic, psychological, and military principles which reflect national goals
- Be transmitted through command channels and be a command responsibility.
- Prohibit direct connection between political warfare cadres and political parties or special government organs. Political warfare cadres should have no special channels of communication to the outside (party or higher level political warfare cadres).
- Include the fact that the political warfare cadre's role is to support the commander and not to watch over his activities.
- State that political warfare cadres are subordinate to unit commanders. Unit commanders must have courts-martial jurisdiction, influence on promotions and assignments, and generally unsubverted command authority over the political warfare cadre.
- Provide that the political warfare cadre should rotate in and out of political warfare jobs. Political warfare should not become a career specialty.
- Emphasize the welfare, educational and recreational aspects of political warfare.

Organizationally, counterintelligence should not be included as a political warfare function

The Republic of Vietnam has studied the ROC model in detail.

and has integrated some of the points mentioned. The South Vietnamese have taken from the Chinese model that which they believe is consistent with conditions in the Republic of Vietnam. They have rejected portions of the Chinese model which are not suited to Vietnamese national goals.

The Republic of China's political warfare model has much to offer nations struggling to achieve stability and independence. It is worthy of continued study to seek solutions to problems which are peculiar to emerging nations. Most important is to recognize the ROC model, not as a panacea, but as a partial solution to insurgency problems when those problems are caused by conditions similar to the Chinese experience.

CHINA IN AFRICA*

By G. T. Yu

The effect of persuasive communications is greater when the source is perceived by the audience to be similar or in similar circumstances

CHINESE AFRICAN INTERACTION

Chinese-African interaction represents an excellent example of China's international participatory role. Over a decade has elapsed since China first appeared on the African scene. During this period, Africa increasingly assumed an important place in Chinese foreign policy. An intensive drive to win friends and gain influence ensued. Although the campaign has suffered serious reversals, China's presence continues to be evident in Africa. In 1969 thirteen African States continued to recognize China, while Chinese influence among the African liberation movements was also dominant.

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To date, the major thrust of China's interaction with Africa occurred during the years 1960 to 1965. Two dominant factors explain the wide level of Chinese activities. First, between January 1, 1960, and December 31, 1965, no fewer than twenty-nine African colonies won independence; consequently, these years represent also the peak of China's diplomatic offensive and other activities in Africa.

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Secondly, with the increased level of the Sino-Soviet conflict beginning in the 1960s, China sought to openly challenge Soviet diplomatic influence and subvert Soviet revolutionary credibility internationally. Africa,

*Excerpts from "China in Africa," *The Yearbook of World Affairs*, 1970, Stevens and Sons, London 1970. Reprinted with the permission of Stevens and Sons, publishers, copyright holder

therefore, assumed the role of a battlefield in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Chinese activities in Africa directed toward the subversion of Soviet influence and credibility took many forms, including the campaign to identify the Soviet Union as a "European" State and the attempt to link Soviet policies with "United States imperialism."

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1965 dates the beginning of the . . . present period of Chinese-African interaction. This period has been characterised by a reduction in the overt formal presence of China on the African continent and the initiation of a "selective" Chinese foreign policy toward Africa. Within China, this period coincided with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; and except for Angola, Mozambique and a few other colonies this has been the post-independence era in Africa. Without question, this had been a period of Chinese retreat. . . . Really meaningful interaction with China involved less than six States, including the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Tanzania and Zambia. Thus toward the end of 1969, China's policy toward Africa had changed from one of indiscriminately seeking to win recognition from and establish diplomatic relations with most of the African States in the early and mid-1960s to a policy of selective interaction with a limited number of African States.

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CHINA'S AFRICAN POLICY: OBJECTIVES

Since the late 1950s with the passing of the colonial empires and the emergence of the independent African States, Africa has served an important function in the foreign policy of China. While for reasons of security, and other immediate factors, Asia represents the area of primary national interest, China has perceived Africa as second only in importance. Three primary objectives can be suggested for the importance of Africa to China. Anti-imperialism has constituted a major theme in the foreign policy of China. . . . The 1965 statement by Lin Piao calling upon the "world countryside" of Asia, Africa and Latin America to surround and capture the "world cities" of North America and Western Europe can be accepted as a Chinese variation of the classical Marxist-Leninist thesis.¹

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If anti-imperialism constitutes a primary policy objective, the campaign to challenge and subvert the international status of the Soviet Union has become equally important to China. . . . A Chinese objective, therefore, has been to identify the Soviet Union with "United States imperialism" and to discredit the Soviet Union as a revolutionary force. . . .

A final Chinese objective has been the constantly reiterated theme: African-Asian-Latin American solidarity.

INSTRUMENTS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

China has conducted an aggressive campaign in Africa to achieve its

policy objectives, utilising a vast variety of foreign policy instruments, formal and informal. In the formal category, China has put great emphasis upon inter-State relations and has sought to win recognition by, and exchange diplomatic missions with, most of the African States.

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To give substance to the relationship with the African States, China has been quick to employ additional formal foreign policy instruments. These have been expressed chiefly in the form of a variety of agreements. Generally speaking, they fall within four categories. First, there have been the more traditional alliance type of agreements, expressed in the form of friendship treaties. These treaties have always been based upon the Five Principles of Bandung, intended to promote solidarity between the two parties, and contained the provision "to develop economic and cultural relations in the spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly cooperation." . . . Cultural pacts represent a second type of agreement utilised by the Chinese. Such agreements usually call for the exchange of students, educators, newspaper reports, theatrical groups, and other activities in the cultural domain. . . .

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Finally, there are the economic aid and technical assistance agreements. As an instrument of foreign policy designed to give substance to Chinese-African interaction, this formal instrument has been most important. The hunger and need for funds, the lack of technical know-how and human resources, and the great desire to engage in developmental work to attain political and, moreover, economic independence, have made the African States highly receptive to foreign assistance.

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Concurrent with the utilisation of formal foreign policy instruments, China has made extensive use also of informal instruments. A study of statecraft has pointed to the importance of informal foreign policy instruments.² Basically, such instruments seek to bring into direct contact a State's representatives and opinions with the people and/or processes of another country, in an effort to achieve specific policy objectives. The emphasis here is upon face-to-face interaction as opposed to the formal State-to-State relationship. A major assumption is that by utilising informal instruments a State may better solidify friendship (or increase the level of conflict) with other States. Within the context of Chinese-African interaction, a degree of face-to-face contact has evolved through China's use of informal foreign policy instruments.

China's use of informal instruments includes a wide variety of techniques, overt and covert, violent and non-violent. (It is important to note that many of the informal techniques are made possible through prior formal access; *e.g.*, film agreements concluded between states make possible the showing of motion pictures to the general public.) Among the overt, non-violent techniques of informal access has been the exchange programme. This has brought Africans from various social levels and

professions to China and has sent delegations of one sort or another from China to Africa. Until the advent of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, an increasing number of Africans and Chinese had visited each other's country. During the month of September 1964, e.g., no less than twenty-five separate reports on Africans in China were announced, ranging from an art delegation from Mali, a youth league from Zanzibar, to a music scholar from Morocco; in the same month, a Chinese youth delegation was visiting several central African states while a trade union mission was in Algeria. Whatever the type of delegation and whoever the individuals, the exchange programme has without doubt done much to introduce China to the Africans.

China has made extensive use of the communication media to reach the African population. Since 1956, radio broadcasts have been utilised with increasing frequency. Beginning with only seven hours per week in English, China in 1969 was broadcasting to Africa over 100 hours per week in English, French, Hausa, Portuguese, Swahili, and Cantonese and Mandarin Chinese. Radio Peking's programmes have consisted of combinations of news and commentary, strongly ideological in nature, with intervals of recorded music. Another important media has been motion pictures. China has exported to Africa full-length films, short films and newsreels; Chinese film weeks have been held in several African cities. Modern Chinese theatre groups have also toured Africa.

China has relied also upon the printed word to reach the African populace. There are now English, French and Spanish editions of the weekly *Peking Review* for Africa. Where sale and distribution have been permitted, the *China Pictorial*, *Quotation from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, Mao's selected military writings, and other Chinese offerings, have been readily obtainable. Other communication media include the New China News Agency, which freely distributes news of China to the Africans. In discussing the communication media, one must be intellectually aware that the measurement of flows is not necessarily a measure of their impact. Nevertheless, China's intensive use of the communication media, whatever the impact, cannot be denied.

Direct, face-to-face interaction between the representatives of one State and the populace of another constitutes another type of informal foreign policy instrument. Such personal contacts, it has been maintained, allow the representatives of one State to enjoy the maximum level of interaction with and impact on the populace of another State.

Within this context, the dispatching of Chinese experts to assist African individuals and groups in specific fields of knowledge (together with the training of select Africans in China) must also be considered. No doubt through such personal interaction, China has sought to influence a segment of the African population. Chinese technical assistance to Africa has included experts on tea planting and soil analysis in Morocco, rice growing and military training in Tanzania and Uganda, and building construction in Guinea. To date, the impact of the face-to-face interaction

via the presence of Chinese experts in Africa has been less as a consequence of personal interaction than through perceived exemplary Chinese behaviour patterns. Chinese experts in Africa, have largely refrained from establishing close social contact either with their African counterparts at work or with Africans generally. Personal interaction, therefore, has been minimal. Where the Chinese experts have made an impact has been in their collective and individual hard work and frugality, which has been cited by the indigenous leadership as behavioural patterns to be followed. In Tanzania, where over a thousand Chinese experts were residing in 1969, the face-to-face interaction between the Chinese experts and the indigenous population has followed this pattern.³

Participation in regional and functional international organisations constitutes yet another level of Chinese-African interaction. As an informal instrument of foreign policy, membership and participation in various international organisations have permitted China to gain access to both the representatives and processes of the African States. China's past and present role in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, the Afro-Asian Conferences, the Afro-Asian Journalists Association and other organisations represent examples of the great use of this informal instrument.⁴

China has been equally active in the use of covert informal foreign policy instruments. Unlike overt instruments which can readily be observed, covert operations are hidden and therefore difficult to measure. The great secrecy surrounding such activities have [sic] sometimes led to a majority of the covert operations being attributed to Chinese influence, thereby giving the Chinese a far greater role in Africa than they in fact enjoy. This is not to deny the use of covert instruments by China. Chinese "illegal" arms and money, and methods in unconventional warfare have been uncovered in a sufficient number of instances to lend support to certain charges. For example, Chinese assistance to the Angolan, Mozambique and other African liberation movements has not been without total foundation. In short, we can correctly assume that China has made free use of covert informal foreign policy instruments. The question, however, is not the utilisation of covert instruments. Rather it is the extent of Chinese covert instruments, and China's perceptions pertaining to the use of covert instruments in relation to its use of overt instruments of foreign policy.

Fundamentally, China perceives no conflict between its concurrent use of overt and covert informal instruments of foreign policy. The two instruments have been seen as complementary. Thus, China has not hesitated to employ—or threaten to employ—revolution as an instrument of foreign policy, while utilising overt instruments in its relations with the African States and territories.

Taking into account all foreign policy instruments, formal and informal, overt and covert—and positing that the extent of one State's interest in another's can be measured in terms of the degree and depth of utilisation

of such instruments—the African States have occupied an important role in China's foreign policy. Similarly, the concentrated employment of a vast variety of foreign policy instruments toward Africa constitutes a measure of China's international participatory role.

NOTES

¹ For the full text of Lin's comments, see "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peking), September 3, 1965. For an English translation, see *Peking Review*, September 3, 1965, pp. 9-30.

² A. M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft* (1965).

³ G. T. Yu, "Dragon in the Bush: Peking's Presence in Africa," 8 *Asian Survey*, 12 (December 1968), pp. 1018-1026.

⁴ For an account of China's role in one such organization, see C. Neuhauser, *Third World Politics, China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization 1957-1967* (1968).

Southcast Asia

BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF NEWSREELS AND DOCUMENTARIES IN THE NEW SITUATION*

BY PHAN TRONG QUANG

In the face of aerial bombardment of their territory, the North Vietnamese concerned themselves with elementary and psychological impulses rather than with abstract ideological arguments. The effects of the air strikes were clearly depicted in order to reinforce domestic resolve and evoke international sympathy.

For nearly two years now, in the face of the situation of the American imperialists intensifying their war of aggression in South Vietnam and launching a war of destruction against North Vietnam, the Vietnamese documentary and newsreel films branch, rather than declining, has developed vigorously. In addition to the Vietnamese newsreel and documentary shops, we have additional Vietnamese People's Army film shops. Newsreels, documentaries and science films have all increased over 1964. The process of making a film and getting it to the masses has been shortened. The number of films issued at home and sent abroad has tripled.

By way of instruction, the science films have made great efforts in guiding intensive cultivation to increased productivity of plants, in introducing production experiences from areas where there is continuous fighting, in actively contributing to stepping up the technological revolution in agriculture, and in teaching military, air-defense and first aid common sense.

By way of mirroring real people, real things and real scenery, the newsreel and documentary films have positively contributed to convicting the American imperialists and to singing the praises of our army and people. Although there have not yet been many films of the type that

*Excerpts from a translation of an article by Phan Trong Quang in the Vietnamese-language periodical *Hoc Tap* (Studies), No. 1, Hanoi, January 1967, pages 72-79. JPRS, listed in the monthly *Catalog of U.S. Government Publications*.

denounce enemy crimes, these films have become tombstones of hate and resentment through the pictures recording the barbarous crimes of the American invading army in its deliberate destruction of market places, schools, temples and churches and especially of our hospitals. The film of the Quynh Lap Leprosy Camp, destroyed by the American pirates, is, before international opinion, a fitting slap in the mouth of Johnson, the robber who both kills people and recites his prayer of "humane peace." The cruel character of the American imperialists was unmasked through their insane act of bombing the sick people receiving treatment there. The American bombs and bullets only brought to the surface the great and humane efforts of the public health workers of our country on the road to conquering Hansen's germ and to defeating the U.S. imperialists. The realism of the film is a reflection of the ardent revolutionary sentiment of the people who made the film. Only by really hating and resenting the enemy and only by really loving our system and our people could the film makers show these real pictures and be able to have such an effect. Teaching and creating hatred, resentment and despising of the enemy and building up the determination of our people to annihilate the enemy is a science and it is one of the important tasks of our culture and art.

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We have recorded beautiful pictures which easily reflect the incomparable bravery and the will of the army and people of North Vietnam to defeat the enemy's war of destruction. In the rain of enemy bombs and storm of enemy bullets our patrol boats still fiercely strike back at the enemy planes; the air defense fighters still aim directly at the enemy and fire; the militia women still bravely fight and help down U.S. jet planes, the workers still climb up tall electrical poles to join a wire; the Suot women still bravely row the ferryboat to serve the troops. . . . By bringing to the movie screen these very "real" and very "alive" scenes, the newsreels and documentaries have tried to prove in a concrete and active way the great revolutionary heroism of our army and people. One type of news reportage films about the front line provinces of the old Region Four has been welcomed by the people because of the new pictures in the first period of combat. A number of films after that learned how to penetrate an individual, a thing and a scene and condition in combat. Through the scenes of our soldiers placing their guns on the corpses of the French tanks at Dien Bien Phu and of our army and people joining together to pull artillery up high hills in order to fire on U.S. airplanes, the film *Tay Bac Attacks The Americans* showed the people the relationship between the previous resistance against France and the present resistance against the United States and, in so doing, consolidated their trust in the anti-American national salvation task. The film *Fighting To Protect The Native Island*, is like a picture poem singing the praises of the spirit of combat unity of the army and people of Bach Long Vi. From the first arrival of troops on the island to the time when the troops help the militia in military training and coordinate in rhythmic combat against

the American aircraft one sees a process of development, not only of incidents, but also of people. The film *Brave Con Co* showed moving shots of the life of combat on a small and brave island of the fatherland through the eyes and feelings of a soldier guarding the island. It can be said that the film is a diary splashed with feeling. Alongside the hours and minutes of fierce fighting against enemy planes and warships, our soldiers still occasionally relax and lie with their legs crossed, whistling; still sometimes mischievously splash water on one another while bathing; or right in the middle of the fighting trench enjoy the boiled crab of the cook. Their bravery is as great as their spontaneity, initiative and optimism; it is an unusually simple kind of bravery, combining in a lively way the essence of the new revolution and the traditional national traits of the Vietnamese people.

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Together with the precious films of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, the newsreels and documentaries in North Vietnam have effectively contributed to teaching the line and policy of the Party and Government, to stimulating the revolutionary heroism and will to win, to stimulating the people to stretch up into the front ranks, both producing and fighting and mastering science and technology. The newsreels and documentaries have been received by the masses with no less enthusiasm than for a feature film. Not only is the percentage of showings distinctly higher than before but the average number of viewers per showing is higher for newsreels and documentaries than for features. The tendency to treat newsreels and documentaries lightly and purely business thinking in the showing of films have begun to be overcome. It can be said that we have begun to carry out the instructions of late 1964 of Prime Minister Dong defining the present requirements for film production as "principally not feature films but newsreels and documentaries."

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The aforementioned record in producing and issuing newsreels and documentaries is a noteworthy victory on the ideological and cultural front. It has contributed to the defeat of the schemes of the Americans in using bombs, bullets and psychological warfare in the hope of shaking the determination to liberate South Vietnam and of blocking every anti-American-national salvation action of our people. It proves that in the war against the United States newsreels and documentaries have increasingly become powerful ideological weapons and more and more are the indispensable spiritual food of our people. From this we can affirm that the more the anti-American-national salvation work progresses and the fiercer the struggle becomes, the more abundant and the more powerful the newsreels and documentaries will become; and, regardless of the situation, the production, issuing and elevation in quality of the documentaries and newsreels will still continue to develop.

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Among our ideological tools newsreels and documentaries are able to

reflect these real people, real things and real scenes in the most faithful, lively and timely way. The film *Anh Nguyen Van Troi Song Mai* (Nguyen Van Troi Lives Tomorrow) has greatly contributed to the work of mobilizing among our people a seething movement to imitate hero Nguyen Van Troi. It has been warmly received by foreign opinion chiefly because it has been able to introduce a hero who is proud and indomitable before the enemy troops during the last minutes and seconds of his life. When we saw Troi's picture in the newspapers we were able to concretely perceive a part of the truth. When we saw his image on a screen it was like seeing the entire truth about the historic nine minutes of his life. Real people and really brave things which have a political significance and effect, once selected for filming into documentaries or newsreels, take on more and more of a political character and are increasingly effective in directly serving politics. Lenin clearly pointed that the nature of newsreels and documentaries is reason and politics visualized, that the spirit of the film must comport with the proletarian press line and that the people who make the films and documentaries must become Bolshevik reporters with movie cameras in hand.

In reflecting real people, real things and real scene in the anti-American-national salvation task in order to stimulate, teach and organize our people to defeat the American aggressors, newsreels and documentaries perform the duty of a Party newspaper using images. As Party newspapers using images, the newsreels and documentaries must really correctly and really promptly reflect the line, policy and viewpoint of the Party through the reality of the masses who are striving to properly execute every directive and resolution of the Party in a self-aware manner. And, like a Party newspaper, newsreels and documentaries must assure timeliness, a mass quality, a combat quality, a liveliness and, most of all, truthfulness.

The principal value of newsreels and documentaries is the value of truth in life. Our people need to see newsreels and documentaries chiefly because they want to see the images of their native villages and their people and activities at the present time in order to take pride, be encouraged and be determined to vanquish the American invaders. Our people trust in the newsreels and documentaries and, consequently, we cannot allow one detail of the film to be able to sow suspicion in the viewer. In addition to the films which have unnatural smiles and smiles in the wrong places, there are a number of films which have a great many images of one hand on the plough and one hand on a gun, one hand on a hammer and one hand on a gun, and one hand on the fishing net and one hand on a gun; these have a forced quality. Tendencies to rearrange everything according to the subjective desires of the person making the film are also pretty prevalent. Even in some of the good combat films we still see details lacking in genuineness. No embellishment, no matter how "artistic" has any place in newsreels and documentaries, because newsreels and documentaries are only to reflect real people and real things.

Even in cases where we must reluctantly film a re-creation of the truth, the newsreels and documentaries still must assure the truthfulness and trustworthiness of the images represented and not permit the viewer to see the "hand" of the producer in it.

Every genuine image has truth; but every truthful image does not have genuineness. The image of mother Suot rowing the ferryboat to serve combat has been praised by viewers as genuine not just because it contains truth but, chiefly, because it has revealed the heroic but normal quality of a mother, in particular, and of our people in general. The genuineness discussed here is the genuineness representing the essence and law of matter in the process of its development, meaning genuineness in accordance with the point of view of Marxism-Leninism.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN LAOS*

BY THE 7TH PSYOP GROUP

A summary overview of the psychological operations program of the contending sides in Laos, the Royal Lao Government and the Pathet Lao.

Both the [Royal Laotian Government] RLG and the [Pathet Lao] PL have a variety of psychological operations (PSYOP) programs designed to reach various target groups within Lao society. PL themes are directed at the youth, ethnic minorities, religious leaders, and RLG troops. PL themes claim corruption and graft in the established government and are aimed at the youth and various ethnic groups. The PL direct the "war-monger" theme to all sections of the society. Along with this is an anti-U.S. propaganda program, designed for RLG troops. It stresses the righteousness of PL programs and calls for the RLG troops to defect to the "rightful" side.

To carry out their objectives the PL use radio, propaganda teams, motion pictures and printed media, including leaflets and a newspaper called the *Lao Hak Sat*. Four radio stations broadcast in support of the PL: *Radio Peking*, *Radio Pathet Lao*, *Radio of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces*, and *Liberation Radio* (Vietnam). Most of these programs are in Lao to Laos but the Pathet Lao send reports in English for international audiences via teletype.

In an effort to persuade rather than to force, the RLG carries out its own PSYOP programs. RLG themes are addressed to the entire country as well as to special audiences of Government officials, Lao-Thai, merchants and commercial circles, military forces, the PL, farmers, other ethnic groups, monks and the youth.

The PSYOP objectives of the RLG are to reduce the combat efficiency of the enemy to mold favorable attitudes toward the war effort, to stress the goodwill of the U.S. to confuse the enemy concerning ideology and the

*From "PSYOP Intelligence Special Report," Issue SR 1-72, 7 February 1972, pp. 1-15--1-16.

aims of leaders, to convince enemy troops to defect, and to carry out plans for economic and other development while educating the people.

To carry out these goals the Government uses posters, leaflets, motion pictures, still pictures, cartoons, traveling theater groups, FAR PSYOP teams, loudspeaker programs, radio broadcasts, and printed media.

The RLG has radio stations at Savannakhet, Pakse, Luang Prabang, Chimaimo, and Vientiane which transmit to an estimated 70,000 radio receivers in the country.

Since most of the people are illiterate, radio and loudspeaker programs are the most effective from the standpoint of reaching numbers of people. The cartoons, plays, and to lesser extent, leaflets are well received. Probably the most effective program is that of FAR country teams who travel throughout the country informally talking to villagers.

The Lao publish *Khao Phap Pacham Sapda*, a weekly news and photo sheet that has a circulation of approximately 20,000 and reaches the largest number of literate people in the country; this pictorial newspaper is valuable because its format is very effective in appealing to the uneducated villagers.

Since PSYOP effectiveness is always difficult to assess, the Ministry of Information, Propaganda, and Tourism is responsible along with military units for assessment. Recently, the value of leaflets was shown when large numbers of PL defectors stated that leaflets and loudspeaker programs were influential in their decision to desert. During the conflict in Indochina, PSYOP will be important.

Most Lao leaders are quick to recognize the importance of PSYOP to them even if the situation does not always allow necessary materials and support for thorough programs.

Pacific

INFORMATION AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS*

BY THE NEW ZEALAND DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Government information must be clear, well written, and adapted to the audience. Official information activity must be carried out with reference to policy objectives and national interest.

* * * * *

In the past five years, following the somewhat belated recognition of the support which information activity must give to foreign policy, several important steps have been taken to shape and extend New Zealand's information efforts overseas. A Cabinet Committee has been established to provide co-ordination and guidance. An information unit has been set up within the Tourist and Publicity Department to produce material specifically designed for distribution overseas. Procedures have been worked out for regular co-operation and consultation in Wellington among the five most interested Departments—Treasury, the State Services Commis-

*Excerpts from *Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs* (New Zealand), 1 April 1966 to 31 March 1967, pp. 67-69.

sion, the Departments of External Affairs, Industries and Commerce, and Tourist and Publicity. A special annual appropriation for overseas information work has been provided. And deliberate efforts have been made in a number of ways to expand and improve overseas information activities within the broad policy objectives which have been set.

Particular attention was paid during [1966-1967] to projects for the adaptation and translation of information publications and film soundtracks for different regions; and priority was accorded material in vernacular languages for the new posts which were opened in Bonn and Rome. The basic booklet *Facts and Figures* is now printed in French, Italian, German, and Japanese, with Malay, Mandarin, and Thai versions soon to be available. The publication *New Zealand* has been completed in French, Japanese, and Thai, with Malay and Mandarin editions also planned. Selected articles in the New Zealand *Fact Sheets* series have been printed in all these languages, and also in Samoan and Indonesian. A set of the *Fact Sheets* in Dutch is in preparation. Finally, a number of background articles and a tourist brochure are also being translated and printed in most of these languages.

As the overseas information service has enlarged its scope, it has become apparent that continuing expansion in the range of publications and other resources, coupled with the growing experience of those concerned, make possible new and valuable opportunities to give factual details about New Zealand and to supplement its policies. At the same time, the increasing complexity of conducting sustained and successful information programmes has brought new problems.

For programmes to be effective, and equal to new opportunities as they arise, certain requirements are essential. The information service must be equipped with a comprehensive range of materials to enable it to present a true picture of New Zealand in all its aspects; there must also be close co-operation and co-ordination of efforts among the various Departments concerned in Wellington, and between the Department of External Affairs and overseas posts. At this early stage there are, obviously, some areas in which improvements in liaison are required. There is a need also for continual vigilance against differences of interpretation on basic policy features of the overseas information programme and for constant reference, in every publicity venture, to the accepted basic principles which govern information activities abroad.

If the increased production of basic information material in foreign languages is the year's most important advance, there have been several other useful achievements. Particular efforts have been made to take advantage of occasions which, of themselves, have directed attention of New Zealand. The distribution by posts to local newspaper editors and broadcasting stations of the New Zealand Dry Press Kits, comprising feature articles and photographs on aspects of New Zealand, is an obvious example of the opportunities for valuable publicity which exist from time to time concerning New Zealand in overseas capitals. The visits to New Zealand during the year of President Johnson and Vice-President Hum-

phrey of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Australia and South Vietnam, aroused considerable interest abroad and led to heavy demands on our posts in many countries for information on New Zealand and its national and international policies. Kits of background material were provided to the groups of journalists accompanying the visiting parties. From all these differing operations one lesson has emerged clearly, namely, that the greater the number of audiences which New Zealand seeks to interest in itself, the more varied and sensitive must be the information which it provides.

The overseas programme exchange service of the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation, which was established in 1965, has rapidly expanded its distribution of transcribed radio programmes to stations in the Pacific and throughout Asia. It has thus provided a valuable supplement to the Department's own efforts in the day-to-day activity of overseas posts. The Department has also given encouragement to New Zealand participation in international cultural exhibitions. Particularly pleasing results were achieved through the exhibition of Katherine Mansfield manuscripts, photographs, publications, and personal articles in Paris, London, New York, Baltimore, and Ottawa. This exhibition involved the posts concerned in a considerable amount of administrative effort, but the reward in the audiences gained and the consequent appreciation of New Zealand cultural achievements, has fully justified a sustained and complicated operation. Planning is now proceeding for the tour in the Pacific and Asia of an exhibition of paintings of contemporary Maori artists and Maori artifacts.

An active programme of visits by influential persons from countries of importance to New Zealand, was fulfilled under the Overseas Visitors Fund.

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The Department will continue . . . to work in close association with the Overseas Information Section of the Tourist and Publicity Department to maintain and improve the effectiveness of New Zealand's information activities abroad. It will continue to emphasize the futility of information activity that lacks purpose and is pursued without regard to policy objectives and the national interest. It will stress, too, the need for information material that is clear, well written, and both in content and language, fully adapted to the audience.

Africa

SOUTH AFRICAN PROPAGANDA: METHODS AND MEDIA*

By VERNON MCKAY

No country perceives itself as an international pariah, even if other states so treat it. The political communications of such a state tend to focus on the few highly specific audiences where the messages may have some impact.

. . . . For two decades, South Africa has been the target of worldwide

*Excerpts from "South African Propaganda: Methods and Media," *Africa Report*, February 1966, pp. 41-46. Reprinted with the permission of *Africa Report*, copyright holder.

criticism, some of it fair and some unfair. To respond to its critics, the Republic has mobilized a many-sided counterattack through the films, periodicals, and booklets of its Information Service, through employment of American public relations firms, and through publicizing the views of certain Americans who express strong sympathy for white South Africa and eulogize it as a fine field for American investors.

. . . . The Cabinet Ministers who portray South Africa as a stable, prosperous Western ally in contrast to a chaotic and savage black Africa infected with Communism are striking a responsive chord. . . . The ultimate objective is to change U S. Government policy toward Africa.

NEW CONFIDENCE IN PRETORIA

To understand the current expansion of South Africa's information program, one must relate it to the political factors that account for the aura of confidence now emanating from Pretoria. . . . South Africans are encouraged both by their success in repressing African nationalist movements, sabotage, and terrorism, and by the hope that the threat of economic sanctions against them is receding.

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The government's view that diversionary turbulence elsewhere will ease pressure on South Africa had repeatedly been confirmed, however, by the crises over Berlin, Cuba, the Congo, Malaysia, the Dominican Republic, the Middle East, and India's conflicts with China and Pakistan. These crises bolstered the view that Europe, Latin America, and Asia were higher than Africa in United States foreign policy priorities, and that the American armed forces, heavily committed in Vietnam and elsewhere, would regard the idea of a naval blockade of South Africa with great disfavor.

"OPEN SEASON ON UNCLE SAM"

Pretoria's new confidence was reflected during the next few months by the introduction of further stringent security legislation in April and June and by Dr. Verwoerd's declaration of "open season on Uncle Sam," as a South African newspaper termed it (*Daily Dispatch*, July 21, 1975). In May [1965], when the American aircraft carrier *Independence* wanted to refuel in Cape Town enroute to the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, the South African Government took the position that only white flight crews from the carrier could land at the Republic's airports. The United States responded on May 13 by cancelling the carrier's visit to Cape Town.

This was followed, on June 25, by Prime Minister Verwoerd's statement at a Nationalist Party meeting at De Aar that the United States would not be allowed to post Negroes at its two space tracking stations in South Africa. Since the United States had not sent any American Negroes to the stations, Verwoerd's statement was gratuitous and provocative. NASA responded three days later by stating that the United States planned to continue operating its tracking stations, using personnel assigned without regard to race and color. The issue also got to the White

House, where Press Secretary Bill D. Moyers reaffirmed on July 16 that the United States would assign personnel abroad regardless of color. In response to questions from the press, however, Moyers refused to say whether the United States would close the South African stations in case of a showdown.

At the De Aar political rally on June 25, according to *The New York Times*, Dr. Verwoerd also bitterly attacked the multiracial guest list of invitees to the American Ambassador's annual Fourth of July party, and declared that South African officials would continue to boycott mixed receptions. Since this was the third year in which the Ambassador had invited people of all races, Dr. Verwoerd's statement again seemed deliberately provocative.

On August 30 the *Rand Daily Mail* carried a story saying that the Government of South Africa had demanded three cuts in the USIA film entitled *John F. Kennedy, Years of Lightning, Days of Drums*, because of scenes of U.S. Peace Corps volunteers working with Africans in Tanganyika, Negroes and whites working together in the United States, and scenes of the civil rights program. USIA refused to show a cut version of the film.

This was followed on September 21 by the Prime Minister's statement at the Orange Free State Nationalist Party Congress in Bloemfontein regarding his tangle with the United States Government over the activities of four American diplomats. It was true, he said, that these United States representatives had conducted themselves in a manner which his government did not regard as being in the interest of friendly relations between the two countries. He denied, however, the reports in the American press that South Africa had asked the United States to withdraw these diplomats. To repudiate reports that he had been rebuffed by the United States, the Prime Minister stressed that there was no question of a rebuttal because he had only informed the United States of the behavior of its representatives, leaving it to the State Department to deal with the matter.

Two days later the American Embassy in Pretoria announced that the United States had decided not to withdraw the four "senior and experienced" diplomats. The statement reaffirmed full confidence in the officers, and the "conviction that they had performed their duties in accordance with normal and accepted practice for the conduct of diplomatic representatives." The Afrikaans newspaper, *Die Vaderland*, stated that the four Americans were "active in leftist politics," and it hinted that the government was displeased at reports that they were associated with the South African Institute of Race Relations. The paper also contended that the US Embassy had distributed films praising people who opposed the South African Government's policy and had issued "frankly propagandistic" materials on the civil rights issue in the United States.

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Whatever Dr. Verwoerd's motives, it should not be overlooked that his attacks on American policy unintentionally helped the United States, at

least temporarily, by improving its image in the minds of Africans and other critics of apartheid.

THE INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

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When the Nationalist government came to power in 1948, it decided to reorganize the Office and concentrate on an expanded information program abroad. Overseas information officers formerly under the Department of External Affairs were transferred to the State Information Office under the Department of the Interior. A Cabinet decision gave the Office director and his staff access to all Ministers and department heads, and the Office worked out a system of cooperation with other departments and with such government organizations as the South African Tourist Corporation, which advertises the Union's scenic attractions.

While the Office also serves South Africans at home, "by far" its "most important function," according to its first annual report in 1949, "is to serve as a channel for the distribution of information on South Africa abroad." When Dr. D. F. Malan became Prime Minister in 1948, there were only three information branches overseas—one in London since 1939, a second in New York since 1942, and a third in Nairobi since 1943. The Nationalist government increased the number of information attaches and assistants to 16 in 1949. Officers were assigned to Paris, The Hague, Rome, Bonn, Lisbon, Ottawa, Buenos Aires, and Leopoldville, and plans were made to send one to Salisbury. The Office announced the optimistic intention to have an information attache in every country with which the Union had diplomatic relations.

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The major program of the Office soon developed in the United States. According to its 1951 annual report ". . . the South African Government Information Office in the U.S. is in fact serving two States, the U.S. and the vast organization of the United Nations with its exceptional potentialities for spreading news and influencing world opinion." In 1951 the Union decided to set up an office in Washington in addition to the office operating in New York since 1942.

The 1952 annual report also suggested that the "West Coast offers an important and approachable field for South African publicity," although it was December 1963 before an office was finally opened in San Francisco. Above all, the 1952 report stressed the significance of New York which, "apart from being the biggest center of news dissemination in America, if not in the world, also has in its midst the elaborate press organization attached to the United Nations," with representatives of about 400 world newspapers, news agencies, and radio services accredited to the UN all the year around, and more than 1,000 accredited pressmen there during the General Assembly. The Office concentrates on lobbying of these newsmen in order to maintain the best possible relations with them: "This is undoubtedly the most important aspect of public relations activities in the UN."

By 1955, after J. G. Strijdom had replaced Dr. Malan as Prime Minis-

ter, the stage was set for still further expansion of information activities. The State Information Office was transferred back from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of External Affairs, then headed by Eric Louw. At this time, Louw also held the key post of Minister of Finance and was willing and able to provide more money for overseas propaganda. Partly because of its policy decision to refuse to cooperate in United Nations discussions of South Africa's racial problems, the government was convinced of the necessity for greater publicity overseas through its own channels.

A change in tone in South Africa's attitude toward world opinion is clear in the first of 107 "Fact Papers" which began to appear in 1955 as supplements to the Information Office's weekly *Digest of South African Affairs*. Written by P. J. Meiring, Director of State Information, it appeared in December 1955 under the title "World Opinion—does it matter?" Meiring warned his countrymen that those who are indifferent to world opinion "have arrived at a dangerous state of mind" because "the possibility of isolation and ostracism is more than South Africa would like to endure or care to afford." He concluded his four page plea with these words:

Modern techniques have turned selling into a highly specialized science. South Africa could profitably employ these new-fangled methods in her difficult task of "selling" herself to the outside market. The real commodity that wants selling, however, is good will and the real story that wants telling is the unofficial, domestic and social story of what individual White South Africans are doing for the Bantu. Let that be a story of real understanding and willingness to uplift and it will be a story to impress and convince the outside world.

In addition to the problem of persuading the South African public, Meiring was having difficulty at this time in convincing Cabinet Ministers that they should be more careful in their speeches to constituents at local political rallies in order to avoid unnecessarily adverse reactions overseas. *The Star* (Johannesburg), in several critical articles during this period, called on the Information Office to publicize "facts" rather than political speeches. Meiring evidently had some success with Prime Minister Strijdom, partly by trying to convince him that the growth of President Eisenhower's popularity in the United States was the result of good press relations.

Another tactic of South Africa's propagandists is the use of American public relations firms. In 1955, when Meiring was considering offers from four American public relations organizations, he concluded that this was an effective way of selling Belgian policy in the Congo to American audiences, but doubted that American firms would have "enough sympathy and understanding for South African problems" to be good press agents for the Union. Five years later, however, the South African Government decided to employ . . . a New York firm, to help sell South Africa to the American public, mainly through films.

THE FULBRIGHT INVESTIGATION.

The activities of . . . [the firm] were investigated on March 25, 1963 by

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during its study of the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States. The Committee Chairman, Senator J. William Fulbright, made it clear on several occasions that the Committee was not challenging the right of public relations firms to do business with foreign governments. The only issue was whether the public knew that it was getting foreign propaganda as required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Senator Fulbright pressed the point with painstaking care. When the . . . [spokesman for the firm] said that he did not engage in hardcore political lobbying, Chairman Fulbright took considerable time to establish the fact that the . . . Organization did engage in "political" propaganda. The Senator produced a letter dated November 22, 1961 . . . to Meiring which described the firm's propaganda work for the South African Government during the preceding seven months. . . .

What much of this work proves—beyond doubt—is the value of positive nonpolitical propaganda to create an effect essentially political. Political propaganda as such would have been largely ineffective. But institutional publicity—touching on South Africa's general life, economic, social, and cultural accomplishments, tourist attractions, sports, festivals, etc.—can tend to soften hard political attitudes, make for good feeling, and tend to correct misinformation about the country. (U.S. Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States*. Part 7, Hearing on March 25, 1963, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1963, p. 708.)

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Two years later, the government [employed] another American public relations firm. . . . to undertake "a professional survey and public opinion poll" to determine South Africa's image in this country. In a letter dated December 23, 1964, the South African Director of Information asked . . . [the firm] to "propose a program to counteract the harmful effects of current misconceptions of the true thrust and intention of South African policies. . . ." . . . [The firm] replied on January 4, 1965, that

South Africa has been the target of special interest and pressure groups internationally in recent years to an extent almost unbelievable in the history of militant propaganda. I am certain that no responsible person or group, in or out of the American government, desires misunderstanding with the Republic of South Africa, whose history so nearly parallels our own.

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In addition to the above expenditures, the South African Government paid over \$141,000 during the first six months of 1965 for the tourist publicity of the New York office of the South African Tourist Corporation. Three American law firms were also in the employ of South Africa, one of them being a lobbyist for South African sugar.

THE NEW OFFENSIVE

By fiscal 1965/66, after a decade of continuous expansion, the information budget had risen to \$4,459,000 under a separate Department of Information created in 1962 with its own Minister in the Cabinet. The total personnel complement of the Department and its external service had risen to 378.

South Africa's accelerated drive for American support was launched in March 1965 by three full-page South African advertisements appearing in

The New York Times, *The Washington Post*, and four other major American newspapers. The first ad, on March 21, stressed South Africa's role as a rich, anti-Communist ally which has attracted 100,000 immigrants in the past three years. The second, five days later, eulogized the "miracle" of a "real Eldorado" where American corporations in 1963 reported "a 26 percent return on their outlays." And the third, on March 31, portrayed the Transkei as South Africa's "Pattern for Self-Determination" in the form of a "Community of politically independent, economically interdependent states." The response to the newspaper advertisements reportedly brought as many as 100 letters a day to the Embassy from Americans, some of whom were interested in emigrating to South Africa. *The Washington Post* reported that a "flock of other newspapers," seeking advertising income, had also contacted the Embassy.

South African officials are also exhibiting a new alertness in the treatment of the Republic's critics. One good example is their response to diplomatic correspondent William R. Frye, who is making a study of American policy toward South Africa for The Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. After a visit to South Africa in March and April 1964, Frye published a series of articles in his syndicated column, "The World in Focus," in 78 newspapers, and in his syndicated news service, "The UN Today," in 16 newspapers. South African officials wrote letters of protest to the editors of many of these newspapers. Some of the editors subsequently canceled Frye's column.

Finally, South Africans are paying the expenses of a growing number of sympathetic American businessmen, journalists, professors and others, including wives, for tours of South Africa. The latest beneficiaries are a group of 14 American editors, publishers, and reporters who were given a tour of South Africa early in 1966. Four Americans were also brought to The Hague in 1965 by the South African Government to testify on its behalf in the South West Africa case before the International Court of Justice. While some of these trips are paid for by the government, others are financed by the South Africa Foundation, a private organization financed mainly by South African businessmen. Although the South Africa Foundation . . . contends that it does not engage in "political propaganda," the fact is that it buttresses the government by emphasizing only one side of the South African story—the boom in the White sector of the economy.

In the hope of improving the results of these propaganda efforts, the government is simultaneously attempting to stifle criticism at home and curtail it abroad. Visas have been denied to such American observers as Professor Gwendolen M. Carter, Director of Northwestern University's Program of African Studies, and Waldemar A. Nielsen, President of the African-American Institute. Visa application forms now contain a question asking if material will be written for publication. If the answer is affirmative, the application is sent to Pretoria for detailed screening. Few

graduate students now receive visas for research in South Africa. The whole system has tightened up, especially within the last three years.

Inside South Africa, the government is clamping down on the press and the English-speaking universities which in the past enjoyed an atmosphere of free speech. The press has been forced to undertake voluntary censorship in order to stave off repressive legislation. The opposition *Rand Daily Mail* has succumbed to the extent of booting "upstairs" to the post of editor-in-chief its talented and outspoken editor Laurence Gandar. In the universities, many faculty critics have left the country, some are confined by "banning" regulations, and most of those remaining find it expedient to curtail their expression of political views. Students, under the influence of parents, professors, and the government, are also becoming noticeably more conservative. Several organizations that seek to improve African conditions, such as the Institute of Race Relations, the Christian Institute, and the Defense and Aid Fund, are becoming the object of more and more overt attacks in this conformist political climate.

PROLIFIC AND ATTRACTIVE OUTPUT

The Information Service produces numerous informative periodicals, hundreds of attractive pamphlets and booklets, occasional press releases, and films for cinema and television. Its officers also make many speeches.

Six Information Service periodicals reach American readers, three of them produced in South Africa and the other three by the New York office. *South African Panorama* is an attractive illustrated monthly, including handsome color photography and many readable and informative articles about the Republic. *South African Digest* (formerly *Digest of South African Affairs*) is a valuable and convenient weekly featuring the latest statements by government officials and useful data on recent developments. *Bantu* is an illustrated monthly dealing mostly with Bantu developments and produced largely for South African readers although a limited number of copies are sent overseas.

The New York office produces *South African Summary*, a weekly news release which summarizes for American readers material cabled daily from Pretoria to the New York office. *Business Report* is a second weekly news release, somewhat longer than the *South African Summary*, which emphasizes economic data and other news of special interest to American business. The Third New York periodical, *Scope*, is a more elaborate illustrated monthly on items of contemporary relevance. By December 1965, according to information filed with the Department of Justice, the monthly circulation of *Scope* had risen to 14,000, *South African Summary* to 4,800, and *South African Business Report* to 3,100. The monthly *Panorama*, which is produced in South Africa, went to 1,200 American recipients in May 1965.

The hundreds of pamphlets and booklets include the complete texts of many speeches by Cabinet Ministers, reprints of articles by Americans and others favorable to South African policy, and a great many publications, both long and short, written especially for the Information Service covering many aspects of South African life. The effective Audio-Visual

section of the Department of Information produces a number of films each year, mostly in color, and has won more than two dozen cups, medals and diplomas at international film festivals. It produces films in English, Afrikaans, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese. The most recent award came in October 1965 at the Ninth International Film Festival in San Francisco, where its film on "White South Africans" won first place among 225 films submitted by governments in the category "The film as communication—government film for general information."

The television section of the Department of Information has also produced several hundred films for television, but in the words of the Department's 1963-64 report: "Television gives a preference to sensational material; consequently it is difficult to get constructive material on South Africa into television screens." Successful efforts were continued, however, to get one-minute television recordings of interesting events in South Africa incorporated in U.S. television news services. Moreover, during 1963-64, officials of the Information Office in New York participated in about 60 U.S. television and 50 radio interviews, as well as giving about one hundred lectures to American audiences.

Finally, at the end of October 1965, Dr. Verwoerd officially opened the new Bloemendal international shortwave radio center near Meyerton which is to beam "The Voice of South Africa" in nine languages for a total of 30.25 hours a day. When complete, the station's powerful transmitters will be able to reach "about every corner of the earth."

By 1964, the Department of Information was able to report that while many Americans remained "cynical" about South Africa's racial experiment, "there was an appreciable decline in the eagerness of journalists to forecast nothing but darkness for South Africa. . . ."

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN INTERNAL CONFLICT: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN PORTUGUESE GUINEA (1959 until 1965)*

BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

While the propaganda by both sides in the Portuguese-Guinea conflict for internal and external consumption tried to convey a sense of victory, certain themes run so contrary to prevailing international sentiments in specific situation as to be unacceptable. As a result, the insurgents garnered much international support while the Portuguese were almost completely isolated on this issue

BACKGROUND

Like other African colonial territories, Portuguese Guinea was caught up with the fervor for independence sweeping across Africa in the mid-twentieth century. If independence had not been achieved by Guinea in 1958 and Senegal in 1960, there would most likely have been no in-

*Excerpts from *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Volume III The Experience in Africa and Latin America*, The American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, Washington, D.C., April 1968, pp. 353-370 (written in early 1965).

surge in Portuguese Guinea. This was less the result of any direct aid from these two states than simply the psychological influence of neighboring areas' having transformed the slogan of "independence" into reality. In a larger context, the situation also resulted from a world opinion that put "colonialism" in the company of bad words and "independence" among the good.¹

Slightly larger than Massachusetts and Connecticut combined, this small wedge of Portuguese territory on the coast of West Africa, between the former French colonies of Senegal and Guinea, is a tropical lowland region of mangrove swamps and marshes along the Atlantic, with low foothills in the interior. It is roughly comparable in size and terrain to the coastal region of South Carolina. Fifteen to thirty miles off the coast, which is broken by numerous inlets and estuaries, lies the Bijagos archipelago of about 25 small islands. The country's largest city is Bissau, the chief seaport and capital, with a population of 39,000.

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African Dissidence Is Largely Unstructured

From the urban and "civilized" population, feelings of dissatisfaction and nationalism have spread to the 500,000 Africans living mainly in the interior. In the face of this growing alienation, some support for Portugal has come from tribal chiefs who owe their importance and power to Portuguese backing, and from other tribal elements. Particularly in the Fula regions of the eastern interior, traditional elders have sought and found support from the Portuguese against their younger nationalist rivals.* Traditional animosity between the intermingled Diola and Manjak peoples in the north has also been reflected in conflicting reactions to Portuguese rule.² Intertribal disputes are thus translated into nationalist-colonialist terms, and sometimes they result in African support for the colonial power. In other instances, tribes which agree in opposing the Portuguese have joined rival nationalist organizations because of tribal differences.

Some tribes have a long tradition of resistance to European penetration. The Portuguese had to conduct military campaigns against coastal groups such as the Bijagos and Balantes as late as the World War I period. These tribes are located in the heavily populated areas of the earliest and deepest Portuguese penetration. Farther east in the interior, where there are fewer Europeans, there tends to be proportionately less antagonism to colonial rule.

During the 1950s, opposition to Portuguese rule grew among the *metiços* and urban African populations, specifically among laborers and those who had received some education. In 1952 an unsuccessful effort was made to organize an African political club. In 1954, an African sports and recreation association was formed, but it was repressed by the

*A similar situation, also involving the Fulas, occurred in neighboring French Guinea under French rule.

government because it opened its membership to *indígenas* as well as to *assimilados*. In 1955 an attempt was made to create a frankly political Movement for the National Independence of [Portuguese] Guinea (MING), but it failed for lack of support among civil servants and commercial employees in the face of Portuguese opposition. Between 1956 and 1958, urban workers were organized informally to the extent that they carried out strikes for specific labor benefits, but no African labor union was permitted.

Political activity during the 1952-59 period was limited to reform groups who concentrated on demands for better wages and political rights, as well as for ending "contract" or forced labor, and the Portuguese system of dividing the African population into *indígenas* and *assimilados*.³ As attempts to organize and strike were put down by the Portuguese, these specific grievances became the basis for the nationalist movement.

INSURGENCY

The Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which despite its lack of legal status was to become the major insurgent organization, was founded in September 1956. It concentrated its efforts among urban workers and artisans, organizing strikes for specific demands. An important change in tactics followed the "massacre of Figiguiti quay" of August 3, 1959, when a port strike in Bissau was ended bloodily with some 50 deaths. After this event, which marked the beginning of active insurgency, the PAIGC organization turned away from the city and toward the bush, where the Portuguese presence was weaker.⁴

Insurgent Phases and Areas of Operation

The insurgency involved a preparation stage, a phase of open guerrilla warfare, including some area control from the very beginning, and, from 1964, what may be considered a regular military phase. Actual fighting broke out during the middle of 1962 and has taken place in most of the heavily populated western half of the country. As of this writing in early 1965, the insurgency is still ongoing.

During the first year, the insurgency was largely contained in a southern area between Bissau and Bafatá on the Geba River and the border with Guinea. During the second year of the insurgency, fighting spread to the Senegal border region between the Cacheu River and the frontier around São Domingos, and in the Oio forest between Mansóá, Farim, and the Cacheu River, while intensifying in the original southern zone around Cacine and Catió.

Insurgent Aims, Strategy, and Tactics

The insurgents' purpose was to obtain total independence from Portugal. Their strategy has been to destroy the military and economic founda-

tion of the Portuguese presence and to wipe out installations that the PAIGC regarded as the symbols and bases of exploitation and socioeconomic disruption. Attacks were also launched to capture materiel, especially arms and small craft; and PAIGC claimed to have solved its arms problem with captured Portuguese weapons.

Guerrilla attacks during 1963 and 1964 followed several general patterns. Lines of communication—roads, bridges, and river transportation—were primary targets after the first sabotage attempts in 1962. Portuguese barracks and troop stations were other military objectives. Barracks and towns—such as São João and Fulacunda—were raided and burned, but never permanently occupied. Economic objectives were Portuguese trading posts and *cercos* (peanut storage bins), and installations of the large trading companies have been frequently hit. Guerrilla activity has thus been directed mainly against Portuguese military forces and commercial installations, although native supporters of the Portuguese have been killed along with Portuguese troops.

Attacks occurred most frequently at night, following classic guerrilla tactics of sudden ambush, after which the attacking force melted away into the forest. Before 1964, few operations ever reached a "military" phase, in the sense of pitched battles rather than guerrilla engagements. Occasionally, the size of forces involved in an ambush led to prolonged fighting rather than simply a hit-and-run raid, but this was usually by accident rather than by design.

Rebel Intelligence and Propaganda Efforts

To prevent counterattack, warning systems were set up around insurgent villages, so that the rebels' own local population could be notified in time to flee into the bush before Portuguese troops arrived. This system was not always effective, however, since Portuguese sympathizers were also found in some villages.⁵ According to Portuguese sources, insurgent intelligence made extensive use of the women attached to guerrilla groups: On trips into town to make purchases, they were supposed to observe and report on Portuguese military movements.⁶

Intensive propaganda efforts by the insurgents to encourage desertion by Portuguese soldiers and officers have allegedly achieved some success.⁷ Word-of-mouth propaganda and written tracts have been used to win over the native population and to spread the idea that PAIGC is the wave of the future, while Portugal is on the way out. Any talk of discouragement among the small Portuguese population is inevitably overheard in the towns, and this supports the insurgents' propaganda effort. Continuing attempts are also made to organize the native population—politically, into the PAIGC's territorial units, and functionally, to give food, shelter, and information to the guerrillas.

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PAIGC's Internal Support Base

The PAIGC's operations and membership gave it the best claim for

being the most significant nationalist movement in Portuguese Guinea. Relations with other nationalist groups tended to be hostile, as each group claimed to be the exclusive representative of the nationalist movement or, alternatively, an indispensable segment of the movement that must be taken into account in any unification effort. Within this contradictory atmosphere of hostility and unity, some attempts at political coordination were made.

A stillborn attempt to unify the PAIGC and the Union des Populations de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (UPG), led by Henri Labery, a Capeverdean in Dakar, took place in that city in July 1961 under the name of the Front Uni de Libération de Guinée et du Cap Vert (FUL). More successful was a later organization, the Front pour la Libération et l'Indépendance Nationale de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (FLING), which brought together the UPG, the Mouvement de Libération de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (MLG), led by Henri and Francois Mendy of Senegal, and the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain de Guinée (RDAG), led by Doudou Seydi and Cheik Mane of Senegal. In November 1963 FLING was reported to have been reconstituted, bringing into membership the moderate Union des Ressorissants de la Guinée Portugaise (URGP), or Union of Nationals of Portuguese Guinea, led by Benjamin Pinto-Bull, a Capeverdean in Dakar.

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Importance of External Aid to the Insurgents

External aid has had the effect of keeping the insurgency alive, primarily by means of supplies of small arms and secondarily through the military sanctuary and haven for PAIGC leadership provided by the neighboring states, Guinea and Senegal. In the case of the splinter movements, including the MLG, sanctuary was everything, for the groups had little support and carried out little activity inside Portuguese Guinea. In the case of PAIGC, sanctuary and haven meant arms, offices for organization, and bases from which to carry out diplomatic operations to influence world opinion.

There is no way to measure the value of diplomatic support as against such material assets as arms or financial aid, but it is safe to say that the African states' propaganda campaign carried on by diplomatic means against Portugal has been of great advantage to the insurgents. Without it the insurgency would have been subject to demoralization, condemnation by world public opinion, and a more vigorous riposte from Portugal; furthermore, it kept hope and faith alive among the insurgents. Thus the diplomatic aspect of external aid, although intangible, may have been more effective than its few concrete victories might suggest.

Collective African Diplomatic Support

African aid to the insurgents of Portuguese Guinea has been given individually by single nations and collectively. It was, for example, at the second All African Peoples Conference, held in January 1960 at Tunis,

that the PAIGC joined the Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola (MPLA), led by Mario de Andrade, to form the Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional (FRAIN). In Casablanca in April 1961, this organization was enlarged to include nationalist movements from other Portuguese territories and became the Conferência de Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP), with coordinating headquarters in Rabat.⁸

Three African interstate groups—the Casablanca Group, the African and Malagasy Union, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—have given diplomatic support to the PAIGC, and their members in the United Nations (U.N.) have sponsored measures, such as boycotts of Portuguese goods, in order to exert pressure for the rebel cause. In 1963, the OAU voted \$700,000 to assist the various insurgent movements in Portugal's African colonies.

Support From the African States of Guinea and Senegal

Aid from Guinea to the insurgents began in 1959, soon after that country gained independence from France. The external seat of the PAIGC was set up in the Guinean capital of Conakry following the already mentioned "massacre of Pigiguiti quay."⁹ Guinea's aid in the form of sanctuary led the insurgents to concentrate their efforts in the southern portion of Portuguese Guinea near the Guinean border during the early stages. Arms supply routes run from Conakry across the border into the Portuguese Guinea interior. A rest and indoctrination center was known to exist outside Conakry. Guerrillas have received training in Guinea, ranging from political and military instruction to political and labor courses in the Guinean "workers' university" in Conakry. Guinea has given financial aid and has beamed radio propaganda across the border to Portuguese Guinea since 1959 in support of PAIGC.

Guinea has given active diplomatic support to the PAIGC through the OAU, United Nations, and Casablanca Group. In an investigation of the Portuguese Guinean problem held by the U.N. in 1962 and by the OAU in 1963,¹⁰ the Guinean chairman of the subcommission in each case facilitated the PAIGC's presentation of its case. Guinea is also a member of the OAU liberation coordination committee of nine.

Senegal's position has been equivocal. Senegalese contacts with Portuguese Guineans and Capeverdeans antedated World War II, but Senegal could not proffer aid until it achieved independence in 1960. Both the PAIGC and MLG had bureaus in Dakar, but the MLG took greater advantage of this opportunity than did the PAIGC. At the OAU foreign ministers' conference in Dakar in August 1963, Senegal threw heavy diplomatic support behind FLING, of which the MLG was a part, effectively blocking OAU approval of the PAIGC as the sole representative of the nationalist movement in Portuguese Guinea.¹¹ Senegal is also a member of the OAU's liberation committee and special investigatory committee. Portuguese Guineans and Capeverdeans living in Dakar re-

ceived scholarships and education in Senegalese schools and at the University of Dakar. Some medical care was given to wounded insurgents in Senegalese hospitals. The insurgents also received press support through the Senegalese government's newspaper, *L'Unité Africaine*, and through Radio Senegal. The leaders of many Portuguese Guinea nationalist splinter groups were Senegalese citizens who had jobs in Senegal.

Support From Morocco, Algeria, and Ghana

Moroccan aid probably began about 1961. Significant events were the founding of the Casablanca Group in January 1961; the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) in Casablanca in April 1961; and the establishment in June 1961 of a Moroccan ministry for African affairs, through which aid to the insurgency is coordinated. The Moroccan army has given training to guerrillas, and Morocco has given both financial aid and important quantities of arms. Office space has been provided in Rabat for the PAIGC bureau and CONCP offices, and diplomatic support for PAIGC has also come from Morocco in the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Casablanca Group.

Algeria became an important source of arms after the end of the Algerian war, principally through the shipment of war surplus; it has also been a source of financial aid. Radio Algiers propagandized the insurgent's cause, and support was given through the Algerian press, particularly *Révolution Africaine*, which was read throughout much of the continent. In the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Casablanca Group, Algeria has given diplomatic support to PAIGC against rival groups; it was a member of the OAU special investigating committee and liberation coordination committee. Algerian aid is coordinated through the offices of the president and the foreign ministry.

Ghana also gave diplomatic support to PAIGC through the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Casablanca Group, and has granted arms and financial aid in small quantities. A PAIGC bureau was located in Accra; money, aid, and accommodations are being handled by the Ghanaian African affairs bureau. Ghana's press and radio have given heavy propaganda support to the insurgents.

External aid from African sources has aroused little international reaction. Guinea and Senegal have been very careful to keep their aid limited and to avoid condoning direct guerrilla incursions from their soil, lest the Portuguese use the doctrine of "hot pursuit" to ravage such territory — the Tunisian experience in the Algerian war was a vivid lesson. As a result of this policy, Senegal was even able to have Portugal condemned by the United Nations Security Council on one occasion when it bombed the Senegalese village of Bouniak on April 8, 1963, following an MLG raid. The solidarity between newly independent African governments and aspiring independence movements in Africa has been more or less accepted throughout the world.

Aid From Communist Countries

There was more international concern, especially in the West, over Communist aid. The U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and possibly China have contributed important quantities of arms and given training, including education in Soviet schools, as well as guerrilla and political instruction. In Guinea's "labor university," Communist-bloc instructors also appear to have taught insurgents. There are no reliable reports of any foreign personnel operating with the guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea.

As far as can be determined, Communist influence has been ancillary to nationalism and did not, in any case, initiate the insurgency. *Mestiços* and modernized Africans, especially the *assimilados*, have had occasion to contact members of the illegal, clandestine Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) when in Portugal for schooling, training, or work. Insurgency leaders have also been in contact with nationalist leaders from Angola and Mozambique who are themselves influenced by Communists, whether Portuguese or other nationalities. Thus, although indirect contacts exist and have grown since the outbreak of the insurgency, the insurgency is a product of local conditions.

Portugal has emphasized the Communist aspect of the fight in the United Nations, but since the extent of Communist infiltration into the movement is not known, Western governments have limited their reaction to careful watching. It is by no means proved that arms aid has won for the bloc countries any permanent advantage among the insurgents.

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COUNTERINSURGENCY

Portugal's counterinsurgent strategy in this small West African colony evolved in reaction to the escalation of insurgent activity. As the nationalist movement gained momentum, the Portuguese turned from police measures to military operations. Later, the Salazar government instituted political reforms which appeared to have been taken in response to the growth of African nationalism throughout Portugal's African possessions, especially in Angola, which was in open revolt after 1961. Since Portugal's energies were so fully engaged in Angola, its military effort in Guinea was essentially defensive, although there were several military offensives against guerrilla-held areas.¹²

Portugal's initial response to the nationalist insurgency was to use police repression. After a number of strikes had taken place, a branch of the Portuguese political police, the *Policia Internacional de Defesa de Estado* (PIDE), was set up in Portuguese Guinea in 1957. The Bissau port strike was ended by police action in August 1959, and the first large wave of arrests began in April 1960. Demonstrations in the cities were promptly broken up through the use of police and security forces. After 1959, there were no successful strikes. A 9 o'clock curfew was imposed in the principal towns, but this has been lifted from time to time.¹³

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Psychological Operations and Civic Action

Portuguese efforts at psychological warfare have met with varying degrees of success. African support for the Portuguese has come from various groups and tribes, notably the Fula, an eastern tribal group that has cooperated quite consistently with the Portuguese.¹⁴ Effective use of the printed word has been limited by high illiteracy rates and general lack of public confidence in the government's official statements and commentaries. Government information media have in some cases succeeded in encouraging insurgents to defect, by carrying offers of pardon to guerrillas in the interior.¹⁵ Penitent prisoners have been rewarded with high-paying jobs as civilian construction workers, but most efforts at prisoner rehabilitation have occurred in jail. There has been no known offer of general amnesty during the insurgency.

Because of their budgetary inability to carry out a broad program of social welfare, the Portuguese have concentrated their civic action efforts in operational areas; army doctors, for instance, devote much of their own time to helping local people. There has been no native resettlement program, and there have not been enough insurgents captured to warrant a general rehabilitation program. The PAIGC has repeatedly charged Portugal with the use of torture and brutal killings, and also with the maintenance of a concentration and forced labor camp on Galinhas Island.¹⁶

Programs of Social and Political Reform

Positive social and political reforms have also been undertaken by the Portuguese in an attempt to restore harmony in their realm. The *assimilado* system was abolished by the reforms of 1961-62; thus all inhabitants of Portuguese Guinea were presumably placed on an equal footing under Portuguese law. The legal status of *indigena* and its accompanying head tax were also abolished, along with forced labor laws. However, the effect of these changes has not appeared to be very great. Some "public labor" or even "private labor" still persisted, although it is less widespread than before; other personal taxes replaced the head tax.

Critics of Portuguese policies claimed that the proclamation of equality on paper had little meaning in the absence of greater economic and educational opportunities and that the reform measures, as much as any other measures, were imposed by a foreign authority.¹⁷ In this view, the extension of Portuguese citizenship to all inhabitants of Portuguese Guinea would have meaning only if effective legislative bodies were created, to be elected by the entire population, and if a vigorous political, social and economic educational campaign were carried out prior to the vote.

Political reforms have also been instituted. New colonial statutes were drawn up in 1961-62 and promulgated in June 1963 to liberalize the political regime of all the overseas territories, including Portuguese Guinea.¹⁸ Pursuant to the Organic Law of 1963, a partially elected legisla-

tive council was authorized. On the local level, municipal committees and parish and local boards were established. The new organic law, which was indefinite on the powers of these bodies, provided for transitional conditions which left effective power in the hands of appointed officials. Laws passed by the council were subject to approval of the Portuguese overseas minister in Lisbon. Elections for the legislative council were held in March 1964, and the first council session opened in April. Voter registration requirements were so rigorous, however, that only a small percentage of the population could vote.¹⁹ In any case, there was little or no indication that these reforms achieved appreciable positive effects.

By mid-1962, Portugal had also permitted the creation of the moderate nationalist party, the URGP or Union of Nationals of Portuguese Guinea, under the leadership of Benjamin Pinto-Bull, brother of the secretary general of the province. The Portuguese encouraged the URGP and allowed it to present its case for reforms, following which it was immediately criticized by other nationalist groups as "neo-colonialist." According to African reports, the URGP was eventually frustrated by Portuguese intransigence and, tired of impotent moderation, merged with FLING by the end of the year.²⁰

Reactions in Portugal

Public opinion in metropolitan Portugal generally supported the government's suppression of the insurgency, for the territory of Portuguese Guinea has been considered an integral part of Portugal, and the insurgents as tools or agents of communism. Portuguese declarations and propaganda, however, have paid much less attention to Portuguese Guinea than to Angola and Mozambique, and many Portuguese were probably largely ignorant of the situation, possibly even of the existence of Portuguese Guinea. Relatively few Portuguese troops were involved, and the economic damage suffered by private investors in Portugal was fairly small and affected few people; thus there were few ways in which the insurgency touched the daily lives of the Portuguese people.

Still, the problem must also be seen in the context of the Salazar regime's general political position.²¹ Instead of retiring in 1958, as had been predicted, Salazar strengthened his hand in order to counter growing opposition. He consolidated his own political position at home, directed popular dissatisfaction against foreign scapegoats, and hardened his counterinsurgency policies in Africa. In June 1964, for example, the post of governor of Portuguese Guinea was combined with that of the military commander in chief. At the same time, Salazar encouraged ostensibly liberal reforms in the colonies, and there were persistent semiofficial rumors of greater liberalization.

International Reactions to Portuguese Policies

Portugal's colonial policies have aroused a variety of international reactions.²² Communist-bloc countries loudly condemned Portugal's at-

tempt to maintain its colonial rule in Portuguese Guinea. Spain has given consistent support to Portugal in the United Nations; France, Belgium, and Great Britain have given partial support. The United States, Britain, and France have at times expressed concern for the violence in the Portuguese colonies, and in April 1963 the U.N. Security Council unanimously voted to condemn Portugal in the Bouniak incident. At the same time, however, Western states have been reluctant to support what they sometimes view as empty and self-righteous resolutions presented by the African states in the United Nations. Western votes for these resolutions have more often reflected an intention to appease the Africans than to condemn the Portuguese.²³

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Attitudes in Latin American countries have varied. PAIGC officials have cited Brazil and Venezuela as areas where there has been some unofficial support for the nationalist movement, revolving around Salazar opponents in exile there. Through 1963, however, Brazil and the Dominican Republic supported Portugal in the United Nations on matters concerning Portuguese Africa, whereas all other Latin American states have rather consistently voted against her.

Although African countries have generally condemned Portuguese colonial policy, only Portuguese Guinea's immediate neighbors and radical African nationalists have shown much interest in this particular Portuguese colony. African reactions have been based on both moral and political grounds; they have protested the limitation on indigenous African rights and sought to promote solidarity among all African nationalist and independence movements. Portuguese attempts to suppress insurgency in Portuguese Guinea have been supported in Africa only by the white governments of Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, two countries also under diplomatic attack for similar policies.

NOTES

¹ Much of the information for this article was gathered in interviews with three men associated with the insurgents—Amilcar Cabral, in Conakry in October-November 1962; Arraujo, in Dakar in May 1963; Portuguese Embassy Secretary Luis Navega, in December 1963; and Portuguese Military Attaché Col. Pinto-Bessa, in December 1963. Some of this interview material was previously published in the author's article, "Africa's Quiet War: Portuguese Guinea," *Africa Report*, IX (February 1964), 8-12. In the present study, specific source reference will be made to the interviews or to the previous article only when necessary.

² Interview with Professor L. V. Thomas, University of Dakar, May 1963.

³ *Le Peuple de la Guinée "Portuguesa" devant l'ONU* (PAIGC, mimeographed, n.d. [circa 1961]), pp. 54-64. See also the series of mimeographed reports submitted by the PAIGC before the Afro-Asian Jurists Conference, Conakry, October 15-22, 1962 "L'Emigration et le travail forcé," "La Situation politique," "Partis politiques et syndicats," "La Lutte de libération nationale," "Situation judiciaire," and "Notre peuple, le gouvernement portugais, et l'ONU."

⁴ Information on the details of the insurgency is drawn largely from the periodic mimeographed communiqués of the PAIGC. Brief news items, based on this material, can also be found regularly in *Le Monde* (Paris).

⁵ Interview with Amilcar Cabral.

⁶ Translation from the Portuguese Press, January 29 1964, subject: "Terrorism in Portuguese Guinea," Attachment No. 1 to IR 287.9002464. Unclassified.

⁷ See the PAIGC "Message" of February 22, 1963, appealing for desertions and citing previous cases.

⁸ See *Conférence des organisations nationalistes des colonies portugaises* (Rabat: CONCP, 1961).

⁹ The following information has been gained largely through interviews. See Zartman, "Africa's Quiet War."

¹⁰ See *African Revolution* (Algiers), vol. I, no. 4, 63-69.

¹¹ See *Le Monde*, July 31, August 3, 1963.

¹² Much of the material in the "Counterinsurgency" section is simply factual and can be gleaned from public as well as insurgent sources without any problem of political interpretation. It is regretted, however, that beyond the interviews granted by the Portuguese Consulate in Dakar and the Portuguese Embassy in Washington, there has been little assistance from Portuguese officials in providing information.

¹³ *Le Monde*, June 15, 1961; Cabral, Speech to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly December 12, 1962, p. 6; David Hapgood, Bulletin "DH-7" of March 30, 1962 (New York: Institute of Current World Affairs, 1962); *The New York Times*, March 22, 1962.

¹⁴ "Comments . . . [on this study]," enclosure with letter from U S. Department of State to Special Operations Research Office, August 4, 1964 (hereafter referred to as "Comments").

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, September 2, 1963; PAIGC Communiqué, February 13, 1963, Portuguese Press Agency (ANTI), February 8, 1963.

¹⁶ See *Le Peuple de la Guinée*; Cabral, Memorandum to the Union Africaine et Malgache, March 10, 1963; Cabral, Speech.

¹⁷ See also *Le Peuple de la Guinée* pp. 25-30.

¹⁸ See *Organic Law of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces* (Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1963), chapters I, II, IV (secs. I, III); James Duffy, *Portugal's African Territories Present Realities* (Occasional Paper No. 1, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962); James Duffy, *Portugal in Africa* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1962); Patricia Wohlgenuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations," *International Conciliation*, 545 (November 1963).

¹⁹ "Comments."

²⁰ Radio Yaoundé, November 27, 1963.

²¹ See Duffy, *Portugal's African Territories*, pp. 24-27.

²² See *ibid.*, pp. 27-32; Wohlgenuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations."

²³ U.N. votes are given in *ibid.*, pp. 60-66.

INSURGENT APPEALS AND METHODS

Political communications emanate from intergovernmental organizations, national governments, semi-governmental organizations, and private institutions. A growing number of domestic and international propaganda appeals derive from insurgent groups.

Domestically, insurgent propaganda may serve one or more objectives. It often seeks to reinforce the revolutionary spirit of the insurgents and their supporters. It may attempt to attract others to the cause of the rebels or to demoralize those loyal to the incumbent regime. On the other hand, it may simply take advantage of an event or development in such a way as to add to the state of unrest in the country.

Internationally, insurgent appeals may attempt to win foreign support (including the support of international organizations) to undermine the

international legitimacy of an existing administration, or to create the appearance of a viable opposition movement.

The means that the insurgents utilize to communicate with the population of the area in which they operate, or to which they aspire, depend upon the circumstances of the specific insurgency. In general, however, groups that are illegal can rely very little upon the mass media such as the newspapers. Instead, rebel groups tend to look to informal channels of communication and social movements for their primary channels in most cases.

The four articles that follow illustrate and discuss the appeals and methods of various revolutionary groups. The content should not be considered to have official Department of Defense approval, express or implied.

Insurgent Appeals

OLAS: GENERAL DECLARATION*

Supranational or international revolutionary organizations must rely on ideological and highly political statements of doctrine

This Conference [of the Latin American Solidarity Organization], after a deep and exhaustive analysis of the conditions existing on the continent and after having ideologically clarified the essential problems of the revolutionary movements, has arrived at the following conclusions:

Latin America exists in conditions of convulsion, characterized by the presence of a weak bourgeoisie which, in indissoluble union with the landholders, constitutes the controlling oligarchy of our countries. Increased submission and almost absolute dependence of this oligarchy on imperialism has caused the intense polarization of forces on the continent consisting of the oligarchic imperialist alliance on one side and the peoples on the other. The peoples have a tremendous revolutionary power which is only waiting to be channeled by a correct leadership, by a revolutionary vanguard, in order to develop or to initiate the fight.

That power is the power of the proletarian masses, of city and rural workers, of a poor and highly exploited peasantry, of the young intellectuals, of students with a great tradition of struggle, and of the middle strata, all joined together by the common denominator of the exploitation to which they are subjected.

In the face of the crisis of the whole structure of the economic, social and political system throughout the continent, and the growing rebelliousness of the peoples, imperialism has designed and developed a continental strategy of repression which proposes vainly to detain the course of history. The survival of the colonial and neo-colonial systems of exploitation and domination are the aims of U.S. imperialism.

*The General Declaration of the Latin American Solidarity Organization Conference, Havana, July-August 1967.

This situation determines and demands that revolutionary violence be unleashed and developed in response to reactionary violence.

Revolutionary violence as the highest expression of the peoples' struggle is not only the path, but it is the most concrete and the most direct potential for the defeat of imperialism.

The peoples as well as the revolutionaries have confirmed this reality and consequently realize the need to initiate, develop and bring armed struggle to its culmination in order to destroy the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the oligarchies and the power of imperialism.

In many countries the special conditions prevailing in the countryside, the favorable topography and a potentially revolutionary social base, in addition to the special adaptation of technical methods and professional armies to repress the people in the cities (which, moreover, are ill-adapted to an irregular war), mean that guerrilla warfare is the fundamental expression of armed struggle, the best school for revolutionaries and their indisputable vanguard.

The revolution, already underway in some countries, an imperative necessity in others and a future prospect in the rest, has a well defined anti-imperialist character within its anti-oligarchic aims.

The principal objective of the people's revolution on the continent is the seizure of power by means of the destruction of the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the state and its replacement by the people in arms in order to change the existing economic and social regime. This objective can be achieved only through armed struggle.

The development and the organization of the struggle depend on choosing the right site on which to carry it out and the most adequate methods of organization.

The lesson of the Cuban Revolution, the experiences accumulated by the revolutionary movement in recent years throughout the world, and the presence in Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia and Guatemala of an ever-growing armed revolutionary movement show that guerrilla warfare as a genuine expression of the people's armed struggle is the most effective method and the most adequate form for waging and developing revolutionary warfare in most of our countries and, consequently, on a continental scale.

In this particular situation the unity of the peoples, the identity of their aims, the unity of their views and their disposition to unite in carrying out the struggle are the elements characterizing the common strategy that must be opposed to that which imperialism is developing on a continental scale.

This strategy requires a precise and clear expression of solidarity, whose most effective characteristic is the revolutionary struggle itself, which extends across the continent and whose vanguard detachments are the guerrillas and liberation armies.

We, the representatives of the peoples of our America, conscious of the conditions which prevail on the continent, aware of the existence

of a common counter-revolutionary strategy directed by U.S. imperialism.

PROCLAIM:

1. That making the Revolution is a right and a duty of the peoples of Latin America;

2. That the Revolution in Latin America has its deepest historical roots in the liberation movement against European colonialism of the 19th century and against imperialism of this century. The epic struggle of the peoples of America and the great class battles that our people have carried out against imperialism in earlier decades, constitute the source of historical inspiration for the Latin American revolutionary movement;

3. That the essential content of the Revolution in Latin America is to be found in its confrontation with imperialism and the bourgeois and landowning oligarchies. Consequently, the character of the Revolution is the struggle for national independence, for emancipation from the oligarchies, and for taking the socialist road to complete economic and social development;

4. That the principles of Marxism-Leninism guide the revolutionary movement of Latin America;

5. That armed revolutionary struggle constitutes the fundamental course of the Revolution in Latin America;

6. That all other forms of struggle must serve to advance and not to retard the development of this fundamental course, which is armed struggle;

7. That, for the majority of the countries of the continent, the problems of organizing, initiating, developing and completing the armed struggle now constitute the immediate and fundamental task of the revolutionary movement;

8. That those countries where this task is not included in immediate planning must nevertheless inevitably consider this as a future probability in the development of their revolutionary struggle;

9. That the historic responsibility of furthering revolution in each country belongs to the people and their revolutionary vanguards;

10. That in most of our countries the guerrillas are the embryo of liberation armies and constitute the most efficient way of initiating and carrying out revolutionary struggle;

11. That the leadership of the revolution requires, as an organizing principle, the existence of a unified political and military command in order to guarantee success;

12. That the most effective type of solidarity that the revolutionary movements can offer each other lies precisely in the development and culmination of their own struggle within their own countries;

13. That solidarity with Cuba and cooperation and collaboration with the armed revolutionary movement are imperative duties of an interna-

tional nature, the duties of all the anti-imperialist organizations of this continent;

14. That the Cuban Revolution, as a symbol of the triumph of the armed revolutionary movement, constitutes the vanguard in the anti-imperialist movement of Latin America. Those peoples that carry out armed struggle will also place themselves in the vanguard as they advance along the road of armed struggle;

15. That the peoples directly colonized by European powers—or subjected to the direct colonial domination of the United States—who are now on the road to liberation must maintain, as their immediate and fundamental objective, their struggle for independence and their close ties with the general struggle on this continent, since this is the only way of preventing their being absorbed into the neocolonial system of the United States;

16. That the Second Declaration of Havana, a résumé of the great and glorious revolutionary tradition of the past 150 years of Latin American history, serves as a guiding document for the Latin American Revolution, and has been upheld, widened, enriched and made even more radical by the peoples of this continent during the past five years;

17. That the peoples of Latin America harbor no antagonisms toward any peoples of the world and extend their hand of brotherly friendship to the people of the United States itself, encouraging them to fight on against the oppressive policy of imperialist monopolies;

18. That the struggle in Latin America is strengthening its bonds of solidarity with the peoples of Asia and Africa and the socialist countries, especially with the Negroes of the United States, who suffer from class exploitation, poverty, unemployment, racial discrimination and the denial of the most basic human rights, and who constitute a force of considerable importance within the revolutionary struggle;

19. That the heroic struggle of the people of Vietnam aids all revolutionary peoples fighting against imperialism to an incalculable degree and constitutes an inspiring example for the people of Latin America;

20. That we have approved the Statutes and created a Permanent Committee with its seat in Havana for the Latin American Organization of Solidarity, which constitutes the true representation of the peoples of Latin America.

We, the revolutionaries of our America, the America lying south of the Rio Bravo, successors of those men who won our first independence, armed with an irrevocable will to struggle and a revolutionary scientific orientation and with nothing to lose but the chains which bind us.

ASSERT:

That our struggle constitutes a decisive contribution to the historic struggle of humanity to liberate itself from slavery and exploitation.

The Duty of Every Revolutionary is to Make the Revolution!

THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM*

BY THE ALGERIAN DELEGATION IN CAIRO

In colonial wars, a major insurgent goal is the establishment of a national personality—even if artificial—which may be claimed to have a prima facie right to self-determination.

Algeria is the case of a country annexed by a colonial power after a military conquest characterised by all aspects of classical imperialism. These aspects can be summed up as a policy of social depersonalization, exploitation and oppression of the Algerian masses for the sole benefit of the colonizing power and European settlers.

Colonialism has attracted the cultural and religious heritage of the Algerian nation, intent on depersonalizing the masses so as to exploit them further and to implement the policy of "assimilation."

The national language of the Algerian people is Arabic. Colonialism has sought to stamp out the Arabic language. The results of this policy are characterised until now by the refusal to allow the teaching of Arabic in Government schools and by the many hindrances to free education. Only in the Higher Institute of Islamic studies, and three Medersas (secondary schools), attended by less than 500 students, are Arabic studies pursued. In the French secondary schools, Arabic is taught as a foreign language. The opening of free primary-schools is openly hampered by the authorities who frequently close them down and arrest their teachers. One teacher (Cheikh Zerrouki) has been condemned to four years imprisonment for teaching Algerian history.

Even education in French is very limited. The percentage of illiteracy is 90 percent and today two million school-age children are deprived of any education. Two Algerian children out of 100 inhabitants go to school, while the proportion for the Europeans in Algeria is 16 students for 100 inhabitants. . . .

The Algerian problem is essentially a colonial one, and so long as the colonial regime continues to exist there can be no permanent solution and no permanent peace in Algeria, for it is in the nature of colonialism that it contains within itself the germs of continual conflicts and constitutes the greatest threat to peace. The Algerian people are deeply peace-loving. If there is any bloodshed in Algeria it is because the French Government have flatly rejected any peaceful solution of the problem.

The movement towards the independence of colonial peoples is gathering momentum and is becoming irresistible. Nevertheless, despite the changes which have occurred in Asia and in parts of Africa, in North Africa and particularly in Algeria, the French have persistently resisted any alteration in the status quo. In November, 1954, Mr. Mitterand, French Minister of the Interior, not only reaffirmed both inside the French Parliament and elsewhere that Algeria is a part of France and

*From "What Is Algeria," (Cairo. Algerian Delegation), 1955.

that "no interference by other countries in the Algerian question will be tolerated," but he also stated *"for Algeria the only negotiation is war."*

The fact remains, however, that the Algerian problem exists and can no longer be ignored. The military operations are continuing and the French now talk of an "impasse" and of the necessity of sending more and more reinforcements. French manoeuvres to suppress this problem, to hide it from the outside world are—as in the case of Tunisia and Morocco—doomed to failure. *From the legal point of view Tunisia and Morocco are "protectorates" while Algeria is considered "a part of France."* In reality the problems of the three countries are the same and the fictions invented by France to confuse the issue have been rudely destroyed by the latest events in Algeria. The political aims of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria are the same; and their peoples look towards the establishment of independent states; their destiny is linked to each other in the future as it was in the past.

Therefore, the basic solution for the North African problem lies firstly in the recognition of the fundamental fact that there is a single problem and that attempts to appease one part of North Africa in order to be able to crush another more effectively are destined to failure.

The French have to realise that the use of military repression against the force of nationalism cannot succeed. Sooner or later the French will have to recognise Algerian aspirations and to come to terms with the nationalists' demands. The continuance of forceful repression in Algeria will only cause increased bloodshed and bitterness between the Algerian and French peoples.

1. *Algerian Demands:* The political demands of the Algerians today, as since the end of the last World War, remain the establishment of a Sovereign Constituent Algerian Assembly elected by universal direct suffrage without distinction of race or religion. Such an assembly will enable the Algerian people to give expression to their aspirations through a genuinely representative body which will then undertake negotiations with France to define future Franco-Algerian relations. The prior conditions for such elections would be the abolition of the present police state government, the release of all political prisoners, the ending of police and military repression and the restoration of all civil liberties.

The Algerian Nationalists are for the establishment of a Social and Democratic Republic in Algeria.

2. *An International Problem:* Today the Algerian problem is not the concern of France alone but of the whole world—and particularly of those peoples who stand for abolition of Colonialism everywhere.

The 29 countries meeting at Bandung from April 18th to April 24th [1955] specifically considered the situation in Algeria.

The Conference declared its unanimous support of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination in the following terms:

In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of the rights to self-determination, the Asian-African

Conference declared its support for the rights of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issues without delay. (Chapter D, Paragraph 2)

In addition, the Conference recognized that the basic right of the Algerian people to study their own language and culture had been suppressed, and condemned this denial of fundamental rights as an impediment to cultural advancement and to cultural co-operation on the wider international plane.

In a letter dated July 26th, 1955 addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the representatives of the Asian-African countries requested the "Question of Algeria" to be included in the Agenda of the tenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. They declared . . .

The right of self-determination occupies a position of decisive importance in the structure of the United Nations. In the first Article of the Charter itself, it is specifically enumerated among the Purposes and Principles of the Organization; it is cited again in Article 55 as the basis of international economic and social co-operation; and it is affirmed in resolution 637 (VII), adopted by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, as a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all other fundamental human rights. The emergence into independence of the peoples of many nations previously dependent is among the most encouraging features of the first decade of the United Nations history. On the other hand, the denial of the right of self-determination to other dependent peoples or undue delay in its implementation is a potential source of international friction and of concern to the international community.

It is against this background that the United Nations should consider the deteriorating situation in Algeria, which has become a cause for growing concern. The position in Algeria is the direct result of colonial conquest, and the people of Algeria cannot be said to have exercised their right to self-determination as envisaged in the United Nations Charter. Delay in the exercise of this vital right can only frustrate the legitimate aspirations of the Algerian people, embitter relations between them and the French authorities and lead, as it is in fact doing, to the suppression of other fundamental rights, the retardation of cultural development and the imposition of order by force alone.

The French Government, for its part, has been quick to appeal to the Atlantic Pact Powers to support its attitudes towards Algeria and has already succeeded in obtaining permission from NATO High Command to withdraw French forces from Western Germany for use in Algeria. France is making every effort to put pressure on her friends and allies in case of the "internationalisation" of the problem.

The Algerian people are today being hard pressed by the forces of repression ranged against them. They know that their struggle for independence has entered a new and critical phase and that the sacrifices demanded of them are very great. They have accepted this and they have pledged themselves to stand united until final victory is achieved throughout North Africa. They know that in this struggle they are not alone, that millions throughout the world are watching their efforts with sympathy.

The Algerian people call upon the democratic forces in the world to take up the cause of Algerian freedom. The Algerians firmly believe that those who have so valiantly championed the cause of freedom in Morocco,

Tunisia and other parts of the world will not fail in their response to the people of Algeria. For Algeria is a part of the great struggle of peoples against the curse of colonialism, still powerful but yielding step by step to the irresistible forces of freedom.

WE ARE AT WAR*

BY THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

Where insurrectionary groups enjoy not military successes the emphasis on the survival and continued activism of the revolutionary group is primordial.

On 16th December, 1961, Unkhonto We Sizwe, military wing of the ANC, made it known that we, the oppressed people of South Africa, would fight for our rights. We made this known not only with words. Dynamite blasts announced it.

From 13th August, 1967, our men of Umkhonto We Sizwe, together with our brothers of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) have been fighting the oppressors in Matabeleland, Wankie and further south.

The Vorster government, through the radio and newspapers, continues to lie about this fighting.

The truth is very different from what these newspapers have reported. Our men are armed and trained freedom-fighters, not "terrorists." They are fighting with courage, discipline and skill. The forces of the Rhodesian racialists suffered heavy losses. So also did the white soldiers sent to Rhodesia by Vorster to save the Smith regime from collapse.

The freedom-fighters have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Apart from those who have been ambushed and killed, hospitals at Bulawayo and Wankie are crowded with wounded Smith and Vorster forces. Several South African helicopters and military transport planes have been brought down over the past three months.

The fighting will go on in Rhodesia and South Africa. We will fight until we have won, however long it takes and however much it will cost.

WHY WE FIGHT

To you, the sons and daughters of the soil, our case is clear.

The white oppressors have stolen our land. They have destroyed our families. They have taken for themselves the best that there is in our rich country and have left us the worst. They have the fruits and the riches. We have the backbreaking toil and the poverty.

We burrow into the belly of the earth to dig our gold, diamonds, coal, uranium. The white oppressors and foreign investors grab all this wealth. It is used for their enrichment and to buy arms to suppress and kill us.

In the factories, on the farms, on the railways, wherever you go, the hard, dirty, dangerous, badly paid jobs are ours. The best jobs are for whites only.

*Leaflet distributed by the African National Congress.

In our own land we have to carry passes: we are restricted and banished while the white oppressors move about freely.

Our homes are hovels: those of the whites are luxury mansions, flats and farmsteads.

There are not enough schools for our children; the standard of education is low, and we have to pay for it. But the government uses our taxes and the wealth we create to provide free education for white children.

We have suffered long enough.

Over 300 years ago the white invaders began a ceaseless war of aggression against us, murdered our forefathers, stole land and enslaved our people.

Today they still rule by force. They murder our people. They still enslave us.

ONLY BY MEETING FORCE WITH FORCE CAN WE WIN BACK OUR MOTHERLAND

We have tried every way to reason with the white supremacists. For many years our leaders and organizations sent petitions and deputations to Cape Town and Pretoria, even overseas, to London and the United Nations in New York. We organised mass demonstrations, pass-burnings, peaceful stay-at-homes.

What answer was given by the government?

Strikers and demonstrators were shot in cold blood. New acts of oppression and injustice were heaped upon us. Our leaders and spokesmen were banned, gagged, jailed, banished—even murdered. Our organisation, the African National Congress, was outlawed. Our meetings, journals and leaflets were prohibited.

The Nazi Vorster, who was interned for helping Hitler, is now the Prime Minister of South Africa. This man is the murderer of Mini, Mkaba, Khayingo, Bongco, Saloojee and other brave sons of Africa. He has condemned Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Mhlaba, Motsoaledi, Mlangeni, Kathrada, Fischer and many others to rot away in jails for life.

They have declared war on us. We have to fight back!

Our *Indian* brothers know full well the hardships and bitterness of white baaskaap rule. Since the time of Mahatma Ghandi and before, they have had to face persecution—attempts to deport them to India, Ghetto Acts, Group Areas and other forms of oppression.

The South African Indian Congress fought back. Led by men like Yusuf Dadoo, Monty Naicker and Nana Sita, the Indian community marched hand in hand with the ANC for liberty, for the rights of all South Africans.

Our *Coloured* brothers know how even the few privileges they were allowed—crumbs from the master's table—have been taken away from them. Votes, skilled jobs, trade union rights—one by one they are being taken away. Now apartheid madness is conscripting the Coloured youth into labour camps and jails for pass offenders. The ghetto walls grow

higher. That is why the Coloured People's Congress (CPC) pledged its support to the Freedom Charter and why its leaders are driven into jail or exile.

And what of the *white* minority? For years they have been misled by racist politicians, domineers and fascists who told them they were the superior race. They have followed the Vorsters and the de Villiers Graffs, and now they are being called upon to fight and die in defence of apartheid. Let them ask themselves: is it worth it? Has it brought anything but uncertainty and fear, isolation and contempt at home and abroad. Is this a future to fight and die for—a life in an armed camp, surrounded by the hate and anger of the oppressed non-white people?

The African National Congress, remembering also the Bram Fischers and the Dennis Goldbergs, calls on white South Africans to take their place on the side of liberty and democracy, the side of our freedom fighters—now *before it is too late*.

WHAT WE FIGHT FOR

We are fighting for democracy—majority rule—the right of the Africans to rule Africa. We are fighting for a South Africa in which there will be peace and harmony and equal rights for all people.

We are not racists, as the white oppressors are. The African National Congress has a message of freedom for all who live in our country.

WHAT YOU SHOULD DO

The battle has begun.

In Rhodesia, we have met the oppressors with guns in our hands! That was the start. Soon there will be battles in South Africa.

We will speak to them with guns, again and again, now here, now there until their day is done and apartheid destroyed for ever.

We call on you to be prepared.

Stand up and speak out against Vorster and his Nazis. Don't collaborate with them! Take courage from our immortal freedom-fighters who died in the name of freedom for all.

Our country will be free. We fight for all South Africans, for you and your children and your children's children

PREPARE TO SUPPORT OUR FIGHTING MEN!

Pass this message to your friends and relatives, throughout Southern Africa—in Botswana, Lesotho, South-West Africa, or Swaziland; in Rhodesia, Mozambique or Angola, and in every corner of South Africa itself.

HELP THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS!

MAKE THEIR PATH EASY! Make the enemy's path hard!

WE ARE ANSWERING THE WHITE OPPRESSORS IN THE LANGUAGE THEY HAVE CHOSEN! THIS IS A WAR TO

DESTROY APARTHEID, TO WIN BACK OUR COUNTRY FOR
ALL OUR PEOPLE!

WE SHALL WIN! FORWARD TO VICTORY OR DEATH!
AFRIKA! MAYIBUYE! AMANDLA NGAWETHU!
MATLA KE AFONA! POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Insurgent Methods

COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS*

BY DOUGLAS PIKE

Successful insurgent movements are usually characterized by effective communications with the indigenous population. The Viet Cong employed a broad, highly sophisticated concept of social communication.

The three basic means by which ideas are more or less systematically communicated are mass media, such as radio, television, newspapers, magazines, books;¹ the so-called informal channels of communication—word of mouth, rumor, gossip, itinerant peddlers; and social movements or social organizations, in which the organization itself—for example, a church or the Boy Scouts—acts as the channel, communicating not only ideas but also facts, data, and value judgments. The NLF used all three but relied on the third, the social movement, as its chief medium of communication. It is with this phenomenon, together with one other Communist communication device—the agit-prop cadre—that we are chiefly concerned here.

In a sense it is false and misleading to treat the NLF's communication effort as a separate entity. In truth, almost every act of the NLF was conceived as an act of communication. Its use of the communication matrix went beyond the normal social role as understood elsewhere. Its communication system not only communicated information, explained it in meaningful terms, and provided it with a value judgment based on individual relevancy—the more or less traditional communication function—but it also shaped a communication weapon and used it to strike at the vitals of the GVN. Its victories and defeats were essentially the result of successful or unsuccessful communication efforts.

THEORY OF COMMUNICATION

The general characteristics of the NLF communication process were these:

1. The specially created social movements, such as the various liberation associations, became the primary vehicles for communication. Their activities were managed directly or indirectly by the agit-prop cadres and others using both traditional channels, such as word-of-mouth and

*Excerpts from "Communication of Ideas," Chapter 7, in *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966. Reprinted with the permission of M.I.T. Press, copyright holder.

face-to-face communication, and mass media, the latter chiefly designed as a reinforcement.

2. Using this *apparai*, a theoretical formula was employed that first established a claim to truth in terms of basically rational appeals. This was not a full-blown ideology, Marxism or any other, so much as it was the conversion of specific ideas into actions and the transformation of abstract concepts such as nationalism into social levers. Second, using nonrational appeals, the emotions of the villagers were tapped, and passions, chiefly hatred, were generated. Third, a commitment to action was demanded, even if only a token act or gesture.

3. The Communist concept of communication predominated, with the Chinese rather than the Soviet experience serving as the model. As in China, great premium was placed on mass psychological techniques such as rallies, demonstrations, parades, movements (similar to China's "Back to the Countryside" movement), group criticism and individual denunciation campaigns, neighborhood and work meetings, and other forms of organizational communication, often with the mass social organizations acting as media.

4. The communication of ideas was viewed not as a separate act but as an integral part of the Revolution; communication was a seamless web. It was based on the orthodox Communist distinction between agitation and propaganda, derived from the famous Plekhanov (and Lenin) distinction between an agitator as one who presents only one or a few ideas to a mass of people and a propagandist as one who presents many ideas to one or a few persons; this approach was necessary, it was held, because the masses could not be expected to understand Marxism-Leninism but nevertheless must be imbued with the proper spirit so that they would work and sacrifice for the cause. Propaganda thus consisted of theoretical indoctrination through which Party members were armed with scientific knowledge of the laws that govern society, or almost the exact opposite meaning of the word as used in non-Communist countries. In functional terms, agit-prop² activities were conceived as a servo-mechanism by means of which the rural Vietnamese were indoctrinated with a certain set of values and beliefs as the necessary first step, the formation of the masses into an organizational weapon. It was often reiterated in internal documents, as in the following PRP statement:

Agit-prop work is directed at the masses, for the benefit of the masses, and must involve the masses doing propaganda work under Party guidance. Thus the propaganda target is the masses, and the propaganda force is also the masses, but in the second case the masses are organized and educated by the Party, in associations, groups, organizations, etc.

5. Although communication efforts were conducted simultaneously on various levels and with differing and often contradictory themes, the key communicator at all levels was the agit-prop cadre. He was no mere technician but one who sat at the highest policy determining levels and who at the lower echelons tended to dominate all activities, not just

agit-prop work. He was regarded as an instructor who explained NLF policies and programs in terms the ordinary rural Vietnamese could understand, using whatever arguments seemed most likely to be effective. Mass media, where they did exist, were never regarded as strong enough in themselves to convince the unconvinced.

6. Although the successes of the communication program were not due to its Marxist content so much as to its pragmatic arguments, the appeals were rooted in fundamental Communist doctrine: the united-front concept, class consciousness, and the historically determined inevitable triumph of the cause. Contamination of the communication system was reduced by requiring cadres to use Radio Liberation and Radio Hanoi as basic sources of material and by postcommunication audits at higher levels.

7. The NLF communication system suffered from standard Communist communication weaknesses: obtuseness, formalism, irrelevancy, and ultraconformity.

This summary and the following sections on social movements as communication devices and on agit-prop work were taken from two key documents that fell into GVN hands in mid-1962. The first was an NLF document entitled *Directive on Information, Propaganda, Agitation, and Cultural Activities for 1961*. It was written at the Central Committee level for use at the provincial level and contained an analysis of GVN rural communications efforts, an assessment of the rural climate of opinion, a critique of NLF communication efforts during 1961, and a master plan for its communication work during 1962. The second, a PRP document entitled *Training of Propaganda, Cultural and Educational Workers at the District and Village Levels*, was prepared for lower-echelon agit-prop cadres and dealt with specific agit-prop techniques and organization, the staffing of agit-prop and armed propaganda teams, and the use of culture and education (or indoctrination).

The first document was highly theoretical, the second concrete and practical. Taken together, they portrayed the full range of the NLF-PRP communication process; dozens of other documents, as well as more than 4,000 NLF propaganda leaflets subsequently collected, illustrated in detail the basic concepts outlined in the two major directives. Both documents stressed the importance of agit-prop work. The PRP cadre directive outlined it in specific terms:

Daily the masses are oppressed and exploited by the imperialists and feudalists and therefore are disposed to hate them and their crimes. But their hatred is not focused; it is diffuse. The masses think their lot is determined by fate. They do not see that they have been deprived of their rights. They do not understand the purpose and method of the Revolution. They do not have confidence in us. They swallow their hatred and resentment or resign themselves to enduring oppression and terror, or, if they do struggle, they do so in a weak and sporadic manner. For all these reasons agit-prop work is necessary to stir up the masses, to make them hate the enemy to a high degree, to make them understand their rights and the purpose and method of the Revolution, and to develop confidence in our capability. It is necessary to change the attitude of the masses from a passive one to a desire to struggle strongly, to take part more and more violently to win their rights for survival. Good or bad results in our Revolution depend on whether agit-prop action

to educate and change the thinking of the masses * is good or bad. Every person in the Revolution therefore must know how to conduct propaganda. It follows that the [agit-prop] task is a very important one. During the Resistance, this task made the armed struggle possible. At the present time, with our struggle movement approaching, it is the unique weapon the Party and the masses use to strike at the enemy. Therefore a Party member must, in all circumstances—even when he has fallen into enemy hands—continue by all means to make propaganda for the Party under the slogan "Each Party member is a propagandist."

Explaining the difference in approach between efforts during the Viet Minh war and the later period, the document declared:

During the Resistance our struggle approach was to arm all the people and have them engage in guerrilla warfare. At that time we had a slogan, "Propaganda action is half the resistance work." At the present time we pursue a political struggle combined with the armed struggle, which presents to the world three faces: political struggle, armed struggle, and struggle among the enemy. . . . It is the present policy of the Party that after completing the indoctrination work in the Party, Youth League, and other mass-based revolutionary organizations, we begin to reach the masses by propaganda in depth, by meetings in hamlets and villages, word-of-mouth communication. In this, the first action is agit-prop work, . . . which serves two purposes: a means of persuading the masses to participate in the political struggle movement against the enemy and, second, it is a [propaganda] weapon we place in the hands of the masses in their political attack on the enemy. The masses themselves therefore must be trained in the use of propaganda arguments. What we must do is to influence public opinion so as to get the masses to stop the enemy and win over officials of the enemy administration and enemy troops.

The NLF Central Committee directive took a somewhat longer view:

In all phases of the Revolution, the Party's agit-prop effort is vital and must not be neglected. . . . Our programs and policies and our effort to develop Party leadership of the Revolution require that the Party make every effort to develop agit-prop potential and in this way develop and widen Party influence among the masses.

The end result of agit-prop activity, both documents clearly stated, was not to be passive belief or acceptance by the people but actions by them against the GVN in the form of propaganda activities, one of the several forms that the struggle movement could take. Said the NLF Central Committee directive:

If the masses take part in propaganda action it is because it will serve their interests. Because they want to keep their land, peasants persuade each other to take up the struggle. Because they want to protect their homes and property and fight against regrouping [i.e., relocating], the masses take up the *binh van* movement.

Again the PRP cadre directive was more specific:

Agit-prop cadres must get the masses to invent propaganda arguments to use during struggle movements. . . . The masses already have developed many slogans such as "Struggle against shelling and bombing," . . . "Struggle against the strategic hamlet and agrovillage," . . . "Struggle against conscription," . . . "Struggle against looting," . . . and "Americans get out." During struggles, the masses themselves have invented many other arguments to deal with the enemy and stop terrorism.

The importance of agit-prop work was outlined succinctly in a document issued a year later by the Long An province central committee:

It helps the masses understand the Party's programs and policies. . . , assists in unmasking the U.S.-Diem plot to keep the masses poor and miserable, and helps them realize their condition is not due to their bad luck or ignorance, and thus causes the masses to hate the enemy and to sacrifice for the Revolution. . . . It promotes unity and helps organize the people in the struggle. . . .

THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT AS COMMUNICATION CHANNEL

With the social organization as a communication device we reach the heart and the power of the NLF. Here lay the solution to the mystery that for so long puzzled knowledgeable and thinking Americans: How could the NLF achieve success in the face of overwhelming GVN military superiority and massive inputs of American material resources for civic action programs to alleviate economic grievances? Not superior ideology, not more dedicated personnel, not because voluntary support of the villager had been won, but the social movement shaped into a self-contained, self-supporting channel of communication—that was the NLF's secret weapon.

Working from the fundamental assumption that if an idea could be rooted in the group it would become strong, durable, and infinitely more difficult to counter, the NLF created a communication structure far beyond any simple propaganda organization and plunged to depths far below mere surface acceptance of a message by an individual. In the hands of the agit-prop cadres the social movement as a communicational device made these contributions to the NLF cause:

1. It generated a sense of community, first, by developing a pattern of political thought and behavior appropriate to the social problems of the rural Vietnamese village in the midst of sharp social change and, second, by providing a basis for group action that allowed the individual villager to see that his own efforts could have meaning and effect.
2. As an organization's armature, it mobilized the people, generating discontent where it did not exist, exacerbating and harnessing it where it did, and increasing especially at the village level the saliency of all the NLF appeals.
3. It altered to at least some degree the villager's information input, perception of the world, attitude toward government, and daily actions in and out of the village. It changed underlying beliefs and even caused villagers to do things to their own disadvantage.
4. In a self-reinforcing manner it fostered integration of the NLF belief system, turning heterogeneous attitudes into homogeneous ones; the social facilitation or interstimulation that resulted canalized and intensified village feelings, reactions, and aims. Thus even when the NLF organization turned coercive as it finally did, members continued to hold imported and alien values and norms.
5. It greatly facilitated the NLF's efforts to polarize beliefs, stereotype anti-NLF forces, and generally shift villagers' attention in the directions chosen by the NLF leadership. As does any social organization, it caused the villager to rationalize more easily, being influenced by those around him. Since resistance to suggestion, that is, critical judgment, is lower within a group, it caused him to accept spurious arguments more easily and to succumb more quickly to emotional or personal appeals by the cadres and the village NLF leaders. Once critical judgment was impaired, the villager soon came to confuse desire with conviction.

6. Once momentum in the group was developed, the group itself tended to restrict freedom of expression to the sentiments acceptable, to the NLF-created group norms. The individual became submerged, the group became the unit, and great social pressure was brought to bear against the deviant, thus achieving the ultimate NLF objective—a self-regulating, self-perpetuating revolutionary force.

7. Finally, because it helped cut social interaction and communication with the social system represented by the GVN, it isolated the villagers and heightened the sense of conflict between the two systems.

The significance of the social movement as a communicational device and the contribution it made to the NLF effort cannot be stated too strongly. Its essential importance was clearly grasped by the NLF from the earliest days, the result of lessons learned in the Viet Minh war. A 1961 document declared:

An enlightened people if unorganized cannot be a force to deal with the enemy. . . . Therefore organization of the masses is essential, it facilitates our cause in all ways. . . . The [social movement] provides a strong force to oppose the enemy, it makes the Party's task much easier, [and] it both provides an audience for the agit-prop cadre and facilitates further agit-prop work. The [social movement] is a measure of our physical and moral strength, it is a practical way of both serving the people's interests and guaranteeing Party leadership among the people, it is the decisive element in the Revolution.

What the NLF leadership realized—and was all too poorly understood in the United States—was that social organizations are especially potent communication devices in underdeveloped countries. Yet the process is in no way alien to Americans, with their proclivity for the voluntary organization. The Boy Scout movement, for example, transmits and inculcates a whole complex of beliefs, the scope of which is indicated by the twelve Scout laws. A college fraternity can heavily indoctrinate an impressionable youth, shape his political beliefs and economic values, even dictate what sort of a wife to choose. This is done not as a premeditated brainwashing scheme but simply as a by-product function of the organizational essence or nature of its being. What the NLF did was deliberately to create such an organizational structure specifically to transmit information, data, ideals, beliefs, and values.

THE AGIT-PROP TEAM

The Communist institution of the agit-prop cadre is generally well known but little understood by Americans. Its utility to the NLF was so great that it has been singled out from other communication methods for special consideration here. Let us begin by inspecting the visit of a hypothetical NLF agit-prop team to a Vietnamese village.

The team approaches in late afternoon and has a rendezvous outside the hamlet with a Party member or sympathizer who carefully briefs it on developments in the village or hamlet since the team's last visit; he lists the local grievances, local animosities, the most disliked persons in the village.

At dusk the team enters the hamlet with a great deal of fanfare.

shaking hands, greeting people, carrying with it an aura of excitement, a break in the village monotony. Villagers are asked to assemble voluntarily at some central location. One old man, known to be irascible and intractable, announces loudly he'll be damned if he'll listen to a bunch of agitators. The team chief ostentatiously excuses him. However, should a sizable number of villagers indicate reluctance to attend, the team chief grows stern and indicates by gesture and manner that it would be well to give the members of the Revolution at least an opportunity to present their message. So the villagers gather.

The session begins with a short talk by the team chief in which he mixes flattery of the villagers' spirit, sympathy for their plight, and the hint that he will present later a message of great importance.

An interlude of singing and quasi-entertainment follows. The team chief or one of the members leads the villagers in a traditional folk song known and loved by all South Vietnamese. When it ends, the song leader announces that he has written new words to the old melody that he would like to teach the villagers. He recites the verse, which carries a class consciousness and revolutionary message, and after the villagers learn the words, he leads them through it several times.

Then comes the main speech, lasting up to an hour. The team chief has previously received from the interzone agit-prop section a directive outlining current themes to be stressed; they are biological warfare and cholera in an anti-American context. These are carefully fixed to local grievances. He tells the villagers: "Your harvest this year was not so large as in years past. The reason for this is that the Americans are conducting in South Vietnam something called defoliation. Strange chemicals are sprayed from airplanes, killing crops and foliage instantly. It is true that no planes have been seen, for none has sprayed within fifty kilometers of the village. But these chemicals can be carried vast distances, even halfway around the world, by the wind. What has happened is that some of the noxious chemicals have drifted over the village and fallen on the crops, stunting their growth and causing a lower yield." It is also believed by the villagers that there is cholera in the village. "This isn't really cholera but a germ disease for which there is no cure, also spread by the Americans." He continues to recite local fears, grievances, and problems, ascribing them all to some action by the Americans or officials in Saigon. He recounts atrocities committed in nearby areas. As a closer, he tells the villagers that the only way they can fight this injustice, the only way they can survive, in fact, is to join with the NLF and work for a General Uprising, after which there will be peace, economic abundance, and freedom for all.

The general meeting breaks up and the submeetings begin. The farmers gather to be addressed by the team's Farmers' Liberation Association representative, women by the Women's Liberation Association representative, and the youth by the Youth Liberation Association representative. In these meetings appeals are further refined and pin-

pointed, and a theme employed in one group is often inconsistent with one employed in another. For example, farmers are told that all the NLF asks from them is a small financial donation; the women are told the NLF army will protect their village and provide complete security; the youths may be urged to enlist in the NLF army and may be told that they must be prepared to sacrifice even their lives for the Revolution.

The villagers then reassemble in a large meeting that becomes participational. Questions are solicited, including those critical of the NLF. The team chief, a master at handling the barbed comment or loaded question, handles these with ease. Some questions may be fed him by covert Party members living in the village.

In the midst of this question period the team chief, in a demonstration of omniscience, casually remarks that he knows there are enemy agents in the group. He points to Mr. Ba and says "I know he is an enemy agent and will report to the village chief tomorrow about this meeting." The villagers know this is true. But the team chief takes no action against Mr. Ba and simply goes on with the meeting.

Then comes the *pièce de résistance*, a dramatic skit presented by the team. It is a highly entertaining little drama set in Saigon, involving a taxi driver played by the team chief, a Vietnamese girl played by the woman team member, and an American played by another team member. The American accosts the young girl and makes an indecent proposal that is overheard by the taxi driver, who comes to her rescue. There is a lengthy dialogue between the taxi driver and the American—full of double entendres and ribald remarks at the expense of the American, which delights the villagers. The drama becomes a verbal contest between the Vietnamese and the American, and the American is thoroughly confused, deflated, shattered, and defeated. The taxi driver and the girl go off together.

Then the team departs, scattering leaflets in its wake or pasting them to trees and walls, and it hoists and NLF flag.

THE AGIT-PROP CADRE

Agit-prop activity rested on the fundamental NLF assumption that the personal intermediary was the most potent form of communication. On the agit-prop, he was constantly told, rested the burden of the Revolution. A steady flow of messages from higher headquarters constantly reminded him of the complexity of his task and the high degree of skill that he must employ daily, for the NLF knew what all professional communicators know: that the simple communication of facts is often ineffectual in changing men's opinions, majority opinion reinforced by social pressure counts for much more than expert opinion or leadership assertions, and people tend to misinterpret what they hear or read to suit their own preconceptions. And the NLF knew that, working within such complexities, technique counted for all.

Next to technique, the personality of the individual agit-prop cadre was

of chief importance. The ideal cadre was a model of dedication, sobriety, skillfulness.⁴ Agit-prop cadres were chosen, a directive noted, "from among those who have a clean past, who are virtuous in behavior, and who know how to arouse the masses".⁵

The previously cited Central Committee directive listed the duties of the agit-prop cadres in a general way:

To direct the masses toward political struggle, armed struggle, or action among troops [by] directing the thinking of the masses toward the Revolution; to arouse hatred for the enemy in the masses and at the same time to enlighten them about their interests; to consolidate their faith and generate revolutionary enthusiasm.

The cadre directive listed his duties specifically as to:

(1) promote hatred of the enemy; (2) show the people it is in their interest to support the Revolution, for it serves them, (3) teach the people the meaning and techniques of the political struggle . . . ; (4) develop the people's faith and self-confidence in achieving revolutionary successes and maintain their enthusiasm.

As GVN battlefield interdiction began to take a heavy toll among agit-prop cadres and as the NLF grew in size, increased numbers of cadres were required, and infiltration by Northern-trained agit-prop cadres increased. Several of those who were captured gave interrogators a word picture of the training they had received in the North. It consisted of two parts: a session in political indoctrination and one in agit-prop techniques. The first, usually lasting two weeks, involved indoctrination in these major subjects: the world-wide advance of communism; socioeconomic progress being made in the DRV; the role of youth, a chief target in the task of building socialism and of liberating the South; the sociopolitical situation in the South; and the NLF and its successes. At the end of this period the inept were weeded out and final selection of infiltrators made. The remaining group then received about ten days of further training in the specific techniques of agit-prop work.

The outer limits of accomplishment of the agit-prop cadres, in objective terms, appeared to be these: At best they hoped to shape villager opinion to such a degree that the villager would support the cause of his own volition; the least they tried to do, when greater achievement was not possible, was to confuse the opinions and emotions of the villager so that he became indecisive and thus ineffectual in providing support to the GVN. Within this range the agit-prop cadres sought to instigate strife along class lines. They dealt in misinformation, exaggeration, and distortion. They concealed or misstated Communist intentions. They drew attention to and inflated real or trumped-up village grievances.

Wooly-mindedness and lack of specificity were the major short-comings of the cadres, who were instructed to allow their work to grow naturally out of the exigencies of the moment. Cadres were instructed to

study and understand both technique and policy . . . Good technique does not consist of collecting materials about our policies and programs and then giving a "certified copy" to the masses. Neither does it mean picking up a megaphone and explaining general policies in a general way. It means ceaseless effort and taking detailed care to persuade the masses, to clarify their thinking. . . . Many cadres simply distribute slogans, and the result is that the masses know the slogans but do not know what actions to take.

Specificity of theme directed toward specific social elements was also stressed:

Among poor peasants it is necessary to stress the class-conflict viewpoint . . . Among middle-class peasants, stress our agrarian policies, that peasants will be owners of land and rice fields. . . . Among religious groups, show how the Revolution will bring them concrete benefits in the form of religious freedom, and at the same time create class consciousness and strengthen the revolutionary struggle. . . . Among the intermediate classes, those between the worker-peasant class and the petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie, according to individual and group understanding about the NLF and the Party, conduct clever agitation to widen the Front and Party influence; for instance, stress and emphasize the just and correct policies of the Front and the Party. . . . Among the masses, popularize the Front and Party plans and programs, the successes scored in socialist and Communist countries. . . . When the enemy talks about famine in North Vietnam do not deny there is famine but talk about the unending increases in food production in the North. The enemy will say the Communists are bloodthirsty dictators. We should point to their crimes. . . . Maintain the upper hand in counterpropaganda. Meet the enemy's anticommunist charges by promoting class consciousness through the *dan van* movement.

An agit-prop cadre could operate in a team or alone. In the latter case he was told to

take every opportunity for agitation. . . . On a busy train, in a bar, at a private party, make the subject lively and raise the level of the class consciousness of the individuals present according to the circumstances. . . . But be careful not to reveal yourself and avoid talking too much. . . . Here is a good example: Take a newspaper that carries a story about a certain man named A who committed suicide because he was unable to find a job. Bring up the subject of the newspaper story and then lead the conversation to the general subject of jobs, unemployment, the difficulties of earning a living, etc. In this way people are invited to complain about the hardships they face. From this seek an opportunity to incriminate American aid as a source of this state of unemployment and starvation.

Also commonly employed in the earlier days was the "root-and link" device. A Party member looked for a prospective "root" whom he would meet, talk with, and win over, after which he would educate him. This root then became a "link" who looked for other roots, and thus a "chain" was formed. This did not necessarily involve Party membership or any form of formal organization. It was a transmission belt for propaganda, highly directed, specifically oriented, and very personal. The root-and-link device was an effort to make use of traditional channels of communication. NLF output referred to it and similar devices as word-of-mouth propaganda, which it described as:

the principal medium of both covert and overt propaganda. It is direct. It enables us to present our views clearly and to understand immediately the response of the individual. We can by this means offer on the spot a solution to his problems and at the same time mobilize thinking. . . .

Agit-prop teams also employed a vast number of psychological tricks, of which the following is an example. After the important NLF victory at Ap Bac in 1963, guerrilla units moving away from the battlefield passed through villages carrying, on a stretcher-like affair, a bulky item covered by a huge blue cloth. The band would stop for water in a village and the four bearers of the cloth-covered apparatus would set it down without comment. Villagers would gather around and exhibit curiosity about what was under the cloth. The guerrilla leader warned them not to get

near it. Then, as their curiosity reached the bursting point, the leader would say: "Under this blue cloth is a new secret weapon. By means of it we shot down dozens and dozens of the enemy's helicopters at Ap Bac." The band would then finish its marching break, the four bearers would pick up the device, still covered by the blue cloth, and depart. Other techniques employed by agit-props included those that piqued the Vietnamese sense of humor:

It is possible to use riddles during such events [the incident that the agit-prop cadre is capitalizing on], such as this one we used in the [1960] presidential elections: "The head is fascist. The rear is colonialist. The hands and feet are feudalists. The mouth is republican. What is it? (Answer. Diem)." Once these have been devised it is necessary to spread them to the towns and cities. . . . Ask [loaded] questions of the administration authorities or of soldiers and officers. One can pretend to be an ignorant farmer and ask an army officer in the market place: "What exactly have the people of Binh Ninh done to cause the killing of so many of them?" This technique can also be used in the *binh van* movement.

The individual behavior of the agit-prop cadres received close supervisory attention by the leadership, for the cadre was the NLF representative most often seen by the villagers, and their opinion of him to a great degree determined their attitude toward the more abstract aspects of the NLF.

* * * * *

NOTES

¹ See the author's monograph *Viet Cong Communication Techniques* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1966; No. C/66-11), which treats in some detail the methods employed by the NLF in communicating its ideas. For a much shorter version of this monograph see the author's *Vietnam: Communication Factors of Revolutionary Guerrilla War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1965; No. C/65-16).

² Originally the standard term for agit-prop in Vietnamese was *tuyen huan*, a contraction of *tuyen truyen*, meaning propaganda, and *huan tuyen*, literally, training, but more precisely agitation in the Communist sense. Beginning in mid-1962 the NLF started using the term *tuyen van giao*, usually abbreviated as TVG, a contraction of *tuyen truyen* (propaganda), *van nghe* (meaning culture or letters and arts or literature and the fine arts, similar to the French *beaux arts et belles lettres* or *la literature et les beaux arts*, but with a Confucian literary overtone), and *giao duc* (meaning education or, in the Marxist sense, indoctrination). After mid-1962 the NLF generally employed the TVG term, and the GVN continued to refer to these activities as *tuyen huan*, or agit-prop; at the same time the NLF continued to use the term *chinh tri* (political) *tuyen truyen* or, roughly, political propaganda. The significant difference is that TVG referred to communication activities within the NLF system, the liberated area, and among the masses, and *chinh tri tuyen truyen* connoted activities directed against the GVN. In order to maintain this distinction, the only important one to the reader, and to simplify reference as much as possible, the term agit-prop is used here to mean cadre TVG activities and the word propaganda by itself to mean those mass activities that are part of the struggle movement and designed to influence the enemy. Since at the lower echelons virtually all communication activity was in the hands of a single individual, the agit-prop (or TVG) cadre, this over-qualification of usage cannot be regarded as particularly serious. What must be borne in mind, however, is the distinction between the agit-prop (or TVG) work by the cadres seeking to motivate the masses and the propaganda work by the masses themselves as part of their struggle movement.

³ In Vietnamese, *chuan bi nhan tam*, literally, "preparing man's heart": to prepare the people for the coming drive, that is, to shape public opinion or win people's support.

⁴ A cadre directive noted that "the purpose [of agit-prop work] is to mobilize the people's thinking. This is an ideological struggle that is complex and hard to carry out. It requires

time and painstaking efforts. A cadre should be patient, should follow up on each individual, and should repeat the same theme over and over. He should endeavor ceaselessly. He should build durable support and should not become discouraged. He should set an example for the masses, for unless we do how can we expect the masses to follow us? . . . He should behave modestly, listen to the people talk. . . . He should be humble. . . ."

⁵ The best cadres, it added, are those who "ceaselessly study [Party] directives and policies, consolidate their thinking, and improve their virtuous revolutionary behavior. At the same time they remain humble and listen to the judgment of the masses. . . . Cadres not only must know programs and policies but also must feel hatred when they witness killings and oppression of the masses. They must know the secret thoughts and interests of the masses, must share their joys and sadness, must be determined to work for the good of the masses, and must make every effort to influence the masses. They must suffer the hardships of the masses, for only in this way can they feel the suffering and sorrows of the masses. If cadres lack feeling, their propaganda will be emotionless and will not arouse the masses. Above all, . . . cadres must accept responsibility for the words they speak."

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACPW	Assistant Chief of Psychological Warfare
AC of S	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
ACTIV	Army Concept Team in Vietnam (U.S.)
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFN	American Forces Network
Agitprop	agitation and propaganda
AIC	(Cambodian Information Agency)
AID	Agency for International Development
AMLANFOR	American Land Forces (Lebanon crisis)
APT	armed propaganda team
AR 360-55	U.S. Army Regulation on "Public Information—Community Relations." (1957)
ARD	Audience Research Division (of Radio Liberty)
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD/ISA	Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCT(s)	battalion combat team (in the Philippines)
CA	Civil Affairs (U.S. Army)
CAO	Civil Affairs Office (in the Philippines)
CCP	Chinese Communist Party (People's Republic of China)
CEA	Council of Economic Advisors
Chicom	Chinese Communists
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIC	Counterintelligence Corps
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group (in Vietnam)
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
COI	Central Office of Information (Great Britain)
COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam.
CONCP	Conferência de Organizacões Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies) (Portugal)
CONUS	continental United States

CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (South Vietnamese organization)
COSVIN	Central Office for South Vietnam (in North Vietnam)
CPOC	combined PSYOP center (in South Vietnam)
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRAC(s)	Community Relations Advisory Council(s)
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office (United Kingdom)
CTO	Communist Terrorist Organization (Malaya)
CSR	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
CTZ	corps tactical zone
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission (diplomatic)
DDRE	Director of Defense Research and Engineering
DENTCAP	Dental Civic Action Project
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DOCSA	Deputy Director for Operations (Counterinsurgency and Special Activities) (in the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DPRC	Defense Program Review Committee (of the National Security Council)
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EEI	essential elements of information
EUSAK	Eighth U.S. Army, Korea
ExCOM	Executive Committee of the National Security Council (of the United States)
FAR	Forces Armées Royales (Royal Armed Forces) (Laos)
FEC	Far East Command
FLING	Front pour la Libération et L'Indépendance Nationale de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (Front for the Liberation and National Independence of So-Called Portuguese Guinea)
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front) (Algeria)
FM27-10	U.S. Army Field Manual. <i>The Law of Land Warfare</i> , 18 July 1966
FM30-5	U.S. Army Field Manual. <i>Combat Intelligence</i> . 12 February 1971
FM41-10	U.S. Army Field Manual. <i>Civil Affairs Operations</i> , May 1962; August 1967; October 1969

FM31-22	U.S. Army Field Manual. <i>U.S. Counterinsurgency Forces</i> , November 1963
FM33-1	U.S. Army Field Manual. <i>Psychological Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine</i> . May 1965; June 1968; February 1971
FM33-5	U.S. Army Field Manual. <i>Psychological Operations, Techniques and Procedures</i> . October 1966
FRAIN	Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional (African Revolutionary Front for National Independence)
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
FUL	Front Uni de Libération de Guinée et du Cap Vert (United Liberation Front of Guinea and Cape Verde)
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces (in Vietnam)
G1	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Personnel
G2	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
G3	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations
G4	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Logistics
G5 (G5/S5)	Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Civil Affairs
GPW	Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949
GPW 1929	Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department (Republic of Vietnam)
Green Berets	nickname for the Special Forces of the U.S. Army
GVN	Government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
ICA	International Cooperation Administration (a predecessor of the Agency for International Development, AID)
ICC	International Control Commission for Indochina
IG(s)	Interdepartmental Group(s) (of the National Security Council Systems)
IMG	International Media Code
IMV	The Motion Picture and Television Service (of the U.S. Information Agency)
IOP	Office of Policy and Plans (in the U.S. Information Agency)
IOR	Office of Research and Assessment (in the U.S. Information Agency)
IPW	prisoner of war interrogation

IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA	International Security Affairs
ITV	Independent Television Authority (Great Britain)
J1	Personnel Directorate (in the Joint Staff)
J3	Operations Directorate (in the Joint Staff)
J4	Logistics Directorate (in the Joint Staff)
J5	Plans and Policy Directorate (in the Joint Staff)
J6	Communications-Electronics Directorate (in the Joint Staff)
JCS	U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
<i>JCS Publ</i>	<i>Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage</i> (Joint Chiefs of Staff publication)
JUWTFA	Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Atlantic
JUSPAO	Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office
KCS	Kit Carson Scout (in Republic of Vietnam Chieu Hoi Program)
KGB	Committee Gossudarstvennoe Bezopostnosty (Committee of State Security)
KLP	Korean Labor Party (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)
KPA	Korean People's Army (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)
LOC	lines of communication (logistic routes)
MAAG(s)	Military Assistance Advisory Group(s)
MACJ3-11	The PSYOP Division of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Project (in Vietnam)
MI	military intelligence
MING	Movement for the National Independence of [Portuguese] Guinea
MLG	Mouvement de Libération de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (Liberation Movement of So-Called Portuguese Guinea)
MMT	mobile motivation team, or mobile medical team
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Angolan Popular Liberation Movement)
MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile
MTT	mobile training team

NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFORV	U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam
NCNA	New China News Agency
NHK	Nihon Broadcasting Corporation (Japan)
NLF	National Liberation Front (of South Vietnam)
NK	Sometimes used for North Korea
NSC	National Security Council
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum (of the National Security Council)
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum (of the National Security Council)
NVA	army of North Vietnam
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCPW	Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare
OCSW	Office of the Chief of Special Warfare
ODCSOPS	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
OEP	Office of Emergency Preparedness
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
ORO	Operations Research Office
ORTF	Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française (Office of the French National Radio and Television System)
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OWI	Office War Information
OWS	a translation of the popular abbreviation for the Russian phrase "one woman said"
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (African Party of the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PAO	Public Affairs Officer (U.S. Information Agency)
PIDE	Policia Internacional de Defesa de Estado (International Police for the Defense of the State) (Portugal)
PIO	Public Information Officer (in World War II)
PL	Pathet Lao (Laos)
PL	public law (usually followed by a number)
PLA	People's Liberation Army (People's Republic of China)
POW	prisoner of war

PRO	Communist Provincial Committee Headquarters (in South Vietnam)
PRP	People's Revolutionary Part (North Vietnamese-controlled party in South Vietnam)
PSYOP	psychological operations
PSYOP Annex	an annex to a tactical operations order
PSYWAR	psychological warfare
PW(s)	prisoners of war
RAR (4, 1 etc.)	Royal Australian Regiment
RDAG	Rassemblement Démocratique Africain de Guinée (African Democratic Assembly of Guinea)
RFE	Radio Free Europe
RF/PF	Rural Forces/Popular Forces (Vietnam)
RL	Radio Liberty
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
S5	Civil Affairs Officer (U.S. Army)
SAC	Strategic Air Command
<i>samizdat</i>	the private publication and circulation of one's own works (in the Soviet Union)
SCAME	a formula for analyzing propaganda that takes into account: Source, Content, Audience, Media, and Effects
SCAP	Supreme Commander Allied Powers
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
SOP(s)	standard operating procedure(s)
SVN	South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam)
TAOR	tactical area of responsibility
TDY	temporary duty (U.S. military)
TOE	table of organization and equipment (U.S. Army)
THVN	Government of South Vietnam Television
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (a specialized agency of the United Nations)
UPC	Union des Populations du Cameroun (Union of the Peoples of Cameroun)
UPG	Union des Populations de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (Union of the Peoples of So-Called Portuguese Guinea)
URGP	Union of Nationals of Portuguese Guinea

USAID(s)	U.S. AID missions
USARV	U.S. Army Vietnam
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service (includes most overseas operations of U.S. Information Agency—USIA)
USOM	United States Operations Mission
VC	Viet Cong
VIS	Vietnamese Information Service (Republic of Vietnam)
VOA	Voice of America
VPB	Voice of the People of Burma
WSAG	Washington Special Actions Group
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe Africa People's Union

AUTHOR INDEX

(Page numbers denote the first page of authors' essays. The two volumes of this book are numbered sequentially; Volume Two begins on page 477.)

- | | |
|---|--|
| Aaron, H. R., 420 | Harris, E., 412 |
| African National Congress, 1149 | Hausman, C. K., 181, 271 |
| Algerian Delegation in Cairo, 1146 | Hemphill, J. A., 512 |
| Allen, G. V., 368 | Henderson, J. W., 232 |
| ARVIN Captain, 307 | Herz, M. F., 403, 416, 678 |
| Askenasy, A. R., 67, 299 | Hollander, F. G., <i>See</i> Durham, F. G. |
| Bairdain, E. F., 898 | Holt, R. T., 754, 760 |
| Bairdain, E. M., 898 | Hoskins, M. W., 287 |
| Barghoorn, F. C., 1090 | Hurley, N. P., 919 |
| Barr, J. S., 735 | Janis, I. L., 609 |
| Barrett, R. J., 40 | Johns, J. H., 62, 144, 465 |
| Beeley, H., 186 | Johnston, W. F., 149, 397 |
| Beloff, M., 1075 | JUSPAO Planning Office, 133, 438, 744, 755 |
| Berger, C., 407, 670, 689, 713 | JUSPAO Planning Staff, 682 |
| Bogart, L., 957 | Katagiri, T., 137, 220, 246 |
| Bohannan, C. T. R., 440 | Katz, P. P., 22, 478, 572 |
| Brandon, J. R., 739 | Kelly, G. A., 248 |
| Broman, B. M., 722 | Lanigan, J. D., 694 |
| Brzezinski, Z., 1028 | Lansdale, E. G., 762, 767 |
| Bullard, M. R., 461, 1105 | Latin American Solidarity Organization, 1142 |
| Choukas, M., 726 | Lerner, D., 47 |
| Clarkson, E. J., 758 | Lescage, L., 728 |
| Cooper, B. H., 229, 241, 262, 379, 380, 386 | Le Vine, V. T., 234 |
| Dasbach, A. M., 720 | Linebarger, P. M. A., 666 |
| Daugherty, W. E., 18, 80, 121 | Little, J. M., 585 |
| Davis, M., 191, 698, 702 | Long Chuong Fac, 508 |
| Delaney, R. F., 1 | Lorimer, E. S., 886 |
| de Sola Pool, I., 1043 | Lovett, C. B., 413 |
| Donnell, J. C., 480 | McAulay, A. H. D., 340 |
| Dunn, S. W., 886 | McKay, V., 1122 |
| Durham, F. G., 711 | Macy, W. T., 408 |
| Editors, The, 85, 225, 382, 401, 684, 725 | Martin, L. J., 1011 |
| Ellul, J., 1050, 1065 | Miller, G. R., 624 |
| Eswara, H. S., 796 | Ministry of Defense, USSR, 346, 353 |
| Foote, A. E., 636 | Monroe, J. L., 855 |
| Free, L. A., 155, 364 | Moon, G. A., 326 |
| Friedrich, C. J., 1043 | Morris, M. A., 122 |
| Fulton, R. B., 542 | Morris, R. P., 946 |
| Furse, D., 357 | Moskos, C. C., 454 |
| Garver, R. A., 848 | Moynahan, B., 763 |
| Gergen, K., 314 | Murty, B. S., 699 |
| Gergen, M., 314 | Nathan, R. S., 125, 259, 673, 684 |
| Gessner, P., 680 | New Zealand Department of External Affairs, 1120 |
| Giza, R. H., 1100 | Niehoff, A. H., 770 |
| Gleason, R. L., 730 | Norton, J. H., 1059 |
| Glick, N., 718 | Okes, I. E., 590 |
| Grinter, L. E., 668 | |
| Guthrie, G. M., 306 | |

Orth, R. H., 506, 594, 658, 662, 790, 1003
Ozaki, J., 391

Pappas, D. G., 272
Pike, D., 716, 1152
Preston, H. O., 855
Price, J. R., 197

Quang, Phan Trong, 1115

Radio Free Europe, 806, 883, 913

Raffa, A. L., 855
Rao, Y. V. L., 939
Robinson, D. D., 778
Rolph, H., 996
Ronalds, F. S., 928
Rubin, B., 1084

Saral, T. B., 943

Schramm, W., 690, 765

7th PSYOP Group, 194, 495, 518, 534, 545,
547, 549, 606, 676, 687, 749, 784, 854,
1119

Simpson, H. R., 343

Smith, D. D., 985

Sparks, K. R., 111

Stone, V. A., 796

Sugden, G. S., 178

Szalay, L. B., 862, 878

Tanaka, Y., 20

Thebaud, C. C., 312

Thornton, T. P., 425

Too, C. C., 370

Tuck, R. L., 830

U. S. Information Agency, 553

Valeriano, N. D., 440

Valyuzhenich, A., 823

van de Velde, R. W., 754, 760

Watson, F. M., 53

Wechsler, I. R., 102

Whelan, J. G., 213, 333, 972

Wong, P., 836

Yamashita, K. S., 282

Yarborough, W. P., 337, 458, 587

Yoh, B., 1072

Yu, G. T., 1110

Zartman, I. W., 1130

Zorthian, B., 167

SUBJECT INDEX

(The two volumes of this book are numbered sequentially;
Volume Two begins on page 477)

Cheson, D.: 3, 156-157
 Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA): 100
 advertising: 2, 5
 African National Congress: 1149-1152
 age as prestige factor in communication: 755-758
 aged persons as communicators: 755-758
 agit-prop: 356, 399n(1), 1046-1041, 1048, 1157-1162
 AID (Agency for International Development): 96-98
 overseas operations, 97-98, 183
 Washington operations, 97
 aircraft as a communication channel: 730-735
 Algerian Delegation in Cairo: 1146-1149
America Illustrated: 720-722, 848-854
 Americal Division: 351
 American Specialist Program: 92
 Armed Forces Radio: 139-140
 Armed Propaganda Team (APT): 26
 Army Concept Team (ACTIV) report on PSYOP in Vietnam: 227-228
 Assembly of Captive European Nations: 198
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
 (ASD-ISA): 100
 attitude change (*see also* persuasion; persuasion theory): 624-635,
 658-662, 770-773, 796-805
 audience analysis: *See* target analysis
 audience, importance of in communication: 1027-1163
 audience research: *See* target analysis
 audience selection: *See* target analysis
Aux Frontières de l'Avenir: 1087

 "back translation": 507
 balloons as a communication channel: 727-728, 729
 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation): 5, 49, 186-191, 915-916,
 1079-1085
 Berlin airlift, PSYOP effect of: 50
 Berlo, D.: 24
 Bernays, Edward: 5
 "Biafra lobby": 703-705
 books, role of in communication: 1078
 British Broadcasting Corporation: *See* BBC
 British Council: 186-191, 1080-1084
 British Information Service: 186-191
 British PSYOP: *See* PSYOP, British
 broadcasting, international (radio and TV): 928-938
 broadcast monitoring, use of in PSYOP: 530
 Buchanan-Centril Adjective Check List: 806
 Bureau of applied Social Research: 28
 Burston-Marsteller Associates: 193

 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 8, 86-88, 113
 in Dominican intervention, 265
 Cameroon insurgency: 234-241
 cannon as a communication channel: 728-730
 Can't-i' H.: 70, 162-163
 captured documents, use of in PSYOP: 536-545, 950, 955-956, 996-1002

change agent (in communication): 770, 796-806
 channels of communication: *See* communication channels
 Chassin, Gen. L.: 254
 Chieu Hoi Program: 26, 28, 33, 152, 391-396, 408-411, 414, 416-420, 758, 911-913, 947, 953, 996-1002
Children Adrift: 924-925
China Pictorial: 1113
Chroniques de France: 1087
Civic Action: 54-55, '30 453-459
 civil affairs (civil-military relations): 58-60, 113, 256, 424, 444-454
 Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (in Vietnam): 339-340
 civilians, use of in PSYOP: 579-580
 Command and General Staff College survey of PSYOP effectiveness: 951-957
 communication
 cross-cultural, 282-305, 590-594, 667-668
 definition of, 65
 in developing countries, 939-943
 "development," *See* "development" communication
 as education (to inform), 24
 effects of new technology on, 9-10, 12, 107-109
 as entertainment, 24
 face-to-face, 695-696
 facilitative, 1012-1021
 functions of, 24
 from point of view of receiver, 24
 from point of view of sender, 24
 governmental, 1120-1130
 governmental international, 191-194, 1011-1021, 1075-1084
 interpersonal, 21, 23, 28, 35-36, 283-287
 mass media,
 in democratic societies, 1050-1058
 in totalitarian societies, 1028-1050
 nongovernmental international, 702-711
 nonverbal, 143
 persuasive (*see also* persuasion; propaganda), 21, 33-36, 609-624, 1012
 as propaganda (to persuade), 24
 purpose of, 33
 role of, 23-25
 total transmission, process of, 31-33
 communication channels: 26-27, 72, 759-773
 choice of, 693-698
 interaction among, 697
 non-governmental, 116, 191-194
 role of in communication, 25
 communication models: 36-39, 38 (fig.), 636-642
 "communication: process and effects" 553-571
 "communication revolution": *See* communication, effects of new technology on
 communication situation: 26
 Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT): 118
 communication techniques: 26
 communication theory: 20-21, 22-39, 366, 636-642, 770-773, 790-796, 985-988
 Communist ideology, use of to influence people: 1059-1065
 community relations: 55-56
 congruity theory: 887-897
 content analysis: 786-787, 835-862

content analysis (cont'd)
 computer, 836-848
 of documents from the People's Republic of China, 836-848
 of Ho Chi Minh's will, 606-608
 quantitative, 835-854
 of radio broadcasts, 534-536
 of rival communications, 855-862
 conversion effect (of communication): 47-49
 Cooley, C.: 22
 Coordinator of Information: 82
 counterinsurgency planning and operations: 83
 CPOC (combined PSYOP centers): 143, 246-248
 credibility:
 of communication, 32-33, 412-413, 531-532, 905-906
 of communicator (*see also* source analysis), 32, 49, 408-411, 642-649, 796-805
 Creel Committee (U.S. Committee for Public Information): 4
 Creel, G.: 4-5
 Cuban missile crisis: 46, 50, 129-130, 178-181, 259-261, 386-391
 Cultural Presentation Program: 93
 cultural troupes as a communication channel: 737
 culture-drama teams (in Vietnam): 744-749
 culture shock: 283-287
 customs, importance of in PSYOP: 508-510

 dance as a communication channel: 735-736
 Daugherty, W. E.: 32, 578
 Davis, E.: 6
 deception as a tactic in PSYOP: 760-761
 decoding (in communication theory): 284
 defection and surrender themes, combining: 416-420
 defectors, use of in PSYOP (*see also* Chieu Hoi Program): 518-534, 578-579, 668-670, 758
 Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) (of NSC): 88
 De Fleur, M.: 22
 Department of Defense (DOD): 98
 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 99
 PSYOP groups, 8
 Special Operations groups, 8
 deprecation of enemy as PSYOP theme: 106
 Deutsch, K.: 21
 Deutschmann, P. J.: 26
 "development" communication: 50-52, 943-946, 1062-1065, 1087-1089
 development (economic) and PSYOP: 144-149
 institution building, 144-149, 465-471
 role of communication in, 470-471
 role of military in, 146-149
 Dialogue: 718-719
 Dicks, H. V.: 490, 576, 578
 Dicks-Shills Questionnaire: 576
 Directive on Information, Propaganda, Agitation and Cultural Activities for 1961 (NLF):
 1154-1155
 dissemination: 141-142
 doctrine, PSYOP: *See* PSYOP doctrine
 dogmatism scale: 304
 Dominican intervention, PSYOP in: 229-232, 262-266, 454-457
 Donovan, Gen. William: 6
 drama as a communication channel: 24, 736, 739-749
 Drogheda Committee (British): 186, 1080

Dulles, J. F.: 3, 156
 Duncan Committee (British): 186-190
 Dyer, M.: 9
 "Earlyword" system: 725-726
 East German uprising (1953): 127-128
 EDCOR (Economic Development Corps—Philippines): 450-452
 Effects Analysis: *See* PSYOP effectiveness, measuring
 Eisenhower, President Dwight:
 and USIA, 104-105
 elites, political and cultural (*see also* key communicators): 297-298, 366, 561-562
 encoding (in communication theory): 284
 essential elements of information (EEI): 478-486, 495-498, 572-584
 definition, 479-480
 estimating foreign attitudes, 299-305
 Exchange of Persons Program, 93, 95
 exhibitions as a communication channel: 737-738
 "eye of God" technique: 756-770
 feedback: 21, 479
 films: *See* motion pictures
 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile): 948
 1st Infantry Division: 947
 1st PSYOP Battalion: 229-232
 foreign government officials as a communication channel: 706-707
 foreign legislators as a communication channel: 705-706
 foreign pressure groups as a communication channel: 703-705
 foreign policy and PSYOP: 85
 Fourteen Points: 2, 13(n), 68, 72
 4th Infantry Division: 949
 4th PSYOP Group: 137-144, 220-225, 246-248, 247 (fig.), 414
 frame of reference: 29-31
 France: *Panorama*: 1087
 Free Europe Exile Relations: 198
 Free Europe, Inc.: 198-211
 Free Europe Press: 198
 Fulbright Act: 110
 Fuller, J. F. C.: 18
 Galitzine and Partners: 193
 Giap, General: 397-398
 Goebbels, J., principles of propaganda: 329-332, 1030-1042
 gossip as a communication channel: 770-773
 governmental and intergovernmental reports, use of in PSYOP: 582
 groups, social (*see also* reference group): 23
 influence of on communication, 27
 "Gustav Siegfried Eins": 761
 Haines Board: 84
 Herz, M.: 672
 Ho Chi Minh: 398, 606-608
 Hoi Chanh: *See* Chieu Hoi Program
Hombre: 923
 Hovland, C. I.: 610, 1016
 Hungarian uprising: 129
 H. Wm. Bernhardt (agency): 193

Independent Television Authority (Great Britain): 1085
 indicators of PSYOP effectiveness: 946-957
 institution, building: *See* development (economic) and PSYOP
 insurgent appeals and methods *See* propaganda, insurgent
 intelligence: 57-58, 83
 model of PSYOP intelligence process, 479-486, 481 (fig.)
 utilization of in PSYOP, 477-495
 intelligence reports, use of in PSYOP: 549-553, 580-581
 Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) (of NSC): 87
 Interim International Information Service: 103
 international assistance, psychological aspects of: 314-326
 Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA): *See* AID
 international humanitarian organizations as a communication channel: 707-708
 International Media Guarantee (IMG) program: 116
 international organizations, PSYOP effects of: 50
 interpreters: 284, 313, 340-342
 interrogation: 517-518, 576, 578, 953-954
 "interviewer effects": 490
Izvestia: 712, 1039-1040
 ideology, Communist: 1059-1065
 ideology, expansion of U.S.: 823-829
 ideology, relationship to PSYOP: 7
 in USSR, 9

 Jackson, C. P.: 8
 Jackson, W.: 8, 128
 jamming: 982-984, 1045
 Janowitz, M.: 82
 JFK Center for Military Assistance: 33
John F. Kennedy, Years of Lightning, Days of Drums: 1124
 Johnson, Gen. H. K.: 225, 422
 Johnson, President Lyndon B.:
 and public opinion polls, 164-165
 and USIA, 107-116
 Joint Anglo-American Magazine Program: 126
 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): 99
 definition of PSYOP, 46
 Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force: 129-130
 Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO): 11, 96, 110-111, 130-132, 135-144, 182, 225-228
 organization and function, 232-234
 JUSPAO: *See* Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office
 JUWTF (Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Atlantic), writing of PSYOP annex
 for: 259-261

 Kennan, G.: 3
 Kennedy, President John F.: 10, 121-122, 178-181
 and public opinion polls, 163-164
 and USIA, 105, 115
 key audiences (*see also* target groups; key communicators): 480-484
 key communicators: 45, 297-298, 366, 662-666
 perception of U.S. by, 45
 Kit Carson Scouts: 357-358
 Klapper, J. T.: 25, 36, 1018
Kommunist: 1090

la guerre révolutionnaire: 248-259
 language training: 283-287, 312-313

Larson, A.: 6
 Lasswell, H. D.: 20, 24, 609, 611, 777
 Lazarsfeld, P.: 23, 609
 leaflets: 4, 26, 403-408, 670-673, 678-679, 684, 689-690, 713-716
 in Korean War, 713-716
 in Korea, 527-530
 in Lebanon intervention, 714-715
 in Malaya, 714
 in Vietnam, 716-717, 762-763, 901-905
 in World War II, 713-716
Le Boulevard de Saint Laurent: 926
 Lenin, V. I., views on propaganda and agitation: 356
 Lerner, D.: 72, 82, 484
 Lerner, M.: 3
 Lewin, K.: 609-611
Lilies of the Field: 923
 Linebarger, P. M. A.: 58, 63, 82, 589-590, 666-668
 Lippmann, Walter: 3, 5, 131
 Little, LTC J. T.: 458-459
 loudspeakers as a communication channel: 729-730, 901-905

 McLuhan, M.: 10, 116-117
 magazines: 718-719, 720, 721
 mail as a channel of communication: 699-700, 726-727, 739, 763-765
 Mallin, J.: 265
 Mao Tse-tung: 398
 Marks, L. B.: 108-109
 Martin, J. B.: 265
 Mass media: *See* communication, mass media
 media: *See* communications media; communication channels
 media, PSYOP: *See* communication channels
 media analysis: 788, 897-946
 qualitative, 913-946
 interviewing, 913-919
 quantitative techniques, 898-913
 Mégrét, L.: 258
 message composition: 670-692, 903-905
 importance of language in: 578-579
 importance of timing, 687-693
 messages (PSYOP)
 content of, 484-485
 Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs): 100
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV): 226-228
 military operations, psychological effects of: 70
 "Militaries" study: 254
Mint Tea: 925
 motion pictures (*see also* television, films): 680-682, 697, 701, 736-737, 943-946, 1084-1089
 use of in intercultural communications, 919-928
 movies: *See* motion pictures
 multinational corporations as a communication channel: 707
 Murrow, E. R.: 105-107, 115
 My Lai: 173

 national images: 806-823
 national policy and PSYOP: *See* PSYOP policy and national policy
 National Security Act of 1947: 86

national security and PSYOP (*see also* PSYOP policy and national policy): 2, 12-13, 40-41
 National Security Council (NSC): 86-88
 and Cuban missile crisis: 178-181
 National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM): 86, 88
 national security policy and public opinion: 155-166
 National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM): 86, 88
 national security system: 8, 85-101
 nationbuilding: 125, 465-471
Neue Auslese: 126
 New China News Agency: 195
 news broadcasts: 545-547
 Soviet, 711-713
 newspapers:
 international, 709-711
 in People's Republic of China, 29
 9th Infantry Division: 951
 Nixon Doctrine: 44
 NLF (National Liberation Front of North Vietnam): 25
 North Korean views:
 of People's Republic of China, 551-553
 of United States, 549-551
 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldier as a PSYOP target: 498-506

 ODCSOPS: *See* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
 Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française: 1086-1087
 Office of Strategic Services: *See* OSS
 Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW): 82-84
 Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs: 81-82, 103
 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (OSCSOPS): 84, 185
 Office of War Information (OWI): 82, 103
 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile): 949-951
 Open Sky Proposal (Eisenhower): 45
 "Operation Annie": 761
 "Operation Cornflakes": 763-765
 "Operation Mincemeat": 760-761
 "Operation Roundup": 414-416
 Operations Coordinating Board: 106
 Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS): 1142-1149
 organization, PSYOP. *See* PSYOP organization
 OSS (Office of Strategic Services): 6, 82

Peking Review: 1113
People's Daily (Renmin Ribao): 195
 People's Liberation Army (PLA) (People's Republic of China): 194-196,
 344-345, 1109-1105
 perception of the enemy: 71-72
 persuasion (*see also* attitude change): 790-796
 cross-cultural, 886-897
 definition of, 21
 international (*see also* communication, persuasive), 47-52, 1011-1021
 persuasion theory (*see also* attitude change): 21, 609-624, 1003, 1011
 bibliography of, 621-624
 persuasive communication: *See* communication
Phcebe: 925-926
 Pike, D.: 150-151
 Plowden Committee (British): 190

plays: *See* drama as a communication channel
 postage stamps, use in PSYOP: *See* mail as a communication channel
Pour Vous, Madame 1087
 POW cooperation in PSYOP. 406-407, 416-420, 487-488, 512
 as source of PSYOP intelligence, 512-518, 575-578, 725-726
 policy, PSYOP: *See* PSYOP policy
 "political development": 465-471
 political themes in PSYOP 405
 POLWAR: *See* PSYOP (*see also* PSYOP, South Vietnamese)
 populace and resources control. 60
 posters, 26
 practical jokes *are* PSYOP: 767-770
Pravda 712, 1039-1040, 1091
 press, the (*see also* newspapers).
 government relations with, 167-173
 military security and, 172
 role in society, 168-169
 in Vietnam, 167-174
 primary group: 64-67
 role in communication, 28
 printed media. 696-697, 700, 939-942, 1046-1048
 in developing countries, 339-943
 prisoner treatment as PSYOP theme: 404-405
 Project Falling Leaves: 413-416
 propaganda (*see also* PSYOP; communications, terminology for PSYOP). 1011-1021, 1075-1141
 African, 1122-1141, 1146-1152
 definition of, 1012
 East Asian, 1105-1115
 East European, 1090-1105
 grey and black, 8, 678-679, 720-721, 761
 and ideology, 1027-1072
 insurgent, 1141-1163
 Pacific area, 1120-1122
 role of the government system in, 1027-1058
 role of ideology in, 1027-1028
 Southeast Asian, 1115-1120
 as term for PSYOP, 2
 use of analysis of foreign government, 545-548
 West European, 1075-1089
 propaganda cycle: *See* PSYOP cycle
 psychological action (*l'action psychologique*): *See* terminology for PSYOP
 Psychological Action Service (SAPI) (French): 251-259
 psychological implications of the use of force. 422-424
 psychological operations (*see* PSYOP)
 Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee: 19
 psychological warfare (PYWAR): *See* terminology for PSYOP, PSYOP, evolution of PSYOP (*see also* terminology for PSYOP)
 in Algeria, 248-259
 American people's attitude toward, 2-3, 6-7
 British, 7, 18-19, 49, 186-191, 373-380, 1075-1084
 British attitude toward, 7
 Chinese (People's Republic of China), 29, 41-43, 194-197, 344, 722-725, 735-739, 1041
 in Africa, 1110-1115
 historical, 1073

PSYOP (con't)

Chinese (Republic of China), 463, 1105-1110
as communication, 22
comparison of U.S. and Soviet, 9, 848-854
in counterinsurgencies, 370-379, 446
in the Cuban missile crisis, 178-181, 259-261, 386-391
definitions of, 40-47, 69
in Dominican Republic, 229-232, 262-266
in the era of national liberation wars (post-1960), 10-11, 69, 149-154, 397-400
evolution of, 2-13
French, 234-241, 248-259
in Cameroon, 234-241
in Hungarian uprising, 382-386
importance of systematic research to, 479
in insurgencies (*see also* PSYOP in the era of national liberation wars), 149-154, 183,
220-228, 234-241, 397-400, 454-457, 465-471, 1130-1141
in Korean War, 7, 82-83, 412-413, 518-534
lack of definition, 2
in Laos, 1119-1120
in Lebanon intervention, 241-246, 380-382, 714-715
in Malaya, 73, 370-380
Nazi, 1030-1043
as "new diplomacy," 8, 14(n19)
in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 191-194, 702-711
NLF (National Liberation Front-Vietnam), 680-682, 716-717, 750-753, 1117, 1152-1163
in a non-war/limited war, 419, 439-471
North Korean, 532-534
North Vietnamese (*see also* PSYOP, Viet Cong) 403-407, 537-545, 1115-1119
in the Philippines, 73, 401-403, 440-454, 767-770
in Portuguese Guinea, 1130-1141
role of in military, 67-74
South African, 1122-1130
South Vietnamese, 460-465
Soviet, 8-9, 41-43, 346-353, 672, 676-678, 711-713, 1029-1050, 1090-1105
directed toward the PRC, 1100-1105
and ideology, 1090-1100
by Special Forces in S.E. Asia, 337-340
strategic, 362-400
strategic and tactical, 420-471
tactical, 400-420
use of force and, 422-424
U.S. in general, 27, 49, 151-153, 720-721
deficiencies of, 11-12, 113-114, 684-687
future of, 12, 732-735
Soviet view of, 823-829
Viet Cong (*see also* PSYOP, North Vietnamese), 131-132, 150-152, 345, 397-400, 536-
545, 680-683, 996-1002
Viet Minh, 253, 398
in Vietnam, 130-132, 134-144, 150-154, 220-228, 397-400, 403-411, 413-416, 684-687,
730-735, 898-913, 946-951, 996-1002
location of PSYOP units in, 221 (map)
organization of, 220-225, 222 (fig.), 246-248
in World War I, 4-5, 14(n9), 68, 673
in World War II, 5-6, 83, 672-673, 678-679, 763-765
World War II to Korean War, 7, 41, 50, 81-82, 407-408
PSYOP channels: *See* communication channels

PSYOP community *See* PSYOP organization; national security system
 PSYOP country plans: 133
 PSYOP cycle: 137-144
 PSYOP Division (in International and Civil Affairs Directorate of ODCSOPS): 84
 PSYOP doctrine: 1-2, 6-8, 10
 for the 1970s, 11-13
 PSYOP effectiveness: 777-1026
 criteria of, 492-493, 778-784, 898-899
 importance of audience predisposition to, 985-996
 letters from listeners as a measure of, 976-979
 measuring, 485-486, 491-493, 788, 946-1021
 diversity of methodologies, 946-957
 post-testing for, 142, 487-491
 interviews, 490-491, 972-975
 surveys, 488-490, 957-972
 pre-testing for, 139, 487-491, 690-693, 781-782, 1003-1011
 by means of informal media testing, 491
 panels, 490, 988-995
 survey, 488-490, 957-972
 use of POWs in evaluation, 780-781
 PSYOP framework at national level (*see also* PSYOP organization): 85-101
 PSYOP goals: 373-370
 PSYOP information sources. *See* PSYOP intelligence sources
 PSYOP intelligence:
 and research, 138
 in Vietnam, 138
 PSYOP intelligence methods (*see also* content analysis): 571-606
 direct observation, 587-590
 interviewing, 590-594
 intuition, 535-587
 sampling, 594-606
 PSYOP intelligence sources: 510-570, 572-584
 methods for exploiting, 572-584
 PSYOP and nationbuilding: *See* nationbuilding
 PSYOP objectives, situational variables in: 440-454
 PSYOP organization (*see also* PSYOP framework at national level; PSYOP, in Vietnam,
 organization of): 81-101, 177-266
 civilian, 81-85
 definition of in-country, 177
 headquarters-field coordination, 247-266
 for in-country communication, 219-247
 interface between civilian and military, 10-11, 81-101, 225-232
 for international communication, 177-219
 military, 81-85, 132, 137-144, 181-185
 PSYOP personnel: 269-358
 characteristics of an effective PSYOP officer: 272-282, 299-305
 cross-cultural relationships, 282-305
 professionalism, 271-272
 PSYOP policy:
 democratic style, 132-133
 and national policy, 122-133, 262-266, 362-370, 385
 planning, 120-154, 129-130, 137-144
 priorities in, 133-137
 totalitarian style, 132-133
 PSYOP-related personnel: 305-358

PSYOP-related personnel (cont'd)
 indigenous scout, 357-358
 information officer, 326-333
 interpreters, 340-342
 MAAG advisor, 312-313
 military advisor, 306-312
 political officer, 343-353
 propagandist and agitator, 353-356
 radio programming officer, 333-337
 security assistance advisor, 314-326
 Special Forces, 337-340
 PSYOP targets: 498-506
 PSYOP terminology. *See* terminology for PSYOP
 PSYWAR: *See* PSYOP; terminology for PSYOP
 PSYWAR Center and School: 83
 Public Affairs Officer (PAO): 94-95, 169-174, 326-333
 public diplomacy: 178-181
 public information: 56-77
 public opinion: 155-166, 365-366
 definition of, 156-157
 global, 159
 regional: 169-160
 role of in international affairs, 155-156
 role of in policymaking, 160-166
 in the Far East, 553-570
 published documents, use of in PSYOP: 563
 radio:
 compatibility of equipment, 139-140
 role of international: 831-832, 928-930, 985-996
 short wave, a
 effects of broadcasts to U.S., 985-996
 use of in PSYOP, 676-678, 696, 700-701, 738, 761
 broadcasts, 676-678, 830-835, 901-905, 913-919, 985-996
 in Korea, 530-531
 in People's Republic of China, 29, 738
 Soviet, 711-713, 1040, 1044-1046, 1100-1105
 Radio Free Europe (RFE): 197-211, 382-386
 corporate structure, 192-202, 200-201 (figs.)
 European headquarters, 199-202
 facilities and staff, 193
 funding, 119, 205
 image in Europe, 827-836
 and national policymaking, 127-129
 New York Headquarters, 198
 operations: 205-212
 organization: 205-212
 policymaking, 202-212, 3-3-3P
 publications, 873-878
 research and analysis, 205-211, 862-878, 883-885, 913-919
 Radio Liberty (RL): 213-219
 funding, 119
 policy: 215-217
 measuring effectiveness of, 972-985
 programming, 217-218
 staffing, 335-337
 target analysis by, 478-488
 Radio Moscow: 983-995, 1040, 1101-1105

Radio Peking: 545-547
 RARET: 202
Red Flag (Honggi): 195
 reference group: 658-662
 reference group theory: 886-897
 reinforcement effect (of communication): 47, 49
 reinforcement function (of communication): 27-28
 residual effect: 1013
 Reuters: 1078
 "Revolutionary Development" (South Vietnam): 135
 research:
 government-sponsored, 7
 interviews, 590-594
 sampling, 594-606
 types of samples, 605 (table)
 social science and PSYOP, 609-648
 Rockefeller, Vice President Nelson: 6, 81-82
 Roosevelt, President Franklin D.: 162
 Rowan, C. T.: 107-108, 225
 Ruder & Finn: 193
 rumor: 765-767, 771-773, 1037-1039, 1043-1045
 RVNAF Political Warfare Department: 135

 safe-conduct pass: 31, 49, 407-408, 669
samizdat: 830
 Sarnoff, R. W.: 1089
 satellites, communication: 930-931, 1089
 SCAME formula: 784-789
 Schramm, W.: 9, 29, 609, 1013
Scope: 1129
 "seafloating" as a communication channel: 729
 secondary group: 65-67
 self-critique (self-criticism): 1035
 self-images, national: 806-823
 self-praise as PSYOP theme: 406
 Senior Review Group (of NSC): 86-88
 7th PSYOP Group: 140, 143, 226-227
 sex as PSYOP theme: 405
 Shakespeare, F.: 115
 Shils, E.: 49
 "sleeping effect": 1017
 slogans: 682-683, 1093-1094
 Smithsonian Institution: 93-94
 "socialism," misunderstanding of term: 667
 social movements as PSYOP: 1152-1165
 society and culture: 553-571
 in the Far East, 553-571
 relation to communication, 29
 songs as a communication channel: 749-753
 source analysis: 785-786, 789-835
 example of Soviet, 823-829
 relationship of source to a political hierarchy, 823-829
 sampling technique in, 806-823
 attributes, of sources, 790-805
South African Digest: 1129
South African Panorama: 1129

South African Summary: 1129
 Soviet image: 42
 Soviet society, effect of mass media on: 1043-1050
 Special Forces: 10, 83, 337-340, 453-459
 psychological role of, 587-590
 special warfare: 83
 Special Warfare Center and School: 83
 State Department:
 relationship with USIA, 3, 113
 rivalry with Creel Committee, 4
 role in national security system, 89-91
 overseas operations, 91-91
 Washington-level operations, 89-90
 role in PSYOP/information, 113
 Steibert, T. C.: 105
 stereotyping, 72, 806-823, 1031-1032
 "strategy of truth" (BBC): 49
 students as communication channels: 703, 1078
 superstition, use of in PSYOP: 762-763
 surrender, role of in PSYOP (*see also* defection): 400, 405-406, 416-420
 symbolic acts as PSYOP: 754-755
 symbols: 48

 target analysis: 486-487, 658-687, 862-897
 analyzing cultural frame of reference, 862-883, 886-897
 target audience: *See* target groups
 target groups: 141
 in Far East, 556-563
 army enlisted men, 557
 army officers, junior and middle rank, 559-560
 ethnic minorities, 557-558
 intellectuals and administrators, 561-562
 labor, 557
 labor leaders, 559
 mass media communicators, 558
 peasants, 557
 religious leaders, 558-559
 small businessmen, 560
 teachers, 561
 university students, 560-561
 upper-rank military officers, 562
 urban proletariat, 557
 voluntary associations and interest groups, 562-563
 women, 558
 in Korea, 518-534
 Tass: 1046-1047
 tatze-pao: *See* wall posters
 Tchakhotine, S.: 255
 telecommunications (telegraph, telephone, wireless): 700
 television: 1079-1080, 1084-1089
 films, 855-862
 French, 1086-1087
 international, 923-933
 in Nigeria-Biafra dispute, 698-699, 701
 in Soviet Union, 711-713
 West German, 1086

terminology for PSYOP: 2, 18-19, 68, 83-84, 252-253, 823-824
 Terror.
 as a symbolic act, 425-439
 use of in internal war, 425-439
 Tet in Vietnam: 508-510
 theater: *See* drama
 The Five "Ss": 516
The Head Men: 1088
The Leopard: 922
The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner: 924
 themes, PSYOP: 503-506, 670-673, 856-862, 903-905
 need for simplicity in, 673-675
The Parable: 927-928
The Stage to Three: 1088
 "The Voice of South Africa": 1130
The World of Marshall McLuhan: 926
 Thomson, C. A. H.: 82
Time Magazine: 1079
Training of Propaganda, Cultural and Educational Workers at the District and Village Level: 1154-1155
 translation: 506-508
 trend analysis, example of (table): 535
 troop behavior: 58
 Truman Doctrine: 123-124
 Truman, President Harry S.:
 "Campaign of Truth," 7
 and public opinion, 156
 and USIA, 103
 25th Infantry Division: 95
 two-step flow of communication: 27

 unconditional surrender: 72-73
 Under Secretaries Committee (of NSC): 87-88
 unintended audiences for PSYOP: 666-668
 unintended effects of PSYOP: 689-690
 United Nations (UN): 709
 importance as communication, 50
 United States Information Agency (USIA): 8-11, 25, 81, 91-96,
 102-111, 112-119, 181-182, 229-232, 243-246, 364-368, 958-972
 country plans, 95
 and the Cuban missile crisis, 180-181
 cultural programs of, 25
 in Dominican intervention, 265
 information programs of, 25
 mission regarding Vietnam, 110, 115
 Office of Policy and Plans (IOP), 91
 Office of Research and Assessment (IOR), 92
 overseas operations, 94-96, 111-112
 relationships with other agencies and departments, 92-93, 110, 119
 role in national policymaking, 115-116
 Soviet view of, 823-829
 statement of mission (1953), 104-105
 statement of mission (1963), 105-106
 statement of mission (1967), 108-109
 Washington-level operations, 91-92
 United States Information Service (USIS): 94-96, 131, 229-232, 243-246, 364

unorthodox channels of communication: 759-773
 unpublished studies, use of in PSYOP: 553-571
 U.S. Advisory Commission on Information: 96
 USAID's (U.S. Aid missions): *See* AID
 U.S. Air Force and PSYOP: 730-735
 U.S. Army, Office of Chief of Special Warfare: 8
 U.S. country team: 95
 U.S. image: 42-43, 368-370, 668
 U.S. information (*See also* United States Information Agency), 111-115
 recommendations about, 116-119, 369-370
 USIS: *See* United States Information Service
 U.S. Military Assistance Command: 137
 U.S. Mission (Vietnam): 133-137, 182-183
 U.S. Navy: 81
 USS Pueblo: 784-789
 USSR: 720-721, 848-854

 Vietnamese, communicating with: 287-300
 Vietnam war, East European attitudes toward: 913-919
 VISNEWS: 1085
 Voice of America (VOA): 92, 364-370, 380-386, 915-916
 Voice of the National United Front of Kampuchea (VN'UK): 534-536
 Voice of the People of Burma: 547-548
 vulnerabilities of audiences: 483-484

 wall newspapers as a communication channel: 738-739
 wall posters: 722-725
 warfare, political side of: 1105-1110
 Whittington Special Actions Group (WSAG) (of NSC): 88
 Westmoreland, Gen. William: 166, 173, 182, 340
West Side Story: 924
 Wheeler, Gen. E. G.: 70
 Whitton, J.: 6
 world view, American: 3

You Don't Back Down: 1088

 Zacharias, E.: 19
Zorba The Greek: 922-923
 Zorthian, B.: 182

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SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION

AD- H030140

ERRATA SHEET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET
NO. 525-7-2

THE ART AND SCIENCE
OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:
CASE STUDIES
OF
MILITARY APPLICATION

VOLUME TWO

Page XXIX change DA Pam 525-7-1 to read DA
Pam 525-7-2 and Pamphlet No. 525-7-1 to read
525-7-2.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF ARMY
22 December 1976

FAGO 120C